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Is the semiconductor industry headed for an almighty crash? There are reasons to believe a bust, if it comes, will be less vertiginous than the boom Oct 15th 2026|5 min read For more than four decades the semiconductor industry has been governed by two laws as dependable as any in physics. The first is that the number of transistors, the tiny switches etched onto a chip, keeps rising. The second is that every boom ends in a bust. The first, which makes chips more powerful, is in rude health. Leading processors for artificial intelligence contain more than 200bn transistors, and the industry reckons it can cram in a trillion by the end of the decade. The second is stirring unease about how long the good times will last. The industry is used to booms, but not one like this. AI has created an insatiable appetite for the chips used to train and run AI models. In the first half of 2026 semiconductor sales grew faster, year on year, than at any time since the 1980s (see chart). This month TSMC, the world’s biggest contract chipmaker, reported its sixth consecutive quarter of record profits; Samsung Electronics, a South Korean chip heavyweight, reported its fourth. Yet investors are growing jittery. Despite blowout results and rosy forecasts, an index of leading semiconductor firms has fallen by over 10% since October 6th. Their fears were not helped when on October 12th Hock Tan, boss of Broadcom, a big chip designer, likened many investors in the AI trade to gamblers in a casino who “have no clue” what they are investing in. Nearly all of the industry’s expected growth hinges on chips for AI, making it a giant bet on the technology. If that bet sours—and the “supercycle”, as some have taken to calling it, comes to an end—will chipmakers suffer a bust as vertiginous as the boom? There are reasons to think not. Even as the semiconductor industry has grown, manufacturing has become far more concentrated. Most chip designers, such as Nvidia, whose graphics-processing units have powered the AI boom, do not make their own silicon. Nor do software firms such as Google and OpenAI, which have also taken to designing AI processors. Instead they rely on foundries—and one in particular. In the early 2000s some 25 firms could make the most advanced processors. Today four can, and TSMC makes nearly all of the high-end ones. Memory chips, which are also vital for AI, have gone the same way. More than 20 firms made advanced memory chips in 1990. Now only three—Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron—make almost all of them. China has produced new entrants in both processors and memory chips, but without access to the most advanced chipmaking tools, they remain behind the frontier. Consolidation has allowed a few dominant chipmakers to set the pace of expansion and dictate the terms on which they sell. They are investing heavily to capitalise on the boom. TSMC’s capital expenditure is expected to hit roughly $62bn this year, more than one and a half times as much as in 2025. Next year analysts expect it to be around $76bn. The memory-makers have also boosted their investments. Even so, their outlays are modest in comparison with the windfall from AI. As a share of revenue, TSMC’s capital spending is expected to fall from 44% in 2023 to 36% this year. Moreover, investments are being paid for from the cash that chipmakers are generating, rather than borrowing. This year TSMC’s capacity expansions will use up a little more than half of its operating cashflow, and Samsung’s barely a fifth. The debts of these chipmakers look modest next to their swelling cash piles. Manufacturers are enjoying a “very good pricing environment”, according to Bill Wiseman of McKinsey, a consultancy, and have every reason to pace their expansion to preserve it. DRAM, a type of memory used in nearly all electronics, costs about six times what it did in early 2023. TSMC has not cut the price of its three-nanometre manufacturing process, which it launched in late 2022, even though a process normally gets cheaper after a couple of years. The speed of capacity expansion has also been impeded by the fact that many new chipmaking facilities are being built in America, where construction takes “about twice as long”, according to Mr Wiseman. Consolidation has also given chipmakers more bargaining power, shifting who will bear the burden of any slowdown. Until recently, memory was sold mostly on the spot market or through short-term contracts. When demand slackened, customers were not obliged to keep buying and prices therefore collapsed. Now, with capacity scarce and only a few suppliers to choose from, buyers are signing up years in advance, and on the sellers’ terms. Nvidia has committed more than $250bn to securing supply and components until January 2029. In September Micron said that “take-or-pay” agreements, under which customers must buy the agreed volumes or pay anyway, had locked in 35% of its revenue through to 2030, with $32bn-worth of commitments, most of which involve cash deposits. Such prepayments help fund new factories. They also shift at least part of the risk of a bust onto buyers. An end to the AI boom would still bring chipmakers plenty of pain. If spending stalls, prices will drop, profits will shrink and stratospheric stock prices will come back down to earth. Customers will look to renegotiate contracts that were signed at the top of the market. The second law of the semiconductor industry still applies. This time, however, customers will share the hangover. ■ 四十多年來，半導體產業一直受制於兩條如同物理學規律般可靠的定律。第一條是：刻在晶片上的微型開關——電晶體——的數量會持續增加。第二條是：每一次繁榮最終都會以衰退告終。第一條定律讓晶片變得更加強大，目前依然蓬勃發展；用於人工智慧的頂級處理器包含超過 2,000 億個電晶體，而業界估計到了本世紀末，晶片上能塞入一兆個電晶體。至於第二條定律，則引發了大家對於榮景還能持續多久的不安。 半導體產業對榮景早已習以為常，但從未見過像這次一樣的情形。AI 對於用來訓練和運行 AI 模型的晶片產生了無窮無盡的需求。2026 年上半年，半導體的銷售額年增率創下了自 1980 年代以來的最快紀錄（見圖表）。本月，全球最大的晶片代工製造商台積電，公布了連續第六個季度創紀錄的利潤；韓國晶片巨頭三星電子則公布了連續第四個季度創紀錄的利潤。然而，投資者卻變得越來越不安。儘管業績表現亮眼、前景看好，但自 10 月 6 日以來，領先的半導體企業指數已下跌了超過 10%。大型晶片設計公司博通（Broadcom）的大老闆陳福陽（Hock Tan）在 10 月 12 日時，將許多 AI 交易的投資者比作賭場裡「完全不知道」自己在投資什麼的賭客，這讓他們的擔憂雪上加霜。 該產業幾乎所有的預期增長都取決於用於 AI 的晶片，這使其成為對該技術的一場豪賭。如果這場豪賭落空——而且正如某些人所稱的「超級週期」走向終結——晶片製造商是否會遭受與繁榮時期一樣劇烈的崩盤？我們有理由認為不會。 即使半導體產業不斷成長，製造業也變得更加集中。大多數晶片設計公司，例如以圖形處理器推動 AI 榮景的輝達（Nvidia），並不自己製造矽晶片。像 Google 和 OpenAI 這樣也開始設計 AI 處理器的軟體公司同樣不自己製造。相反地，他們依賴晶圓代工廠——尤其是其中特定的一家。在 2000 年代初期，大約有 25 家公司能夠製造最先進的處理器；如今只剩下四家，而台積電幾乎承包了所有高階晶片的製造。 對 AI 同樣至關重要的記憶體晶片，也走上了相同的道路。1990 年有超過 20 家公司生產先進記憶體晶片，現在只剩下三家——三星、SK 海力士和美光——包辦了幾乎所有的產量。中國在處理器和記憶體晶片領域都出現了新進業者，但在無法取得最先進晶片製造工具的情況下，他們依然落後於技術前線。 產業整合讓少數幾家佔據主導地位的晶片製造商能夠掌控擴產的節奏，並主導銷售條款。他們正在大量投資以利用這次的榮景。台積電今年的資本支出預計將達到約 620 億美元，是 2025 年的一倍半以上；分析師預計明年的資本支出將達到 760 億美元左右。記憶體製造商也增加了他們的投資。 即便如此，與 AI 帶來的意外之財相比，他們的支出其實相當保守。作為營業收入的比重，台積電的資本支出預計將從 2023 年的 44% 降至今年的 36%。此外，這些投資是用晶片製造商自己產生的現金來支付，而不是透過借款。今年，台積電的產能擴張將消耗其營運現金流的半數多一點，而三星則僅占五分之一左右。與這些晶片製造商日益膨脹的現金儲備相比，他們的債務顯得微不足道。 諮詢公司麥肯錫的比爾·威斯曼（Bill Wiseman）表示，製造商正享受著「非常良好的定價環境」，並且有充足的理由來控制擴展速度以維持這種環境。DRAM 是一種幾乎用於所有電子產品的記憶體，其價格大約是 2023 年初的六倍。台積電並未調降其於 2022 年底推出的 3 奈米製程價格，儘管製程通常在推出幾年後會變得便宜。威斯曼先生指出，許多新的晶片製造設施正建於美國，而那裡的施工時間「大約需要兩倍長」，這也阻礙了產能擴張的速度。 產業整合也給了晶片製造商更多的議價能力，從而改變了誰將承擔任何放緩所帶來的負擔。直到最近，記憶體主要還是在現貨市場或透過短期合約進行銷售。當需求放緩時，客戶沒有義務繼續購買，價格因此崩盤。現在，由於產能緊缺且只有少數供應商可供選擇，買家提前數年簽約，並且是按照賣方的條件簽訂。輝達已承諾出資超過 2,500 億美元，以確保到 2029 年 1 月為止的供應和零部件。美光在 9 月表示，「照價付款」（take-or-pay）協議——即客戶必須購買約定的數量，否則無論如何都得付款——已經鎖定了其到 2030 年前 35% 的收入，涉及價值 320 億美元的承諾，其中大部分包含現金押金。這類預付款有助於資助新工廠的建設，同時也將崩盤的部分風險轉嫁給了買家。 AI 榮景的終結仍會給晶片製造商帶來巨大的痛苦。如果支出停滯，價格將會下跌，利潤將會縮水，天文數字般的股價也將回到現實。客戶將尋求重新談判在市場頂峰時期簽署的合約。半導體產業的第二條定律依然適用。然而，這一次，客戶將會共同承擔這場宿醉。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

AI often makes writing worse. (Even if it makes it better) Why is complicated. But it’s not about the damn em-dash Sep 24th 2026|4 min read Writing using artificial intelligence is everywhere. It has crept into elite newspapers (the* Wall Street Journal* ran an op-ed drafted by it) and elite publishing houses (Grasset in France finds itself defending a star author accused—falsely, he claims—of using it in a prize-winning novel). It is in the speeches of British politicians, in the homework of British students and abundantly there in LinkedIn posts (41% of longer ones, according to a study by Pangram, a detector, use it). Ask Gmail to draft a love letter to your partner and it will instantly offer up “My Dearest [Husband’s Name]…”. It is quick. It is not quite Keats. Who cares? The reactions show that people do care. AI-spotting has become a mania. Prose is being scrutinised with the attention, and jargon, once reserved for Latin literature. Arcane rhetorical terms like antithesis and epanorthosis (the “not X, but Y” construction) and tricolon (threefold things, like “veni, vidi, vici”) are bandied about by social-media users with the verve of Ciceronian scholars. Literary criticism has rarely been so hot. The em-dash, the most notorious AI “tell”, seems to be acting as—another rhetorical word—a synecdoche, the term for when writers use a part for the whole, like “wheels” for “car” or, perhaps, “em-dash” for “the intellectual obsolescence of the human race”. This, says Maryanne Wolf, an emeritus professor of neuroscience at UCLA, is not a battle over punctuation. It is a “battle for our minds”. AI is so “unprecedented”, says Steven Pinker, a professor at Harvard, that we cannot tell how, or whether, it will affect the English language. Happily there is a body of evidence dating back a few years (about 1,300) on what good writing is. It is called “English literature”. The first thing that a millennium of English writing shows is that most people are terrible at it. They find it painful to do (“like a long bout of some painful illness”, as George Orwell had it) and produce words that are almost as painful to read. AI can be bad; humans are often worse. Dan Brown offered: “His eyes went white, like a shark about to attack.” William Wordsworth offered an ode to a spade (it began “Spade!”). Lee Child offered the phrase: “It was about as distinctive as the most distinctive thing you could ever think of.” AI, by contrast, writes with the ease of the easiest thing you could ever think of. It can write a sonnet in half a second, a 1,000-word article in ten seconds, an Austen-length novel in half an hour. And though it can be bad, it often isn’t. In a recent** blind tasting** of two short stories, one human-written and one AI-written, researchers from Villanova University found that respondents rated the AI story as “higher quality and more absorbing”. Yet English literature also shows that writing is not just the act of spewing words onto a page. Writing, as writers point out, is no more merely words on the page than a smile is joy, or a tear is sorrow. Real writing is not writing at all. It is thinking; specifically it is thinking: “What do I think?” Often “you only really know what you think by writing it,” says Emma Smith, a professor of English at Oxford. For how, as a character quoted by E.M. Forster puts it, “can I tell what I think till I see what I say?” When Michael Gove, the editor of the Spectator and an ex-MP, was in the cabinet he told his underlings to “Think in ink.” To make a good argument you need to have followed its logic “step by step”—in writing. Those who use AI to write speeches are, he says, using “counterfeit currency”. But counterfeit currency is always disliked; AI writing is not. Few would object to someone using AI to contest a parking fine, fill in a tax return or for a second-language speaker to polish their English. If a company uses AI to announce a new parking policy, few care. But, says Colleen Kirk, a professor at the New York Institute of Technology, if that policy was problematic and the company apologised using AI—then “You’ve got a big problem.” You risk activating “moral disgust”. In 1970 a Japanese robotics expert, Mori Masahiro, noted that the more human a robot looks, the more** affinity **humans feel for it—until it becomes too human, whereupon affinity turns to revulsion: the *“uncanny valley”. If you shook someone’s hand in a darkened room and, unexpectedly, clasped a prosthetic hand you would, Mori wrote, “shriek*”. AI writing—bland, plasticky, human-ish—seems to sit in the “uncanny valley” of prose. It certainly makes social media shriek. So here is the AI paradox. AI prose is easier to produce and often better than human prose. Yet humans do not like it; they may** impair **their ability by using it and they often loathe its use by others. This may be ridiculous but is encouraging. As humanity destroys its intellectual dominion with its own intellect—as it is beaten back in chess, in Go, in coding—we retain one last advantage: we are human. And, for now, humans (often) prefer to read humans. So make the most of that and, as E.M. Forster also said, *“Only connect”*. And probably write personal emails yourself. Especially to your “[Dearest Husband]”. ■ 使用人工智慧來寫作無所不在。它已經悄悄溜進了頂尖報紙（《華爾街日報》刊登了一篇由它起草的專欄文章），也滲透進了頂尖出版社（法國的格拉塞出版社發現自己不得不為一位明星作家辯護，該作家被指控——但他聲稱這是誣陷——在一本獲獎小說中使用了 AI）。它出現在英國政治人物的演講稿中、英國學生的作業裡，更大量充斥於 LinkedIn 的貼文中（根據檢測工具 Pangram 的研究，較長的貼文當中有 41% 使用了 AI）。如果你要求 Gmail 給你的伴侶寫一封情書，它會立刻為你呈現出：「我最親愛的［丈夫姓名］……」。它非常快速。但它並不太像濟慈（Keats）(英國著名詩人)的詩句。 誰會在意呢？人們的反應顯示出，大家其實非常在意。尋找 AI 的痕跡（AI-spotting）已經變成了一種狂熱。人們正在用過去專門留給拉丁文學的專注力與專業術語，來嚴格審視這些散文內容。諸如「對照法」（antithesis）、「更正修正法」（epanorthosis，即『不是 X，而是 Y』的句型結構）以及「排比法」（tricolon，即三重疊句，例如『我來，我見，我征服』）等晦澀的修辭術語，被社群媒體用戶以宛如西塞羅學者般的熱情隨口引用 (西塞羅--馬庫斯·圖利烏斯·西塞羅（Marcus Tullius Cicero，西元前106年－前43年）是古羅馬共和國晚期的哲學家、政治家、律師、作家與雄辯家。他奠定古典拉丁文學風格)。文學批評很少像現在這樣紅火過。 破折號（em-dash）作為最惡名昭彰的 AI「辨識特徵」（tell），似乎正充當著——這裡又是另一個修辭學詞彙——「提喻法」（synecdoche），也就是創作者用局部來代表整體的用語，比如用「輪子」代表「汽車」，或者也許是用「破折號」代表「人類智力的過時」。加州大學洛杉磯分校（UCLA）的神經科學榮譽教授瑪莉安·沃爾夫（Maryanne Wolf）表示，這並不是一場關於標點符號的爭奪戰。這是一場「爭奪我們心智的戰鬥」。 哈佛大學教授史蒂芬·平克（Steven Pinker）表示，AI 是如此「前所未有」，以至於我們無法預測它將如何影響、或是否會影響英語這門語言。幸運的是，關於什麼是好文章，我們擁有追溯至好幾年前（大約 1,300 年）的大量證據。那被稱為「英國文學」。 上千年來的英語寫作所揭示的第一件事，就是大多數人其實都極度不擅長寫作。他們覺得寫作是一件痛苦的事（正如喬治·歐威爾所說的，『就像經歷了一場某種痛苦重病的長期發作』），而且寫出來的文字讀起來也同樣令人痛苦。AI 可以寫得很爛；但人類往往更爛。丹·布朗（Dan Brown）曾寫過這樣的句子：「他的雙眼翻白，就像一條即將發動攻擊的鯊魚。」威廉·華茲華斯（William Wordsworth）寫過一首獻給鏟子的頌歌（開頭竟是『鏟子啊！』）。李·查德（Lee Child）則寫出了這樣的短語：「這大概跟你所能想到的最特別的事物一樣特別。」 相比之下，AI 寫起文章來，簡直就像你能想到的最輕鬆的事物一樣輕鬆自如。它可以在半秒鐘內寫出一首十四行詩，在十秒鐘內寫出一篇 1,000 字的文章，在半小時內寫出一本珍·奧斯汀體量的小說。而且雖然它可能會寫得很爛，但通常並不會。在維拉諾瓦大學（Villanova University）的研究人員最近進行的一項針對兩篇短篇小說的盲測中（一篇由人類撰寫，一篇由 AI 撰寫），受訪者評定 AI 寫的小說具有「更高的品質且更吸引人」。 然而，英國文學也表明了，寫作不僅僅是把文字噴吐到頁面上的行為。正如作家們所指出的，寫作絕不僅僅是頁面上的文字，就像微笑不單純等同於喜悅、眼淚不單純等同於悲傷一樣。真正的寫作根本不是寫作本身。它是思考；具體來說，它是去思考：「我到底具體是怎麼想的？」 牛津大學的英語教授艾瑪·史密斯（Emma Smith）說，通常「你只有透過把想法寫下來，才能真正知道自己到底在想什麼。」因為正如 E.M. 佛斯特（E.M. Forster）作品中的一個角色所說的：「在我看到自己說了什麼之前，我怎麼知道自己是怎麼想的？」當《旁觀者》（Spectator）雜誌編輯兼前國會議員麥克·戈夫（Michael Gove）還在內閣時，他曾告訴他的下屬要「用墨水來思考」（Think in ink）。要提出一個好的論點，你必須在寫作中「一步一步地」遵循其邏輯。他說，那些使用 AI 來撰寫演講稿的人，使用的是「偽鈔」。 但偽鈔總是令人厭惡的；AI 寫作卻並非總是如此。很少有人會反對有人利用 AI 來申訴停車罰單、填寫報稅單，或是讓非母語人士用它來潤飾英文。如果一家公司使用 AI 來宣布一項新的停車政策，很少人在乎。但是，紐約理工學院的教授柯琳·柯克（Colleen Kirk）表示，如果這項政策出了問題，而公司使用 AI 來道歉——那麼「你就遇到大麻煩了。」你有可能會觸發人們的「道德反感」。 1970 年，日本機器人專家森政弘注意到，機器人看起來越像人類，人類對它感到的親和力就越強——直到它變得「太像」人類，親和力便會驟然轉變為反感：這就是「恐怖谷」（uncanny valley）。AI 的寫作——平淡、帶有塑膠感、似人非人——似乎正處於散文風格的「恐怖谷」之中。它確實讓社群媒體尖叫不已。 所以這就是 AI 的悖論。AI 的散文更容易產出，而且往往比人類寫的散文更好。然而，人類並不喜歡它；人們可能會因為使用它而削弱自身的思考能力，而且他們常常厭惡其他人使用它。這或許很荒謬，但卻振奮人心的。當人類用自己的智慧摧毀自己的智慧主導權時——當我們在西洋棋、圍棋、程式碼編寫上被擊敗時——我們依然保留著最後一項優勢：我們是人類。而且，至少在目前，人類（通常）更喜歡閱讀人類寫的東西。所以，好好利用這一點吧，正如 E.M. 佛斯特也曾說過的：「唯有連結」（Only connect）。而且，大概還是親自撰寫你的個人郵件吧。特別是寫給你的「［最親愛的丈夫］」。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Chinese students abroad are more liberal than at home They see faults in China’s system as well as in democracies, surveys show Oct 1st 2026|4 min read America should expect that educating China’s young people will give it “moral, intellectual and commercial influence”, wrote Edmund James, a university president, in 1906. In subsequent years, dozens of China’s brightest went to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on scholarships funded by the American government. Back then, American officials and teachers displayed a confident, missionary liberalism. They thought that educating young Chinese would help mould China in America’s image. But in recent years America has become less welcoming. The number of Chinese enrolled in American universities fell by nearly a third between 2019 and 2025, to 265,000. China, however, is feeling confident. Its leader, Xi Jinping, wants more young Americans to visit and stay for their studies. On September 24th, while at the White House, Mr Xi said he hoped 100,000 young Americans would visit China or study there in the next five years. That is a far cry from the mere 350 American students resident there in 2022, amid the covid-19 pandemic and at a low point in bilateral relations. Mr Xi says that such exchanges could create “a new generation of ambassadors” to sustain the relationship between the two powers. Visiting China “breaks down cognitive barriers”, notes Xinhua, an official news agency. But does experience of a different political environment change people’s thinking? New research by Fan Yingjie of Princeton and co-authors explores whether it does among Chinese in America. The researchers enlisted almost 1,000 Chinese freshmen for their research in 2019. Nearly 400 of them were in America and the rest—a control group—at public universities in China. Over the next four years, Ms Fan and her colleagues regularly put questions to the students to gauge their political leanings, as well as what they thought of China and its government. The work is remarkable because research that involves asking Chinese citizens in China for their views on sensitive political matters has become increasingly rare under Mr Xi’s rule. The ability to compare the answers of such a group with those of Chinese students in America gives the research unusual empirical heft. Mr Xi would surely be disappointed by the results. Ms Fan found that students’ ideological views were remarkably stable throughout their time in America—there was neither a backlash against Western liberalism nor a newfound zeal for it. Yet students (and presumably their families) who decide to study in America in the first place are much more liberal than their homebody peers (see chart 1). They are more likely to support free markets, are less socially conservative and are less nationalistic. One possible reason is that Chinese women** **tend to outnumber men in studying in the West. Fran Martin of the University of Melbourne finds that some young women go overseas because of gender bias in China’s society and job market, and so are less traditional in their outlook. Among Chinese students in America, ideological views did not change much while abroad, says Jennifer Pan of Stanford, a co-author of Ms Fan’s study. But they did update their views of how well the Communist Party is running China. Support for it started lower among those studying in America, and fell sharply during China’s draconian “zero-covid” lockdowns of 2020-22 (see chart 2). Approval for the regime, and general patriotic feeling, fell among undergraduates in China also, but more slowly. Being educated abroad, however, can highlight the West’s shortcomings. Ms Martin’s research shows that as life in China has become technologically advanced, offering many conveniences, some young Chinese studying in the West feel they are living “in a bit of a backwater”. Although most of the cohort followed by Ms. Martin moved back to China after graduation, some have since returned to Australia after experiencing the competitive pressures of China’s work culture and high youth unemployment. In the American study, the share of students planning to move home after graduation dropped from 40% in 2020 to just over 10% by 2023. As for Americans studying in China, vanishingly few stay. Study abroad may not reshape either country’s politics, or even the students themselves, but it does give some Chinese more choices. ■ 民調顯示，他們不僅看到了中國體制的缺點，也看到了民主體制的缺陷。 2026年10月1日 | 閱讀時間約 4 分鐘 美國伊利諾大學校長愛德蒙·詹姆斯（Edmund James）在 1906 年曾寫道，美國應該期待，教育中國的年輕一代將能帶來「道德、知識與商業上的影響力」。在隨後的歲月中，數十位中國最頂尖的優秀人才，憑藉著美國政府資助的獎學金赴麻省理工學院深造。當時，美國的官員與教師展現出一種自信且帶著傳教熱忱的自由主義信念。他們認為，教育中國年輕人將有助於按照美國的形象來塑造中國。然而，近年來美國卻變得不再那麼歡迎他們了。在 2019 年至 2025 年間，入讀美國大學的中國學生人數下降了近三分之一，減少至 26.5 萬人。 相反地，中國現在卻感到信心十足。中國國家領導人習近平希望有更多美國年輕人前來訪問並留學。9 月 24 日，習先生在白宮時表示，他希望在未來五年內能有 10 萬名美國年輕人訪問中國或在當地留學。這與 2022 年新冠疫情期間、以及雙邊關係陷入低谷時僅有 350 名美國留學生常駐中國的情況相比，可謂天壤之別。習先生表示，這樣的交流可以培養出「新一代的大使」，以維護這兩個大國之間的關係。官方媒體新華社也指出，前往中國訪問能夠「打破認知障礙」。但是，體驗不同的政治環境真的會改變人們的思想嗎？ 普林斯頓大學的范英傑（Fan Yingjie，音譯）及其合作著者發表的一項新研究，探討了這種現象是否會發生在赴美留學的中國學生身上。研究人員在 2019 年招募了近 1,000 名中國大一新生進行研究。其中近 400 人在美國，其餘的人——也就是對照組——則在中國的公立大學就讀。在接下來的四年裡，范女士和她的同事們定期向這些學生提問，以評估他們的政治傾向，以及他們對中國及其政府的看法。 這項研究非常難能可貴，因為在習先生的領導下，詢問中國境內中國公民對敏感政治議題看法的研究已經變得越來越罕見。而能夠將這組學生的答案與在美中國留學生的答案進行比較，更賦予了這項研究極高的實證份量。 習先生對研究結果肯定會感到失望。范女士發現，學生們的意識形態觀點在整個赴美留學期間都非常穩定——既沒有出現對西方自由主義的反彈，也沒有對它產生新的狂熱。然而，當初就決定選擇赴美留學的學生（以及他們的家庭），本身就比留在國內的同齡人要自由派得多。他們更有可能支持自由市場、在社會觀念上較不保守，而且國家主義傾向也比較低。 其中一個可能的原因是，在西方留學的中國女性數量往往多於男性。墨爾本大學的法蘭·馬丁（Fran Martin）發現，有些年輕女性選擇出國，是因為中國社會與求職市場中存在著性別偏見，因此她們在觀念上也相對沒那麼傳統。 這項研究的共同作者、史丹佛大學的潘潔（Jennifer Pan）指出，在赴美留學的中國學生當中，他們的意識形態觀點在出國期間並沒有太大的改變。然而，他們對於中國共產黨治理中國成效的看法，確實出現了變化。對該政權的支持度，在選擇赴美留學的人群中原本就比較低，而在 2020 年至 2022 年中國實施嚴厲的「清零」封控政策期間，更是急遽下降)。雖然在中國就讀的大學生對該政權的認同感以及整體愛國情緒也有所下降，但下降的速度相對較為緩慢。 不過，在國外接受教育，同時也會放大西方的缺點。馬丁女士的研究顯示，隨著中國的生活在科技上變得十分先進並提供許多便利，一些在西方留學的中國年輕人反而覺得自己生活在「有點落後的地方」。** ** 雖然馬丁女士所追蹤的這群學生中，大多數人在畢業後都搬回了中國，但在經歷了中國職場文化的激烈競爭壓力與居高不下的青年失業率之後，部分學生後來又回到了澳洲。而在關於美國的那項研究中，計畫在畢業後回國的學生比例，從 2020 年的 40% 大幅降至 2023 年的略高於 10%。至於在中國留學的美國人，留在當地的則是屈指可數。 出國留學或許無法重塑任何一個國家的政治走向，甚至無法改變學生本人，但它確實給了部分中國年輕人更多的選擇。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The truth and the lies about Islam in Europe Islam poses no serious danger. But Islamism and the fear of Islam do   Sep 10th 2026|6 min read   PANIC ABOUT Islam in Europe is spreading. In several European countries half the population now thinks it is incompatible with Western values. On September 6th the populist-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 44% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt, its largest state-election tally yet, warning about “Islamisation” and promising forced deportations. The same weekend in Britain hundreds of balaclava-clad thugs occupied Dover, chanting “Stop the boats” and “Christ is King”. In France Marine Le Pen's call to ban Islamic headscarves from public places is backed by 60% of voters.   The obsession has also taken root in America. The fear is less of terrorists, as it was after September 11th 2001, than of an Islamic plot to take over Europe from within. Members of the Trump administration warn of “civilisational erasure”.   This perception is harming transatlantic relations. It is also wrong. Europe faces no Islamic takeover, no mass radicalisation of Muslims and no erasure of its culture. As our reporting shows, it does not have “no-go zones”, sharia is not creeping into national law and nowhere is a demographic “great replacement” under way.   The real danger to Europe is different: of extremism fuelled by Islamism (the belief that the state should enforce Islamic principles) and by social-media-driven right-wing paranoia. The left makes this worse by denying the modest but real threats Islamism poses. So do politicians in the centre, by keeping quiet lest they attract accusations of racism. This dynamic could indeed harm Europe’s liberal democracies—not by replacing them with a caliphate, but by slowing integration and favouring policies that would do lasting harm to their freedoms.   The most extreme fears are easily debunked. Even after record migration from majority-Muslim countries, Muslims now make up just 6% of Europe’s population of well over 500m. Although new arrivals typically have more children than the native-born do, fertility rates tend to converge within two generations. That is a long way from civilisational erasure.   In fact, most Muslim immigrants want to get on in their new home, not impose on it a version of the societies they have just left. Their children tend to do better than their parents at school. In Britain 67% of Bangladeshis who sat standard tests in 2021 were enrolled in university by age 19, compared with 38% of white Britons. Many Muslims are involved in mainstream politics: witness Britain’s home secretary and London’s mayor. In important ways Muslim attitudes can resemble those of other Europeans. In polling we commissioned among British Muslims, we found little resistance to women working.   What, then, is setting so many Europeans against Islam? Plenty of Muslims hold illiberal views—we report in this issue on the killing of an openly gay imam in South Africa. In Britain, our polling finds, 52% of Muslims think homosexuality is wrong, and young Muslims (41% of under-35s) are more likely than their elders (25%) to believe violence can be justified if someone insults the prophet.   Holding socially conservative views does not in itself make people a threat—some of Europe’s defenders on the right are just as anti-gay as the Muslims they decry. But some of these attitudes should trouble liberals who have long assumed that open societies eventually make people more tolerant. And if the state is too pusillanimous to confront wrongs committed by minorities, as when gangs of Muslim men abused young girls in several English cities, it rightly causes outrage.   Just as important is the conflation of Islam, a religion, with Islamism, a political ideology. Islam isn’t a problem; Islamism can be. Unlike the jihadis of 9/11, most Islamists do not advocate violence. But many practise “entryism”—infiltrating democratic institutions to promote an illiberal agenda. Well-connected Islamist groups might lobby for sweeping hate-speech laws or against counter-extremism programmes. The main danger of entryism is local. Small, well-organised networks can capture a school, a mosque, a council or a charity and use such institutions to discourage integration and impose religious conformity on other Muslims who live nearby. Concern about these non-violent Islamists has grown among Europe’s security services. In France authorities fret about** covert entryism by the Muslim Brotherhood. An official report released last year warned that Islamism could, in time, threaten secular rules and women’s rights**. But that seems unlikely. France’s interior ministry estimated that just 139 of 2,800 Muslim places of worship were linked to the Brotherhood.   Instead, the main victims are other Muslims. Half of the 12 council wards in Blackburn, in northern England, are over 60% Muslim; two are over 80%. In such areas women can feel pressure to let sharia councils govern their family lives. Gay and liberal Muslims face intimidation. Non-conformist Muslims complain that Western authorities—scared of being seen as racist—do not extend the same protections to them as they do to non-Muslim citizens.   There is broader harm, too. Islamists stir up antisemitism, not least over Gaza. They demand curbs on free speech about their beliefs. They scare politicians, comedians, academics and journalists into self-censorship. They can bully schools, student unions, charities and councils.   What turns these local threats into a continental danger is how they are exploited. It suits Islamists to claim that any criticism of their political project is an attack on Islam itself. The populist left, including Unsubmissive France and the Greens in Britain, tends to treat questions about migration, crime or Islamism as racist.   And the populist right often whips up fear by claiming that all Muslims pose a threat and accusing the state of a “woke cover-up” and “two-tier treatment”. Few have been more vehement than Elon Musk, who has used his social-media platform to shape views of Islam around the world and to boost Europe’s anti-Muslim right, from the AfD to Tommy Robinson, a British agitator whom we feature in a three-part podcast series starting this weekend.   The populist right’s remedies are as illiberal as the Islamists they claim to be protecting Europe from. Promises of mass deportation, segregation and dress bans all terrify Muslims, inhibiting integration and driving them into the arms of extremists. Any country that enacted such policies would find that the hatred they unleashed would cause enduring damage.   That is why Europe’s mainstream politicians need to offer an alternative. Violence and threats of it should be prosecuted. But there should be no taboos for the sake of cultural sensitivity. Free speech is not the enemy of tolerance but its precondition. Entryism should be called out, as should bigotry. Governments nervous about collecting, or releasing, data leave a vacuum to be filled by speculative hyperbole.   Tackling all this will not be easy or quick, but there is hope. Europe’s Muslims are assimilating, as did earlier waves of Catholic, Jewish and Caribbean migrants in the countries where they settled. The arrival of all those previous groups sparked moral panics about whether they would ever fit in. All eventually found a place. Muslims will, too—if division and paranoia are not allowed to get in the way. ■   主旨： 歐洲對伊斯蘭的真相與謊言：伊斯蘭本身並無危險，真正的威脅來自伊斯蘭主義與群眾恐慌 日期： 2026年9月10日 【第一段：群眾恐慌與政治亂象】 針對歐洲伊斯蘭教的恐慌，正在各地迅速蔓延。 在好幾個歐洲國家，已經有一半的人口認為，伊斯蘭教與西方核心價值完全無法相容。9月6號，極右翼的「德國另類選擇黨」（AfD）在薩克森-安哈特邦的選舉中，拿下了高達 44% 的選票，創下該黨在邦選舉中的歷史新高。他們在競選中不斷警告「伊斯蘭化」的危機，並承諾要實施強制驅逐出境。 同一週末，在英國，數百名戴著巴拉克拉法頭套的暴徒佔領了多佛港，高喊著「阻止難民船」和「基督為王」的口號。而在法國，瑪琳．勒龐（Marine Le Pen）主張要在公共場所禁止佩戴伊斯蘭頭巾，這個提議獲得了高達六成選民的支持。 這種執念甚至跨越了大西洋，在美國扎根。人們現在擔心的不再是像 2001 年「911 事件」那樣的外在恐怖份子，而是害怕伊斯蘭勢力正在從內部暗中掌控歐洲。川普政府的成員甚至警告，這是一場「文明的消亡」。 【第二段：事實釐清與真正的危險】 這種觀感不僅正在傷害跨大西洋的盟友關係，而且它根本是錯的。 歐洲並沒有面臨被伊斯蘭接管的危險，沒有出現大規模的穆斯林極端化，也沒有所謂的文化消亡。正如我們的調查報導所顯示，歐洲根本沒有所謂的「治安禁區」（No-go zones），伊斯蘭教法沒有滲透進國家法律，各地更沒有發生人口結構上的「大換血」（Great Replacement）。 歐洲面臨的真正危險其實另有原因：第一，是「伊斯蘭主義」（也就是主張國家應強制施行伊斯蘭教義的政治主張）所引發的極端主義；第二，則是社群媒體所推波助瀾的右翼疑神疑鬼。 左派把情況搞得更糟，因為他們選擇無視伊斯蘭主義所帶來的溫和但實質的威脅。而中間派政客則保持沉默，深怕被扣上種族歧視的帽子。這種政治動態確實會傷害歐洲的民主體制——但並不是因為歐洲會被「哈里發國」取代，而是因為它會拖慢社會融合，並促成那些對人民自由造成永久傷害的政策。 【第三段：數據與融合現況】 那些最極端的恐慌，很容易就被事實推翻。 即使經歷了來自穆斯林占多數國家的破紀錄移民潮，穆斯林目前也僅占歐洲 5 億多總人口的 6% 左右。雖然新移民的生育率通常高於本土出生的人口，但到了第二代，生育率通常就會趨於一致。這離所謂的「文明消亡」還差得遠。 事實上，絕大多數穆斯林移民是希望在新的家園好好生活，而不是把他們剛離開的社會制度強加給新環境。他們的下一代在學校的表現，往往也比父母更好。 以英國為例，在 2021 年參加標準考試的孟加拉裔青年中，有 67% 在 19 歲前進入大學，而英國白人青年的比例僅為 38%。許多穆斯林也積極參與主流政治，英國的內政大臣和倫敦市長就是很好的例子。在許多重要觀念上，穆斯林的態度與其他歐洲人非常相似。我們在英國穆斯林群體中進行的民調就發現，他們對於女性參與工作幾乎沒有阻力。 【第四段：保守觀念與社會爭議】 那麼，到底是什麼原因讓這麼多歐洲人站到了伊斯蘭教的對立面？ 確實，許多穆斯林持有一些非自由主義的觀點——我們在本期報導中，就提及了一位南非公開性性向的伊瑪目（伊斯蘭教長）遭到殺害的慘劇。在英國，我們的民調顯示，有 52% 的穆斯林認為同性戀是不對的；而年輕的穆斯林（35 歲以下占 41%）比年長的穆斯林（占 25%）更容易認為，如果有人侮辱了先知，使用暴力是可以被接受的。 抱持社會保守觀念本身，並不代表這些人就是威脅——畢竟，許多打著保護歐洲旗號的右翼捍衛者，他們反同性戀的程度並不亞於他們所指責的穆斯林。但是，對於長期認為「開放社會最終會讓人們變得更包容」的自由主義者來說，這些態度確實令人不安。 此外，如果政府過於懦弱，不敢去面對少數族群所犯下的過錯——例如先前在英國數個城市發生的穆斯林男性幫派集體侵害年輕少女案——這必然會引發社會大眾的憤怒。 【第五段：宗教與政治意識形態的混淆】 同樣重要的是，人們常把「伊斯蘭教」這個宗教，與「伊斯蘭主義」這種政治意識形態混為一談。 伊斯蘭教本身並不是問題；但「伊斯蘭主義」可能是。 與 911 事件中的恐怖份子不同，大多數伊斯蘭主義者並不主張暴力。但許多人實行「滲入主義」（Entryism）——也就是滲透進民主體制內，去推廣非自由主義的訴求。這些人脈廣闊的伊斯蘭主義團體，可能會遊說政府制定嚴苛的反仇恨言論法，或是反對去極端化計畫。 這種「滲入主義」的主要危險在於地方層面。小型但組織嚴密的網絡可以掌控一所學校、一座清真寺、一個地方議會或慈善機構，並利用這些機構來阻礙社會融合，把宗教規範強加給住在附近的其他穆斯林。 【第六段：地方威脅與其受害者】 歐洲的安全部門對這些非暴力伊斯蘭主義者的擔憂日益加劇。在法國，官方非常擔心穆斯林兄弟會的隱蔽滲透。去年公布的一份官方報告警告，伊斯蘭主義隨著時間推移，可能會威脅到世俗法規與女性權益。 不過，要全面威脅世俗體制似乎不太可能。根據法國內政部的估算，在全法 2,800 個穆斯林禮拜場所中，只有 139 個與穆斯林兄弟會有關聯。 事實上，這種意識形態最大的受害者，往往是其他的穆斯林。 在英格蘭北部的布萊克本（Blackburn），12 個選區中有半數的穆斯林人口超過 60%，甚至有兩個選區超過 80%。在這些區域，婦女可能會感受到壓力，被迫讓伊斯蘭教法委員會來處置她們的家庭生活。同志與自由派穆斯林則面臨恐嚇。許多不願從俗的穆斯林抱怨，西方政府因為害怕被貼上種族歧視的標籤，根本沒有給予他們與非穆斯林公民同等的保護。 此外，還有更廣泛的危害。伊斯蘭主義者煽動反猶太主義（尤其是在加薩議題上）；他們要求限制對其信仰的言論自由；他們甚至威脅政客、喜劇演員、學者和記者，迫使他們進行自我審查；他們還會霸凌學校、學生會、慈善機構和地方議會。 【第七段：政治兩極化的惡性循環】 讓這些地方威脅演變成全歐洲危機的，正是這些威脅被惡意利用的方式。 對伊斯蘭主義者來說，把任何針對他們政治主張的批判，統統包裝成「對伊斯蘭教的攻擊」，最符合他們的利益。 而民粹左派（包括「不屈法國」以及英國的綠黨）則傾向於把所有關於移民、犯罪或伊斯蘭主義的質疑，一律打成種族歧視。 至於民粹右派，則藉由聲稱「所有穆斯林都是威脅」，並指控政府在進行「左傾掩蓋」和「雙重標準執法」，來不斷煽動恐懼。其中最猖狂的莫過於伊隆．馬斯克（Elon Musk），他利用自己的社群平台重塑全球對伊斯蘭教的看法，並為歐洲的反穆斯林右翼勢力推波助瀾——從德國另類選擇黨，到英國煽動者湯米．羅賓遜（Tommy Robinson，我們本週末開始的採訪播客節目中將對他進行三集特別報導）。 【第八段：右翼解方帶來的傷害與未來展望】 民粹右派提出的解決方案，其實和他們聲稱要保護歐洲免受其害的伊斯蘭主義者一樣，缺乏自由精神。大規模驅逐出境、種族隔離以及禁穿特定服飾等承諾，只會讓穆斯林感到恐懼，進而阻礙融合，甚至把他們推向極端主義者的懷抱。任何實行這些政策的國家都會發現，隨之爆發的仇恨將造成永久且不可逆的傷害。 這就是為什麼歐洲的主流政客需要提供另一種選擇。 暴力以及暴力威脅必須依法嚴懲，但絕不能為了所謂的「文化敏感性」而設立禁忌。言論自由絕不是包容的敵人，而是包容的前提。 面對「滲入主義」必須果斷揭露，面對偏見也應一視同仁地譴責。政府如果不敢收集或公開數據，只會留下真空，讓誇大不實的推測趁虛而入。 解決這些問題絕非易事，也不可能一蹴可幾，但我們依然可以看到希望。歐洲的穆斯林正在逐步融入社會，就像早年落腳於這些國家的天主教徒、猶太人和加勒比海移民一樣。當初每一個新移民群體的到來，都曾引發過「他們到底能不能融入」的集體恐慌，但最終，他們都找到了屬於自己的位置。 只要我們不讓對立與猜忌繼續蔓延，穆斯林也同樣能在這裡找到歸屬。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China would face a “hellscape” in a war over Taiwan New tech may give America an edge Sep 15th 2026|TAIPEI AND HONOLULU|7 min read   IN AN OFFICE block on the outskirts of Taipei, Chan Hsiang-chih opens a workshop door and offers a glimpse at the future of warfare in the Taiwan Strait. Inside sit two torpedo-shaped undersea drones, prototypes for Taiwan’s navy. “That’s where the bomb goes,” he says, nodding to the rear of one. It can identify targets and drop its payload or launch a kamikaze strike, alone or in a swarm. Dr Chan started his business, AwareOcean, in 2015 to supply offshore windfarms. Now he builds the kind of low-cost autonomous weapons that Taiwan and America need for their new plan to thwart a Chinese invasion.   Dubbed “Hellscape”, the plan draws on lessons from Ukraine and Iran in using large numbers of low-tech drones, combined with artificial intelligence, to frustrate a far more powerful adversary. It envisions flooding the Taiwan Strait with relatively cheap aerial, sea-surface and underwater drones just as Chinese forces launch an attack. Assuming that China jams communication links with these weapons, they will strike Chinese ships using inertial guidance, image recognition or on-board AI that prioritises targets, evades counter-measures and co-ordinates attacks with other drones. That will not stop an invasion. But it would raise the costs and buy time and space for American warships and planes to reach Taiwan.   Whether America would actually intervene is an open question, especially since Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Visiting Beijing in May, he questioned the logic of fighting so far from America and said he would use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining-chip with Mr Xi. Sure enough, in the run-up to Mr Xi’s visit to Washington on September 24th, Mr Trump has held off approving a $14bn arms package for Taiwan that was cleared by Congress in January. Taiwanese officials worry that more concessions to China may follow to secure deals on trade and technology. And they fear that deliveries of earlier American arms packages could be delayed by shortages due to the war against Iran.   Yet American and Taiwanese military commanders are quietly forging ahead with Hellscape, a plan originally conceived when Joe Biden was president. They think China is unlikely to attack before the end of the decade, when America will have a new leader. And they believe their odds of success have improved in the light of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, even accounting for China’s growing capabilities. American strategists have long taught that an attacking force needs three times the firepower of a defender to secure victory. They now think the attacker needs an advantage of more like 20 or even 30 to one.   “Uncrewed systems are to today’s conflicts what the machine gun was in World War I and the tank in World War II: a game-changing technology that redefines the battlefield,” Raymond Greene, America’s de facto ambassador in Taipei, told a conference there on September 9th. Taiwan could easily exploit the lessons from Ukraine and Iran because of its world-leading semiconductor industry, strong manufacturing base and booming economy. It also has access to battle-tested American aerial drones (of which Taiwan bought 2,000 in August). And it is collaborating with America on sea drones and AI-enabled swarming technology, he said. The problem is not the lack of a good plan. It’s that to make it work, America needs the political will and all the drone and missile capacity it can get. Proponents of the plan are looking beyond Mr Trump, banking on bipartisan congressional support for Taiwan (which remains strong) and the island’s importance to America’s AI industry. But some fear the influence within the Republican Party of a “restrainer” camp that favours abandoning Taiwan. Others worry that Mr Trump has deepened public opposition to overseas wars and done lasting damage to relations with Asian allies, whose support they would hope to have to make Hellscape work.   America’s efforts to build more low-cost drones have borne some fruit. It reverse-engineered an Iranian aerial-strike drone in 18 months. And the Pentagon plans to buy 200,000 cheap UAVs by 2027. But progress has been slowed by testing backlogs and shortages of non-Chinese components. Hellscape needs far fewer sea drones: a single successful strike can sink or cripple a warship, as Ukraine showed in the Black Sea. Some American models designed for a war over Taiwan have been used against Iran. And American troops tested a Ukrainian kamikaze boat in the Philippines in April. Still, these are still mostly experimental systems, produced in negligible numbers, says Professor Michael Horowitz of the University of Pennsylvania, who led the Pentagon’s drone drive under the Biden administration.   He and others also warn that such drones cannot replace bigger, older and more expensive weapons. The plan is for drones to exhaust China’s missile interceptors and damage its invasion flotilla sufficiently to make it easier for American aircraft-carriers, submarines and other platforms to hit their targets. The worry is that the Iran war has diverted America’s forces from the Pacific and depleted its weapons stockpiles, especially of precision missiles and missile interceptors. Restocking America’s magazines will take years. Some worry that Mr Xi might try his luck before then, possibly as soon as 2028, when Taiwan holds its next presidential election—about 10 months before Mr Trump leaves office.   “The other thing to keep in mind”, says one former Pentagon official, “is that it would not be consistent with American policy…to put large quantities of American weapons in Taiwan that we would then come in and use.” Changing that policy would invite an unholy row with China. That is why, says the former official, “it is all the more important to sufficiently train and equip Taiwanese forces.”   Taiwan presents other challenges. Chief is its capacity to produce enough drones. Soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan launched a programme to develop a drone industry free of Chinese components. It aims to buy 208,000 locally produced aerial-attack drones and 1,320 suicide boats by 2032. Output and exports have grown in the past two years. But the plan has been delayed by squabbling over funding, which was only approved in August. The main obstacle was the Kuomintang, Taiwan’s biggest opposition party, which favours closer ties with China. Should it return to power in 2028, there could be further delays. “If a real crisis hits, the timeline would probably be compressed significantly, just like in Ukraine,” says Chen Ping-hei, a professor at Taiwan National University who works on the drone programme. But as of now “the manpower and funding is clearly insufficient.” He thinks Taiwan needs 4m UAVs and 10,000 marine drones.   There are also sceptics within Taiwan’s armed forces. They worry that investment in drones could come at the expense of bigger-ticket items, such as Patriot missiles for a new air-defence system. Some also want fighters and warships to help counter Chinese actions that fall short of an invasion, such as a blockade. (Chinese customs vessels recently began regular patrols east of Taiwan.) Others place more emphasis on striking the Chinese mainland early and preserving Taiwanese forces for a counter-attack.   China’s response raises troubling questions too. It initially mocked Hellscape, with one official military outlet branding it a “psychotic plan” and calling America a paper tiger unable to produce the necessary drone swarms. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still enjoys an overwhelming advantage in drone numbers and production capacity. It has been testing its own unmanned systems in drills around Taiwan, while studying developments in Ukraine and the Middle East. It has also sent officers to Russia to train with Russian counterparts in drone and counter-drone operations and to gain access to relevant data from the front lines. Recently, however, there have been signs of concern within the PLA. Mr Xi’s purges have made it harder to meet his order for it to be ready to execute an invasion, if instructed, by 2027. Some Chinese military experts now suggest that Hellscape requires the PLA to update its invasion plans, and to invest more in shipborne weapons that could identify and destroy drones.   Hellscapers concede that the obstacles are daunting. But to deter conflict, its proponents say, Taiwan and America do not need to demonstrate that they could defeat China outright. They just need to convince Mr Xi that he would struggle to achieve the quick and relatively cost-free victory that he hopes for. ■   在台北郊區的一棟辦公大樓裡，詹翔智打開工作坊的大門，讓人窺見台灣海峽未來戰場的一角。房間裡擺著兩艘雪茄狀的水下無人機原型，正準備交付給台灣海峽的海軍。「炸彈就是裝在這裡，」他點頭指向其中一艘無人機的後方說道。這款無人機可以自動辨識目標、投放彈藥，或者以單機、群飛的方式發動自殺式襲擊。詹博士在 2015 年創立了「智海科技」（AwareOcean），原本是為了服務離岸風電產業；如今，他轉而製造這類低成本的自律型武器，而這正是台灣與美國為了挫敗中國入侵計畫，所急需的關鍵配備。 這項名為「地獄景觀」（Hellscape）的戰略計畫，汲取了烏克蘭與伊朗的實戰經驗，主張利用海量低成本無人機結合人工智慧，來反制實力懸殊的強大對手。它的核心構想是：一旦中國發動進攻，美台將立即在台灣海峽鋪天蓋地投放大量相對便宜的空中、水面及水下無人機。考量到中國屆時必然會進行電磁干擾、切斷訊號，這些無人機將依靠慣性導航、影像辨識，或是機載 AI 來自動排定目標優先順序、避開反制手段，並與其他無人機協同攻擊。雖然這無法完全阻止入侵，但能大幅提高敵方的犯台代價，並為美軍艦艇與戰機爭取趕赴台灣的時間與空間。 然而，美國屆時是否真的會出兵干預，目前依然是個未知數，特別是在川普重返白宮之後。川普今年五月造訪北京時，曾公開質疑為何要在遠離美國本土的地方作戰，甚至表示他會把對台軍售當作與習近平談判的籌碼。果不其然，在習近平預計於 9 月 24 日造訪華府前夕，川普扣下了美國國會早在今年一月就批准的 140 億美元對台軍售案。台灣官員非常擔心，美方為了爭取在貿易與科技領域達成協議，未來可能會對中國做出更多讓步。同時，他們也焦慮先前訂購的美國武器，會因為中東爆發對伊朗的戰爭、導致產能吃緊而延遲交付。 儘管如此，美台兩國的軍事指揮官仍默默推進著「地獄景觀」計畫——這項戰略最早是在拜登任內孕育而生的。軍方評估，中國在 2030 年以前不太可能發動攻擊，屆時美國已經迎來新一任總統；此外，借鑑烏克蘭與中東戰場的經驗，即便中國軍力不斷擴張，美台的勝算其實已經顯著提升。過去美國戰略家習慣認為，進攻方需要擁有防守方 3 倍的火力才能獲勝；但如今他們認為，進攻方恐怕需要取得 20 倍甚至 30 倍的絕對優勢才行。 美國駐台實質大使（處長）谷立言（Raymond Greene）在 9 月 9 日於台北舉辦的一場論壇上表示：「無人駕駛系統對當今衝突的重要性，就如同第一次世界大戰的機關槍、第二次世界大戰的坦克一樣，是一項徹底重塑戰場規則的革命性科技。」他指出，台灣擁有全球領先的半導體產業、雄厚的製造業基礎以及蓬勃發展的經濟，完全有能力吸收並運用烏克蘭與伊朗的教訓。此外，台灣不僅能取得經過實戰檢驗的美國空中無人機（台灣已於今年八月採購了 2,000 架），同時也在水面無人艇與 AI 蜂群技術上與美國展開合作。 問題不在於沒有好的計畫，而是要讓這項戰略奏效，美國必須展現足夠的政治意志，並備妥龐大的無人機與飛彈產能。該計畫的支持者將目光投向川普之外，寄望於美國國會長期以來跨黨派對台灣的強烈支持，以及台灣在全球 AI 產業鏈中的關鍵地位。然而，部分人士擔心共和黨內部主張孤立主義的「克制派」（Restrainers）勢力抬頭，這派聲音傾向放棄台灣；也有人憂心，川普加深了美國民眾對海外戰爭的反感，並對亞洲盟友關係造成了長期傷害，而這些盟友的支援，正是「地獄景觀」能否成功的關鍵之一。 美國在打造低成本無人機方面的努力已經取得了一些成果。美軍在 18 個月內逆向工程複製了伊朗的攻擊無人機，五角大廈更計畫在 2027 年前採購 20 萬架平價無人機。然而，由於測試流程塞車以及非中國製零組件短缺，整體進度受到了拖延。相對來說，「地獄景觀」所需的水面無人艇數量較少，因為正如烏克蘭在黑海所展現的那樣，單次成功的突襲就足以擊沉或重創一艘大型軍艦。部分針對台海衝突設計的美軍無人艇模型，目前已在打擊伊朗的行動中投入使用；美軍甚至於今年四月在菲律賓實測了一款烏克蘭的自殺式無人艇。不過，曾於拜登政府時期主持五角大廈無人機推動計畫的賓州大學教授麥可·霍羅威茨（Michael Horowitz）指出，這些目前多半仍屬於實驗性系統，量產規模小得可憐。 霍羅威茨教授與其他專家同時警告，這類無人機無法完全取代體積更大、更傳統且昂貴的重型武器。「地獄景觀」的設定，是用無人機消耗中國的防空飛彈、重創其渡海艦隊，進而為美軍航空母艦、潛艦等大型平台創造更容易打擊目標的條件。令人擔憂的是，對伊朗的戰爭分散了美軍在太平洋的兵力部署，並嚴重消耗了美國的武器庫存，特別是精準導引飛彈與防空攔截彈。補充美國的彈藥庫需要耗費數年時間，有些人開始擔心習近平可能會在此之前鋌而走險，甚至最早可能在 2028 年台灣舉行下一屆總統大選時動手——那時距離川普卸任還有大約 10 個月。 一位前五角大廈官員提醒：「另一件必須記住的事是，按照美國現行政策，我們不可能在台灣預先囤積大量美軍武器，等衝突爆發後再派美軍過去使用。」若要改變這項政策，勢必會引發與中國的大規模外交風暴。這位前官員補充道，這正是為什麼「為台灣軍隊提供足夠的訓練與裝備，會顯得如此至關重要」。 台灣自身也面臨著其他嚴峻挑戰，其中最核心的問題就是無人機的產能不足。在俄羅斯全面入侵烏克蘭後不久，台灣便啟動了一項去中國化供應鏈的無人機產業發展計畫，目標是在 2032 年前採購 20.8 萬架國產空中攻擊無人機以及 1,320 艘自殺無人艇。儘管過去兩年產量與出口量有所成長，但該計畫卻因預算爭議而一再延宕，直到今年八月預算才獲得通過。主要的阻力來自台灣最大的反對黨國民黨，該黨主張與中國建立更緊密的關係；若國民黨在 2028 年重新執政，計畫可能會面臨更多變數。參與無人機計畫的台灣大學教授陳炳輝表示：「如果真正的危機爆發，時間表大概會像烏克蘭一樣被大幅壓縮。但就目前而言，人力與資金顯然嚴重不足。」他評估，台灣實際需要高達 400 萬架無人機與 1 萬艘水面無人艇。 台灣軍方內部同樣存在質疑的聲音。部分軍官擔心，將大量資源砸在無人機上，會削弱對大型昂貴裝備的投資，例如用於新防空系統的愛國者飛彈。也有人主張應該優先購買戰鬥機與大型艦艇，以應對中國未達全面入侵標準的「灰色地帶」行動（例如中國海警船近期開始在台灣以東海域進行常態化巡邏）。另外一些人則強調，應該具備源頭打擊中國本土的能力，並在初期保存台灣戰力以備後續反攻。 中國方面的反應，同樣拋出了一連串令人不安的懸念。中方最初對「地獄景觀」嗤之以鼻，官方軍事媒體甚至痛批這是「精神病式的狂想」，並嘲諷美國是無力生產足夠無人機蜂群的「紙老虎」。中國人民解放軍在無人機數量與製造產能上，至今仍占有壓倒性優勢。解放軍不僅在台海周邊演習中持續測試自家的無人系統，也密切研究烏克蘭與中東的最新戰況；他們甚至派遣官員前往俄羅斯，與俄軍一同進行無人機及反無人機演練，藉此取得來自前線的第一手實戰數據。 然而，解放軍內部最近也開始出現焦慮的跡象。習近平發動的大規模軍方肅清行動，讓解放軍難以確保能在 2027 年前達到「具備備戰犯台能力」的要求。部分中國軍事專家現在開始建議，為了應對「地獄景觀」，解放軍必須更新其登陸作戰計畫，並在艦艇上加裝更多能夠精準辨識並摧毀無人機的武器裝備。 「地獄景觀」的推動者坦言，前面的障礙確實非常巨大。但他們強調，為了達成威懾、阻止戰爭爆發，台灣與美國並不需要證明自己能徹底擊敗中國；他們只需要讓習近平深信，他絕不可能輕易拿到他所渴望的那場「快速且低成本的勝利」。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Are you committed to your company or your team? Employees have overlapping identities at work. That’s a challenge for bosses   Sep 10th 2026|4 min read Humans are conditioned to form allegiances extremely quickly, a type of behaviour sometimes called the “minimal group effect”. In a famous series of experiments, a social psychologist called Henri Tajfel found that you can divide strangers into groups on totally arbitrary grounds—how good they are at estimating the number of dots on a chart, say, or how much they like a certain type of abstract art, or even just on the basis of a coin toss—and they will immediately start to favour members of their own group when then asked to distribute rewards. If people are prepared to start dividing the world into “us” and “them” based on whether someone likes Mondrian, it’s no surprise that they form strong identities and loyalties based on where they go to work every day. One of the small diversions of office life is watching to see how quickly joiners start using the word “we” to refer to their new employer: it’s usually instantaneous and occasionally takes place during the interview. But if you work for a large enough company, you do not belong only to the organisation. You have “nested identities”: you are also a member of a department, and of a team within that department, and perhaps of smaller groups as well. These other in-groups can really matter. A research meta-analysis by Michael Riketta of the University of Tübingen and Rolf van Dick of Goethe University finds that on average employees identify more strongly with their work group than with their organisation. That ought not to be a huge surprise. Proximity, familiarity and shared routines bind people from a specific team together. Identities at work also depend largely on which department you are in. If you are at a staff event for Widget & Sons and a colleague asks what you do, you don’t say “I work for Widget & Sons” but tell them which group you work in. Identifying with a sub-group is not necessarily bad. It makes perfect sense for organisations to divide labour up among departments. A bit of friendly competition between teams can be useful. But a strong sense of group identity can also impede co-operation across the wider organisation. It becomes natural to blame the general uselessness of other departments if things go wrong. Budget allocations are framed as victories and losses. Information may well be hoarded in silos rather than shared. A paper by Jeanine Pieternel Porck of Oklahoma State University and her co-authors finds, for example, that a strong sense of group identification is associated with reduced understanding of an organisation’s strategy. For executives, therefore, the challenge is to reconcile strong bonds within teams with a sense of commitment to the organisation as a whole. An example from outside the office helps explain how to go about this. A long long time ago, when Manchester United was a dominant football club, a group of researchers wondered whether being a fan of the team would affect someone’s willingness to help a supporter of a rival outfit. Mark Levine of Lancaster University and his co-authors ran an experiment in which self-identified fans were first reminded of their allegiance to Man Utd and later encountered a jogger who deliberately slipped and fell in front of them. The participants were more likely to offer help if the stranger was wearing a Man Utd football shirt than if they were sporting a Liverpool one or a plain top. The thought-provoking part came next. The researchers ran the same experiment with another group of United supporters, but this time the participants were primed to think of themselves as fans of the beautiful game rather than of a specific club. Now, when they saw someone appear to injure themselves, they were equally likely to offer help to anyone wearing a football shirt, their own or Liverpool’s. It’s not a watertight experiment. Nor is it a heart-warming story: whatever happens, some poor soul in a plain top is left hurt and unaided. But it is an instructive one. Employees will naturally form in-group relationships with their closest team-mates. Bosses often have to work harder to ensure that people also feel like members of the wider organisation. That might mean making efforts to bring people from different teams into contact with each other, through project-based work or social events or the physical layout of the office. It definitely means explaining to members of departments how their work contributes to the health of the overall organisation. People are quick to divide into “us and them”. “Us and us” takes a bit more thought. ■   你忠於公司，還是忠於團隊？ 員工在職場中擁有重疊的身份認同，這對管理者的領導能力是一大考驗。 2026年9月10日｜閱讀時間：4分鐘 人類天生具備極快建立陣營的傾向，這種行為有時被稱為「最小分組效應」（minimal group effect）。著名社會心理學家亨利·泰菲爾（Henri Tajfel）在一連串經典實驗中發現，即使根據完全隨機的標準將陌生人分組——例如估算圖表上點數的能力好壞、對某種抽象藝術的喜好程度，甚至只是丟硬幣——一旦要求他們分配獎勵，人們就會立刻開始偏袒自己組內的成員。 如果人們只因對方是否喜歡蒙德里安（Mondrian）的畫作，就準備好把世界劃分為「我們」與「他們」，那麼他們根據每天上班的場所建立強烈的身份認同與忠誠度，也就不足為奇了。辦公室生活的一大樂趣，就是觀察新進員工有多快開始用「我們」來稱呼新雇主：這種轉變通常是立竿見影的，有時甚至在面試過程中就已發生。 然而，如果你在一間規模夠大的公司上班，你所屬的絕不單單只有這家企業本身。你擁有「嵌套身份」（nested identities）：你同時屬於某個部門、該部門裡的某個團隊，甚至更小的群體。這些部門與小團體（內群體）影響至關重大。圖賓根大學的麥可·里凱塔（Michael Riketta）與法蘭克福大學的羅爾夫·範·迪克（Rolf van Dick）在一項後設分析中指出，平均而言，員工對自己「工作團隊」的認同感，遠強於對「公司整體」的認同感。 這其實並不令人意外。近距離的接觸、熟悉感以及共同的工作日常，緊密地將特定團隊的成員凝聚在一起。此外，職場上的身份認同很大程度上取決於你所在的部門。如果在 Widget & Sons 公司的員工活動中，有同事問你是做什麼的，你不會說「我在 Widget & Sons 上班」，而是會直接告訴對方你在哪個部門或團隊工作。 認同次級群體未必是一件壞事。企業將勞動分工落實到各部門完全符合情理，團隊之間保持適度的良性競爭也大有裨益。然而，過於強烈的群體認同感也可能阻礙跨部門的合作。一旦事情出錯，自然而然就會歸咎於其他部門「總是不給力」；預算分配演變成非贏即輸的角力；資訊也極可能被困在各自的「組織氣蜂」（silos）中無法共享。奧克拉荷馬州立大學的讓寧·皮特內爾·波克（Jeanine Pieternel Porck）及其合作者在一篇研究論文中指出，強烈的團隊認同感往往與員工對公司整體戰略理解度的降低存在相關性。 因此，對企業高層而言，挑戰在於如何將團隊內部的緊密纽帶，與對公司整體的凝聚力相調和。一個來自球場外的例子有助於說明該如何達成這一點。很久很久以前，當曼聯（Manchester United）還是英超霸主時，一組研究人員很好奇：成為某一球隊的球迷，是否會影響一個人援助宿敵球隊支持者的意願？蘭卡斯特大學的馬克·萊文（Mark Levine）及其團隊進行了一項實驗，受試者皆為自證身份的曼聯球迷。在實驗中，研究人員先提醒他們對曼聯的忠誠，隨後讓他們目擊一名跑者在面前故意滑倒。結果顯示，如果受傷的陌生人身穿曼聯球衣，受試者伸出援助之手的機率，遠高於對方身穿利物浦球衣或素色上衣的情況。 意想不到的轉折出現在下一步。研究人員對另一組曼聯球迷進行了相同的實驗，但這次，受試者事先被引導將自己定位為「足球這項運動的熱愛者」，而非「特定球會的擁護者」。這一次，當他們看到有人似是受傷時，無論對方穿的是曼聯還是利物浦的球衣，他們提供幫助的機率完全相同。（這並非一個天衣無縫的實驗，也稱不上是個溫馨的故事：無論如何，那個穿著素色上衣的無辜受害者總是得不到援助。但這確實是一個極具啟發性的實驗。） 員工自然會與最親密的團隊夥伴建立同陣營的關係；而主管們則往往需要付出更多努力，來確保大家同樣覺得自己是廣大公司的一份子。這可能意味著要透過專案合作、社交活動或辦公空間的彈性規劃，來促成不同團隊之間的互動；這也絕對意味著必須向各部門成員說明，他們的工作是如何為整個公司的健康發展做出貢獻。人們總是能輕易劃分出「我們與他們」，但要打造出「我們與我們（大家都是自己人）」，則需要投入更多的巧思。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The pressure to have children collides with a fierce work culture Aug 24th 2026|5 min read   For those unaccustomed to truth in advertising, employers in China can be astonishingly forthright in their help-wanted notices. Huangshi, a city in Hubei, recently sought investment-promotion officers under 35 years old, specifying “men preferred”. A high-speed rail operator in Lanzhou wanted women, but only so long as they were under 25, over 160cm tall and with a “good appearance”. A Suzhou packaging firm, by contrast, stretched to the geriatric reaches of 45 in its search for a sales representative, adding that female candidates should already be married with children—in other words, please no maternity leave.   These are just a few blatant examples of discrimination that women face in the Chinese labour market. More extensive discrimination is largely out of sight. It includes pressure on women to avoid pregnancy, higher pay for male colleagues and fewer opportunities as women’s careers progress.   In the 1950s, when Mao Zedong declared that “women held up half the sky”, in narrowly economic terms China looked egalitarian. Men and women had similar jobs as well as incomes, though both were miserable—and that was if you were lucky enough to escape becoming victims of Mao’s revolution-without-end. Today women in China more than match men in educational terms: 51% of university students are female, up by 14 percentage points since 1995. The picture at work, by contrast, has grown worse. Men on average now earn roughly a third more. In 1990 nearly 80% of women aged between 15 and 64 were in the labour force, one of the highest rates anywhere in the world. Today that has slipped to under 70%, below both Japan and the European Union. China’s business leadership is overwhelmingly male. Women are even rarer at the top of politics. For a quarter-century until 2022, the Politburo, the Communist Party’s top body, boasted a woman or two. Since then there have been none.   Sexism is part of the problem. For businessmen and officials, the banqueting table is often where deals get done. But long boozy dinners (officially forbidden under Xi Jinping) can be offputting to women, or worse. A senior cadre and a property executive in Hangzhou, a wealthy east-central city, were recently accused of assaulting a young female employee after such a dinner. The incident provoked public outrage, including renewed calls to clean up the practice of banquets. A more common experience for women is less aggressive, though still demeaning. “Our bosses wouldn’t say it directly but they hope we act as decoration,” says Ms Dou, who worked in tech. Yet nothing is straightforward. Erica, a woman in her 20s in the events industry, says she has had more friction with female bosses than male ones. “We’re a patriarchal society, so when women break through and get power, they tend to be more controlling,” she says.   The more pervasive problem is less that of outright sexism and more how women’s role, or potential role, as mothers clashes with work. A “motherhood penalty” is common nearly everywhere. But in China the penalty is especially high, owing to a fierce work culture, an outdated retirement system and an intensifying state-led fertility push colliding with entrenched career patterns.   Compared with other countries at its level of development, China has generous maternity leave: mothers can get about half a year off work, on full pay. But the state covers only part of the salary on leave, with employers paying for the bulk. Five women in their 30s and 40s told Chaguan that their bosses expected to be informed should they be trying to get pregnant. “Speaking as a former manager, I myself wasn’t all that willing to hire women under 35,” said Ms Chen, who used to work in media. “What if she comes in and gets pregnant right away?” The government’s recent push for two-child families, aimed at reversing a fast-declining fertility rate, adds to employers’ concerns that married women are liable to take extended breaks from work.   The little brats After pregnancy, women face other hurdles. A common expectation that they will guide their children through school is hardly compatible with the long hours expected in many Chinese jobs. “Men the same age as me are in a better position,” says Ms Dou, in her early 40s. “There’s an assumption that they don’t have as much responsibility at home.” Job ads often state that candidates should be able to tolerate high stress, regularly work overtime and always be reachable. Such requirements do not discriminate specifically against women, but are deterrents to any parent with their hands full with young children—usually the mother.   Nor is there much runway left for a woman returning to work, perhaps in her early 40s. In white-collar jobs the official retirement age is just a few months over 55 for women and 60 for men (by 2040 these will be raised gradually to 58 and 63, respectively). Companies have less incentive to invest in mid-career women who have taken time off for children. “The job market is already biased enough against women,” says Ms Wu, a former web designer who left to have a child. “After 35 it is like frost on top of snow.” She is taking matters into her own hands, retraining as a drone pilot.   Policy tweaks would help, including making maternity and paternity leave more equal (many places give fathers 15 days, if they take any). More state funding for paid leave would ease the financial strain on companies. Men and women should also have the same (higher) retirement ages.   Yet what women are up against is less skewed policy than powerful social norms, especially the weight placed upon mothers. Until that changes, China is undermining its own potential. In educational terms, Chinese women already hold up more than half the sky today. In the world of work, they are getting just about a third of it. ■   催生壓力和狼性加班文化互相衝突 2026 年 8 月 24 日 | 閱讀時間約 5 分鐘 對不習慣徵才廣告吐露真言的人來說，中國雇主的徵才啟事有時坦率得令人吃驚。湖北黃石市近期招募 35 歲以下的招商人員，明確註明「男性優先」；蘭州一家高鐵營運商想招募女性，但要求年齡必須在 25 歲以下、身高 160 公分以上，且「形象氣質佳」；相比之下，蘇州一家包裝企業在尋找銷售代表時，將年齡門檻寬限到堪稱高齡的 45 歲，但附帶條件是女性求職者必須「已婚已育」——換句話說，請別來休產假。 這些不過是女性在中國職場遭遇歧視的冰山一角。更多且更普遍的歧視通常隱藏在螢光幕後，包括逼迫女性避免懷孕、給予男性同事更高的薪資，以及在女性職涯發展的過程中提供較少的晉升機會。 1950 年代，當毛澤東喊出「婦女能頂半邊天」時，單從經濟層面來看，中國似乎相當平權。當時男女從事的職業和收入相去不遠，儘管大家的苦日子都不好過——而這前提還是你夠幸運，沒有成為毛澤東那場「無休止革命」下的犧牲品。如今，中國女性在受教育程度上早已不輸男性：大學生中有 51% 是女性，比 1995 年增加了 14 個百分點。然而，職場上的景況卻每況愈下。平均而言，現在男性的收入比女性高出約三分之一。1990 年，15 至 64 歲的女性中有將近 80% 投入職場，名列全球最高水平之一；如今這一比例已下滑至 70% 以下，比日本和歐盟都还要低。中國企業的高層領導絕大多數是男性，而在政治頂層，女性更是鳳毛麟角。在截至 2022 年長達四分之一個世紀的時間裡，中共最高權力機構政治局至少還保有一至兩位女性席次，但自此之後，便是一片空白。 性別歧視是問題的一部分。對商人和官員來說，餐桌應酬往往是促成交易的場合。但漫長且酗酒的飯局（雖然在習近平主政下官方名義上禁止）常讓女性退避三舍，甚至引發更糟糕的後果。東部富庶城市杭州的一名資深幹部與一名地產高管，最近就被指控在一場飯局後性侵了一名年輕女員工。這起事件引發社會公憤，也再次讓大眾呼籲肅清應酬飯局的陋習。對大多數女性而言，更常見的遭遇雖不至如此具攻擊性，卻同樣令人難堪。曾從事科技業的竇小姐表示：「我們老闆不會明說，但他們希望我們充當門面花瓶。」然而，情況並非單一維度。二十多歲、從事活動企劃的 Erica 表示，相比於男主管，她與女主管之間的摩擦反而更多。「我們是一個父權社會，所以當女性打破天花板獲得權力時，她們往往會展現出更強的控制欲，」她說道。 比起赤裸裸的性別歧視，更根深蒂固的問題在於女性身為（或潛在身為）母親的角色，與工作產生了嚴重衝突。「生育懲罰」在世界各地屢見不鮮，但在中國，由於高壓激烈的加班文化、過時的退休制度，以及國家主導的催生政策與既有職涯模式產生強烈碰撞，使得這種懲罰尤為沉重。 與同等發展水平的其他國家相比，中國提供了相當優渥的產假：媽媽們可以休假約半年，且領取全薪。然而，國家僅負擔產假期間的部分薪資，大頭仍須由雇主支付。五位三四十歲的女性告訴《茶館》專欄，她們的老闆要求如果打算備孕必須提前告知。曾任職於媒體業的陳小姐說：「站在前主管的角度，我自己當時也不太願意招募 35 歲以下的女性。萬一她一進公司就懷孕怎麼辦？」政府近期為了扭轉陡降的出生率而推行「三孩政策」（註：原交稿提及 two-child，意指多胎鼓勵政策），反而進一步加劇了雇主的顧慮，擔心已婚女性隨時可能會請長假離崗。 「小淘氣們」帶來的考驗 懷孕生子過後，女性還面臨著其他關卡。社會普遍期望母親能全程輔導孩子的學業，這與中國許多工作所要求的高強度加班時間幾乎無法兼容。「和我同齡的男性處境更好，」四十歲出頭的竇小姐說，「大家會默認他們在家庭中不需要承擔那麼多責任。」徵才廣告常標榜應徵者須「抗壓能力強」、「能適應常態性加班」且「隨時保持通訊暢通」。這些要求雖然表面上並未針對女性，但對任何要照顧幼童、分身乏術的家長來說，都是極大的阻礙——而這個家長角色通常就是母親。 此外，當女性到了四十歲出頭重新回到職場時，留給她們發展的跑道也所剩無幾。白領階級的官方退休年齡，女性僅比 55 歲多幾個月，男性則為 60 歲（到 2040 年，這兩個門檻將分別逐步提高至 58 歲和 63 歲）。對於因生育而中斷職涯的中生代女性，企業投資她們的意願自然較低。「職場對女性的偏見已經夠深了，」曾任網頁設計師、為了生孩子離職的吳女士說道，「過了 35 歲更是雪上加霜。」她選擇把命運掌握在自己手中，目前正在轉行接受無人機飛行的專業培訓。 政策上的微調會有所幫助，例如讓產假與陪產假更加平等（許多地方的父親即使休假也只有 15 天）。由國家財政提供更多有薪假期的補助，也能減輕企業的財務負擔。此外，男女也應適用相同（且較高）的退休年齡。 然而，女性真正面臨的挑戰，與其說是傾斜的政策，不如說是強大的社會規範，尤其是壓在母親身上的沉重枷鎖。只要這種觀念不改變，中國就一直在削弱自身發展的潛力。單看受教育程度，如今的中國女性早已頂起了「大半邊天」；但在職場的世界裡，她們所分得的，卻僅僅只有三分之一。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

THE British government currently slaps a 5% Value Added Tax (VAT) on sanitary products. But some view the “tampon tax” as an affront to women, who have little choice but to bear the burden of the levy. The government has been prevented from reducing the rate to zero by European Union rules, which limit how much countries can lower VAT rates on some goods. But on March 17th, George Osborne rummaged around for a rabbit in his post-budget hat, and revealed progress towards a new VAT arrangement with the EU that would give him the freedom to ditch the hated tax. Mr Osborne will be glad to end the political headache; in November last year he compromised by pledging to give the £15m ($22m) raised from the tax to charity. This pleased some, though others pointed out that as some of the funds would go to domestic violence charities, this amounted to women paying to solve problems caused by men. More recently, eurosceptics grumbling about EU power have been threatening to embarass the government by supporting an amendment to a government bill that would scrap the 5% tax. Any new deal with the EU would show that the transfer of power between Britain and Brussels can run both ways. Scrapping the tax makes for more palatable politics, but leaves economic questions. Working out a rationale within the British system of VAT is a fool’s errand; products that enjoy the reduced rates are meant to be necessities, but the definition of a necessity is loose. Tampons would join things like ostrich meat and helicopters in the zero rate category, whereas toothpaste and toilet paper will face a rate of 20%. Normally economists worry about applying different rates of tax to similar products, for fear of distorting behaviour. Why should the government nudge customers towards jaffa cakes and away from chocolate-covered digestive biscuits by applying a lower rate of VAT to the former? It also wastes resources as companies battle for their product to meet the zero-rated category criteria. The justification is normally made on distributional grounds: the poor spend more of their income on zero-rated goods, so moving towards a uniform rate would hurt them more. A VAT on tampons is paid for by women rather than men, so any move to get rid of it would redistribute towards women. (Men’s razors attract the full 20% VAT rate, not 0% as some campaigners have claimed in the past.) The bigger question is whether VAT is the best way to redistribute. One vision of an ideal tax system applies a uniform rate of VAT on all final consumption, and then uses the direct tax and benefit system to do the heavy lifting when it comes to redistribution. This would minimise ugly distortions, remove any government meddling over which types of consumption are favoured over others, and focus different bits of the tax and benefit system on what they do best. But even a purist economist can see that this would be difficult politics. 廢除棉條稅政治上討喜，但經濟效益如何？ 英國政府目前對衛生用品課徵 5% 的增值稅（VAT）。但有些人認為「棉條稅」是對女性的侮辱，因為她們別無選擇，只能承受這筆稅負。此前，受限於歐盟限制各國調降特定商品增值稅稅率的規定，政府一直無法將稅率降至零。但在 3 月 17 日，喬治·歐斯本（George Osborne，時任英國財政大臣）從他預算案發布後的帽子裡變出了一隻兔子，宣布與歐盟在新的增值稅協議上取得進展，這將讓他得以自由廢除這項深惡痛絕的稅目。 2016 年 3 月 18 日｜閱讀時間 3 分鐘 英國政府目前對衛生用品課徵 5% 的增值稅（VAT）。但有些人認為「棉條稅」是對女性的侮辱，因為她們別無選擇，只能承受這筆稅負。此前，受限於歐盟限制各國調降特定商品增值稅稅率的規定，政府一直無法將稅率降至零。但在 3 月 17 日，喬治·歐斯本從他預算案發布後的帽子裡變出了一隻兔子，宣布與歐盟在新的增值稅協議上取得進展，這將讓他得以自由廢除這項深惡痛絕的稅目。 歐斯本先生會很樂意結束這個政治頭痛問題；去年 11 月，他曾做出妥協，承諾將該稅種籌集到的 1,500 萬英鎊（約 2,200 萬美元）捐給慈善機構。這讓一部分人感到滿意，但也有人指出，由於部分資金將流向防止家庭暴力的慈善機構，這無疑是讓女性付錢來解決由男性產生的問題。近來，對歐盟權力心生不滿的疑歐派人士一直威脅要支持一項政府法案修正案以廢除這項 5% 的稅率，藉此讓政府難堪。與歐盟達成的新協議將能表明，英國與布魯塞爾之間的權力轉移可以是雙向的。 廢除該稅種在政治上比較討喜，但卻留下了經濟問題。試圖在英國增值稅體系內理出合理邏輯根本是徒勞無功；享受優惠稅率的商品本應是生活必需品，但「必需品」的定義卻相當寬鬆。衛生棉條將與鴕鳥肉和直升機一同歸入零稅率類別，而牙膏和捲筒衛生紙則面臨 20% 的標準稅率。 通常情況下，經濟學者會擔心對類似商品套用不同稅率，因為這樣有可能會扭曲消費者行為。政府為什麼要對爪哇蛋糕（Jaffa cakes）課徵較低的增值稅，從而誘導消費者選擇它而非巧克力消化餅乾？當企業竭力爭取讓自家產品符合零稅率標準時，也會浪費資源。給予優惠稅率的理由通常是基於「收入分配」考量：窮人將更多收入花在零稅率商品上，因此轉向統一稅率對他們的傷害更大。衛生棉條的增值稅是由女性而非男性支付，因此任何廢除該稅種的舉動都會將財富重新分配給女性。（男士刮鬍刀適用的是 20% 的全額增值稅率，並非如過去某些倡議者所聲稱的 0%。） 更根本的問題在於，增值稅是否為進行財富重分配的最佳方式。理想稅務體系的其中一種藍圖，是對所有最終消費課徵統一的增值稅，然後利用直接稅和福利體系來承擔財富重分配的重任。這樣可以最大限度地減少扭曲現象，消除政府對特定消費偏好的干預，並讓稅務和福利體系的不同環節各司其職。然而，即便是最純粹主義的經濟學者也能看出，這在政治操作上極具難度。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China’s mysterious new billionaires are conquering the world And refusing to talk to the press   Jul 19th 2026|Shanghai|7 min read   Early last year, when DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial-intelligence lab, was causing panic among its Western rivals, almost nothing was known about Liang Wenfeng, its founder. Mr Liang remains a mysterious figure, but at least one thing is clear. As DeepSeek closes a funding round valuing it at $71bn, its founder’s personal wealth has soared to roughly $38bn—making him far wealthier than Anthropic’s Dario Amodei or OpenAI’s Sam Altman.   Mr Liang will not be spotted on the conference circuit. He has never appeared live on Chinese TV, and there are few photos of his unpolished, wiry figure. That puts him at home among the new generation of young Chinese billionaires. The country is cranking out more of them than anywhere else bar America. According to Hurun, which tracks the riches of the world’s wealthiest people, there are at least 29 self-made billionaires aged 40 or under in China. Adding Mr Liang, who will turn 41 at some point this year, brings the total to 30. That is nine more than last year.   China’s new tycoons differ from their predecessors in striking ways. They have abandoned property speculation and boozy dinners with officials for video games and meet-ups over Japanese anime. But they are also adept at taking imaginative ideas and scaling them into global businesses faster than any before them. The history of China’s uber-rich is short. In the 1980s tycoons figured out how to wrest assets from the state. Zhang Ruimin, a member of a troupe of students who terrorised teachers and intellectuals during Mao’s era, got hold of a state-owned refrigerator business called Haier and turned it into what is now the world’s largest home-appliance maker. The opening of the property market in the 1990s minted another early group of billionaires including Xu Jiayin, founder of Evergrande, a now-collapsed property developer. In the early 2000s industrialists such as Wang Chuanfu of BYD, originally a battery maker, launched a wave of manufacturing firms as China entered the World Trade Organisation. And then in the 2010s the consumer internet produced China’s first generation of tech moguls, including Jack Ma of Alibaba, an e-commerce giant, and Pony Ma of Tencent, maker of WeChat. The founders of ByteDance, creator of TikTok, and Shein, the online fast-fashion firm, who are both now in their early 40s, built their fortunes a few years later.   China’s new generation of tycoons are charting out a different path. More than two-thirds of the young billionaires on Hurun’s rich list made their money from consumer goods or media. Seven created video games; four built tea or coffee businesses. After Mr Liang, the wealthiest is Wang Ning, founder of Pop Mart, maker of the strange-looking Labubu dolls. Only three have struck it rich with AI, including Yang Zhilin, the baby-faced 34-year-old founder of Moonshot AI, which on July 17th released a new model that is said to rival the best from America. No property mogul makes the list—perhaps unsurprisingly, given how the sector has fared in recent years.   The businesses built by China’s new billionaires are also far more global than in the past. It once took a decade or more for Chinese entrepreneurs to figure out foreign expansion. No longer. Zhang Junjie, the 33-year-old founder of Chagee, a milk-tea shop, launched his firm in 2017 and opened his first overseas shop just two years later. The company is now listed in New York and operating in nine countries.   The new tycoons’ heavy reliance on foreign markets partly reflects the slump in consumer spending at home. Around 80% of sales at Dreame, a consumer-electronics brand founded by 39-year-old Yu Hao, come from overseas. Insta360, which sells small waterproof cameras, is almost as reliant on foreign demand. Pop Mart made more than $2bn in sales outside China last year, about 40% of its total. Chagee’s sales at home have slumped, but overseas they are growing healthily.   Attitudes to work are also different among this cohort. A controversial part of Chinese business culture for the past decade or so has been the so-called “996” routine, working from 9am to 9pm six days a week. The idea was championed by Alibaba’s Mr Ma and embraced by other local tech giants. At Pinduoduo, another e-commerce platform, young white-collar staff have died from overwork on their way home from the office. China’s new entrepreneurs, by contrast, have adopted a more relaxed approach to management. Many are relatively flexible about working times. Liu Wei, the 39-year-old billionaire co-founder of miHoYo, a gaming firm, has eschewed presenteeism. He has overseen what the company calls its “happy work, steady growth” approach, which prioritises mental health (though one employee also recently died from complications related to overwork, suggesting that cultural norms are hard to shift). DeepSeek’s Mr Liang has reportedly said that the human brain can concentrate only for 6-8 hours a day, and that overwork leads to mistakes.   The willingness of workers to put in longer hours than anyone else in the world is what has built the Chinese economy over the past 30 years, huffs one private-equity investor, who recently visited an up-and-coming consumer brand and did not like what he saw. Some blame the relatively laid-back attitude of China’s young founders on cushy upbringings. Gone are the tales told by earlier tycoons of struggling for survival amid the country’s political and economic convulsions. Among China’s young billionaires, only Mr Liang and Mr Zhang of Chagee grew up poor. The three founders of miHoYo originally bonded over Japanese cartoons and formed their company as a celebration of gaming and comics. The founder of MiniMax, an AI lab, is so fond of a multi-player game called “Dota 2” that his staff refer to him as “IO”, a character from it.   To get rich is perilous   It is not all rosy for China’s young billionaires. The relationship between China’s government and its wealthiest people has deteriorated over the past few years. Older magnates once viewed themselves as part of a nation-building project. The property sector, which contributed up to a quarter of China’s GDP at its peak, was a collaborative effort between private entrepreneurs and local officials. Mr Ma was instrumental in building China’s digital economy. But the central government has now punished many prominent figures in these areas. Leverage has been sucked out of the property industry. Mr Ma’s business empire became the subject of a state crackdown in 2020 after he criticized regulators. Xi Jinping, China’s ruler, has sought to tamp down inequality under the slogan of “common prosperity”.   In 2021 Zhong Shanshan, the 71-year-old founder of Nongfu, a bottled-water company, reached a net worth of nearly $100bn. No one has since come close, including Mr. Zhong, who has seen his wealth plunge to around $39bn as the share price of his company has slumped. Mr. Ma is worth roughly a fifth as much as in 2021, and many other internet moguls have suffered similarly. Still, they have fared better than property magnates, a number of whom have been detained.   This environment has created a sense of disillusionment among China’s young billionaires. Many are eager to engage in industrial policy but are given little opportunity to do so, notes Steven Hai of Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University. Their global ambitions also leave them exposed to souring relations between China and America. Xiao Hong, the 33-year-old founder of Manus, another AI firm, would have become a billionaire earlier this year if the Chinese government had not stopped him from selling his company to Meta, an American tech giant.   These innovators live with the sense that the businesses they have built could be derailed at any time by sudden policy changes in China or America, notes Rupert Hoogewerf of Hurun. By shunning publicity they seem to believe they can survive for longer, he says. Most young Chinese billionaires have never spoken to foreign media. (None would speak to The Economist.) Many avoid the Chinese press as well. The result is a generation of tycoons that is both China’s most global yet—and its most enigmatic. ■ 中國神秘的新億萬富豪正在征服世界，卻拒絕接受媒體採訪 2026年7月19日｜上海｜閱讀時間：7分鐘 去年年初，當中國人工智慧實驗室 DeepSeek 讓西方競爭對手陷入恐慌時，外界幾乎對它的創辦人梁文鋒一無所知。 如今，梁文鋒依然是一個相當神秘的人物，但至少有一件事已經很清楚：隨著 DeepSeek 即將完成一輪募資，公司估值達到 710億美元，其創辦人的個人財富也暴增至大約 380億美元。這讓他的身家遠遠超過 Anthropic 的 達里奧・阿莫迪（Dario Amodei），以及 OpenAI 的 山姆・奧特曼（Sam Altman）。 梁文鋒不會出現在各種商業會議或產業論壇的巡迴活動上。 他從未在中國電視節目上公開現場露面，而網路上流傳的照片也寥寥可數，能看到的通常是他那副不修邊幅、身材瘦削的模樣。 這讓他與中國新一代的年輕億萬富豪十分相似。 中國正在大量培養這一代年輕富豪，數量僅次於美國。 根據追蹤全球富豪財富的胡潤研究院（Hurun），中國至少有 29名40歲以下的白手起家億萬富豪。 如果把今年某個時候即將滿41歲的梁文鋒也算進去，總數就來到 30人，比去年多了9人。 中國的新一代企業大亨，和他們的前輩有著非常明顯的不同。 他們拋棄了房地產投機，也不再熱衷於和官員吃豪華宴席；取而代之的，是打電玩、聚在一起聊日本動漫。 但另一方面，他們也非常擅長把充滿想像力的點子，迅速擴大成為全球性的企業，而且速度可能超越過去任何一代中國企業家。 中國超級富豪的歷史其實很短 中國超級富豪的歷史其實相當短暫。 到了1980年代，一些企業家開始摸索如何從國家手中取得資產。 張瑞敏就是其中之一。 在毛澤東時代，他曾是那群恐嚇教師與知識分子的學生組織成員之一。後來，他取得了一家名為 海爾（Haier）的國營冰箱企業，並將它發展成如今全球最大的家電製造商。 1990年代，房地產市場開放，又造就了另一批早期億萬富豪，其中包括許家印，也就是如今已經倒閉的房地產開發商恆大集團創辦人。 進入2000年代初期，隨著中國加入世界貿易組織，一批製造業企業家掀起了新一波企業創業潮。 其中包括 比亞迪（BYD）的王傳福。比亞迪最初是一家電池製造商。 接著，到了2010年代，消費型網際網路產業又孕育出中國第一代科技巨頭。 其中包括電子商務巨頭阿里巴巴的馬雲，以及打造微信的騰訊創辦人馬化騰。 幾年後，字節跳動（ByteDance）和Shein的創辦人也建立起自己的龐大財富。 字節跳動打造了 TikTok，而 Shein 則是一家主打線上快時尚的企業。 如今，這兩家公司的創辦人都已經40歲出頭。 新一代富豪正在走出不同的道路 中國新一代企業大亨正在開闢一條不同的道路。 根據胡潤富豪榜，年輕億萬富豪中，有超過三分之二靠消費品或媒體產業致富。 其中有7人靠開發電子遊戲創造財富；4人則建立了茶飲或咖啡事業。 排在梁文鋒之後、身家第二高的是王寧，他是潮玩公司 泡泡瑪特（Pop Mart）的創辦人，而泡泡瑪特最知名的產品，就是外型奇特的 Labubu 娃娃。 只有3人靠人工智慧致富，其中包括34歲、長著一張娃娃臉的 楊植麟。 他是 AI 公司 Moonshot AI 的創辦人。7月17日，這家公司推出了一個新模型，據稱可以與美國最頂尖的 AI 模型抗衡。 至於房地產大亨，則一個都沒有進入這份榜單。 考慮到中國房地產業近年的表現，這或許並不令人意外。 他們從一開始就把目光放向全球 中國新一代億萬富豪所建立的企業，也比過去更加全球化。 過去，中國企業家往往需要花上10年甚至更久，才能摸索出進軍海外市場的方法。 現在已經不同了。 張俊傑今年33歲，是奶茶品牌 霸王茶姬（Chagee）的創辦人。 他在2017年創立公司，僅僅兩年後，就開設了第一家海外門市。 如今，這家公司已在紐約上市，並且已經進入9個國家。 新一代企業大亨高度依賴海外市場，部分原因其實也反映了中國國內消費支出的低迷。 以消費電子品牌 追覓（Dreame）為例。 這家公司由39歲的俞浩創立，大約 80%的銷售額來自海外市場。 銷售小型防水相機的 Insta360，對海外需求的依賴程度也幾乎一樣高。 泡泡瑪特去年在中國以外市場創造了超過 20億美元的銷售額，約占公司總營收的40%。 霸王茶姬在中國國內的銷售額已經下滑，但海外市場卻仍然保持健康成長。 他們對工作的態度也不一樣 這一代年輕富豪對工作的態度，也與前人有所不同。 過去十年左右，中國商業文化中一個極具爭議的現象，就是所謂的 「996」工作制度。 也就是每天早上9點工作到晚上9點，一週工作6天。 這種工作模式曾受到阿里巴巴馬雲的推崇，也被其他中國科技巨頭所採用。 在另一家電子商務平台拼多多，甚至曾有年輕白領因過度工作，在下班回家的路上死亡。 相比之下，中國的新一代企業家採取了更加輕鬆的管理方式。 許多人對工作時間相對彈性。 39歲的億萬富豪劉偉是遊戲公司 米哈遊（miHoYo）的共同創辦人之一。 他並不鼓勵員工只是為了「被看見」而長時間待在辦公室。 他推動公司所稱的 「快樂工作，穩定成長」理念，把心理健康放在重要位置。 不過，最近仍有一名員工因與過勞有關的併發症死亡，這也顯示，要改變根深蒂固的文化規範並不容易。 據報導，DeepSeek 的梁文鋒曾表示，人類的大腦一天只能維持大約 6到8小時的高度專注，而過度工作只會導致更多錯誤。 「正是比世界上任何人都更願意加班，才打造了中國經濟」 一名最近造訪某個新興消費品牌的私募股權投資人對此頗有微詞。 他表示，過去30年來，正是中國人願意比世界上任何其他地方的人投入更長工時，才建立起了中國經濟。 但他最近參訪一家正在崛起的消費品牌時，卻不喜歡自己看到的情況。 有些人則把中國年輕創辦人相對悠閒的工作態度，歸因於他們從小過著較為優渥的生活。 早期企業大亨經常講述的那種故事——在中國劇烈的政治與經濟動盪中努力求生——如今已經逐漸消失。 在中國年輕億萬富豪當中，只有梁文鋒以及霸王茶姬的張俊傑出身貧困。 米哈遊的3位創辦人，最初就是因為喜歡日本動漫而結識，後來更以遊戲與漫畫為共同熱情創辦了公司。 AI 實驗室 MiniMax 的創辦人則非常喜歡多人線上遊戲 《Dota 2》。 他的員工甚至以遊戲中的一個角色 「IO」來稱呼他。 致富並非沒有風險 中國年輕億萬富豪的故事，並非一切都如此美好。 過去幾年，中國政府與最富有階層之間的關係已經惡化。 早期的企業大亨曾經把自己視為國家建設計畫的一部分。 房地產業在高峰時期曾占中國 GDP 的四分之一，這個產業曾是民營企業家與地方官員共同合作的結果。 馬雲也曾在建立中國數位經濟的過程中扮演重要角色。 但如今，中國中央政府已經對這些領域中的許多知名人物採取懲罰性措施。 房地產業的槓桿資金已被大幅抽離。 2020年，馬雲批評金融監管機構之後，他所建立的商業帝國便成為政府整頓的對象。 中國領導人習近平則以「共同富裕」為口號，試圖降低社會貧富差距。 2021年，71歲的農夫山泉創辦人鍾睒睒，身家一度接近 1000億美元。 此後，再也沒有人接近這個數字，包括鍾睒睒本人。 隨著農夫山泉股價下跌，他的財富已縮水至大約 390億美元。 馬雲如今的身家，大約只有2021年時的五分之一。 許多其他網路產業巨頭也遭遇類似的財富縮水。 不過，他們的處境仍比房地產大亨好一些，因為後者當中已有不少人遭到拘留。 年輕富豪開始感到失望 這樣的環境，也讓中國年輕億萬富豪產生了一種失落感。 西交利物浦大學（Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University）的 Steven Hai 指出，許多年輕富豪其實非常希望參與中國的產業政策，但政府給他們的機會卻相當有限。 另一方面，他們的全球化野心，也讓自己暴露在中美關係惡化的風險之中。 肖弘今年33歲，是另一家 AI 公司 Manus 的創辦人。 如果不是中國政府阻止他把公司出售給美國科技巨頭 Meta，他早在今年稍早就可能成為億萬富豪。 胡潤研究院的 胡潤（Rupert Hoogewerf）指出，這些創新者始終生活在一種不安之中： 他們辛苦建立起來的企業，隨時都有可能因為中國或美國突然改變政策，而被迫偏離原本的發展軌道。 他認為，這些企業家選擇避開媒體曝光，似乎是因為他們相信，這樣可以讓自己的企業存活得更久。 大多數中國年輕億萬富豪從未接受過外國媒體採訪。 《經濟學人》也沒有一個人願意接受採訪。 許多人甚至也刻意避開中國媒體。 最終形成了一個既是中國最全球化的一代企業大亨，同時也是最神秘莫測的一代。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The six stages of holiday-making Two weeks off, but how many days of relaxation? Aug 13th 2026|4 min read   It’s summer, in the northern hemisphere at least, which means emptier offices and fuller airports. In theory, a holiday is a time to properly relax. In practice, there are several stages to pass through before that moment arrives, and several more to experience before you are fully immersed in work again.   1.    The preparation phase. You badly need a holiday. In your final couple of days before leaving, you complete your most urgent tasks, like tidying your desk. You tell people on your team that you trust them completely and in the same breath, that they should contact you if anything comes up, no matter how trivial. As a result, they don’t feel trusted at all. You think about setting up an out-of-office message and decide not to: it’s really not a problem to check your phone occasionally. As you leave the office, you think you feel a cold coming on. 2.    The relax-like-hell phase. You spend the first few days approaching the holiday like it’s work. You spend loads of time asking AI models for places to go that are off the beaten track. In a typical morning, you drive two hours to eat breakfast at a place recommended by ChatGPT which turns out to be closed, and then visit a museum devoted to the ancient craft of curing fish.   At lunch, you drink wine and then fall asleep. You think of this period of unconsciousness as time that could have been spent relaxing. You are acutely aware of time passing, your days of freedom slipping away. You pick up a book and instead of reading it, worry that you could be enjoying your leisure in even more leisurely ways. You feel very tense for someone on holiday.   3.    The letting-go phase. Meanwhile, you check your email every so often, and intervene in things you don’t need to. You get a couple of WhatsApp messages and are asked to join a call, and feel both irritated and pleased. Can’t you do it without me? You can’t do it without me! As you triage messages, sorting them into things that have to be dealt with quickly and those that can wait, you gradually realise just how much of what goes on each week a) doesn’t require you at all and b) has no lasting value. You start to ignore most messages; if it’s important, they will find a way to contact you. You switch on your out-of-office message.   4.    The delusional phase. Finally, you start to relax. You lie in a little longer. You don’t look at your phone quite as much. You realise that back in the office the weekly sales meeting is happening right at this very minute, and you laugh out loud at the smallness of your old life. Fairly soon, you start to lose your grip on reality. You think about moving to wherever it is you are, forgetting that you are enjoying yourself because the weather is nice and you are not working. You start trying to figure out how soon you can retire. You fantasise about working outdoors, perhaps in sea-kayaking or doing something artisanal to a dry-stone wall.   5.    The motivated phase. The end of the holiday is fast approaching. You realise that sea-kayaking gives you blisters and that the things you are best equipped to do don’t involve dry-stone walls. You start to look at emails again, but only the ones that matter. You feel motivated to return. You have seen how much time is spent on unimportant things and are determined to prioritise much more ruthlessly. You have some really good ideas about how to improve the weekly sales meeting.   6.    The recidivism phase. You return to the office full of vim. You look and feel healthier than your colleagues. Then you have the same conversation 800 times. “How was your holiday?” “Wonderful.” “Where did you go?” [Insert answer.] “What did you do there?” [Insert details.] You soon realise that no one is interested in where you went and start to make up responses. “Where did you go?” “Wakanda.” “What did you do?” “We visited the vibranium mines.” “Oh, I’ve always wanted to do that.”   It’s nice to see people. It’s good to have a sense of purpose. But you quickly revert to old habits. An empty calendar feels less like ruthless prioritisation and more like a public display of redundancy; the slots soon fill up again. When emails come in, you answer them indiscriminately. Your desk becomes more cluttered. You attend the weekly sales meeting and dimly recall that you once had an idea for improving it. Colleagues come back from their own breaks and you ask how their holidays were. You are not listening to the answers. They seem so well, so energetic. You think you feel another cold coming on. You badly need a holiday. ■ 度假的六個階段 兩週假期，但真正放鬆的又有幾天？ 2026年8月13日 | 閱讀時間 4 分鐘 夏天到了——至少在北半球是如此——這意味著辦公室空了，機場卻擠滿了人。理論上，度假是一個能讓人徹底放鬆的時刻；但在現實中，在那個時刻到來之前，你必須先經歷幾個階段，而在你重新完全沉浸於工作之前，還有另外幾個階段等著你。 準備階段。 你急需放個假。在離辦公室前的最後兩天，你完成了最緊迫的工作，比如整理乾淨你的辦公桌。你告訴團隊成員你完全信任他們，但緊接著又說，如果有任何事情發生，不管多麼微不足道，都可以隨時聯繫你。結果，他們根本感覺不到自己被信任。你考慮要設定「不在辦公室」的自動回覆信件，但最後決定不設：偶爾看一眼手機真的沒什麼大不了的。當你離開辦公室時，你覺得自己好像有點感冒了。 拼命放鬆階段。 你把前幾天的假期過得像是在上班一樣。你花了大量時間詢問 AI 模型有哪些遠離喧囂的冷門景點。在一個典型的早晨，你開了兩個小時的車去吃一家 ChatGPT 推薦的早餐，結果發現它根本沒開，接著你又去參觀了一間展示古代醃魚工藝的博物館。 午餐時，你喝了葡萄酒，然後睡著了。你把這段無意識的時間視為「本可用於放鬆」的時間。你極度敏感地意識到時間的流逝，自由的日子正在悄悄溜走。你拿起一本書，但沒有閱讀，反而擔心自己本可以利用更悠閒的方式來享受閒暇時光。作為一個在度假的人，你感到非常緊張。 放手階段。 與此同時，你隔三差五地檢查郵件，干預一些你根本不需要插手的事情。你收到幾條 WhatsApp 訊息，並被邀請加入視訊會議，這讓你感到既煩躁又高興。沒有我你們就辦不成事嗎？你們還真的沒我不行！當你對訊息進行分類 triage，將它們分為「必須快速處理」和「可以等等再說」時，你逐漸意識到每週發生的事情中有多少是：a) 根本不需要你；b) 完全沒有長遠價值。你開始忽視大多數訊息；如果真的重要，他們總會找到方法聯繫你。你終於開啟了「不在辦公室」的自動回覆。 幻想階段。 終於，你開始放鬆了。你睡得稍微久了一點，看手機的次數也沒那麼頻繁了。你意識到此時此刻，辦公室裡正召開著每週銷售會議，你對自己過去那渺小的生活發出陣陣會心的冷笑。很快地，你開始脫離現實。你想著搬到你現在度假的地方生活，卻忘了你之所以開心是因為天氣很好且你不用工作。你開始嘗試計算自己多久之後可以退休。你幻想著在戶外工作，也許是划海上皮划艇，或是對著乾砌石牆做些手工藝活。 動力階段。 假期的尾聲迅速逼近。你意識到划皮划艇會讓你起水泡，而你最擅長做的事情根本與乾砌石牆無關。你重新開始看郵件，但只看那些真正重要的。你感到有一股返回工作的動力。你看到了有多少時間被浪費在不重要的事情上，並決心要更狠心地排出優先順序。對於如何改進每週銷售會議，你產生了一些非常棒的想法。 舊病復發階段。 你滿懷活力地回到辦公室。你看起來、感覺起來都比同事們更健康。然後你把同一段對話重複了 800 次。「假期過得怎麼樣？」「太棒了。」「去哪裡了？」（插入答案）「在那裡做了什麼？」（插入細節）。你很快意識到根本沒有人對你去哪裡感興趣，並開始編造回答。「你去哪裡了？」「瓦干達（Wakanda）。」「做了什麼？」「我們去參觀了汎合金（Vibranium）礦山。」「噢，我一直想去那裡。」 能見到大家真好，擁有目標感也很不錯。但你很快就重蹈覆轍。空白的行事曆看起來不再像是狠心排序優先順序的成果，反而更像是公開展示自己是個贅員；日程很快又被排滿了。當郵件寄來時，你不加篩選地一一回覆。你的辦公桌變得越來越凌亂。你參加每週銷售會議，隱約想起自己曾經有一個改進它的好主意。同事們陸續休假歸來，你問他們假期過得如何。你根本沒有在聽答案。他們看起來那麼健康、那麼精力充沛。你覺得自己好像又有點感冒了。你急需放個假。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How much would you pay for a smarter baby? Startups claim they can screen embryos for everything from genetic diseases to IQ. Not everyone is convinced   Aug 10th 2026|San Francisco and New York|9 min read   Late last year New Yorkers noticed a series of strange advertisements on the subway. “Have your best baby,” one promised. “IQ is 50% genetic,” noted another. Predictably, they stirred controversy. Yet Kian Sadeghi of Nucleus, the embryo-screening startup behind them, was pleased. “This is a mass-market product. What’s a better way of showing that it’s a mass-market product than the subway?”   Nucleus is one of a growing number of Silicon Valley startups pushing the nascent technology. Noor Siddiqui of Orchid, a competitor, likes to say that “sex is for fun; embryo screening is for babies”. Herasight, another rival, began offering a screening service last year that allows parents to examine an embryo’s risk of various diseases, and also estimates of its height, intelligence and longevity—at a cost of up to $50,000. Nucleus adds hair and eye colour to the mix. The burgeoning industry aspires to reshape the way humans are made.   Not everyone is pleased. In many jurisdictions, including Britain, screening embryos for sex, let alone for polygenic conditions such as hypertension or physical traits such as height, is illegal. Many geneticists and doctors’ groups are sceptical that the technology works. Others say it is unethical. In America, where regulation is looser, religious conservatives and adherents of the “Make America Healthy Again” movement are vehemently opposed.   The startups’ visions may seem otherworldly. But change is coming fast. Cash is pouring into fertility research, leading to potentially rapid advances in genetic testing. Polygenic screening, particularly for common diseases, is popular among Americans, nearly three-quarters of whom say they would use it if they were already undergoing in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). A fight is brewing over the future of these technologies—and the businesses promoting them.   For the moment, only a tiny share of babies are born via IVF, as is necessary for embryo screening. In 2024, the most recent year for which figures are available, 100,000 American babies were created using the process, representing 2.8% of the total. David Sable, an investor and formerly a practising reproductive endocrinologist, says the global fertility market is commonly estimated to be worth just $25-30bn a year.   Yet Silicon Valley’s interest in fertility could expand access to IVF. Several years ago Peter Thiel and Elon Musk began to speak about low birth rates as a threat to America, and started putting money into fertility startups. They were joined by other investors. American venture-capital (VC) investments in fertility enterprises nearly doubled between 2019 and 2022, jumping from $254m to $496m, according to PitchBook, a data provider, even if they have since slowed a bit.   Many of these startups are focused on making IVF cheaper. At present, only 15 American states require the treatment to be included in insurers’ maternity benefits, meaning most Americans pay out of pocket. To reduce costs, a number of startups are selling fertility insurance and payment plans. Nader al-Salim of Gaia, one such firm, says its services save patients an average of $15,000 over the entire fertility process, largely by pooling risk.   Dr Sable reckons that if IVF does become much more widely available, the embryo-screening market could grow to $400-500bn annually. His estimate assumes the cost will fall to around $15,000 for the entire process; currently, just one cycle of IVF in America costs $15,000-20,000. Dr Sable reckons that prices will drop thanks to technological innovations which may increase success rates, allowing people to go through fewer cycles. Falling labour costs, as a result of automation and economies of scale, as well as greater standardisation should also help.   Some screening is already common among IVF patients. One example is PGT-A, which checks embryos have the right number of chromosomes, and which some studies claim lowers the miscarriage risk (many experts are sceptical). Certain clinics also offer PGT-M, which checks for disorders caused by a single gene, such as cystic fibrosis or Huntington’s. Now startups are adding a third screen: PGT-P, which scores embryos for conditions and traits determined by multiple genes, potentially ranging from certain cancers to eye colour and IQ. Demand for such tests could be substantial. A survey published in 2023 in *Science *found that 43% of all IVF participants would use polygenic screening to increase their child’s chance of getting into an elite university, provided it were safe and free. A third said the same for genetic editing.   Consider Arthur Zey, a software engineer, and his husband Chase Popp, a teacher. Mr Zey says he has always been a “tech nerd” and wanted to apply his skills to the process of having a child. “Most of my professional career I’ve been a product manager in tech, and so in some ways this is just like another product to manage,” he says. Earlier this year the couple had a son using an embryo selected from a group of six on the basis of the results of polygenic screening provided by Herasight. That allowed them to see risk scores for monogenic diseases and more than a dozen polygenic diseases. The startup also gave them predicted ranges for IQ and height.   Messrs Zey and Popp say they hoped to maximise their son’s lifespan, rather than his height or IQ. Yet Mr Zey knows there are advantages to being tall and smart. “All I could do is look at the results for my six embryos and say: ‘Okay, it kind of seems like this one is better.’”   The burden of perfection   For now, Messrs Zey and Popp are unusual. Commercial PGT-P screening is a niche industry. Startups like Herasight cater to a small population of typically very rich people, mostly in America. Even so, that has not stopped them from drawing plenty of criticism.   Some concerns the underlying science. Polygenic risk scores are based on genome-wide association studies (GWAS), which use data from large populations to try to discern associations between genetic variants and specific conditions and traits. Companies that offer screening claim that comparing embryos’ genomes to risk scores derived from these databases, sometimes with adjustments based on ancestry and family history, allows them to come up with individual assessments.   That is disputed, however. Although selecting on the basis of polygenic risk scores works across many offspring, as in animal breeding, it is less sure to have the desired result for a single child, notes Kevin Mitchell of Trinity College Dublin. For example, an embryo’s genome may have a single rare variant that has a large effect on its likelihood of developing a certain condition, but which would be unlikely to surface in population-level correlations.   Herasight attempts to deal with this issue by validating its risk scores using sibling data from GWAS datasets to ensure its models retain predictive value within a single family. It claims that, if it tests ten embryos for a couple where both parents have type-2 diabetes, it can reduce their child’s absolute risk of developing the condition by 12-20 percentage points, from a baseline of 40-60%. Herasight has been critical of competitors, particularly Nucleus, for not providing more detailed public information about their methodology. (Nucleus, for its part, says it is working constantly to ensure its scores are accurate.)   Some also argue that the magnitude of the benefits from embryo screening are overstated. If parents picked from ten viable embryos, the median boost to their child’s height would be 2.9cm, according to a paper in *Cell *in 2019, based on technology at the time. If they selected for IQ, the gain would be three points—unlikely to be life-changing. Moreover, for those picking among fewer than five embryos, the expected gains drop precipitously. Although the average number of viable embryos depends on the patient’s age, in many cases it is closer to two or three from each IVF cycle. Dagan Wells of the University of Oxford adds that, for many conditions, genes are less important than environmental factors such as diet. Selecting against some traits could also have unintended consequences. Genetic material can have different effects in different parts of the body, a phenomenon called pleiotropy. If parents select an embryo intending to lower their child’s risk of a certain disease, they may be neglecting or exacerbating problems for which providers do not (or cannot) offer a score.   Yet many of the technical issues, not least the lack of training data among certain populations, should improve with time. The *Cell *paper estimated that increasing the sample size of the underlying databases could double the median gain in IQ points from polygenic scoring. Or consider the effects of rare genetic variants. As databases grow, artificial-intelligence models may be better able to account for the effects of individual variants. With pleiotropy, some studies suggest that most genetic correlations between pairs of polygenic diseases are either positive—meaning cutting the chance of one decreases the chance of others—or insignificant. At present, the technology is “kind of a promissory note”, says Trinity’s Dr Mitchell. “They say, ‘Trust us, this is a bit shit right now, but it’ll be good soon’.”   If technological problems are resolved, ethical ones will only grow. Disability-rights groups are already wary of PGT-M, worrying it suggests lives with certain genetic conditions are not worth living. The rise in use of PGT-P widens that debate to many more traits. Then there are opponents who are concerned that screening startups are promoting a friendlier version of eugenics. Some worry that embryo editing—on which America has applied a de-facto ban since 2016—could come next.   Industry insiders reject the fretting, sometimes bluntly. Risk scores may not be perfect, but they are “best in class”, says Delian Asparouhov of Founders Fund, a VC firm co-founded by Mr Thiel, which has invested in various fertility startups. “What I hate about some of the traditional health-care industry and genetic counsellors is they’re like, ‘You need to have a Harvard clinical-grade license’” to interpret genetic data. “Fuck that,” he continues. “I just want whatever the best statistical models are. I don’t need a PhD to read this stuff.” (Herasight, Nucleus and Orchid all have genetic counsellors to walk clients through their results.) As for ethics, Mr Asparouhov argues that all parents-to-be engage in a form of genetic selection when they choose a partner. “If this is eugenics, then so is Hinge,” he argues.   Most of the companies offering PGT-P are more circumspect. They say their customers are mainly looking for ways to ensure their children are healthy, rather than to create “super-babies”. Yet their decision to offer scores for intelligence and aesthetic traits suggests they recognise there is a market for the latter.   Arguments over the future of a small cohort of startups may seem like a niche concern. But if IVF gets cheaper and genetic data more abundant, as looks likely, the business of embryo screening will only grow—along with the ferocity of the debate. The nearly 50-year history of the fertility industry is full of technologies that were once contentious, including IVF. Startups like Nucleus, Orchid and Herasight are, in that sense at least, nothing new. ■   為了更聰明的寶寶，你願意付出多少代價？   新創公司聲稱他們可以對胚胎進行篩檢，範圍涵蓋從遺傳疾病到智商的一切。但並非所有人對此深信不疑 2026年8月10日 | 舊金山與紐約 | 閱讀時間 9 分鐘   去年底，紐約人注意到地鐵上出現了一系列奇怪的廣告。「擁有你最好的寶寶，」其中一張承諾道。「智商有 50% 取決於遺傳，」另一張寫著。不出所料，這些廣告引發了爭議。然而，背後這家胚胎篩檢新創公司 Nucleus 的基安·薩德吉（Kian Sadeghi）卻對此感到高興。「這是一個大眾市場產品。有什麼比地鐵更能展示它是一個大眾市場產品的方式呢？」 Nucleus 是越來越多推動這項新興技術的矽谷新創公司之一。競爭對手 Orchid 的努爾·西迪基（Noor Siddiqui）喜歡說：「性愛是為了樂趣；胚胎篩檢是為了寶寶。」另一家對手公司 Herasight 於去年開始提供一項篩檢服務，讓父母能夠檢查胚胎患有各種疾病的風險，並且還能預估其身高、智力與壽命——費用高達 50,000 美元。Nucleus 甚至將髮色和瞳孔顏色也納入考量。這個蓬勃發展的產業渴望重塑人類的誕生方式。   並非所有人都為此感到高興。在許多管轄區（包括英國），篩檢胚胎的性別，更不用說篩檢高血壓等多基因疾病或身高這種身體特徵，都是違法的。許多基因學家和醫生團體對這項技術是否有效持懷疑態度。其他人則表示這不符合倫理。在法規較為鬆散的美國，宗教保守派以及「讓美國再次健康」（Make America Healthy Again）運動的支持者皆對此強烈反對。 這些新創公司的願景可能看起來恍如隔世。但改變正在迅速降臨。資金正源源不絕地湧入生育研究，引領著基因檢測領域潛在的飛速進展。多基因篩檢，特別是用於常見疾病的篩檢，在美國人當中相當受歡迎，如果已經在接受體外受精（IVF，即試管嬰兒），近四分之三的人表示他們會使用它。一場關於這些技術的未來——以及推廣它們的企業——的爭霸戰正在醞釀中。   目前，只有極小比例的嬰兒是透過試管嬰兒出生，而這是進行胚胎篩檢所必需的。在有數據可查的最新年份 2024 年，有 100,000 名美國嬰兒是透過這種方式孕育的，占總數的 2.8%。大衛·塞博（David Sable）是一位投資人，過去曾是執業的生殖內分泌學家，他表示，全球生育市場的年價值普遍估計僅為 250 億至 300 億美元。   然而，矽谷對生育領域的興趣可能會擴大使用試管嬰兒的途徑。幾年前，彼得·提爾（Peter Thiel）和伊隆·馬斯克（Elon Musk）開始將低出生率視為對美國的威脅，並開始將資金投入生育新創公司。其他投資人也加入他們的行列。根據數據提供商 PitchBook 的資料，美國風險投資（VC）對生育企業的投資在 2019 年至 2022 年間幾乎翻倍，從 2.54 億美元躍升至 4.96 億美元，即使此後稍微有所放緩。   這些新創公司中有許多正專注於讓試管嬰兒變得更便宜。目前，僅有 15 個美國州要求將此治療納入保險公司的生育福利中，這意味著大多數美國人需要自費。為了降低成本，許多新創公司正在銷售生育保險和付款計劃。其中一家公司 Gaia 的納德·薩利姆（Nader al-Salim）表示，他們的服務主要透過分散風險，在整個生育過程中平均為患者節省 15,000 美元。 塞博醫師估計，如果試管嬰兒真的變得更加普及，胚胎篩檢市場可能會成長到每年 4000 億至 5000 億美元。他的估算假設整個過程的費用將降至 15,000 美元左右；目前，在美國僅一個試管嬰兒週期就需要花費 15,000 至 20,000 美元。塞博醫師認為，由於技術創新可能會提高成功率，從而使人們能經歷更少的週期，價格將會下降。自動化和規模經濟帶來的勞動力成本下降，以及更高度的標準化，應該也會有所幫助。   某些篩檢在試管嬰兒患者中已經相當普遍。一個例子是 PGT-A，它能檢查胚胎是否擁有正確數量的染色體，且有些研究聲稱這能降低流產風險（許多專家對此持懷疑態度）。某些診所還提供 PGT-M，用於檢查由單一基因引起的疾病，如囊腫性纖維化或亨廷頓氏舞蹈症。   現在，新創公司正在添加第三種篩檢：PGT-P，它能對由多個基因決定的狀況和特徵進行評分，潛在範圍從某些癌症到瞳孔顏色和智商。對此類檢測的需求可能相當龐大。2023 年發表在《科學》（Science）雜誌上的一項調查發現，如果有安全且免費的前提，所有試管嬰兒參與者中有 43% 會使用多基因篩檢來增加孩子進入精英大學的機會。三分之一的人對基因編輯也持相同態度。   想想軟體工程師亞瑟·澤伊（Arthur Zey）和他的丈夫，身為教師的蔡斯·普普（Chase Popp）。澤伊先生說他一直是一個「科技宅」，並希望將自己的技能應用到生育孩子的過程中。「在我的職業生涯的大部分時間裡，我都是科技領域的產品經理，因此在某些方面，這就像是另一個需要管理的產品，」他說。今年早些時候，這對伴侶利用 Herasight 提供多基因篩檢結果，從六個胚胎中挑選出一個，並誕生了一個兒子。這讓他們能夠看到單基因疾病和十幾種多基因疾病的風險評分。這家新創公司還向他們提供了智商和身高的預測範圍。 澤伊先生和普普先生表示，他們希望能最大化兒子的壽命，而不是他的身高或智商。然而，澤伊先生知道身材高大和聰明是有優勢的。「我能做的就是看看我那六個胚胎的結果，然後說：『好吧，看起來這個好像比較好。』」   完美的負擔   目前而言，澤伊先生和普普先生屬於少數。商業化的 PGT-P 篩檢是一個小眾產業。像 Herasight 這樣的新創公司服務於一小群通常非常富有的人群，主要在美國。即便如此，這並沒有阻止他們遭受大量的批評。   有些疑慮關乎背後的基礎科學。多基因風險評分是基於全基因組關聯研究（GWAS），該研究使用來自龐大人群的數據，試圖辨識基因變異與特定狀況和特徵之間的關聯。提供篩檢的公司聲稱，將胚胎的基因組與來自這些資料庫的風險評分進行比較（有時根據祖先和家族史進行調整），可以讓他們得出個體評估結果。   然而，這一點存在爭議。都柏林聖三一學院的凱文·米切爾（Kevin Mitchell）指出，雖然根據多基因風險評分進行選擇在許多後代中有效（如動物育種），但對於單一孩子來說，是否能產生預期結果就不那麼確定了。例如，一個胚胎的基因組可能有一個單一的罕見變異，這對其罹患某種狀況的可能性有很大影響，但這種變異不太可能出現在人口層面的相關性中。   Herasight 試圖透過使用來自 GWAS 資料庫的手足數據驗證其風險評分來解決這個問題，以確保其模型在單一家庭內仍保留預測價值。它聲稱，如果它為一對雙親均患有 2 型糖尿病的夫婦測試十個胚胎，它可以將他們的孩子患該疾病的絕對風險從 40-60% 的基準降低 12-20 個百分點。Herasight 一直對競爭對手（特別是 Nucleus）持批評態度，因為後者沒有就其方法論提供更詳細的公開資訊。（Nucleus 方面則表示，它正不斷努力確保其評分的準確性。）   有些人還認為，胚胎篩檢帶來的好處被誇大了。根據 2019 年發表在《細胞》（Cell）雜誌上的一篇基於當時技術的論文，如果父母從十個可用的胚胎中挑選，對孩子身高的中位數提升將是 2.9 公分。如果他們針對智商進行選擇，獲益將是三點——不太可能改變人生。此外，對於那些在少於五個胚胎中進行選擇的人來說，預期好處會急劇下降。雖然可用胚胎的平均數量取決於患者的年齡，但在許多情況下，每個試管嬰兒週期更接近兩到三個。牛津大學的大衛·威爾斯（Dagan Wells）補充說，對於許多狀況而言，基因的重要性不如飲食等環境因素。   淘汰某些特徵也可能帶來意想不到的後果。基因物質可以在身體的不同部位產生不同的影響，這種現象被稱為「多效性」（pleiotropy）。如果父母選擇一個胚胎是為了降低孩子罹患某種疾病的風險，他們可能會忽視或加重提供者沒有（或無法）提供評分的潛在問題。   然而，許多技術問題（尤其是某些人群中缺乏訓練數據的問題）應該會隨著時間的推移而得到改善。《細胞》雜誌的那篇論文估計，增加基礎資料庫的樣本量，可以使多基因評分帶來的智商點數中位數增益翻倍。或者考慮罕見基因變異的影響。隨著資料庫的擴大，人工智慧模型可能能夠更好地解釋單一變異的影響。對於多效性，一些研究表明，多基因疾病對之間的絕大多數基因相關性要麼是正相關的——意味著降低一種疾病的幾率會降低其他疾病的幾率——要麼是不顯著的。目前，這項技術「有點像一張承諾紙條」，聖三一學院的米切爾醫師說。「他們說，『相信我們，這東西現在有點爛，但很快就會變好了』。」   如果技術問題得到解決，倫理問題只會與日俱增。殘疾權益團體已經對 PGT-M 保持警惕，擔心這意味著患有某些遺傳狀況的生命不值得活下去。PGT-P 使用率的上升將這場爭論擴大到了更多的特徵上。還有一些反對者擔心，篩檢新創公司正在推廣一種更友善版本的優生學。有些人擔心胚胎編輯——美國自 2016 年以來已實施事實上的禁令——可能會是下一步。 產業內部人士拒絕這種擔憂，有時甚至相當直白。風險評分可能不完美，但它們是「同類最佳的」， Founders Fund（由提爾先生共同創立、已投資多家生育新創公司的風險投資公司）的德里安·阿斯帕魯霍夫（Delian Asparouhov）說。「我討厭某些傳統醫療保健產業和基因諮詢師的地方在於，他們會說，『你需要擁有哈佛臨床級許可證』」才能解讀基因數據。「去他的，」他繼續道。「我只要最好的統計模型。我不需要博士學位來讀這些東西。」（Herasight、Nucleus 和 Orchid 都設有基因諮詢師來引導客戶了解他們的結果。）至於倫理，阿斯帕魯霍夫先生認為，所有準父母在選擇伴侶時都在進行某種形式的基因選擇。「如果這是優生學，那麼 Hinge（交友軟體）也是了，」他爭辯道。   大多數提供 PGT-P 的公司都較為謹慎。他們表示，他們的客戶主要是尋求確保孩子健康的方法，而不是為了創造「超級寶寶」。然而，他們決定提供智力和審美特徵評分的事實表明，他們意識到後者存在市場。   關於一小群新創公司未來的爭論看似是一個小眾關注點。但是，如果試管嬰兒變得更便宜，基因數據變得更豐富（這看起來很有可能），胚胎篩檢業務只會成長——隨之而來的還有討論熱度。生育產業近 50 年的歷史充斥著曾經備受爭議的技術，包括試管嬰兒本身。像 Nucleus、Orchid 和 Herasight 這樣的新創公司，至少在這個意義上，並非什麼新鮮事。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

South Korea’s stock-market boom is collapsing** spectacularly**   It may be a harbinger   Jul 29th 2026|5 min read   America’s giant technology companies have gone from printing money to incinerating it. The market reckons Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft will collectively report negative free cashflows next year, owing to their extravagant spending on data centres. Yet real fortunes are being made today from Silicon Valley’s gamble on the future.   Three companies are expected to surpass an astonishing $200bn of free cashflow apiece next year. One is Nvidia, an American darling that designs the advanced processors needed to run artificial-intelligence models. The other two are Samsung and SK Hynix, a pair of South Korean outfits that dominate the market for the more mundane memory chips in phones, laptops and, increasingly, data centres. Their windfall represents one of the greatest cross-border transfers of cash in corporate history.   Now a nation newly enamoured of stock markets is discovering that shares can go down as well as up. Since peaking in June the stock prices of Samsung and SK Hynix have crashed by 41% and 52% respectively, wiping $1.2trn from South Korea’s highly concentrated stock market. Those of SK Hynix fell by more than a fifth this week as investors digested a mere six-fold increase in its quarterly operating profit, compared with the year before. Samsung’s shares have not been this volatile since the dotcom era.   South Korea is a great experiment in mixing the extremes of state capitalism and market speculation. Last year, after a failed coup, the country’s president attempted to cheer his country by talking up the stock market (sound familiar?). The KOSpI, its main index, speedily hit a level the government had set as a target.   Ordinary South Koreans withdrew capital from insurers and banks to invest in stocks. Workers threatened industrial action to secure Wall Street-sized bonuses. Those at SK Hynix and Samsung’s chip division settled for an extraordinary 10% of operating profits. At SK Hynix that could amount to $500,000 a person this year, and $800,000 next year. (Goldman Sachs paid a meagre average of $400,000 in total compensation to its employees last year.)   Now a government that just weeks ago was embracing markets is being forced to apologise for them. It was only in April that regulators approved leveraged exchange-traded funds (ETFs) tied to individual South Korean stocks. These funds use derivatives to give investors a multiple of the daily return of a share. For example, if SK Hynix is up by 1%, an investor might receive 2%; or if it is down by 10%, an investor might jump out of a window.   When the selling began in June broker accounts faced margin calls and were shut down by the thousand, causing regulators to suspend new ETF launches. At an emergency meeting on July 29th politicians promised to severely limit the use of these funds. One compared the market to a casino. Shares in the country’s department stores are crashing as fast as those of its chipmakers, in anticipation of the handbags that will now remain on the shelves.   The trillion-dollar question for investors in South Korea is when the price of memory will peak. Bulls argue that data-centre construction and robotics mean demand for memory will outstrip supply into the 2030s. But the increasingly common view is that the same thing will happen to memory chips as has happened to every commodity in every commodity cycle in history—that new supply will, within a year or two, cause prices and profits to fall. Despite their vertiginous rise, Samsung and SK Hynix have on average traded only at single-digit multiples of forward earnings during the past year, suggesting that investors think their profits are at or near their highest point.   Perhaps it is inevitable that the first country to taste the riches promised by AI should be the first to have them taken away. No industry can survive if all the rewards are concentrated in one corner of the supply chain. Yet the dangers facing South Korea’s memory giants are also lurking elsewhere in the AI landscape.   First is the dreaded “commoditisation”. The sales of less advanced memory chips by SK Hynix and Samsung are threatened by the rising market share of Chinese competitors (one of which went public this week to great fanfare). So too are America’s model-makers, which face a potentially existential threat from Chinese open-source models.   Second is the risk that supposedly ironclad spending commitments from customers turn out to be no such thing. Both South Korean firms have made much of their “long-term agreements” with buyers, arguing that pre-payment and price certainty gives them visibility on profits for years to come. Yet judicious investors have begun to fear that customers will find ways of wriggling out of deals when it is advantageous for them to do so. Investors also worry how airtight lease agreements for data centres would prove if model-makers tried to get out of them in a bust. The piles of debt tied to Meta’s giant off-balance-sheet data centre have drawn particular scrutiny.   Picked, shovelled and quartered Nvidia has played an important role in stabilising this precarious situation. Jensen Huang, its leather-jacketed chief executive, has something to say on every debate: last week he published an influential letter in defence of open-source models. But his cheque-book is more important. Mr Huang has constructed a vest web of financial ties that keep the party going. This week it was reported that his company is in talks to guarantee $250bn of commitments from OpenAI, maker of ChatGPT, to lease a data centre. More remarkable still is the vague “$500bn” partnership with SK Hynix it announced over the weekend, and how little that seemed to matter to investors this week. Like a central banker meddling in markets, the more Mr Huang intervenes the more nervous investors become. The eventual bust will be all the worse for it. ■     韓國股市熱潮慘烈崩盤，這恐怕只是個前兆 2026 年 7 月 29 日 | 閱讀時間約 5 分鐘 美國的科技巨頭們，已經從過去的「印鈔機」變成了「燒錢機」。市場預估，由於在資料中心上的揮霍式支出，Alphabet、亞馬遜（Amazon）、Meta 與微軟（Microsoft）明年的自由現金流合計將轉為負值。然而，光是憑藉著對矽谷這場未來豪賭的押注，如今就有人賺得盆滿缽滿。 預計明年將有三家公司各自突破 2,000 億美元自由現金流的驚人紀錄。其中一家是美國的寵兒輝達（Nvidia），負責設計運行人工智慧（AI）模型所需的高階處理器。另外兩家則是韓國的三星（Samsung）與 SK 海力士（SK Hynix），這對雙雄壟斷了手機、筆電以及日益擴增的資料中心所需之一般記憶體晶片市場。他們的這筆意外之財，堪稱企業史上最偉大的跨國財富轉移之一。 然而，這個新近狂熱於股票市場的國家，如今正赫然發現：股價能漲，自然也能跌。自今年 6 月觸頂以來，三星與 SK 海力士的股價已分別暴跌 41% 與 52%，從高度集中的韓國股市中抹去了 1.2 兆美元 的市值。本周，儘管 SK 海力士公佈的單季營業利潤較去年同期「僅」暴增了六倍，投資人消化此消息後，其股價仍重挫超過五分之一。三星的股價波動程度，更是達到了自網路泡沫時代以來未曾見過的高峰。 韓國無疑是一場將「國家資本主義」與「市場投機」極端融合的大型實驗。去年，在一場失敗的政變之後，該國總統試圖透過拉抬股市來振奮人心（聽起來很熟悉吧？）。韓國綜合股價指數（KOSPI「高斯皮」。英文讀音近似 KOS-pee）隨即迅速衝上了政府設定的目標關卡。 韓國的普通民眾紛紛從保險公司和銀行提領資金轉而投向股市。勞工們甚至以發動罷工相威脅，要求獲取比照華爾街等級的年終獎金。SK 海力士與三星晶片部門的員工，最終接受了高達營業利潤 10% 的分紅方案。在 SK 海力士，這意味著每人今年可領到 50 萬美元，明年甚至上看 80 萬美元。（相較之下，高盛去年支付給員工的總薪酬平均僅為微薄的 40 萬美元。） 然而，幾週前還在擁抱市場的政府，現在卻不得不為此出面道歉。就在今年 4 月，監管機構才剛批准了連結韓國單一股票的槓桿型 ETF。這些基金利用衍生性金融商品，為投資人提供股票單日報酬率的倍數收益。舉例來說，若 SK 海力士上漲 1%，投資人可能獲利 2%；但若下跌 10%，投資人可能就想跳樓了。 當 6 月拋售潮開始時，經紀戶頭面臨追繳保證金（margin call），數以千計的帳戶遭到強制平倉(強制平倉（又稱爆倉或斷頭）是指當投資人使用融資、期貨或保證金交易時，因為市場價格向反方向大跌或大漲，導致帳戶內的資金與保證金低於規定的最低維持率，券商或交易平台為了防止虧損繼續擴大，自動將持有的部位強制賣出或買回結算的機制。)，促使監管機構緊急暫停新 ETF 的發行。在 7 月 29 日的緊急會議上，政客們承諾將嚴格限制這類基金的使用，更有議員將該市場比作賭場。隨著大家預期高檔包包將繼續擺在架上賣不出去，韓國百貨公司的股價下跌速度，已經跟晶片製造商一樣快了。 對於韓國的投資人而言，價值兆美元的關鍵問題在於：記憶體價格何時見頂？牛市支持者認為，資料中心的建設與機器人技術意味著對記憶體的需求將持續供不應求直到 2030 年代。但越來越普遍的觀點認為，記憶體晶片最終也將重蹈歷史上每一種大宗物資（commodity）週期相同的覆轍——新供給將在一兩年內湧現，導致價格與利潤下滑。儘管經歷了驚人的漲幅，三星和 SK 海力士過去一年的預估市盈率（forward earnings multiples）平均僅處於個位數，這顯示投資人認為他們的利潤已達到或接近頂峰。 第一個品嚐到 AI 帶來巨額財富的國家，卻也是第一個被剝奪這些財富的國家，這或許是某種必然。如果所有回報都集中在供應鏈的單一角落，沒有任何產業能夠長久生存。然而，韓國記憶體巨頭所面臨的危險，同樣潛伏在 AI 版圖的其他角落。 第一，是令人聞之色變的「商品化」（commoditisation）。 SK 海力士與三星在較低階記憶體晶片上的銷售，正面臨中國競爭對手市場份額上升的威脅（其中一家本周才在大張旗鼓中上市）。美國的模型開發商亦是如此，他們面臨著來自中國開源模型可能帶來的毀滅性威脅。 第二，是客戶看似斬釘截鐵的支出承諾，最終可能根本不是那麼一回事。 兩家韓國公司都大肆宣揚與買家簽訂的「長期合約」，聲稱預付款項與價格確定性讓他們對未來多年的利潤有了明確的可見度。然而，明智的投資人已開始擔心，當對客戶有利時，他們總會找到耍賴退場的方法。投資人同樣擔心，如果模型開發商在不景氣時試圖解約，資料中心嚴密的租賃合約究竟能有多大的法律約束力？與 Meta 龐大的資產負債表外資料中心相關的巨額債務，如今正受到格外嚴格的審視。 淘金工具商的四分五裂 在這場岌岌可危的局勢中，輝達扮演了穩定局勢的重要角色。其身穿皮衣的執行長黃仁勳（Jensen Huang）對每場爭論都有話要說：上周他發表了一封極具影響力的公開信，為開源模型辯護。但他的「支票簿」顯然比言論更具影響力。黃仁勳構建了一張龐大的財務關係網，讓這場派對得以繼續下去。據本周報導，輝達正進行談判，打算為 ChatGPT 開發商 OpenAI 租賃資料中心的 2,500 億美元承諾提供擔保。更令人驚嘆的是，輝達在週末宣佈與 SK 海力士達成一項模糊的「5,000 億美元」合作夥伴關係，而本周投資人對此似乎無動於衷。就像干預市場的央行總裁一樣，黃仁勳干預得越多，投資人就越感到不安。未來的泡沫破裂，恐怕也將因此變得更加慘烈。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Don’t blame supermarkets for your expensive** groceries** Saying greedy shops have caused rising food prices is populist slop（垃圾內容）   Jul 20th 2026|Washington, DC|4 min read   FOR MANY characters in fiction, the central drama of their story concerns their grocery bills. Jean Valjean is imprisoned for stealing a loaf of bread; Mrs Lovett strikes an unholy alliance with Sweeney Todd for access to a source of free meat for her pie business. According to a recent survey of Americans, such drama has come for them too: almost two-thirds cite paying for groceries as a major source of financial stress, twice the share that mention other large or recently volatile expenses, including housing and fuel prices.   At first glance the panic is understandable. Grocery prices in America have climbed by around a quarter since 2020, exceeding nominal wage growth (see chart). Shoppers might even feel some sympathy for Mrs Lovett: ground beef is nearly twice as expensive as it was in 2019, thanks in part to drought-related cattle shortages.   Other countries have also been afflicted by rising grocery bills. Since 2020 food prices in Australia, Britain, Canada and France are up by between a fifth and a third. Discontent is inviting all kinds of intervention. Zohran Mamdani, the mayor of New York City, cruised to victory by promising to do something about the rising cost of living. He plans to bring down food prices by opening a series of government-run supermarkets. In Canada the push for state grocery stores went mainstream when Avi Lewis, a champion of the concept, was elected leader of the country’s leftist New Democratic Party in March.   Others are trying to meddle with prices directly—by suasion or by force. When Walmart, America’s biggest retailer, announced on July 6th that it was lowering prices on staple products including ground beef, President Donald Trump quickly claimed credit, saying it had done so at his behest. On July 1st a new law came into effect in Australia banning large chains from charging prices that the government deems “excessive”.   Yet these interventions—which focus on the very end of the food chain—are looking in the wrong place. In most developed countries there is scant evidence that grocers earn excessive profit margins. Nor have they raised prices for consumers more quickly than the wholesale prices they must pay have increased. Moreover, evidence of concentration—which would give grocers the market power to gouge consumers—is lacking in most developed countries.   First, consider margins. These are often wafer-thin. American supermarkets like Kroger and Albertsons collected just 1% of their sales in operating profits last year. Even Walmart, with its 4% margin, hardly looks like it is milking customers. It is a similar story in Britain and France, with margins only a little fatter in Australia and Canada. The real cream has traditionally been elsewhere in the supply chain, such as with the big food manufacturers. Over the past decade the average operating margin across General Mills, Kraft Heinz, Mondelez and PepsiCo has been 13%.   Second, look at how wholesale prices have changed over the past six years. Grocers are often criticised for raising prices rapidly after the pandemic. But evidence of opportunism is hard to find. Consumer food prices rose no more quickly than producer food prices between 2020 and 2025 in America (and likewise in Australia, Canada and France).   Finally, consider concentration. According to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, a measure of industry concentration, the grocery market in most countries is competitive at the national level (a little more so in America and Britain, a little less so in Australia and Canada). That does not guarantee adequate competition in practice: what matters is whether there are enough rival outlets within a distance that consumers could reasonably be expected to travel to buy their groceries. Analysis published by America’s Department of Agriculture in 2023 noted that the grocery market is far more concentrated when examined at the county level. Even then, however, it is mostly a concern in rural areas and small towns, where less than 10% of the population lives.   Grocery prices have shot up across the developed world largely because the cost of inputs like fertiliser and fuel have surged, owing first to the war in Ukraine and, more recently, to conflict with Iran. The wages that farmers need to pay to attract enough workers have also risen as governments cut back on immigration. There is little evidence to suggest that supermarkets are the ones to blame. Even the packaged-food giants, which increased prices to protect their profits in the post-pandemic wave of inflation, have seen their margins slump over the past three years as shoppers have switched to retailers’ cheaper own-label brands.   The idea that governments should step in to sell food to their citizens is an old one, with a poor record. Supermarkets in the Soviet Union, which were almost exclusively state-run, are remembered for their long bread lines, not their low bread prices. Subsidised stores might well be able to offer lower prices, and may have a useful role to play in underserved rural areas. But placing them in an already competitive market runs the risk of driving existing grocers out of business. Politicians need to cook up some better ideas. ■   請別把高昂的雜貨賬單怪在超市頭上 宣稱貪婪的店家導致食物價格上漲，根本是民粹主義的廢話 2026年7月20日 | 華盛頓特區 | 4分鐘閱讀 對許多虛構作品中的角色來說，故事的核心衝突往往與他們的雜貨帳單有關。尚萬強（Jean Valjean）因偷了一塊麵包而身陷囹圄；洛薇特夫人（Mrs. Lovett）則為了替她的派餅生意獲取免費肉源，與理髮師陶德（Sweeney Todd）結成了邪惡聯盟。根據最近一項針對美國人的調查，這樣的劇碼也來到了他們的現實生活中：幾乎有三分之二的人將支付雜貨費用列為主要的財務壓力來源，這個比例是提及房屋和燃料價格等其他大型或近期波動劇烈支出的兩倍。 乍看之下，這種恐慌是可以理解的。自 2020 年以來，美國的雜貨價格上漲了約四分之一，超過了名義薪資的成長幅度（見圖表）。購物者甚至可能對洛薇特夫人產生些許同情：由於與乾旱相關的肉牛短缺，牛絞肉的價格幾乎是 2019 年的兩倍。 其他國家也同樣受到雜貨賬單上漲的困擾。自 2020 年以來，澳洲、英國、加拿大和法國的食品價格上漲了五分之一到三分之一之間。這種不滿情緒正在引發各種形式的干預。紐約市長佐蘭·曼達尼（Zohran Mamdani）憑藉承諾解決生活成本上漲問題而順利勝選。他計劃透過開辦一系列政府營運的超市來降低食品價格。在加拿大，推動國營雜貨店的概念進入了主流，該概念的擁護者艾維·路易斯（Avi Lewis）於三月當選該國左翼新民主黨的領袖。 其他人則企圖直接干預價格——無論是透過勸說還是強制手段。當美國最大的零售商沃爾瑪（Walmart）於 7 月 6 日宣布降低包括牛絞肉在內的主食價格時，總統唐納·川普（Donald Trump）迅速將功勞歸於自己，表示沃爾瑪是應他的要求而這麼做的。7 月 1 日，澳洲一項新法律正式生效，禁止大型連鎖店收取政府認定為「過高」的價格。 然而，這些將焦點放在食品供應鏈最末端的干預措施，顯然看錯了地方。在大多數發達國家，幾乎沒有證據表明雜貨商賺取了過高的利潤率。他們向消費者提高價格的速度，也沒有快過他們必須支付的批發價格上漲速度。此外，大多數已開發國家並沒有證據顯示，超市業者因市場過度集中而掌握足以向消費者收取高價的市場支配力。 首先，考慮利潤率。這些利潤率通常薄如蟬翼。像克羅格（Kroger）和艾伯森（Albertsons）這樣的美國超市，去年的營業利潤僅占其銷售額的 1%。即使是擁有 4% 利潤率的沃爾瑪，看起來也很難說是在榨取顧客。英國和法國的情況也類似，澳洲和加拿大的利潤率僅稍微豐厚一點。傳統上，真正的油水存在於供應鏈的其他環節，例如大型食品製造商。在過去十年中，通用磨坊（General Mills）、卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）、億滋國際（Mondelez）和百事公司（PepsiCo）的平均營業利潤率為 13%。 其次，看看過去六年批發價格的變化。雜貨商常因在疫情後迅速調漲價格而受到批評。但很難找到投機取巧的證據。在 2020 年至 2025 年期間，美國的消費者食品價格上漲速度並沒有快於生產者食品價格（澳洲、加拿大和法國也是如此）。 最後，考慮集中度。根據衡量產業集中度的赫芬達爾-赫希曼指數（Herfindahl-Hirschman index），大多數國家的雜貨市場在國家層面上是具備競爭力的（美國和英國競爭稍強一些，澳洲和加拿大則稍弱一些）。這並不能確保在實際操作中有充分的競爭：真正重要的是，在消費者可以合理前往購買雜貨的距離內，是否有足夠的競爭對手門市。美國農業部於 2023 年發布的分析指出，若在縣（county）級層面上進行檢視，雜貨市場的集中度要高得多。然而，即便如此，這主要也只是鄉村地區和小鎮面臨的問題，而居住在這些地方的人口不到總人口的 10%。 食品雜貨價格之所以在已開發國家普遍大幅攀升，主要是因為肥料、燃料等生產投入成本飆漲。這波成本上升，最初受到俄烏戰爭影響，而近期則進一步受到伊朗衝突所帶來的衝擊。此外，各國政府收緊移民政策，使農場更難招募足夠勞工，也迫使農民提高薪資，以吸引人力投入農業生產。 目前幾乎沒有證據顯示，超市才是推升食品價格的罪魁禍首。 即使是疫情後為了維持獲利而調漲售價的包裝食品大廠，近三年來也因愈來愈多消費者轉向零售商價格較低的自有品牌（private label），導致獲利空間明顯受到擠壓。 由政府直接販售食品給民眾，並不是什麼新構想，但歷史經驗並不理想。 前蘇聯幾乎所有超市都由國家經營，人們記住的不是低廉的麵包價格，而是排隊購買麵包的漫長人龍。 當然，接受政府補貼的商店或許確實能提供較低的售價，也可能在商業服務不足的偏鄉地區發揮一定作用。然而，若將這類政府經營或補貼的商店設置於競爭已相當充分的市場，反而可能擠壓現有民間超市的生存空間，甚至導致部分業者退出市場。 比起投入經營超市，政治人物更應提出能真正解決食品價格問題的政策。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The World Cup doesn’t understand America John Prideaux, our executive editor, on why America is a spectacular place to host the football tournament   Jun 27th 2026|3 min read Fans of soccerball love to complain about America. With its unbridled capitalism, it has the gall to treat football as a business. “Hydration breaks” have been introduced in this year’s World Cup. Fans suspect these are the first step to more frequent advert breaks for TV viewers, a grubbily commercial innovation that changes their game. Going to a match costs a fortune. Dynamic pricing may work in the NFL or NBA, where the market in tickets resembles the market for any other luxury good. But soccer, with its roots in teams of men who worked in the same factory, has different values. In economics terms, these countries consider football to be part of the commons. In many of the big football countries there is an expectation that the **games **will be carried by channels that are available to everyone. Were the rights sold to the highest bidder, in profit-maximising fashion, and large numbers of people unable to watch, that would become an existential issue for the government of the day. There’s the fact that Donald Trump’s America would seem singularly disinterested in being hospitable. Foreign fans who followed the operations of ICE in Minneapolis earlier this year wondered whether America actually wanted the world to visit. Then its government denied entry to Omar Artan, one of Africa’s best referees, simply because he was from Somalia. America’s president will help present the trophy to the winning team, which will make it harder for athletes to say that the tournament has nothing to do with politics. For all these reasons, the argument goes, America doesn’t understand the World Cup. There is truth to this grumbling, but it misses a big reason why America is, in fact, a spectacular place to host the tournament. This struck me powerfully while I was watching Brazil v Haiti last week at a bar in lower Manhattan. Yes, ticket prices are high: that reflects demand and also how much richer America is on a per person basis than other developed countries. New Jersey’s mass-transit system is indeed annoying. The Trump administration has attempted to spoil the vibe. But it has not succeeded. That is because of American exceptionalism. The country’s population size and history of immigration means almost every nation competing in this World Cup has a sizable diaspora in the United States. That is something Americans take for granted, but it means that you could run a pretty good World Cup in America without inviting any foreign visitors at all. My bar in SoHo was so full of Brazilians that we took over the sidewalk and spilled into the street. (I lived in São Paulo for three years, so they are my second team.) Football-crazed Brazil, which has won the championship five times, boasts a population of 220m, so it’s not hard to find a bar in London or Paris taken over by yellow and green shirts whose wearers, it turns out, can samba while carrying drinks. More unusually, there were a bunch of Haitian fans in the bar, too. Haiti’s population is only 12m. But there are about 850,000 Haitian migrants in the United States. Add in those who claim Haitian ancestry and you get a bigger number. This is an “only in America” thing. In fact, pretty much every nation represented in the World Cup will have a bar just in New York City that is designated as home turf. A dedicated football fan could travel the world, attending home games for every country from Algeria to Uzbekistan, using only the subway. And then there is the way that American cities have adopted nationalities—think of the Scots in Boston or the Bosnians in St Louis. If you had to pick one country as the permanent host of the World Cup, America would surely be it.   世界盃不懂美國 約翰·普里多，本刊執行編輯，談美國為何是舉辦足球賽事的絕佳之地 2026年6月27日｜3分鐘閱讀 足球迷們最愛抱怨美國。這個資本主義肆意橫行的國家，竟然膽敢將足球視為一門生意。本屆世界盃引入了「補水休息」環節。球迷們懷疑，這不過是日後增加更多電視廣告時段的第一步——一項改變他們心愛運動的銅臭味創新。入場看球的費用高得嚇人。動態定價或許適用於NFL或NBA——這些賽事的門票市場與其他奢侈品市場並無二致。但足球有其根基，它發源於同一工廠的工人球隊，承載著不同的價值觀。用經濟學術語來說，這些國家將足球視為公共財。 在許多足球大國，人們普遍期望比賽能在所有人均可收看的頻道上播出。若將版權以利潤最大化的方式售予出價最高者，導致大批民眾無緣觀賽，那將對當屆政府構成生死攸關的政治危機。 還有一個問題：唐納·川普的美國，似乎對接待外賓毫無興趣。今年稍早，跟蹤報導移民及海關執法局 (ICE)在明尼阿波利斯行動的外國球迷，都不禁疑惑——美國究竟是否歡迎世界各地的訪客？接著，美國政府以索馬利亞籍為由，拒絕非洲頂尖裁判之一奧馬爾·阿爾坦入境。此外，美國總統將親自上台為冠軍球隊頒獎，這讓運動員們更難辯稱本屆賽事與政治無關。基於以上種種，外界的說法是：美國不懂世界盃。 這些抱怨不無道理，但卻忽略了一個重要原因——美國其實是舉辦本屆賽事的絕佳之地。上週我在曼哈頓下城一間酒吧觀看巴西對海地的比賽時，這一點深深震撼了我。 是的，票價高昂——這反映的是市場需求，也反映出美國人均財富遠高於其他已開發國家。紐澤西的公共交通系統確實令人惱火。川普政府也試圖破壞氣氛。但它並未得逞。原因，正在於美國的獨特性。 這個國家龐大的人口規模與悠久的移民歷史，意味著幾乎每個參賽國在美國都擁有相當規模的海外僑民社群。 這是美國人視為理所當然的事，但正因如此，即便不邀請任何海外訪客，美國也能辦出一屆相當精彩的世界盃。我在蘇活區那間酒吧裡，巴西人多到我們佔領了人行道，蔓延至街道。（我在聖保羅生活過三年，所以巴西是我的第二支主隊。）熱愛足球的巴西擁有兩億兩千萬人口、五度稱霸世界盃，要在倫敦或巴黎找到一間被黃綠球衣淹沒的酒吧並不難——而那些穿著球衣的人，原來還能一邊端著飲料一邊跳森巴。 更難得的是，酒吧裡還有一群海地球迷。海地總人口僅一千兩百萬，但在美國卻有約八十五萬海地移民。若再加上具有海地血統的人，這個數字還會更大。這就是「只有在美國才會發生」的事。 事實上，幾乎每個參賽國都能在紐約市找到一間屬於自己的「主場酒吧」。一位鐵桿球迷只需搭乘地鐵，便能「環遊世界」，為每一支從阿爾及利亞到烏茲別克的球隊觀看主場比賽。更不用說美國城市認養各國文化的傳統——想想波士頓的蘇格蘭人，或聖路易的波士尼亞人。若真要選出一個永久舉辦世界盃的國家，美國無疑是不二之選。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China’s high-tech rise is leaving much of the country behind That could make a** starkly unequal** country even more so Jun 2nd 2026|TIANSHUI|6 min read Listen to this story LIKE MANY cities in China’s hinterland, Tianshui, in the western province of Gansu, is full of dusty and disused factories. But over the past decade it has also become an unlikely high-tech hub. New industrial parks have sprouted, offering companies cheap energy, financing and land deals. The city has already built an exhibition hall to display the zippy products it hopes to make in the future, called “Tianshui Industry 2050”. All this will please officials in far-off Beijing. They want China’s rust belt to reinvent itself with technology. Just recently they released yet another plan for urban renewal, calling for the transformation of stagnant cities into “innovative” places that can offer their inhabitants a “high-quality life”. Yet for all the fanfare, the people of Tianshui are not much better off. The new factories have failed to offset a broader slowdown in the city’s economy: ten years ago Tianshui’s GDP per person was 16% of Beijing’s; now it is 14%. In 2025 the city’s economy grew at a rate two percentage points slower than the national average. Nor, say locals, have the highly automated facilities created many jobs for them. Throngs of young people are leaving in search of better opportunities. Over the past decade, its population has shrunk by nearly half a million to 2.9m. At this rate, by 2050 there will be few workers left. The tale of Tianshui shows the limits of China’s big bet on advanced manufacturing. The Communist Party has decided the country’s economic future lies in making world-beating technology. So hundreds of cities across the country are, like Tianshui, trying hard to do so. But while the high-tech drive has helped some brainy, connected and wealthy cities become even richer, most of those in the hinterland lack the supply chains or talent to take advantage of it. After all, some 60% of China’s workforce—about 500m people—do not even have a high-school education. Many of them live in smaller and poorer cities. For centuries Tianshui was more a cultural than an economic hub. Legend has it that China’s first emperor, a serpent-bodied demi-god, was born there; Buddhist grottoes have been cut out of the cliffs nearby. But in the 1960s Tianshui industrialised. It became an important cog in the state-planned economy; its factories made tractors, ball bearings and matches. A tale of two cities Dormitories, schools and hospitals were built to cater to the swelling labour force. One of the workers was Ms Dong, now in her 80s, who enjoyed an ultra-stable “iron rice bowl” job at a printing press. She retired in her 40s with a good pension and a guarantee that her son could inherit her job. But most local factories were not competitive enough to survive China’s bumpy transition to a more market-driven economy in the 1980s and 1990s. In the past ten years a new generation of high-tech factories, making gizmos such as sensors and machine tools, has sprung up. But they have not brought many jobs with them. An exhibit at Tianshui’s museum displays snapshots of the city’s factory floors over the decades. Each shows fewer workers and more robots. Most of the factory positions that are available pay around 3,000 yuan ($440) a month, according to locals, half what they could get in a big city like Shanghai. “I’d like to stay here to settle down, but there’s just no good jobs for young people,” says Wen Jin, a 27-year-old Tianshui native who has moved to Jiangsu province, a wealthy eastern region. The city’s best days are firmly in the past, reckons Ma Xin, another local in his 20s who is hoping to get out. High-tech industries do create well-paid jobs as well, in research and development, for instance. But these positions are mainly clustered in big cities near China’s coast, like Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, which boast the best universities, brightest graduates and access to the densest supply chains. Tech-sector salaries in such places have shot up in recent years, some topping 1m yuan a year. But few parts of inland China have a chance of attracting such stellar jobs, explains Dan Wang of Eurasia Group, a consultancy. “The vast majority of Chinese cities are stuck with what they have.” Even as Tianshui is unable to gain from China’s new economic model, it struggles with the problems of the old one. China’s growth has slowed in recent years thanks, in large part, to a lingering property crisis that is gripping the country. House prices have fallen fastest in smaller cities like Tianshui. Unfinished concrete flats litter the city’s outskirts; investment in property there fell by over 40% last year. This in turn has been a drag on consumption because people feel poorer. Total retail sales in Tianshui slipped by a little over 5% in 2025. Gloomy walks through its malls reveal shuttered shops and empty restaurants. There is a risk that these trends, multiplied across China’s smaller cities, will cause the gaps between the country’s haves and have-nots to widen further. The economic slowdown seems to have hit the poor hardest, according to data compiled by Li Shi, a professor at Zhejiang University in the eastern city of Hangzhou. In a paper published in April he cited surveys showing that China’s bottom tenth of workers by income saw their wages rise by only 2% per year from 2018 to 2023, compared with an average annual growth rate of around 5%. China’s government knows that high-tech factories are not an economic panacea. Investment in machinery and other physical assets “has fuelled China’s economic boom, but its returns have gradually declined”, noted Xinhua, the official state news agency, earlier this year. China’s latest five-year plan, which was released in March and covers the period to 2030, called for “investing in people” as well as factories, to make the economy more equal. In practice, that would mean much more government spending on education, particularly for children from poor families, giving them the skills and knowledge to get better-paid jobs. But as the people of Tianshui would attest, that is easier said than done. The city’s budget is far smaller than those of wealthy places—it spends less than one-third of the amount per pupil in school that Beijing does, for example. And the economic downturn threatens to turn this into a cycle of decline; the city’s fiscal revenues fell by nearly a tenth last year. Few of Tianshui’s students ever make it to the country’s best universities. “It’s too difficult for children to compete here,” says Shi Tingting, the mother of a 12-year-old girl. “They end up trapped.” ■ 中國的高科技崛起正將這個國家的很大一部分留在後面 那可能使一個明顯不平等的國家變得更加如此 2026年6月2日 | 天水 | 6分鐘閱讀時間 像許多在中國腹地的城市一樣，天水，在西部省份甘肅，充滿了落滿灰塵的和廢棄的工廠。 但在過去十年間它也已經成為一個出乎意料的高科技樞紐。 新工業園區已經湧現，提供公司廉價的能源、融資和土地交易。 這座城市已經建造了一個展覽廳來展示它希望在未來製造的敏捷的產品，叫做「天水工業2050」。 這一切將會取悅在遙遠北京的官員們。 他們想要中國的鐵鏽地帶用技術來重塑自身。 就在最近他們發布了又一個關於城市更新的計劃，呼籲將停滯的城市轉型為能夠為他們的居民提供「高質量生活」的「創新的」地方。 然而儘管有所有的宣傳，天水的人民並沒有好過多少。 新的工廠已經未能抵消在這座城市經濟中一個更廣泛的放緩：十年前天水的人均GDP是北京的16%；現在它是14%。 在2025年這座城市的經濟以一個比全國平均慢兩個百分點的速度增長。 當地人說，高度自動化的設施也沒有為他們創造許多工作。 成群的年輕人正為了尋找更好的機會而離開。 在過去十年間，它的人口已經萎縮了接近五十萬到290萬。 照這個速度，到2050年將會幾乎沒有工人留下。 天水的故事顯示了中國在先進製造業上的大賭注的局限。 共產黨已經決定這個國家的經濟未來在於製造舉世無雙的技術。 所以全國各地數以百計的城市正像天水一樣，努力嘗試這樣做。 但是雖然高科技驅動已經幫助了一些聰明的、有脈絡的且富裕的城市變得更加富有，大多數在腹地的那此城市缺乏供應鏈或人才來利用它。 畢竟，大約60%的中國勞動力——大約5億人——甚至沒有一個高中教育。 他們中的許多人居住在較小的和較窮的城市。 幾個世紀以來天水更多是一個文化的而非經濟的樞紐。 傳說它說中國的第一位皇帝，一個蛇身的半神，出生在那裡；佛教石窟已經從附近的峭壁上被開鑿出來。 但在1960年代天水工業化了。 它成為了國家計劃經濟中一個重要的齒輪；它的工廠製造拖拉機、滾珠軸承和火柴。 雙城記 宿舍、學校和醫院被建造來迎合膨脹的勞動力。 工人中的一個是董女士，現在在她80多歲，其在一家印刷廠享受了一個超穩定的「鐵飯碗」工作。 她在她40多歲時退休，帶著一份好的退休金和一個她的兒子能夠繼承她的工作的保證。 但大多數本地的工廠不夠有競爭力到足以在1980年代和1990年代中國向一個更加市場驅動的經濟的顛簸轉型中倖存。 在過去十年中新一代的高科技工廠，製造諸如傳感器和機床之類的小玩意，已經湧現。 但是它們沒有隨之帶來許多工作。 在天水博物館的一個展品展示了這座城市的工廠車間幾十年來的快照。 每一張顯示更少的工人和更多的機器人。 根據當地人，大多數可獲得的工廠職位每個月支付大約3,000元（440美元），是他們在一個像上海這樣的大城市所能得到的（數額的）一半。 「我想留在此地定居，但是就是沒有給年輕人的好工作，」文進說，一位27歲的天水本地人，其已經搬到了江蘇省，一個富裕的東部地區。 這座城市最好的日子過去了，馬鑫估計，另一位在他20多歲正希望離開的當地人。 高科技產業也確實創造高薪的工作，例如，在研究與開發中。 但這些職位主要聚集在靠近中國海岸的大城市，像北京、上海和深圳，其坐擁最好的大學、最聰明的畢業生以及獲取最密集供應鏈的途徑。 在這樣的地方科技部門的薪水在近年來已經飆升，一些一年超過100萬元。 但是很少有中國內陸的部分有吸引這樣輝煌工作的機會，歐亞集團（一家諮詢公司）的丹·王解釋道。 「絕大多數的中國城市都與他們所擁有的困在一起。」 即使當天水無法從中國的新經濟模式中獲益時，它與舊模式的問題作鬥爭。 中國的增長在近年來已經放緩，這在很大程度上”歸功”於一場正席捲這個國家的揮之不去的房地產危機。 房價在像天水這樣較小的城市中下跌得最快。 未完工的水泥公寓散落在这座城市的郊區；在那裡的房地產投資在去年下降了超過40%。 這反過來已經成為消費的一個拖累，因為人們感覺更窮了。 天水的總零售銷售在2025年下滑了稍微超過5%。 穿過它的購物中心的憂鬱散步透露出關門的商店和空蕩的餐廳。 有一個風險是這些趨勢，在中國較小的城市中乘數放大，將會導致這個國家的富有者與一無所有者之間的差距進一步擴大。 經濟放緩似乎已經對窮人打擊最重，根據由李實編纂的數據，一位在東部城市杭州的浙江大學的教授。 在四月發表的一篇論文中他引用了調查，顯示按收入計中國最底層十分之一的工人看到他們的工資從2018年到2023年每年只增長2%，相比之下與大約5%的平均年度增長率。 中國的政府知道高科技工廠不是一個經濟萬靈丹。 在機械和其他實體資產上的投資「已經給中國的經濟繁榮注入燃料，但它的回報已經逐漸下降」，新華社，官方的國家通訊社，在今年早些時候指出。 中國最新的五年計劃，其在三月被發布且涵蓋到2030年的時期，呼籲「投資於人」以及工廠，來使經濟更加平等。 在實踐中，那將意味著多得多的在教育上的政府開支，特別是對於來自貧困家庭的兒童，給予他們技能和知識來獲得更好薪水的工作。 但是正如天水的人民會證實的，那是說起來容易做起來難。 這座城市的預算遠小於那些富裕地方的——例如，它在學校中在每位學生身上花費的金額少於北京所做的三分之一。 而且經濟低迷威脅要將這變成一個衰退的循環；這座城市的財政收入在去年下降了接近十分之一。 很少有天水的學生曾經成功進入這個最好的大學。 「對於孩子們來說在這裡競爭太困難了，」史婷婷說，一位12歲女孩的母親。 「他們最終被困住。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Sex tourists fuel outrage about vice in Japan The debates do not have women’s interests at heart Jun 4th 2026|Tokyo|4 min read MAI, a 34-year-old woman in Tokyo, used to work at a hospital. But when covid-19 overwhelmed the wards, she found her work too stressful. A single mother, she also needed money for her family. Lured by higher pay, she entered the sex trade, first working as a porn actress before becoming a deriheru or “delivery health” worker—slang for call-girls who visit clients at home or in hotels. For a two-hour session, she earns ¥30,000 ($190). Mai is among hundreds of thousands of women working in Japan’s sprawling sex industry. The business, thought to be worth ¥2trn-5trn ($12bn-31bn) a year, is woven into male social life. One study in 2022 found that 48% of Japanese men had paid for sex at some point, compared with 11% in Britain. Hagiwara, a 63-year-old man in Tokyo, recalls being taken to a brothel by senior colleagues after joining a company, as a rite of passage. Emu, a man in his 30s, says “most men around me have been at least once.” Lately, however, lawmakers’ tolerance for the industry has come under much strain. Two recent triggers have encouraged Japanese to re-examine the confusing thicket of laws and conventions that govern how sex work is policed. One was an outrageous crime: last year authorities rescued a 12-year-old Thai girl who had been trafficked to Japan and forced to work at a sex shop in Tokyo. The second concern has been the growing visibility of women who sell sex around Okubo Park, near Tokyo’s red-light district (where the haggling more ordinarily goes on behind neon-lit doors). Relatively few women are involved in this. Nonetheless, solicitation (waiting for or approaching clients in public) is illegal in Japan. The sight of women openly waiting for clients has unsettled the public. Compounding the public debate is the fact that some of their customers are foreign tourists, lured to Japan by the cheapness of the yen. Videos of them approaching women in Okubo Park have spread rapidly online. “It is truly lamentable,” said Kamiya Sohei, leader of the right-wing populist Sanseito party, in a video. Behind the outrage lies a sense of wounded pride: during Japan’s boom years in the 1970s and 1980s, it was Japanese men who went abroad for sex. The authorities have decided to act—at least where the streetwalkers are concerned. Recently women around Okubo Park have been detained or arrested. Yet campaigners say it is unfair that authorities have not also been trying to punish the buyers. “Women are taken away by the police—while the men who buy sex stand beside them smirking,” says Kanajiri Kazuna of PAPS, a women’s-rights group. In November an opposition lawmaker raised this disparity in parliament. In response Takaichi Sanae, the prime minister, ordered the justice ministry to re-examine current practices and consider reforms. The prospect of change has sparked very broad debate about how Japan could improve its policing of sex work. Some Japanese feminists would like their country to implement the Nordic style of regulation adopted by Sweden, France and others, which criminalises buying sex while shielding sellers themselves from prosecution. “Buying sex is a form of violence against women,” says Ms Kanajiri. Other Japanese argue that getting tougher on buyers will drive sex work underground, leaving women more exposed to violence. Some want the industry fully legalised and regulated, as in Germany and the Netherlands. Nakayama Misato of Siente, a sex-work advocacy group, argues that criminalisation can mean that women are treated merely as victims, ignoring their agency. “Doing sex work is not a bad thing—it’s a valid way of making a living.” To be more than skin deep, any changes would have to apply not only to streetwalking but to Japan’s vast indoor sex-industry, the laws for which are riddled with loopholes and selectively enforced. Consider the practice of “soapland”, in which customers ostensibly pay to be bathed; if sex happens to take place in the process, officials generally turn a blind eye. Takao Yasuo of Curtin University says this is typical of Japan’s approach to regulating the sex industry. The priority is to keep vice decorously out of public view. A big rethink seems unlikely. For now, the justice ministry is narrowly focused on street prostitution. Taking care of that is “the lowest-cost, highest-visibility form of enforcement available to the state”, notes Mr Takao. “Many lawmakers, especially conservatives, are sensitive to the idea of women becoming sexually promiscuous,” says Shiomura Ayaka, a lawmaker. Women openly soliciting sex in public have become symbols of social disorder. ■ 性觀光客加劇了對日本色情業的憤怒 這些辯論的核心並非以女性的利益為出發點 2026年6月4日 | 東京 | 4分鐘閱讀時間 小麥（Mai），一名在東京的34歲女性，過去曾在一家醫院工作。但是當新冠肺炎壓垮了病房時，她發現自己的工作壓力太大了。作為一名單親媽媽，她也需要錢來養家。在更高薪水的誘惑下，她進入了性產業，先是擔任成人片（A片）女演員，之後成為一名「deriheru」或「派遣健康（外送茶）」工作者——這是指前往客戶家中或飯店服務的應召女郎的俚語。一個兩小時的服務時段，她可以賺取30,000日圓（190美元）。 小麥是日本龐大且擴張的性產業中，成千上萬名工作女性的其中之一。這項據信每年價值達2兆至5兆日圓（120億至310億美元）的行業，已經融入了男性的社交生活之中。2022年的一項研究發現，48%的日本男性曾在某個時間點花錢買過性服務，相比之下，英國的比例僅為11%。萩原（Hagiwara），一名在東京的63歲男性，回憶起自己在進入公司後，被資深同事帶去妓院，將其視為一種成年禮。艾姆（Emu），一名30多歲的男性說：「我身邊的大多數男人至少都去過一次。」 然而，近來立法者對該產業的容忍度受到了極大的考驗。最近的兩個導火線，促使日本人重新審視管理如何對性工作進行治安維持的、那套令人困惑且錯綜複雜的法律與慣例。其中一個是一起駭人聽聞的罪行：去年當局解救了一名被販賣到日本、並被強迫在東京一家情色店工作的12歲泰國女孩。 第二個擔憂則是，在東京紅燈區附近的「大久保公園」周邊，販賣性服務的女性其能見度越來越高（在那裡，討價還價通常是在霓虹燈閃爍的門後進行）。雖然涉及此事的女性相對較少。儘管如此，拉客（在公共場所等待或主動接近客戶）在日本是違法的。女性公開等待客戶的景象讓公眾感到不安。 使公眾辯論更加劇的複雜因素是，她們的某些客戶是外國觀光客，他們因日圓貶值（便宜）而被吸引到日本。他們在大久保公園接近女性的影片在網路上迅速傳播。右翼民粹主義「參政黨」黨魁神谷宗幣（Kamiya Sohei）在一段影片中表示：「這真是令人悲哀。」在憤怒的背後，隱藏著一種受挫的自尊心：在1970年代和1980年代日本經濟繁榮的歲月裡，是日本男性前往國外進行性觀光。 當局已決定採取行動——至少在涉及街頭流鶯的部分。最近，大久保公園周邊的女性遭到拘留或逮捕。然而，社會運動人士表示，當局沒有同時試圖懲罰買家是不公平的。「女性被警察帶走——而買性的男人則站在一旁傻笑，」女權團體 PAPS 的金尻カズナ（Kanajiri Kazuna）表示。去年11月，一名反對黨議員在國會中提出了這一不平等待遇。作為回應，首相高市早苗（Takaichi Sanae）命令法務省重新審視現行做法並考慮改革。 變革的前景引發了關於日本如何改善性工作治安管理的廣泛辯論。一些日本女性主義者希望她們的國家能實施瑞典、法國等國採用的「北歐模式」規範，該模式將買性行為定為刑事犯罪，同時保護賣性者免受起訴。「買性是對女性的一種暴力形式，」金尻女士說。 其他日本人則認為，對買家採取更嚴厲的態度會將性工作推向地下，使女性更容易暴露於暴力之中。有些人則希望像德國和荷蘭那樣，將該產業完全合法化並進行規範。性工作倡議團體 Siente 的中山美里（Nakayama Misato）認為，刑事犯罪化可能意味著女性僅被視為受害者，而忽略了她們的自主權（主體性）。「從事性工作並不是一件壞事——這是一種正當的謀生方式。」 若要使任何改變不只是流於表面（深層改革），這些改變不僅必須適用於街頭拉客，還必須適用於日本龐大的室內性產業，而該產業的法律充斥著漏洞，且屬於選擇性執法。以「泡泡浴（soapland）」的慣例為例，顧客表面上是付費接受沐浴服務；如果在過程中偶然發生了性行為，官員通常會睜一隻眼閉一隻眼。寇廷大學（Curtin University）的鷹尾安雄（Takao Yasuo）表示，這是日本規範性產業的典型做法。其首要任務是體面地將惡行（色情）保持在公眾視線之外。 一場徹底的大反思似乎不太可能發生。目前，法務省正狹隘地將焦點集中在街頭賣淫上。鷹尾先生指出，處理這件事是「國家目前可行、成本最低且能見度最高的一種執法形式」。國會議員塩村文夏（Shiomura Ayaka）表示：「許多立法者，特別是保守派，對於女性變得性生活混亂（放蕩）的想法非常敏感。」在公共場合公開拉客的女性，已經成為了社會秩序混亂的象徵。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How to fight back against Gen-Z socialism The me-first doctrine is a threat to prosperity Jun 4th 2026|5 min read Something new is stirring on the left. A fresh crop of socialists want to remake the economy with price controls,** hefty **wealth taxes and a spree of nationalisations. Supercharged by fury over Gaza, they are winning voters at a formidable pace. Many rose to prominence only recently, like Zack Polanski, who leads the Green Party in Britain, or Zohran Mamdani, the mayor of New York. Others are long-standing political fixtures: the septuagenarian Jean-Luc Mélenchon is on his fourth swing at the French presidency, but thumping support from the 20-somethings of “Generation Z” has put the Elysée back in his sights again. Call it Gen-Z socialism. Not because all its adherents are young—or because it is new for young people to lean leftward—but because it is the brand of leftism, made for the TikTok era, that today’s young revolutionaries support. Forget weighty collectivist ideals or seizing the means of production. Gen-Z socialism is a me-first doctrine. Climate change and race, preoccupations of the 2010s and early 2020s, are now much more peripheral concerns. So are social issues, barring Gaza. Angst about inflation, housing and artificial intelligence have replaced all that with something cruder. “This country is awash in wealth,” says Avi Lewis, freshly elected leader of the New Democratic Party in Canada, a country where productivity has been all but flat for a decade. “We can have nice things.” Saying that prices should be capped to keep your bills down while someone else pays for your public services is a seductive, shareable message. Plenty of the grievances that animate Gen-Z socialists do stem from real issues. Inflation has been too high, rent in big cities is now often unaffordable and AI could upend the labour market. Dismissing these worries would be foolish. Yet Gen-Z socialism is wrong about how to fix the problems of capitalism. It must be resisted, because it is a profound threat to prosperity. No country’s Gen-Z socialists are quite alike. The realities of power have forced some, like Mr Mamdani, to become more moderate. But they broadly agree on three core principles. First, that growth does little to help ordinary people. Theirs is a zero-sum mindset, where a better outcome comes not from creating but from taking—as they fear ai barons will soon do on a vast scale. Second, that spending can be paid for by the richest. Once the left wanted higher taxes for everyone; Gen-Z socialists demand handouts funded by billionaires. The third tenet is a remarkable hostility to private enterprise. Gen-Z socialists are uninterested in letting the market rip and redistributing the proceeds. They would have chunks of everyday life, from housing to groceries, governed by state diktat. Politics has always had zany fringes. The far right is no less barmy—and more dangerous. But what is so worrying about the Gen-Z socialists is how deeply their ideas are bleeding into the centre-left. Desperate to compete, even mainstream Democrats in America now propose mad schemes like exempting over half of tax filers from federal income tax. In Britain the Labour Party, having won power on a centrist platform, has been spooked by the Greens and is rekindling its zeal for higher taxes and state control. Increasingly, the ideas of the Gen-Z socialists can win even when their candidates lose. That is bad news. Rent controls would worsen housing shortages by crushing the incentive to build. The profit margins of big supermarket chains, demonised by Gen-Z socialists, are already wafer-thin after years of ruthless competition—a miracle of modern capitalism. Wealth taxes would become confiscatory and deter innovation. Do not assume that the failure of these policies, if implemented, would bring about an automatic course correction. Europe has struggled for decades to escape the low-growth funk left by its own over-regulation; the rise of statist “Peronists” in Argentina helps explain its century of relative decline. Resisting Gen-Z socialism is therefore an urgent task. The first step is for free-market liberals to stop apologising. A series of popular criticisms of capitalism, each containing a grain of truth, has in aggregate obscured the fundamental wisdom that private enterprise is at the root of human prosperity. Yes, people aren’t always rational, as behavioural economics shows. True, inequality matters and growth is better when broad-based. Free trade and globalisation create losers as well as winners. But this is the best time in human history to be born, given record real incomes, high life expectancy and low rates of extreme poverty. A punchier defence of capitalism would work better in the social-media age than hand-wringing by uncharismatic centrists like Sir Keir Starmer. Centrist governments must also solve the problems driving popular discontent. “Abundance” liberals are right to want to build cheap and plentiful housing and infrastructure. Politicians must stop saddling the young with the burden of funding excessive pensions. The tax system must ensure that meritocracy prevails over inheritocracy: broader-based inheritance taxes and levies on property would help. The hardest challenge will be the disruption caused by advances in AI. The Gen-Z leftists have set out their stall with calls for a moratorium on data centres and a government jobs guarantee. Liberals must be more positive and imaginative in their own prescriptions, using a mixture of taxes, distributed capital ownership and support for workers to make sure that the upsides of labour-market disruption are widely shared. The world is ruled by little else Populists have the wind in their sails; it can sometimes seem as though market liberalism is doomed to political failure. *The Economist *disagrees. A robust defence of the ideas that have brought unprecedented riches has barely been tried. Many of the problems that animate Gen-Z socialists, like high rents, are the result of markets that are insufficiently free, not excessively so. There is time yet for liberalism to once again produce results—and to win the argument. ■ 如何反擊 Z 世代社會主義 「自我優先」的教條是對繁榮的威脅 2026年6月4日 | 5分鐘閱讀時間 左翼陣營中正在醞釀一些新的東西。新一批的社會主義者想要透過價格管制、高額財富稅以及一連串的國有化來重塑經濟。在對加薩局勢的憤怒催化下，他們正以驚人的速度贏得選民支持。許多人直到最近才嶄露頭角，例如領導英國綠黨的柴克·波蘭斯基，或是紐約市市長佐蘭·馬姆達尼。其他人則是政壇的常客：年屆七旬的尚-盧·梅蘭雄正第四次角逐法國總統寶座，而來自「Z 世代」20多歲年輕人的巨大支持，讓他再次將目光投向了愛麗舍宮。 姑且稱之為「Z 世代社會主義」。 這並非因為其所有信徒都很年輕——也不是因為年輕人傾向左翼是什麼新鮮事——而是因為這種左翼主義的品牌是為 TikTok 時代量身打造的，且深受當今全體年輕革命家支持。 忘掉沉重的集體主義理想或奪取生產工具吧。Z 世代社會主義是一種「自我優先」的教條。氣候變遷和種族問題曾是 2010 年代和 2020 年代初期人們關注的焦點，如今已退居到極其邊緣的位置。除了加薩問題之外，社會議題也是如此。 對通貨膨脹、住房和人工智慧的焦慮已經取代了這一切，取而代之的是更粗糙的東西。「這個國家充斥著財富，」加拿大新民主黨新當選的領導人艾維·路易斯說，而該國的生產力在過去十年中幾乎停滯不前。「我們可以擁有美好的事物。」宣稱應該限制價格以降低你的帳單，同時讓別人來為你的公共服務買單，這是一個極具誘惑力且易於分享的訊息。 許多激發 Z 世代社會主義者不滿的情緒，確實源於真實存在的問題。通貨膨脹一直過高，大城市的房租現在往往令人無法負擔，而且人工智慧可能會顛覆勞動力市場。 對這些擔憂不屑一顧將是愚蠢的。然而，Z 世代社會主義在如何解決資本主義問題上是錯誤的。它必須受到抵制，因為它是對繁榮的深刻威脅。 沒有哪個國家的 Z 世代社會主義者是完全相同的。權力的現實已經迫使像馬姆達尼先生這樣的一些人變得更加溫和。但他們大致上認同三個核心原則。 第一，經濟成長對幫助普通人微乎其微。他們抱持的是一種零和思維，認為更好的結果不是來自創造，而是來自掠奪——正如他們擔心人工智慧巨頭很快就會大規模所做的那樣。 第二，政府支出可以由最富有的人來支付。過去的左翼希望對每個人提高稅收；而 Z 世代社會主義者則要求由億萬富翁出資提供福利津貼。 第三，是對私營企業顯著的敵意。Z 世代社會主義者對放任市場自由發展並重新分配收益不感興趣。他們希望日常生活的各個層面，從住房到雜貨，都由國家的強硬命令來管轄。 政治圈一直都有荒誕的邊緣群體。極右翼也同樣瘋狂——而且更加危險。但是，Z 世代社會主義者之所以如此令人擔憂，是因為他們的思想正極深地滲透到中左翼陣營中。為了拼命競爭，甚至連美國主流的民主黨人現在也提出了瘋狂的方案，例如免除超過一半申報者的聯邦個人所得稅。在英國，以中間派政綱贏得政權的工黨已被綠黨嚇壞，正在重新燃起對提高稅收和國家控制的熱情。越來越多情況是，即使 Z 世代社會主義者的候選人落選，他們的思想依然能取得勝利。 這是個壞消息。租金管制會摧毀建造房屋的誘因，從而加劇住房短缺。被 Z 世代社會主義者妖魔化的大型連鎖超市，其利潤率在經歷多年的殘酷競爭後已經薄如蟬翼——這是現代資本主義的奇蹟。財富稅會演變成變相沒收，並阻礙創新。不要假設這些政策一旦實施並遭遇失敗後，會帶來自動的路線修正。歐洲數十年來一直難以擺脫自身過度監管所帶來的低成長泥淖；阿根廷擁護國家主義的「庇隆主義者」崛起，有助於解釋該國經歷長達一世紀的相對衰落。 因此，抵制 Z 世代社會主義是一項迫切的任務。第一步是自由市場自由主義者要停止道歉。一系列對資本主義的普遍批評，雖然每一項都包含著一絲道理，但總體而言，卻掩蓋了「私營企業是人類繁榮的根本基石」這一核心智慧。 誠然，正如行為經濟學所顯示的，人們並不總是理性的。沒錯，不平等確實至關重要，而且當經濟成長基礎廣泛時效果會更好。自由貿易和全球化在創造贏家的同時，也製造了輸家。但是，鑑於創紀錄的實質收入、高預期壽命和極低的極端貧困率，這是人類歷史上最適合出生的時代。在社群媒體時代，對資本主義進行更有力的辯護，會比像施凱爾·斯塔摩爵士這樣缺乏魅力的中間派人士在那裡焦慮束手無策更有效。 中間派政府也必須解決引發民眾不滿的問題。追求「豐裕」的自由主義者渴望建造廉價且充足的住房和基礎設施，這毫無疑問是正確的。政治家們必須停止將資助過高養老金的負擔強加在年輕人身上。稅收制度必須確保唯才主義凌駕於世襲主義之上：更廣泛基礎的遺產稅和房產徵稅將會有所幫助。 最艱巨的挑戰將是人工智慧的進步所帶來的顛覆性衝擊。Z 世代左翼分子(主張社會平等、社會福利與改革進步的人士)已經表明了他們的立場，呼籲暫緩建設數據中心並由政府提供就業保障。自由主義者在他們自己的處方中必須更加積極且富有想像力，透過結合稅收、分散資本所有權以及對勞工的支援，來確保勞動力市場顛覆所帶來的正面效益能被廣泛分享。 世界幾乎不被其他東西所統治。民粹主義者正順風順水；有時這看起來就像是市場自由主義注定要在政治上失敗。《經濟學人》對此持反對意見。對於那些帶來前所未有財富的思想進行堅定辯護，目前還幾乎沒有人嘗試過。許多激勵 Z 世代社會主義者的問題，例如高昂的租金，其實是市場「不夠自由」的結果，而不是「過度自由」所致。自由主義依然有時間再次創造出成果——並在這場辯論中贏得勝利。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The secrets to a good employee survey Likert or not Mar 19th 2026|4 min read 1. “This sentence is false” is an example of a logical inconsistency known as the liar paradox. If this sentence is true, then it is indeed false. But if this sentence is false, then it must be true. This is the kind of thing that makes philosophers go weak at the knees and gives normal people a headache. 2. A small echo of the liar paradox can be heard in a ritual of modern management: the annual employee survey. Imagine being asked to react to this statement: “This survey is a complete waste of time.” If enough people Strongly Agree with this proposition, then it’s probably true. But if a company is the kind of place where employees are prepared to give such honest feedback, then isn’t it likely to be false? 3. Employee surveys are a staple of corporate life. Knowing what workers are thinking is an important goal. High employee churn imposes financial and operational costs. There is lots of research to suggest that employee satisfaction leads to better financial outcomes. But set-piece surveys are really useful only if three conditions are met: they are properly designed, they are used in conjunction with other tools and they lead somewhere. 4. Among other things, proper design means grappling with the problem that employees are not necessarily incentivised to be honest. Faced with a Likert scale and the proposition that “My bosses have the communication skills of a banana,” you might Strongly Agree but still opt to Neither Agree Nor Disagree on your submitted form. Promises of confidentiality and anonymity can help, but only to a point. 5. Impression management, a fancy name for making yourself look good, can skew results on questions about things like job-safety practices. There are ways to mitigate this, however. A recent study by Emma Zaal of the University of Groningen and her co-authors found that using different survey formulations can have a big impact on responses. In a survey of Dutch adults, which asked questions like whether they had sent text messages while driving a car, the inclusion of face-saving options such as “occasionally” or “only when no other option” elicited a very different set of answers from binary “yes” or “no” options. 6. Employers can look at unvarnished feedback, most obviously on workplace-review sites such as GlassDoor. Artificial intelligence has the ability to build a coherent picture out of a mass of unstructured comments. In one recent paper, Tom Reader and Alex Gillespie of the London School of Economics looked for evidence of high-pressure cultures in employee reviews of European firms. Reviews that suggested very ambitious targets and expediency in reaching them were predictive of companies experiencing a future corporate scandal. 7. Frequency is another aspect of good design. A lot can change in the space of a year; an annual survey is a long time to wait for an update on employee sentiment. Retrospective evaluations are also subject to biases like the peak-end rule, which describes how people overweight the most extreme and the closing moments of an experience when they recall it. In one famous experiment, Daniel Kahneman and others put volunteers through two unpleasant tasks: the first involved holding their hands in icy water for a minute, and the second for 90 seconds, though for the final 30 seconds the water’s temperature rose by a little. The first experience was objectively less painful but, given a choice, the second was the one people chose to repeat. 8. Shorter “pulse” surveys cannot eradicate these problems, but are a way to gather more timely data. HappyOrNot, a Finnish company that makes those smiley-face feedback terminals you see in airports and elsewhere, also installs its machines inside companies as a way of keeping track of employee sentiment on a daily or weekly basis. 9. Good design and multiple sources of information contribute to a successful employee survey. But nothing matters more than being seen to act on feedback. If you say that your bosses have the communication skills of a banana and then hear nothing back, you have the faint satisfaction of knowing you are right but not much else. Surveys that prompt no follow-up action deepen cynicism rather than enthusiasm. 10. All of which leads to another paradox. Surveys are most useful in organisations that care about what their employees think. But organisations that care about what their employees think often have less need for surveys.■ 員工滿意度調查成功的秘訣 不論你喜不喜歡（Likert scale 刻度調查的雙關語） 2026年3月19日 | 4 分鐘閱讀 「這句話是假的」是一個被稱為「說謊者悖論」的邏輯矛盾案例。如果這句話是真的，那麼它確實是假的；但如果這句話是假的，那麼它就必須是真的。這種事情會讓哲學家雙膝發軟，並讓一般人感到頭痛。 在現代管理的一項儀式中，可以聽到說謊者悖論的微弱迴聲：那就是年度員工調查。想像一下，當你被要求對這句話做出反應：「這次調查完全是浪費時間。」如果有足夠多的人「強烈同意」這個命題，那麼它很可能是真的。但如果一家公司是那種員工願意提供如此誠實反饋的地方，那麼這句話難道不更有可能是假的嗎？ 員工調查是企業生活的家常便飯。了解員工在想什麼是一個重要的目標。高員工離職率會帶來財務和營運上的成本。有大量的研究表明，員工滿意度能帶來更好的財務成果。但是，這種固定形式的調查只有在滿足三個條件時才真正有用：它們經過妥善設計、與其他工具配合使用，並且能帶來實際的改變。 其中，妥善的設計意味著必須解決一個問題：員工不一定有動機保持誠實。面對李克特量表（Likert scale）以及「我的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧」這個命題時，你內心可能「強烈同意」，但最終在提交的表單上還是會選擇「既不同意也不反對」。保護隱私和匿名的承諾會有所幫助，但也只能起到一定程度的作用。 印象管理（這是一個讓自己看起來面子好看的精緻名稱）可能會在有關工作安全規範等問題上扭曲調查結果。然而，有一些方法可以減輕這種情況。格羅寧根大學的艾瑪·扎爾（Emma Zaal）及其合著者最近發表的一項研究發現，使用不同的問卷設計表述會對回答產生重大影響。在一項針對荷蘭成年人的調查中（詢問他們是否曾在開車時發送簡訊），加入「偶爾」或「僅在別無選擇時」等顧及面子的選項，所引出的答案與二分法的「是」或「否」選項截然不同。 雇主可以參考未經修飾的反饋，最顯而易見的是在 GlassDoor 等職場評價網站上。人工智慧有能力從大量非結構化的評論中，拼湊出一個清晰完整的輪廓。在最近的一篇論文中，倫敦政治經濟學院的湯姆·里德（Tom Reader）和亞歷克斯·吉萊斯皮（Alex Gillespie）在歐洲企業的員工評論中，尋找是否存在高壓文化的證據。那些暗示目標非常宏大、且在達成目標時不擇手段的評論，預示著這些公司未來將會經歷企業醜聞。 頻率是妥善設計的另一個面向。在長達一年的時間裡，很多事情都會發生變化；對於獲取員工情緒的最新動態而言，年度調查是一段漫長的等待。回溯性的評估也容易受到像是「峰終定律」（peak-end rule）等偏誤的影響，該定律描述了人們在回憶一項經歷時，會過度重視最極端以及結束時的時刻。在一個著名的實驗中，丹尼爾·康納曼（Daniel Kahneman）等人讓志願者經歷兩項令人不快的任務：第一項涉及將手放在冰水中一分鐘；第二項則是放 90 秒，不過在最後的 30 秒內，水溫稍微上升了一點。第一種體驗客觀上痛苦較少，但如果可以選擇，人們卻選擇重複第二種。 更短期的「脈搏」（pulse）調查雖然無法完全消除這些問題，但卻是收集更即時數據的一種方法。HappyOrNot 是一家芬蘭公司，負責製造你在機場和其他地方看到的那些笑臉反饋終端機，該公司也將這些機器安裝在企業內部，作為每日或每週追蹤員工情緒的一種方式。 好的設計和多元的信息來源有助於員工調查的成功。但沒有任何事情比「被看見對反饋採取行動」更重要。如果你說你的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧，隨後卻沒聽到任何回應，你只會得到一種知道自己是對的、卻於事無補的微弱滿足感。沒有引發任何後續行動的調查，非但不能深化熱情，反而會加深諷刺與犬儒主義。 這一切引出了另一個悖論：調查在那些關心員工想法的組織中最有用。然而，關心員工想法的組織，往往較不需要進行調查。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The world wants Chinese tech. China is determined to keep it China’s rivals are learning how to get what China won’t share Apr 20th 2026|5 min read THEY USED to gripe about too much technology transfer in China. But in the past year or so, foreign business and political leaders** have started to fret that too little is happening.** No longer do they worry so much about Western tech landing in Chinese hands; rather, they fear that China is now too effective at preventing its best stuff from passing to foreigners. A former Chinese trade official reacts to the pivot with empathy rather than mockery. “It is a bit hypocritical but it’s understandable,” he says. It might be tempting to craft a morality play out of this, as if countries outside China are getting their comeuppance. But at its heart this is a practical problem, a question of whether China will be able to dig a moat around its world-leading technologies, from electric vehicles to artificial-intelligence-powered robots. Chaguan is inclined to take the other side of the bet—namely, that knowledge will flow as it normally does, from those who have it to those who want it. A reverse tech transfer will, over time, occur. In principle, the mechanism is straightforward. Countries can offer Chinese firms market access as long as they set up local manufacturing. In practice, none of this is automatic—and all of it is fraught. The European Union is now at the forefront, recently proposing procurement rules that would require things such as battery-storage systems for Europe to be made there. Chinese companies wanting to be let in to European markets would have to invest in factories there. Developing countries also see promise. From Brazil to Vietnam, governments are opening their doors to Chinese EV companies and urging them to use local content. Yet it is early days. “We have been talking about tech transfer for just the past year and it’s still not really clear how it will work,” says one diplomat with refreshing candour. One obstacle will be China itself. Over the past five years it has built an export-control regime, mimicking America’s. The stated goal is to protect national security but many controls are aimed at shoring up Chinese industry. Last year, for example, the commerce ministry said it would require companies to obtain licences before exporting technologies used in EV batteries. A Western trade official sees little prospect of Chinese officials letting out anything genuinely valuable. They have already reacted angrily to the made-in-Europe legislation, viewing it as a ploy to weaken Chinese industry. The saga of Manus, an AI startup, also highlights Chinese leaders’ paranoia. Founded in China, Manus shifted its business registration to Singapore last year, facilitating a sale to Meta, Facebook’s parent company. Chinese regulators are now attempting to unwind that deal and have barred Manus’s two co-founders from leaving the country. But China’s own record in digesting foreign tech offers some guidance for the rest of the world. Persistence will be essential. China took three decades to hone its methods: incentives for investors; requirements for local joint ventures; content rules; partnerships with foreign universities; and, yes, theft of intellectual property. One critical need is more attention to Chinese scientific research: much of it, at least in pre-commercial phases, is in journals, says Tai Ming Cheung, an analyst of Chinese tech policy. “It’s something we didn’t think about that now we have to,” he says. Moreover, it is a mistake to think tech transfer involves discrete bits of technology, such as a blueprint for photovoltaic cells. Instead, what matters is the whole process, including workforce training—a lesson that India is slowly absorbing. Apple, whose investments helped build up China’s supply chains, now produces a quarter of its iPhones in India. Even if most components are sourced from China, many are made in Chinese factories owned by foreign companies, according to analysis by Chris Miller and Vishnu Venugopalan for the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank. The implication is that the Chinese supply chain may ultimately prove more mobile than it currently seems. At the same time the rest of the world will have to follow a different formula from China’s. Instead of relying on the government’s top-down strategy, other countries will have to depend on companies themselves. The auto sector offers an early indication. Almost all global carmakers—General Motors, Hyundai and Volkswagen, to name a few—are now developing EVs in China, learning from local firms. Many ideas are also seeping out through research-and-development partnerships. “The biggest companies are off limits but there are thousands of suppliers to work with,” says one Chinese executive with a foreign carmaker. China’s tech controls may also have the opposite of their intended effect. For young innovators in AI, the crackdown on Manus is chilling. If they are unable to sell to foreigners, they will never get full value. That will only give them more incentive to take ideas abroad early on. The ultra-competitive Chinese business environment pushes in the same direction. The Chinese auto executive says many local suppliers are starved for profits, which makes foreign partnerships yet more tempting. Transfer portal For all its manufacturing prowess, China still wants what the West has to offer, notably in the semiconductor industry. In that sense the current wrangling over tech transfers has an air of negotiation to it. As the former Chinese trade official puts it, China will not fully benefit from its inventiveness unless it can export its own technology. The point, he says, is to extract a price from others, including access to their latest innovations. This is not a winning proposition for now, especially as American officials want to keep China away from cutting-edge chips. But it points to a possible, even a likely, future in which tech flows both ways across China’s borders. That may worry leaders in both Beijing and Washington. They will, however, struggle to stop it. ■ 世界渴望中國科技，中國決心據為己有 中國的競爭對手正學習如何獲取中國不願分享的技術 2026年4月20日 | 5分鐘閱讀 過去，人們總是在抱怨中國有太多的技術轉移。但在過去一年左右的時間裡，外國商界和政治領袖開始擔心技術轉移發生的得太少。他們不再那麼擔心西方科技落入中國手中；相反地，他們擔心中國現在過於有效地阻止其最優秀的技術流向外國人。一位前中國貿易官員對這種轉變感到感同身受，而非嘲諷。他說：「這有點虛偽，但可以理解。」 把這件事塑造成一部道德劇，彷彿中國以外的國家正在自食其果，或許很吸引人。但其核心這是一個切實的技術問題：中國是否能夠在其世界領先的技術（從電動汽車到人工智慧驅動的機器人）周圍挖出一條護城河。對此，「茶館」傾向於站在賭局的另一邊——即知識會像往常一樣，從擁有者流向渴望者。隨著時間的推移，一場「反向技術轉移」將會發生。 原則上，這個機制非常簡單。各國只要要求中國企業在當地設立製造基地，就可以向其開放市場。但在實踐中，這一切都不是自動發生的——而且每一步都充滿了挑戰。歐盟目前走在前列，最近提出了採購法規，要求供應歐洲的電池儲能系統等產品必須在歐洲本土製造。想要進入歐洲市場的中國公司必須在當地投資設廠。發展中國家也看到了希望。從巴西到越南，各國政府正向中國電動車企業敞開大門，並督促它們使用本地零組件。然而，這一切才剛開始。一位外交官帶著令人耳目一新的坦率說道：「我們在過去一年才開始討論技術轉移，目前仍不清楚這將如何運作。」 其中一個障礙將是中國本身。在過去五年中，中國建立了一套模仿美國的出口管制體系。其宣稱的目標是維護國家安全，但許多管制措施旨在保護中國的產業鏈。例如，去年商務部表示，企業在出口用於電動車電池的技術之前必須取得許可。一位西方貿易官員認為，中國官員幾乎不可能讓任何真正有價值的技術流出。他們已經對歐洲製造的立法做出了憤怒的反應，認為這是削弱中國工業的陰謀。人工智慧初創公司 Manus 的故事也突顯了中國領導人的偏執。Manus 創立於中國，去年將其業務註冊地遷至新加坡，以便利出售給 Facebook 的母公司 Meta。中國監管機構目前正試圖撤銷該筆交易，並禁止 Manus 的兩位聯合創始人離境。 不過，中國自身消化外國科技的歷史紀錄，為世界其他地區提供了一些指引。堅持不懈是至關重要的。中國花了三十年的時間來磨練其方法：給予投資者激勵措施、要求成立當地合資企業、規定在地化比例限制、與外國大學建立合作夥伴關係，當然，還有盜取智慧財產權。中國科技政策分析師張太銘（Tai Ming Cheung）表示，一個關鍵的需求是必須更加關注中國的科學研究：至少在商業化前階段，許多研究都發表在期刊上。他說：「這是我們以前沒想過、但現在必須去做的事。」 此外，如果認為技術轉移只涉及具體的技術碎片（例如光伏電池的藍圖），那就錯了。相反地，重要的是包含員工培訓在內的整個流程——這是印度正在慢慢吸收的教訓。曾協助在中國建立供應鏈的蘋果公司（Apple），現在有四分之一的 iPhone 在印度生產。根據美國企業研究院（American Enterprise Institute）智庫學者克里斯·米勒（Chris Miller）和維什努·維努戈帕蘭（Vishnu Venugopalan）的分析，即使大多數零組件仍源自中國，但許多零組件是在外國公司擁有的中國工廠中製造的。這意味著，中國的供應鏈最終可能會被證明比目前看起來更具流動性。 與此同時，世界其他地區必須採用與中國不同的模式。其他國家不能依賴政府自上而下的戰略，而必須依靠企業自身。汽車行業提供了一個早期的跡象。幾乎所有全球汽車製造商——通用（GM）、現代（Hyundai）和福斯（Volkswagen，又譯大眾），僅舉幾例——目前都在中國研發電動車，向本土企業學習。許多想法也透過研發合作夥伴關係滲透出來。一家外國汽車製造商的中國高管表示：「最大型的公司是不能碰的，但有成千上萬家供應商可以合作。」 中國的技術管制也可能產生適得其反的效果。對於人工智慧領域的年輕創新者來說，對 Manus 的打壓令人心寒。如果他們無法將公司賣給外國人，就永遠無法獲得完整的價值。這只會給他們更多動力，在早期就將想法帶到國外。內捲極其嚴重的中國商業環境也推動了相同的方向。上述汽車大廠的高管表示，許多本土供應商正處於利潤飢渴狀態，這使得與外國建立合作關係變得更具吸引力。 轉移門戶 儘管中國擁有強大的製造實力，但它仍然渴望西方所能提供的東西，特別是在半導體產業。從這個意義上說，當前圍繞技術轉移的爭執帶有一種談判的氣氛。正如那位前中國貿易官員所言，除非中國能夠出口自己的技術，否則它無法完全從自己的創造力中獲益。他說，關鍵在於向他人索取代價，包括獲取他們最新的創新技術。 目前這還不是一個穩贏的提議，特別是在美國官員希望讓中國遠離尖端晶片的情況下。但它指出了一個可能、甚至很大概率發生的未來：科技將在中國邊境進行雙向流動。這可能會讓北京和華盛頓的領導人感到擔憂。然而，他們將很難阻止這一切。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Ageing workers in East Asia are essential. More are needed Yet they often face high barriers to employment and unpalatable options Apr 27th 2026|SEOUL AND TOKYO|6 min read HONDA TAMIKO began working as a child on her family’s farm back when Japan was at war with America. Now 93, Ms Honda still puts in a hard day’s toil as a janitor at a McDonald’s branch in Kumamoto, in southern Japan. Ms Honda says her pension is plenty to live off; she chooses to keep showing up. “Humans are animals, after all,” she chuckles. “We have to keep moving as much as we can.” Ms Honda is the oldest in McDonald’s crew of some 220,000 in Japan. But she is less an outlier than a harbinger. As people live longer, they are staying healthy for longer and working longer, too. Japan and its neighbour South Korea, two of the most rapidly ageing countries, are at the forefront of this transition. Nearly 40% of South Koreans and more than 25% of Japanese aged above 65 remain at work, the highest rates in the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries (see chart). But labour markets and social systems designed for a different demographic era struggle to make the most of those who can work and to support those who can’t. Many people in both Japan and South Korea keep working out of necessity. More than half of elderly employees in Japan say they work for income. The financial pressure is even greater in South Korea, where the pension system failed to keep pace with the country’s rapid development after the Korean war, leaving generations of people with inadequate support. The average public pension replaces only about a third of workers’ pre-retirement income, so nearly 40% of South Koreans over 65 make less than half the median income, the highest rate in the OECD. Many in South Korea fear being made to retire too early: bus drivers in Seoul went on strike earlier this year demanding that the retirement age be raised. “In the past, 65 was considered quite elderly, but now, even at 65, people live a youthful life,” says Shin Gyo-beom, who drives Seoul’s bus number 107. “Wouldn’t it be better for someone more experienced to drive?” Yet money is only part of the story. Many want to keep working for other reasons. “There is infinite value that can’t be quantified in monetary terms,” says Kim Mi-gon of the Korea Labour Force Development Institute for the Aged, a think-tank. Staying employed can help stave off health problems and keep loneliness at bay. “When you’re this age, if you stay at home, you lose it mentally and physically,” says Ms Honda, who belongs to McDonald’s Japan’s “Premium Age Crew”, as employees over 60 are known. “My family keeps telling me to quit, but I know that if I stop working and stay at home I’ll be a burden to them and end up in a facility.” Across East Asia, studies show older people who keep working tend to be less frail and less likely to report depressive symptoms. (The direction of causality is hard to establish, however.) Ro Ick-kyun, a 60-year-old from Hanam, east of Seoul, has had several jobs since he retired from his original career as a corporate executive. “My wife says when I work I seem younger and more full of energy,” he smiles. Some companies are making concerted efforts to use older workers. Consulting on later-stage career options has become common practice at large Japanese firms. Companies are adjusting roles and responsibilities to accommodate older workers. The boss of a car-repair shop in Kashiwazaki, a small city in northern Japan, says that with fewer young people, he needs to get more out of his existing staff. Yet too often those who want to keep working face high barriers and unpalatable options. Lots of human capital is wasted, argues Randall Jones, a former head of the Japan/Korea desk at the OECD. Seniority-based wage and promotion systems are still common in Japan and South Korea, which makes keeping workers on full-time staff contracts costly for companies. Many thus rehire older workers after their official retirement on new temporary contracts with reduced pay and responsibilities. Those who look for new jobs can struggle, not least because discrimination is rampant. “Korean case law and social norms tend to view hiring discrimination based on age…as reasonable,” says Kwon O-hun, a labour lawyer at Gapjil119, a South Korean watchdog that combats workplace abuse. Some start small businesses. Others take on temporary work as cleaners, carers or security guards. “There’s a huge mismatch: lots of supply of desk workers and lots of demand for menial work,” says Kitao Sagiri of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “The skills older folks accumulated are not necessarily what’s needed.” Those who struggle to find new jobs can turn to a host of government programmes and agencies to support older workers. South Korea’s national government finances over 1m part-time jobs for seniors as a quasi-welfare policy. The Seoul 50Plus Foundation, an arm of the capital’s municipal government, aims to help those on the cusp of retirement from their first career plan for a second one. At one airy outpost in the city’s east, older jobseekers can get advice on how to polish their résumés or receive training in AI. Japan has more than 1,300 Silver Human Resource Centres, which help match people aged 60 or above with job opportunities, from caring for even older folk to cleaning up family gravesites for those not up to visiting. Policymakers want to encourage these trends. Keeping people employed for longer helps compensate for the shrinking number of young people in both countries; to the extent it keeps people fit, it also helps reduce health- and nursing-care costs. Since 2006 Japan has encouraged firms to offer job opportunities until the age of 65; in 2021, the government began urging employers to keep workers on until 70. In 2013 South Korea raised its statutory retirement age from 59 to 60. But that does not tackle the underlying issue about what kind of work older people should do. Getting the most out of those who can keep working while providing support to those who cannot will require a more ambitious redesign of social systems and hiring practices. For older workers it also means reconceiving the latter stages of a working life as something more akin to the beginning of it. Murazeki Fumio, the head of Koureisha, a temporary-employment agency for elderly workers in Japan, encourages his new employees to shed their attachments to their old roles: “I always tell everyone: once you’re over 65, approach it as if you were a new hire, with the mindset of starting over from scratch.” ■ 東亞高齡勞工不可或缺：需求日益增加，卻仍面臨重重障礙與無奈選擇 2026年4月27日 | 首爾與東京報導 本田民子（Honda Tamiko）在童年時期就開始在自家的農場工作，當時日本正與美國交戰。如今已 93 歲高齡的本田女士，依然在日本南部熊本市的一家麥當勞分店擔任清潔員，每天辛勤工作。本田女士表示她的養老金足夠生活，但她選擇繼續露面工作。「人類終究是動物，」她笑著說，「我們必須盡可能地保持活動。」 本田女士是日本麥當勞約 22 萬名員工中最年長的一位。但她與其說是一個特例，不如說是一個先兆。隨著人類壽命延長，健康壽命也隨之增加，工作時間也變得更長。日本與鄰國南韓作為全球高齡化最快速的兩個國家，正處於這場轉型的最前線。南韓 65 歲以上的人口中有近 40% 仍在工作，日本則超過 25%，這是經濟合作暨發展組織（OECD，主要由富裕國家組成的俱樂部）中最高的比例。然而，為不同人口結構時代所設計的勞動力市場與社會體制，正難以充分發揮有能力工作者的潛力，也難以支援那些無法工作的人。 許多日韓的高齡者是出於必要性而持續工作。日本超過半數的高齡員工表示，他們是為了收入而工作。而在南韓，財務壓力更為沉重，因為當地的養老金制度未能跟上韓戰後國家快速發展的步伐，導致好幾代人缺乏充足的支援。平均公共養老金僅能替代勞工退休前收入的三分之一，因此南韓 65 歲以上的人口中，近 40% 的收入低於中位數的一半，比例居 OECD 之冠。許多南韓人擔心太早被迫退休：首爾的公車司機在今年早些時候發動罷工，要求提高退休年齡。「過去 65 歲被認為非常老，但現在即使是 65 歲，大家生活得還是很年輕，」駕駛首爾 107 號公車的申教範（Shin Gyo-beom）說，「讓更有經驗的人來開車不是更好嗎？」 然而，金錢並非故事的全貌。許多人是為了其他原因想繼續工作。「有些無限的價值是無法用金錢衡量的，」韓國高齡勞工發展研究院（一個智庫）的金美坤（Kim Mi-gon）表示。維持就業有助於延緩健康問題，並防止孤獨。 「到了這個年紀，如果一直待在家裡，你的身心都會崩潰，」本田女士說，她是日本麥當勞「銀髮菁英組」（Premium Age Crew，指 60 歲以上的員工）的一員。「家人一直叫我辭職，但我知道如果我不工作待在家，就會成為他們的負擔，最後落入安養機構。」 在整個東亞，研究顯示持續工作的高齡者往往較不虛弱，且較少出現憂鬱症狀（然而，因果關係的方向尚難確定）。來自首爾東部河南市、60 歲的盧益均（Ro Ick-kyun）自從結束原本的企業高管生涯退休後，已經換過幾份工作。「我太太說我工作的時候看起來更年輕、更有活力，」他笑著說。 部分公司正有意識地運用高齡員工。在日本大型企業中，針對職涯後期的諮詢已成為慣例。公司正在調整職位與職責以適應高齡員工。日本北部小城柏崎市的一家修車廠老闆表示，隨著年輕人減少，他需要從現有的員工中發揮更大的價值。 然而，那些想繼續工作的人往往面臨高門檻與無奈的選擇。OECD 前日韓事務主管藍道爾·瓊斯（Randall Jones）認為，許多人力資源被浪費了。日本與南韓仍普遍採用年功序列制（依年資敘薪與晉升），這使得公司保留全職高齡員工的成本極高。因此，許多公司在員工正式退休後，以薪水降低、職責減少的新型臨時合約重新聘僱他們。 那些尋找新工作的人則面臨困難，尤其年齡歧視依然猖獗。南韓勞權監督組織 Gapjil119 的律師權五勳（Kwon O-hun）表示：「南韓的判例與社會規範往往認為基於年齡的招聘歧視……是合理的。」有些人選擇創業，其他人則從事清潔工、看護或警衛等臨時工作。東京政策研究大學院大學的北尾早霧（Kitao Sagiri）指出：「這裡存在巨大的錯配：大量想做辦公室工作的勞動力供應，與大量體力活的需求。高齡者累積的技能未必是市場所需要的。」 找不到新工作的人可以尋求政府計畫與機構的支援。南韓政府資助了超過 100 萬個高齡者兼職職位，作為準福利政策。首爾 50Plus 基金會（市府下屬機構）旨在幫助那些即將從第一職涯退休的人規畫第二人生；在首爾東部一個明亮的服務據點，高齡求職者可以諮詢如何修改簡歷，或接受 AI 培訓。日本則擁有 1,300 多個「銀髮人才中心」，幫助 60 歲及以上的人媒合工作，從照顧更高齡的老人到為無法親自前往的人清理祖墳等。 決策者希望鼓勵這些趨勢。延長就業時間有助於補足兩國日益萎縮的年輕勞動力；只要能讓長者保持健康，也有助於降低醫療與護理成本。自 2006 年起，日本鼓勵企業提供工作機會至 65 歲；2021 年起，政府開始敦促雇主讓員工工作到 70 歲。2013 年，南韓將法定退休年齡從 59 歲提高到 60 歲。但這些舉措並未解決底層的核心問題：高齡者究竟該做什麼樣的工作？ 要從有能力工作者身上獲得最大價值，同時支援無法工作者，需要對社會體制與招聘慣例進行更具雄心的重新設計。對於高齡勞工來說，這也意味著需要將職涯後期視為某種「新開始」。日本高齡者人力派遣公司 Koureisha 的負責人村關文雄（Murazeki Fumio）鼓勵新員工放下對過去職位的執念：「我總是告訴大家：一旦你超過 65 歲，就要把自己當作新進員工，以從零開始的心態出發。」■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

On the front lines, Russian soldiers pay officers to stay alive The war against Ukraine has created a corrupt economy of blood money Apr 1st 2026|Altai and Luhansk|5 min read The newly built one-bedroom flat is nicely decorated, with parquet floors, an aquarium, a shower cabin and a full kitchen. The downside is the location: underground in the trenches near Baihavka, a village in the occupied region of Luhansk. The apartment is home to the commander of the local Russian army unit. Maxim, a deserter who helped to build it, says the commander did not spend a kopek. Not only was the labour free, but soldiers paid for the materials, appliances and paint. Russian soldiers must also buy officers alcohol. “They have four korporativy [office parties] a week,” says Sergei, who bribed his way into a rear position as a cook. He works from 5am to 11pm, paying over half his salary to a commander for the privilege. Interviews with a dozen contract soldiers in locations including the Belgorod region, Luhansk and Donetsk reveal a system of extortion and punishment. Officers see their soldiers not just as grunts but as a source of enrichment. Corruption and slave labour have long been features of the Russian and Soviet armies: professional officers control the means of destruction, while recruits serve as cannon fodder in war or free labour in peacetime. Russia’s recruitment drive for its war in Ukraine has poured blood and money into the system, resulting in a vast battlefield economy. Soldiers describe the front lines as a marketplace where everything has a price: drones, medals, home leave and life itself. To back up their claims, they show screenshots of bank transfers, complaints to military prosecutors, demands for money and orders to take part in assaults. Maxim, a 26-year-old from the city of Krasnodar, signed his contract in August 2024 in Moscow, where bonuses were higher. He supplies various reasons: government propaganda, the death of his stepfather in the war. “Something just snapped in my head,” he says. “I didn’t even know the contract was indefinite.” It probably helped that he had been arrested with amphetamines in his pocket and given the option of enlisting to avoid prosecution. He got a bonus of 2.5m roubles ($30,000) and was sent without training to the Luhansk region, where he was paid 200,000 roubles a month until he deserted in January 2026. Of the 8m roubles he got in total, he says 6m went in equipment and bribes. Russia’s army provides gear to elite airborne and special-forces units, but infantry must buy their own. Since 2023 Wildberries and Ozon, the main Russian online retailers, have been available in the occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson. “If you don’t want to spend money on a good pair of boots and a decent body-armour vest, you go into assault wearing trainers,” says Maxim. The collections begin under the pretext of raising money for drones, equipment or food, says Anton, an assault trooper. But if you pay once, “you’ll pay for ever so they don’t send you to the meat grinder.” Ukraine’s wall of drones has created a kill zone at least 20km deep, rendering mass assaults suicidal. It has also created an economy of life and death. Making their own luck Maxim says his commander welcomed new recruits by telling them he had buried 12 companies and they would be the 13th. “He said we were cannon fodder and only 5% of soldiers survive assaults.” The next day he explained that survival was not a matter of luck, but of ability to pay. Maxim and Sergei, another soldier, each paid 1m roubles to be transferred to the rear, plus another 100,000-150,000 roubles a month. Some commanders requisition troops’ bank cards and PIN codes before sending them into an assault. Ilya, another deserter, says a staff officer collects them for safekeeping. The dead are declared missing, and commanders withdraw the money they earned from their bank accounts at ATMs in Donetsk and Luhansk. There is a rich trade in medical documents declaring soldiers unfit for combat. Getting wounded is not free either. “I paid 100,000 for leave after a wound,” says Anton. “To get discharged they ask for a million.” Soldiers who refuse to pay may be thrown into dug-out pits for torture. Andrey Bykov refused to hand over 2m roubles he received as compensation for being wounded to his commanders, who used the call signs Kemer and Dudka. According to his mother, he was first handcuffed and beaten for several days. Later he was tied to a tree and shot. Soldiers ordered by their commanders to kill their own comrades call it “zeroing out”. Soldiers say “refuseniks” can be zeroed out by shooting them, tying them to trees to freeze, denying them medical care after beatings or having drone operators kill them on the battlefield. Verstka, an independent Russian news site, confirmed the identities of at least 100 commanders who either ordered or carried out such killings. “Will these bastards ever be punished?” asks Elena, a 39-year-old from the Altai region in Russia’s north-east. In February 2025 she buried her son, who had served in Kemer’s regiment. He had paid 100,000 roubles “for the needs of the regiment” and was reported as having died on a combat mission. Last summer Elena’s husband, who was serving in the same unit, deserted and recorded several videos about extortion schemes. He filed a complaint with military prosecutors saying Kemer had taken 2m roubles from him. But shortly before the new year he was found by military police and sent back to Kemer’s unit. On January 11th, Elena says, he was tied to a tree and killed.■ 俄羅斯士兵在前線付錢給軍官以求活命 這場對抗烏克蘭的戰爭創造了一個腐敗的血錢經濟 第一部分：前線的「豪華」地堡與剝削 2026年4月1日 | 阿爾泰與盧干斯克 | 5分鐘閱讀時間 這間新落成的一房一廳公寓裝飾精美，鋪著魚骨木地板，有魚缸、淋浴房和設備齊全的廚房。唯一缺點是地點：位於盧干斯克（Luhansk）佔領區白哈夫卡村（Baihavka）附近的戰壕地底下。這間公寓是當地俄軍部隊指揮官的家。協助建造這間公寓的逃兵馬克沁（Maxim）說，指揮官一分錢都沒花。不僅勞動力是免費的，士兵們還支付了建材、家電和油漆的費用。 俄羅斯士兵還必須為軍官購買酒類。曾透過賄賂獲得「廚師」後方職位的謝爾蓋（Sergei）說：「他們每週舉辦四次公司派對（korporativy）。」他從凌晨 5 點工作到晚上 11 點，並將超過一半的薪水交給指揮官，以換取這個特權。 第二部分：制度化的勒索與懲罰 對貝爾哥羅德（Belgorod）、盧干斯克和頓內茨克（Donetsk）等地區的十幾名合約兵進行的採訪揭露了一個勒索與懲罰系統。軍官不僅將士兵視為底層小兵（grunts），更將其視為發財的來源。腐敗和奴隸勞動長期以來一直是俄羅斯和蘇聯軍隊的特徵：職業軍官控制著毀滅手段，而招募的新兵在戰爭中充當炮灰（cannon fodder），或在和平時期充當免費勞動力。 俄羅斯為烏克蘭戰爭發起的徵兵行動為這個系統注入了鮮血與金錢，導致了一個巨大的戰場經濟。士兵們將前線描述為一個「萬物皆有價」的市場：無人機、獎章、返鄉假，乃至生命本身。為了支持他們的說法，他們展示了銀行轉帳截圖、向軍事檢察官提出的投訴、要錢的要求以及參與突擊的命令。 第三部分：高額賄賂與物資自理 來自克拉斯諾達爾（Krasnodar）的 26 歲青年馬克沁，於 2024 年 8 月在獎金較高的莫斯科簽署了合約。他給出了各種理由：政府宣傳、繼父在戰爭中去世。他說：「我腦袋裡有些東西斷掉了。我甚至不知道合約是無限期的。」另一個推動因素可能是他因口袋藏有安非他命被捕，並獲得了透過參軍來避免起訴的選擇。他獲得了 250 萬盧布（3 萬美元 (1 俄羅斯盧布 等於 0.41 新臺幣 )的獎金，並在未經訓練的情況下被派往盧干斯克地區，在那裡他每個月領取 20 萬盧布的薪水，直到 2026 年 1 月逃亡。在他總共獲得的 800 萬盧布中，他說有 600 萬盧布花在了裝備和賄賂上。 俄羅斯軍隊為精銳的空降兵和特種部隊提供裝備，但步兵必須自備。自 2023 年以來，俄羅斯主要電商 Wildberries 和 Ozon 已在頓內茨克、盧干斯克、扎波羅熱和赫爾松等佔領區提供服務。馬克沁說：「如果你不想花錢買一雙好的靴子和體面的防彈背心，你就得穿著運動鞋去衝鋒。」 第四部分：生存的代價 一名突擊隊員安東（Anton）表示，募款通常以籌集無人機、設備或食物的錢為藉口開始。但如果你付了一次錢，「你就得永遠付下去，這樣他們才不會把你送進肉靶機（meat grinder）。」烏克蘭的無人機牆已創造了一個至少 20 公里深的殺傷區，使得大規模突擊等同於自殺。這也創造了一種生與死的經濟。 馬克沁說，他的指揮官迎接新兵時告訴他們，他已經埋葬了 12 個連，他們將是第 13 個。「他說我們是炮灰，只有 5% 的士兵能在突擊中倖存。」隔天他解釋說，生存不是運氣問題，而是支付能力的問題。馬克沁和另一名士兵謝爾蓋各付了 100 萬盧布被調往後方，此外每個月還要再付 10 萬至 15 萬盧布。 第五部分：「清零」與殘酷處決 一些指揮官在將部隊送入突擊前，會徵用士兵的銀行卡和 PIN 碼。另一名逃兵伊利亞（Ilya）說，一名幕僚軍官會收集這些卡片以便「安全保管」。死者被宣佈為失蹤，而指揮官則在頓內茨克和盧干斯克的 ATM 機提取他們賺來的錢。此外，宣佈士兵不適合戰鬥的醫療文件交易也非常興旺。受傷也不是免費的。安東說：「我為了傷後的休假付了 10 萬盧布，如果要退伍，他們要價 100 萬。」 拒絕付錢的士兵可能會被關進地坑受審。安德烈·比科夫（Andrey Bykov）拒絕將他因受傷獲得的 200 萬盧布補償金交給代號為 Kemer 和 Dudka 的指揮官。據他母親稱，他先是被戴上手銬並毆打數日，後來被綁在樹上射殺。士兵被指揮官命令殺死自己的戰友，稱之為「清零」（zeroing out）。 士兵們說，「拒絕者」（refuseniks）可以透過槍殺、綁在樹上凍死、毆打後拒絕提供醫療護理，或讓無人機操作員在戰場上將其殺死來進行「清零」。獨立俄羅斯新聞網站 Verstka 證實了至少 100 名下令或執行此類殺戮的指揮官身份。 「這些混蛋會受到懲罰嗎？」來自俄羅斯東北部阿爾泰地區 39 歲的埃琳娜（Elena）問道。2025 年 2 月，她埋葬了在 Kemer 團服役的兒子。他曾為「團裡的需要」支付了 10 萬盧布，並被報告死於一次戰鬥任務。去年夏天，埃琳娜在同一單位服役的丈夫逃亡，並錄製了幾段關於勒索計劃的影片。他向軍事檢察官提出投訴，稱 Kemer 從他那裡拿走了 200 萬盧布。但在新年前夕，他被軍警找到並送回 Kemer 的單位。埃琳娜說，1 月 11 日，他被綁在樹上殺害。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Why women, more than men, are abandoning rural Japan Bigger cities are, in turn, skewing more female Apr 1st 2026|NANTO|4 min read KOYASU MIWA traverses Japan, from Sapporo in the north to Miyazaki in the south, with one goal: to make the countryside less hostile to women. Ms Koyasu runs a consultancy that advises local governments, lectures businessmen on discrimination and runs workshops urging community elders to let women take a bigger role in local decision-making. On a recent stop in Nanto, a region in central Japan ringed by snow-capped mountains, she leads a session on gender inequality for members of its various community councils, volunteer bodies that deal with issues from disaster preparedness to organising festivals. Of the 31 council chairs in the region none is a woman. Ms Koyasu’s work is part of an effort to assuage a national worry: young women are draining away from the countryside and from small-town Japan. A government report in 2014 expressed alarm about the future of 900 municipalities, half of the country’s total. It concluded that the number of women of child-bearing age in those places would fall by half within the next quarter-century, and that these municipalities faced “extinction” as a result. Officials in lots of outlying places accept that young people will move to cities for university or a first job. But they count on them doing a U-turn and returning home in their 20s or 30s. Yet in roughly 70% of Japan’s 47 prefectures, young women are leaving at higher rates than young men. In Toyooka, a small city in western Japan, census data show that 52% of men who left as teenagers came back in their 20s. For women, the figure was just 27%. Tokyo and a handful of other urban centres are seeing the opposite trend, with more young women moving in than men. The reasons for all this are deeply entrenched: a shortage of good jobs for women, a wider gender pay gap than in the cities and many other forms of sexism. Last year a government regional-revitalisation plan cited unconscious bias and inflexible gender roles as forces pushing women away. Rural areas often struggle with attitudes that the larger cities have shed, argues Yamamoto Ren, a campaigner. In many small offices, women still make the tea while men make the decisions. Ms Yamamoto says those who have left for cities sometimes dread returning home for holidays. “Family and neighbours keep asking, ‘Isn’t it time for a baby?’” Although many Japanese women are enjoying their lives in the cities, others would willingly return to the countryside if things were different. Tokuno Sayuri, a woman in her 30s from Nanto, returned there after briefly living in Tokyo, finding the capital too hectic. Miura Miwako, a journalist in Akita, a northern prefecture famed for its bears, says she would ideally spend her whole career there. “The countryside suits me better,” she says. Yet both she and Ms Tokuno are deeply frustrated with the status quo. “When women notice discrimination here, they rarely speak up—they just leave silently,” says Ms Miura. Many smaller places have now established strategies to tackle gender discrimination. Initiatives in Toyooka include handing out manga cartoons that raise awareness of the issue, and training teachers and businesspeople. Ms Koyasu, the consultant, says her work was once met with jeers and pushback. “But people are increasingly realising that being inclusive towards women is a matter of survival.” Therein lies a tension at the heart of many of the official initiatives. The single biggest reason authorities want women to stay in the countryside is so they can have children. “I never want women to feel like they’re simply kept around to pop out babies,” says Ms Koyasu. Promoting gender equality ought to mean accepting a woman’s choice not to marry or have children. In practice, many towns send mixed signals. Even those that now promote gender equality also sponsor nannyish matchmaking schemes, such as hosting government-backed parties for young singles to find partners, or getting local elders to encourage those who are too shy to pair off. In Nanto, both programmes sit in the same department. Last year Iwate prefecture published a dating guide urging women to wear skirts that make them look “delicate” and make-up that looks “demure” to attract husbands. Changing attitudes, as Ms Koyasu puts it, will take time. ■ 日本鄉村的「消失女孩」 日本的鄉村正在失去她們的女性。 雖然日本年輕人往大城市跑不是新鮮事，但最近的數據顯示，女生離開家鄉的比例遠遠高過男生，這讓很多地方政府開始緊張了，甚至出現了「地方滅絕」的危機感。我們一起來看看是怎麼回事。 1. 誰在決定鄉村的大小事？ 我們先把鏡頭轉到日本中部的「南砺市」。這裡風景很美，被雪山環繞，但這裡的社會結構卻很「硬」。 有一位叫小安三和（Koyasu Miwa）的顧問，她每天的工作就是跑遍全日本，試圖讓鄉村對女性更友善一點。她在南砺市辦了一場講座，對象是當地的「社區委員會」。這些委員會管的事情可多了，從防災到辦祭典都要負責，但全區 31 個委員會的主席，竟然沒有一個是女性。 這就是問題的核心：在很多鄉下地方，做決定的永遠是男性長輩。 2. 回不去的家鄉 日本政府早在 2014 年就發出警告，全日本有一半的鄉鎮（大約 900 個）面臨消失的風險。原因很簡單：育齡女性流失得太快了。 很多地方官員原本以為，年輕人去東京讀書、工作，到了二、三十歲總會回鄉成家吧？結果數據狠狠打臉。在兵庫縣的豐岡市，去外地闖蕩的男生有 52% 會回流，但女生只有 27%。換句話說，女生一旦看過外面的世界，就不想回去了。 3. 為什麼女生不回來？ 這背後的原因其實很根深柢固： · 職場天花板： 鄉下的好工作少，男女薪資差距比大城市還大。 · 刻板印象： 很多辦公室還留著「女生倒茶、男生決策」的舊習。 · 社交壓力： 很多女生說，回老家過年最怕鄰居問：「什麼時候要生小孩？」這種令人窒息的關心，讓家鄉變成了壓力堡壘。 有一位在秋田工作的記者三浦美和子（Miura Miwako）說得很精準：「當女性在這裡感覺到歧視時，她們很少會大聲抗議——她們只是靜靜地離開。」 4. 為了生存，還是為了女性？ 現在，越來越多的小鎮開始緊張了。有的發漫畫宣傳性別平等，有的幫老師和商人上課。小安顧問說，以前她演講時常被噓，但現在大家慢慢發現：「這已經不是政治正確的問題，而是生存問題。」 不過，這裡有個很矛盾的地方。政府之所以想留住女性，主要目的是希望她們「生孩子」來挽救人口。 這讓政策變得很奇怪：一方面在推性別平等，另一方面卻在辦那種「保姆級」的相親活動。甚至還有縣政府發手冊，教女生要穿裙子看起來比較「纖弱」、妝要畫得「端莊」才討男人喜歡。 說到底，如果鄉村留住女生的目的只是為了讓她們當「生育機器」，那這種平等恐怕只是表面功夫。 真正的進步，應該是讓女生不論想不想結婚、想不想生小孩，都能在自己的家鄉感受到尊重，並且有發揮才華的空間。這條改變觀念的路，日本鄉村顯然還有一段路要走。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Self-driving cars will transform urban economies A robotaxi boom is coming. The impacts might be broader than you expect Nov 27th 2025|San Francisco|6 min read Urban Economies reflect how their residents get around. And before long, that will start to change—more dramatically than at any time since the automobile was invented over a century ago. The robotaxis now autonomously shuttling passengers around the Bay Area or Los Angeles may look like ordinary cars, perhaps with a few ungainly sensors, but as they spread and develop, they will operate under different constraints to human-driven ones, and accordingly reshape cities. Over the next year, robotaxis will become** increasingly** difficult to ignore. Waymo, Google’s offering, plans to expand to cities including Miami and Washington. London will mark the company’s first international expansion and put it in direct competition with Uber, which is also set to launch a self-driving offering in the city. San Francisco’s experience suggests that public and regulatory resistance—a formidable force in many cities—can be overcome. A thin majority of residents opposed robotaxis in 2023 when Waymos hit the streets. Today two-thirds are in favour. Pioneer cities offer a glimpse of changes to be expected elsewhere. Road safety ought to improve: Waymos are involved in ten times fewer serious crashes than an average human driver. So far, at least, in San Francisco there have not been job losses among cab or rideshare drivers. The cars operate at the top end of the market. A trip with a Waymo costs roughly a third more than a ride-hailing service on average, reflecting the swish Jaguar cars the firm uses and research spending that must be recouped. Despite the cost of a ride, robotaxis’ market share is rising fast . This is just the start. Robotaxis are losing money at present, but they ought to become much cheaper. The most important fact about them is also the most obvious: no one is at the wheel. That makes their economics entirely different to either regular taxis or cars. Unlike taxis, per-trip costs can be low. A rider no longer needs to buy a driver’s time at a high enough wage to make it worth their while. Although robotaxis still need to be charged, maintained, cleaned and so on, doing so is far cheaper. Unlike regular cars, robotaxis do not sit idle for most of the day, meaning their main cost—the investment to build them—can be spread across many more journeys. Such costs will also come down once fleets begin to be built in bulk. Carmakers will be able to fiddle with the shape of cars that no longer need to accommodate a driver. Tesla, Elon Musk’s firm, is trying to work out how to just use cameras rather than more expensive lidar sensors. Further down the road Thus the economics of owning a car, even an autonomous one, will be altered. In the countryside, which may lack the population density to sustain a robotaxi network, things will probably not be too different. Yet car ownership could lose appeal for many city- and suburb-dwellers. The average American household **allocates **15% of its spending to vehicle ownership. For anyone who is not a ferocious gearhead, drastically reducing this would be tempting. A world of cheap urban transportation is alluring. But it could also cause a real problem: horrific traffic jams. Congestion is** a classic economic externality.** The cost of any single car’s contribution to a jam is not borne entirely by its occupants. Instead, it is spread across everyone on the road. At present, urban traffic is constrained by the fact that getting around by car either requires (expensively) paying someone else to drive or (inconveniently) driving oneself. Without such constraints, the result could be brutal gridlock—negating many of the benefits of robotaxis. An economist’s answer to this conundrum is straightforward: put a price on traffic. Although congestion charging has been a feature of European roads for decades, it is formidably unpopular in America. New York recently set road fees, but only after a protracted battle. Swarms of robotaxis may force the matter. Self-driving cars are much less likely to break traffic rules and incur fines, meaning something will need to fill a hole in city budgets. Presenting a congestion charge as a “robot tax” might even make it easier to swallow. San Francisco may not yet have seen job losses, but that is likely to change as costs fall. America is home to 1m taxi and bus drivers, as well as over 3m truck drivers—adding up to 3% of the working population. Other potential losers are less obvious. Without car accidents there will, for instance, be less demand for personal-injury lawyers. If people stop buying cars, dealers and used-car salesmen will go. Robotaxis might compete with short-haul air travel and even hotels if some are kitted out with beds. Although new jobs will be created—in, say, managing fleets or manning depots—they will hardly make up for the losses. Social disruption is likely; at the same time, job losses will be an opportunity. Workforces in the rich world are shrinking as populations age. Freeing people to work elsewhere might be invaluable. Productivity in the transport industry would surge. The rest of the economy ought to perk up, too. An average working American spends just under an hour commuting each day, against eight hours on the job. Turning even a sliver of that into work could boost output appreciably, says Will Denyer of Gavekal, a research firm. Self-driving cars offer a smoother ride, which, along with better suspension, should make it easier to get work done onboard. And fewer accidents not only mean fewer human tragedies—they also mean lower hospital and rehabilitation bills. Then comes the impact on urban areas. Parking spaces take up a quarter of the downtown of the average American city (see chart 2). Most could be put to better use, perhaps as housing or offices. On-street parking could become drop-off bays or pavements, making city strolls more pleasant. More urbanites might cycle if traffic accidents become less common. Denser and better connected city centres ought to be an economic boon. Outside city centres, however, robotaxis will probably lead to sprawl, since longer journeys will be more tolerable. Self-driving cars could pull people away from more space-efficient transport such as buses, subways and trains, prompting a “death spiral” where fewer customers mean lower revenues, leading to worse service and, in turn, fewer customers. Policymakers will have to increase funding and use autonomous technology to improve public transport (think of self-driving buses). Other policy conundrums will also emerge. Roads dominated by robotaxis may need to be regulated more tightly. Already, human drivers tend to bully their robot counterparts; risk-averse algorithms tuned for safety would rather get cut off at an intersection than risk a crash, and drivers know that. Besides, there is no one behind the wheel to honk or yell profanities. Pedestrians, too, can wander across streets without the frisson of fear that comes from jumping in front of a vehicle with a potentially erratic human driver. Crime might be another problem, since driverless cars are easy to steal from and vandalise. The final shape of the self-driving city is hard to predict. Nearly a century passed after the automobile’s invention before the car-oriented city reached its apogee in places such as Atlanta, Dallas and Los Angeles, each with thick arterial roads, enormous parking lots and sprawling suburbs. The self-driving era carries risks of its own—but also vast promise. ■ 無人駕駛車將翻轉城市經濟 機器人計程車（Robotaxi）熱潮即將來臨，其影響力可能遠超乎你的想像。 城市經濟的樣貌，往往取決於居民的移動方式。不久後，這一切將迎來百年前汽車發明以來最劇烈的變革。目前在舊金山或洛杉磯街頭穿梭的無人駕駛計程車，雖然看起來跟一般車子差不多（頂多多了些笨重的感測器），但隨著技術普及，它們不再受限於人類駕駛的種種約束，進而重新形塑城市。 接下來這一年，機器人計程車將讓你無法忽視。Google 旗下的 Waymo 正計畫擴張到邁阿密和華盛頓；倫敦則將成為其進軍國際的首站，直接對上同樣準備推出無人駕駛服務的 Uber。舊金山的經驗顯示，原本強大的法規與輿論阻力是可以克服的——2023 年 Waymo 剛上路時，過半居民是反對的，但現在已有三分之二的人轉向支持。 先驅城市的轉變跡象 從這些先驅城市可以預見未來的改變。首先，道路安全會提升：Waymo 發生嚴重車禍的機率比人類駕駛低十倍。此外，目前舊金山的運將或外送員尚未出現失業潮，因為無人車目前鎖定高端市場，由於採用捷豹（Jaguar）車款且需回收研發成本，車資比一般叫車服務貴約三分之一，但其市佔率仍快速攀升。 這僅僅是個開始。雖然目前機器人計程車還在虧損，但未來價格一定會大降。無人駕駛最核心的關鍵就在於「沒人開車」，這讓它的經濟模式與傳統計程車完全不同。你不必支付司機薪水，雖然仍有充電、維修與清潔成本，但相對便宜許多。而且與私人轎車不同，無人車不會整天閒置，建造成本可以分攤到更多的趟次中。未來車廠若能大規模量產，甚至能因不必預留駕駛座而改變車體設計；特斯拉（Tesla）甚至嘗試捨棄昂貴的光學雷達（lidar），改用純相機感測來壓低成本。 更遠遠景的連鎖反應 這將改變擁車的邏輯。鄉村地區因人口稀疏可能維持現狀，但在城市與郊區，買車的吸引力將大減。一般美國家庭約有 15% 的支出花在養車，除非你是鐵桿車迷，否則這筆省下的錢極具誘惑力。 然而，廉價交通雖然誘人，卻可能導致災難性的交通大塞車。塞車是典型的「經濟外部性」：單一車輛造成的延誤是由路上所有人承擔。目前城市交通受限於司機的人事成本或親自開車的體力消耗，一旦這些限制消失，路面可能會陷入嚴重的癱瘓。 經濟學家的對策很簡單：徵收「擁擠費」。雖然美國人一直很反對這項收費，但當無人車不再違規、導致城市少掉罰單收入時，市府預算缺口將迫使規費轉型。若將這筆費用包裝成「機器人稅」，或許大眾會比較容易接受。 產業結構的重組 雖然目前還沒看到失業潮，但隨著成本下降，這將不可避免。美國有百萬名運將，還有超過三百萬名卡車司機，佔勞動力 3%。其他受害者包括：事故減少會導致人身傷害律師需求下降；沒人買車，車行與二手車商就會倒閉；如果無人車內裝配備床鋪，甚至會威脅短程航空與飯店業。 當然也會創造新工作（如車隊管理），但很難抵銷損失。雖然會造成社會動盪，但從人口老化、勞動力萎縮的角度來看，這也是釋放人力到其他產業的契機。 對城市空間與生活的影響 運輸業的生產力將大幅躍升，上班族每天平均一小時的通勤時間，若能轉換成在車上工作或休息，對經濟大有幫助。更重要的是，美國城市中心平均有四分之一的空間是停車位，未來這些土地可以改建為住宅或辦公室。路邊停車位能變成行人步道，當交通事故減少，騎單車的人也會增加，更緊湊、連結度更高的市中心將成為經濟助力。 不過，這也可能導致「城市擴張」（sprawl），因為通勤變得輕鬆，人們願意住得更遠，這可能導致公車與地鐵陷入「乘客流失、收入減少、服務變差」的惡性循環。政策制定者必須加強補助，並利用自動駕駛技術來優化大眾運輸。 最後，當路上都是機器人時，交通規則可能需要更嚴格。因為人類駕駛會「欺負」奉公守法的無人車，行人也可能大膽穿梭車陣。此外，車內沒人看管，犯罪與破壞行為也可能增加。 雖然無人車時代充滿風險，但其帶來的繁榮潛力同樣驚人。一如百年前汽車改變了城市地景，新一波的變革也正在路上。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Meta and Google face** a reckoning **over *social-media addiction* A landmark verdict in California could have far-reaching consequences Mar 25th 2026|3 min read Among the 17m American children who use Instagram, the average time spent scrolling the app each day is 30 minutes. But for Kaley, a 20-year-old who started using social media aged six, it became an hours-a-day addiction. Spending time on Instagram, as well as YouTube, led to feelings of body dysmorphia and thoughts of self-harm, she claimed. On March 25th a jury in California agreed, ordering the apps’ parent companies, Meta and Google, to pay Kaley (whose full name has not been made public) $6m in damages. The payout amounts to less than one-thousandth of a percent of the companies’ annual sales. But it threatens to do them far more harm. The novel legal argument used by Kaley’s lawyers may bring social networks to heel in a way that previous attempts have not. The firms are weighing their options—both have said they will appeal—but the ruling could be a turning point in how social apps are regulated. Although this was the first time that Mark Zuckerberg, Meta’s boss, appeared before a jury, it was hardly the first attempt to sue social apps into changing their ways. In 2023 a case against Twitter, over its hosting of terrorist material, made it to the Supreme Court. But that case, like many others, went in favour of the tech industry. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 excuses social networks from liability for what their users post. Kaley’s lawyers took a different approach. Rather than trying to hold Meta and Google responsible for the harmful content hosted on their platforms, they attacked them for the way the platforms are designed. They showed the jury internal company documents demonstrating that executives knew of their products’ harmful effects on children, and argued that features like auto-playing videos, personalised recommendations and infinite feeds were designed to lure youngsters. The verdict could influence thousands of similar lawsuits that have been filed against Meta, Google and other social-media firms. (TikTok and Snap were part of Kaley’s complaint, but settled before the trial.) Some lawyers have compared the claims to the cases brought against tobacco companies in earlier decades, which led to widespread regulation of the industry. **America is not the only place where social apps are facing greater scrutiny. **In February a preliminary ruling from the European Commission found TikTok in breach of its Digital Services Act owing to its “addictive” features. TikTok was told to change the design of its app or risk a fine of up to 6% of the global revenue of its Chinese owner, ByteDance. Reining in such features would probably reduce the amount of time spent on social apps, and thus the number of ads users could be served—and the profits to be gained. Governments are focused in particular on protecting youngsters. In December Australia banned under-16s from using social networks; others from Britain to Malaysia are considering similar measures. A 30-country study last year by Ipsos, a pollster, asked whether under-14s should be excluded from social media, and found a majority in favour in every country. The verdict in California may soon go viral. ■ 社群媒體成癮：Meta 與 Google 正面臨大清算 加州法院的一項指標性判決，可能對科技業產生深遠影響 ** ** 在全美國 1,700 萬名使用 Instagram 的孩童中，平均每人每天刷螢幕的時間大約是 30 分鐘。但對於今年 20 歲的凱莉（Kaley）來說，社群媒體卻成了一場長達數年的噩夢。她從 6 歲就開始接觸社群平台，後來發展成每天花好幾個小時沉迷其中。凱莉聲稱，過度使用 Instagram 和 YouTube 讓她出現了「身體意象失調」（對外表極度自卑）的情況，甚至產生自殘念頭。加州陪審團在 3 月 25 日認同了她的說法，判決母公司 Meta 和 Google 必須賠償凱莉 600 萬美元（約新台幣 1.9 億元）。 這筆賠償金雖然還不到這兩家公司年營收的百分之 0. 1，但對他們的殺傷力卻遠不止於此。凱莉律師團所採用的「全新法律觀點」，可能會以前所未有的方式制衡社群網路。雖然兩家公司都表示會提出上訴，但這個判決很可能成為社群平台監管制度的轉捩點。 雖然這是 Meta 老闆馬克．祖克柏第一次站在陪審團面前，但這並非民間第一次嘗試透過法律手段要求平台做出改變。2023 年，曾有人針對 Twitter 散布恐怖主義內容提起訴訟，一路打到最高法院，但最後結果卻偏向科技產業。因為根據 1996 年《通訊規範法》第 230 條，社群平台對於用戶發布的內容具有「免責權」，不需要負法律責任。 但這次凱莉的律師團隊換了個招式：他們不再針對平台上的「內容」吵，而是針對平台的「設計」開刀。 他們向陪審團展示了公司的內部文件，證明高層明明知道產品會對孩童產生負面影響，卻依然設計出「自動播放」、「個人化推薦」以及「滑不到底的動態牆」等功能，目的就是要誘使年輕人上鉤。 這個判決可能會牽動數千件針對 Meta、Google 及其他平台的類似訴訟（先前 TikTok 和 Snap 也是被告，但在開庭前已達成和解）。有些律師甚至將這次的案例比作數十年前對菸草公司的集體訴訟，當時那些案件最終導致了整個菸草業受到嚴格監管。 除了美國，世界各國對社群平台的監管也越來越嚴。今年 2 月，歐盟委員會初步判定 TikTok 違反了《數位服務法》，原因就在於其「成癮性」功能。TikTok 被要求必須更改設計，否則可能面臨其母公司字節跳動（ByteDance）全球年營收 6% 的鉅額罰款。一旦這些讓人成癮的功能被限制，用戶留在平台上的時間就會縮短，看到的廣告變少，公司的利潤自然也會跟著縮水。 現在世界各國政府都把焦點放在保護青少年。澳洲已經在去年 12 月禁止 16 歲以下青少年使用社群網路；英國與馬來西亞也在考慮跟進。去年 Ipsos 針對 30 個國家的民調顯示，絕大多數人都支持禁止 14 歲以下孩童使用社群媒體。看來，加州這場判決的影響力，很快就會像病毒一樣傳遍全球。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

War in Iran is making Donald Trump weaker—and angrier By diminishing the president’s political superpowers, his reckless campaign may make him more dangerous Mar 19th 2026|6 min read NEVER BET against Donald Trump. No politician can defy political gravity like the man whose supporters stormed the Capitol on January 6th 2021, only for him to be re-elected in 2024 with a bigger share of the vote. And yet it is hard to imagine a crisis more precisely engineered to intercept the trajectory of his presidency than his ill-judged, heedless war against Iran. Even a short war will alter the course of his second term. One that lasts months could bring it crashing to earth. The reason is that the fight against Iran diminishes Mr Trump’s three political superpowers: his ability to impose his own reality on the world, his remorseless use of leverage and his dominion over the Republican Party. Even without Iran, the potency of these Trumpian strengths was likely to wane after the midterm elections. Wars accelerate change. Start with Trump v Reality. In politics, the president has shown a remarkable ability to twist facts and, sure enough, he insists that he has already triumphed in Iran. Yet the war tells a truth of its own. Iran’s regime cannot win in any conventional sense. But despite widespread destruction of infrastructure and the assassinations of senior leaders—including the security chief, Ali Larijani—Iran’s regime survives for now and its 400kg or so of near-bomb-ready uranium remains at large. What is more, Iran is waging its own parallel war against the global energy industry. As it strikes shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the infrastructure of its neighbours, the markets are keeping score. With Brent **crude spiking to more than $110 a barrel **on March 18th, following an Iranian missile attack on a Qatari natural-gas hub, the regime will conclude that its strategy is working. If anything, time is on Iran’s side. America and Israel will gradually run out of useful targets to strike from the air, or run low on interceptor batteries to see off Iranian weapons. By contrast, Iran appears still to have plenty of drones. For as long as it restricts traffic in the strait, oil prices will climb and the damage to the world economy will grow. Mr Trump’s second superpower is leverage. Now that other countries’ leaders have come to expect rough treatment, they are learning how to resist. When the president called on America’s allies to help open the strait, warning that NATO faced a “very bad” future if they refused, they turned him down. He quickly reversed course, pretending he had never needed help. Likewise,** Iran is opposing Mr Trump by accumulating leverage against him. **In recent days it has signalled that it will grant safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz to ships from friendly countries—a sign that it means to use access as a bargaining tool. Even if Mr Trump wants to end the war, Iran could continue to fire at ships. If the waterway remains closed until the end of April, the oil price could reach $150 a barrel. Given that leverage, Iran may hold out for more than just a return to the status quo before the war. It may ask for sanctions to be lifted, or an American commitment to abandon some bases in the Middle East or to restrain Israel. If recession looms in America and stockmarkets start to fall, would Mr Trump escalate by, say, seizing Kharg island, home to Iran’s export terminals? Or would he buckle? The answer depends partly on the last of his powers: his hold on his party. Mr Trump was elected on promises to spare voters from war and inflation. So far, 13 American service personnel have died; ground operations inside Iran, to recover that uranium, or on Kharg would put many more in danger. Average prices of petrol and diesel have reached $3.88 and $5.09 a gallon, compared with $3.11 and $3.72 at Mr Trump’s inauguration. Republican support for the war is strong, but softening. A vocal faction of MAGA, notably Tucker Carlson (interviewed on “The Insider”, our video show, this week), talks of betrayal. In private many elected Republicans are seething. Mr Trump’s** failure to heed warnings** about the Strait of Hormuz is typical of his contempt for strategy and his hubris in thinking he knows better than people who really do. Republicans are now highly likely to lose control of the House in the midterm elections in November. Their chances of losing the Senate too have risen by ten points, to about 50%. The worse the defeat, the lamer a duck the president will be and the less influence he will have over who inherits the party. Were the war to drag on, leading to very high oil prices and tumbling stockmarkets, Mr Trump could seek a way out and look for a win somewhere else—in, say, Cuba. Markets would doubtless register relief if the fighting stopped. But Mr Trump is not in full control of this war. Iran’s attack on the gas hub in Qatar shows it still has cards to play. And even if the fighting ended tomorrow it could take four to six weeks to restore oil production, four to eight weeks to settle oil markets and two months to normalise shipping. The risk of renewed Iranian action would remain. Prices may stay high for months. Every day they do weakens the president. Mr Trump’s politics depends on the strength that comes from winning. If he seems a loser, expect him to exact retribution. A weaker president could become a more dangerous one. Tanking Mr Trump is freest to act abroad. He may abandon NATO. He may cut Ukraine loose to punish Europe. He could bully Latin America in the name of fighting crime and drugs. He may demand money for defending Japan and South Korea. He will be maximalist on tariffs. Even if he does not succeed, that will further erode America’s alliances, to the glee of China and Russia. But Mr Trump is also liable to lash out at home. He has already endorsed the idea of withholding broadcasting licences from media outlets that criticise the war.** He wants the Federal Reserve to slash rates, but his war makes that less likely**—expect further clashes with the central bank. He could target perceived enemies or send immigration agents to more Democratic-run cities. He could threaten to meddle in the midterms, either as theatre to rile his opponents, or because he intends to influence the results. It is hard to see how Mr Trump ends up a winner in Iran. Be warned: he makes a very bad loser. ■ 伊朗戰事正削弱唐納·川普——且讓他愈發憤怒 由於總統的政治「超能力」正在消減，他那魯莽的軍事行動可能使他變得更加危險 2026年3月19日 | 閱讀時間 5 分鐘 永遠不要賭唐納·川普會輸。沒有哪位政治人物能像他一樣無視「政治重力」：他的支持者曾在 2021 年 1 月 6 日衝擊國會大廈，但他卻能在 2024 年以更高的得票率重新當選。然而，很難想像還有什麼危機，能比這場判斷失誤且不計後果的對伊戰爭，更精準地攔截他總統任期的上升軌跡。即使是一場短暫的戰爭，也將改變他第二任期的走向；若戰事持續數月，則可能讓他摔得粉身碎骨。 究其原因，對伊戰爭削弱了川普的三大政治超能力：他將自身現實強加於世界的能力、對籌碼（leverage）冷酷無情的使用，以及他對共和黨的統治力。即便沒有伊朗問題，這些「川式強項」的效力在期中選舉後本就可能轉弱，而戰爭則加速了這種變化。 首先看「川普對抗現實」。在政治領域，這位總統展現了扭曲事實的驚人能力，果不其然，他堅稱自己已在伊朗取得勝利。然而，這場戰爭本身就訴說著真相。伊朗政權在任何傳統意義上都無法獲勝，但儘管基礎設施遭到大規模破壞、高層領導人（包括安全首長阿里·拉里賈尼）遭到暗殺，伊朗政權目前依然倖存，且其約 400 公斤近乎武器級的濃縮鈾仍下落不明。 更甚者，伊朗正針對全球能源產業發動一場平行戰爭。隨著伊朗襲擊荷姆茲海峽的航運及鄰國的基礎設施，市場正在「記帳」。3 月 18 日，在伊朗飛彈襲擊卡達天然氣樞紐後，布蘭特原油價格飆升至每桶 110 美元以上，該政權將據此認定其策略正發揮效用。 如果說有什麼差別，那就是時間站在伊朗這一邊。美國與以色列能從空中打擊的有效目標終將耗盡，或者用來攔截伊朗武器的防空飛彈電池將會短缺。相比之下，伊朗似乎仍有充足的無人機。只要伊朗持續限制海峽交通，油價就會攀升，對世界經濟的損害也會日益擴大。 川普的第二項超能力是「籌碼」。既然其他國家的領導人已經習慣了被粗暴對待，他們正學會如何抵抗。當總統要求美國盟友協助開放海峽，並警告若拒絕則北約（NATO）將面臨「非常糟糕」的未來時，他們拒絕了。川普隨即改弦易轍，假裝自己從未需要過幫助。 同樣地，伊朗也正透過累積對抗川普的籌碼來反擊。近日，伊朗示意將允許友好國家的船隻安全通過荷姆茲海峽——這跡象表明它有意將航行權作為談判工具。即使川普想結束戰爭，伊朗仍可繼續攻擊船隻。若該水道持續封閉至 4 月底，油價可能觸及每桶 150 美元。 有了這項籌碼，伊朗要求的可能不只是回到戰前的現狀。它可能要求解除制裁，或要求美國承諾撤離部分中東基地，或限制以色列。如果美國經濟陷入衰退且股市開始下跌，川普會選擇升級行動（例如奪取伊朗出口終端所在地——哈爾克島），還是會屈服認輸？ 答案部分取決於他的最後一項權力：他對政黨的掌控。川普當年是憑藉「讓選民免於戰爭與通膨」的承諾當選的。到目前為止，已有 13 名美軍官兵喪生；而在伊朗境內發動地面行動以回收濃縮鈾，或進攻哈爾克島，將使更多人陷入險境。目前汽油和柴油的平均價格已達到每加侖 3.88 美元和 5.09 美元，而川普就職時僅為 3.11 美元和 3.72 美元。共和黨對戰爭的支持依然強勁，但正在鬆動。MAGA 陣營中聲音響亮的一派——尤其是本週接受我們影音節目《知情者》（The Insider）採訪的塔克·卡森——已經開始談論「背叛」。 私底下，許多共和黨民選官員正怒火中燒。川普未能聽取有關荷姆茲海峽的警告，這典型地反映了他對策略的輕視，以及那種自認比專業人士更懂的傲慢。共和黨現在極有可能在 11 月的期中選舉中失去眾議院的控制權；失去參議院的機率也上升了 10 個百分點，達到約 50%。敗得愈慘，總統就會變成愈弱勢的「跛腳鴨」，對誰能繼承黨內大位的影響力也就愈小。 若戰爭拖延下去，導致油價居高不下且股市大跌，川普可能會尋求退路，並在其他地方（例如古巴）尋找一場「勝利」。若戰事停止，市場無疑會感到寬慰。但川普並未完全掌控這場戰爭。伊朗對卡達天然氣樞紐的攻擊顯示它手中仍有牌可打。即便戰事明天結束，恢復石油產量可能需要四到六週，穩定石油市場需要四到八週，航運正常化則需兩個月。伊朗重新採取行動的風險依然存在。高物價可能維持數月，而每一天的物價高漲都在削弱總統。 川普的政治生命取決於「勝利」所帶來的實力。如果他看起來像個輸家，預期他將會採取報復行動。一個更虛弱的總統可能會變得更加危險。 兵敗如山倒 川普在外交事務上最能隨心所欲。他可能會放棄北約，可能切斷對烏克蘭的支持以懲罰歐洲，可能以打擊犯罪與毒品為名霸凌拉美各國。他可能要求日本和南韓支付防禦費用，並在關稅問題上採取極限施壓。即便這些行動未能成功，也將進一步侵蝕美國的同盟關係，令中俄兩國竊喜。 但川普也傾向於在國內撒氣。他已經支持「撤銷批評戰爭的媒體機構廣播執照」的構想。他希望聯準會（Fed）降息，但他的戰爭讓這變得更不可能——預期他將與中央銀行發生更多衝突。他可能鎖定所謂的敵人，或向更多民主黨執政的城市派遣移民官員。他甚至可能威脅干預期中選舉，或作為激怒對手的戲碼，或是真想影響選舉結果。很難預見川普如何在伊朗問題上成為贏家。請注意：他是一個非常輸不起的人。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The biggest band you’ve never heard of If you want to impress your children, tell them you listen to this South Korean boyband Feb 26th 2026|6 min read WHO MADE the second-highest-selling album in the world last year? (There are no prizes for correctly guessing who claimed the top spot—it was Taylor Swift.) You may be tempted to name a pop juggernaut such as Lady Gaga or Justin Bieber. Country-music fans might opt for Morgan Wallen. Lovers of Latin music might volunteer Bad Bunny, the star of the Super Bowl half-time show. All those answers are wrong. The right one is Stray Kids, a South Korean boyband. You might find this perplexing, because Stray Kids sounds like a clothing line or an after-school club. Chances are you cannot name one of their hits, never mind hum one of their punchy dubstep- and electronic-inflected tunes. But there are millions of people across the world who can. Stray Kids are** fully fledged** superstars. The band has more than 10.5bn views on YouTube and almost 2bn likes on TikTok. Fans have spent some 21m hours—roughly equivalent to 2,400 years—feasting on a track called “God’s Menu” on Spotify. In November “DO IT” became their eighth album or ep (extended play) to reach number one on the Billboard 200 chart. It is a feat not even BTS, another K-pop group with far superior name recognition, have accomplished. Stray Kids’s recent stadium tour, “dominATE”, lived up to its name, with revenues of almost $200m. A concert film was released in cinemas at the beginning of February. For one weekend, it was the highest-grossing movie in the world. The band is not an overnight success. The eight members had been working on their skills as singers, rappers and dancers in K-pop’s intensive training system long before they joined the band in 2017. That year a reality-television show chronicled Stray Kids’s transformation from a gaggle of novice, nervous youngsters—during shows members would drop their microphones and mess up the words—into a well-oiled entertainment machine. The show was a canny marketing technique; their debut single, “Hellevator”, was released to coincide with its broadcast. But the group’s global breakout came later, in 2020, with the release of “God’s Menu”, a cacophony of sirens, thudding beats and aggressive vocals. (Throughout, the members mimic the sound of gunshots: “DU DU DU DU DU DU”.) The music video, displaying sharp dance moves and even sharper editing, went viral. Stray Kids’s success is not the result of child’s play. They have prospered for two reasons. One is a defiantly original sound. From the start Stray Kids eschewed the effervescent tunes preferred by their K-pop rivals in favour of something much rowdier. (Some call it “noise music”, which does a disservice to the catchy hooks and tuneful bridges.) The frenetic trap-pop style made them outliers, but over time has won them admirers. Stray Kids’s followers—around 75% of whom are female, according to Chartmetric, a music-data firm—find it thrilling. “We made it on our own,” the band declares. “We do what we wanna do.” This is all by design. In 2017 Bang Chan, the group’s leader, selected each member himself from the trainees at JYP Entertainment, a record label. Normally it is music executives who put bands together and it can result in groups that lack chemistry. But Bang Chan picked performers who suited his boisterous style. For instance, Felix, a rapper, has a deep, gravelly voice that lends a distinctive texture to songs. And whereas other K-pop groups may be assigned tracks by their label, leading to variations in style across albums, Stray Kids write most of their music themselves. Three members, working as a group called 3RACHA, handle the music production. Their songwriting approach is guided by recurring “melodic symbols” within tracks, Changbin, one member, has said. Fans can repeat these leitmotifs even if there is a language barrier. Watch “dominATE” and you will see hordes of women screaming “LA-LA-LA-LA” or “MANIAC” on beat. The other reason for their success is Stray Kids’s relationship with those fans. For though their music is gritty, their public image is anything but. The band members wear makeup and paint their nails. They sport designer clothes. (It is a miracle their concert outfits did not precipitate a global shortage of rhinestones and sequins.) Stray Kids demonstrate a more progressive kind of manhood, says Ray Seol of Berklee College of Music. “It’s the Korean way of masculinity…it’s very different from the Western way,” Mr Seol says. “Fans love to see this kind of stuff.” The members also cultivate an air of authenticity. (K-pop fans are attuned to engagement they feel is “fake” or done at the behest of a record label.) The group regularly chats with fans online via livestreams, with special broadcasts for birthdays and other major events; Stray Kids also take fans behind the scenes, sharing songs-in-progress. This creates a sense of proximity and allows fans to feel that they have a direct relationship with their idols. Stray Kids chat about their feelings, particularly feelings of anxiousness. In the “dominATE” film every single member talks to the camera about one insecurity or another. Hyunjin says it took him a long time to accept that being vulnerable was acceptable, to realise that “A wounded blade of grass smells sweeter.” This sensitive side comes out in their music. Their lyrics express the concerns of young listeners starting to make their way in the world. (A large majority of the fanbase is aged 13-24.) “My Pace” talks about the perils of comparing yourself with others. “Grow Up” reassures listeners that they are “doing fine”: “Even adults make mistakes.” Nicole Ohiomah-Paul, a teenage fan from London, says that she “didn’t really like to show [her] emotions” for fear of seeming weak. But Stray Kids have taught her that it “is part of who we are. We’re human.” **Stray Kids exemplify a generational divide **that has long existed in culture. Since the dawn of popular music, parents have been perplexed by what their offspring bop along to in their bedrooms. This has been heightened with the advent of streaming, as listeners can access tracks written by anyone, anywhere. The scale of Stray Kids’s success demonstrates just how much the media landscape has changed in the 21st century. In decades past, television shows, radio stations and newspapers were music’s kingmakers: they decided which acts were worth exposure and listeners’ time. They could boost careers or throttle them. That is no longer the case: “Consumers are the new broadcasters,” says Will Page, a former chief economist at Spotify. Stray Kids have had relatively little attention from traditional outlets, but they have still won fans from Seoul to Sydney and São Paulo. “We make the rules,” the band asserts on “MEGAVERSE”, and “our music echoes through the galaxy.” ■ 你從未聽說過的全球最強天團 如果你想讓孩子對你刮目相看，告訴他們你也在聽這支韓國男團。 去年的全球專輯銷量亞軍是誰？（第一名毫無懸念由泰勒絲奪冠）。你可能會直覺想到女神卡卡（Lady Gaga）或小賈斯汀（Justin Bieber）等流行巨頭；鄉村音樂迷可能會選摩根·沃倫（Morgan Wallen）；拉丁音樂愛好者則可能推舉超級盃中場秀巨星 Bad Bunny。 這些答案都錯了。正確答案是 Stray Kids，一支韓國男團。你可能會感到困惑，因為「Stray Kids」聽起來像個服裝品牌或課後社團。你很可能連他們的一首熱門歌曲都叫不出來，更別提哼出那些富有打擊感、融合了迴響貝斯（dubstep）與電子樂元素的旋律。 然而，全球有數百萬人對他們瞭如指掌。Stray Kids 是名副其實的超級巨星：他們在 YouTube 上的觀看次數超過 105 億次，TikTok 上的按讚數近 20 億。粉絲們在 Spotify 上聆聽《神選菜單》（God’s Menu）這首歌的時間總計約 2,100 萬小時——相當於 2,400 年。去年 11 月，《DO IT》成為他們第八張登上 Billboard 200 榜首的專輯或迷你專輯（EP），這是一項連知名度更高的 K-pop 團體 BTS 都未曾達成的壯舉。 Stray Kids 最近的體育場巡迴演唱會「dominATE」人如其名，創造了近 2 億美元的營收。2 月初上映的演唱會電影，更曾蟬聯週末全球票房冠軍。 他們的成功並非一蹴而就。在 2017 年成軍前，八位成員就在 K-pop 嚴苛的練習生體系中磨練唱跳與饒舌技能。當年的實境節目記錄了他們從一群青澀緊張的青少年——當時他們還會在表演中掉麥克風或忘詞——蛻變為精準運作的娛樂機器的過程。該節目是一場精明的行銷，首支單曲《Hellevator》便配合節目播出同步發行。 但他們真正的全球突破是在 2020 年，憑藉《神選菜單》一曲成名。這首歌融合了警報聲、沉重的鼓點與侵略性的唱腔，成員們在副歌中模仿槍聲（DU DU DU DU DU DU）。其舞蹈動作俐落、剪輯銳利的音樂錄影帶隨即在網路瘋傳。 Stray Kids 的成功並非兒戲，主要歸功於兩大原因。首先是標新立異的音樂風格。他們從一開始就捨棄了 K-pop 對手偏好的輕快旋律，轉而追求更為狂放、喧鬧的曲風。雖然有人稱之為「噪音音樂」，但這顯然忽略了其中朗朗上口的記憶點與動聽的過渡段落。這種狂躁的 Trap-pop 風格讓他們成為異類，卻也隨著時間贏得大批擁護者。據數據公司 Chartmetric 統計，其粉絲約 75% 為女性，她們對此深感震撼。正如樂團所宣言：「我們靠自己成功，我們只做想做的事。」 這一切都在計畫之中。2017 年，隊長方燦從 JYP 娛樂的練習生中親自挑選成員。通常團體是由高層湊合而成，往往缺乏化學反應，但方燦挑選的是能契合他豪放風格的表演者。例如，饒舌擔當 Felix 那深沉渾厚的嗓音，為歌曲增添了獨特的質感。 此外，其他 K-pop 團體通常由經紀公司分配曲目，導致風格參差不齊；但 Stray Kids 大部分音樂皆為自創。由三位成員組成的「3RACHA」負責音樂製作。成員彰彬曾表示，他們的創作受歌曲中反覆出現的「旋律符號」引導。即便有語言隔閡，粉絲仍能跟著這些主導動機（leitmotifs）唱和。在「dominATE」現場，你會看到成千上萬的女性隨著節奏尖叫「LA-LA-LA-LA」或「MANIAC」。 第二個成功關鍵是他們與粉絲的關係。雖然音樂風格硬核，但他們的公眾形象卻極其細膩。成員們化妝、塗指甲油，身著設計師服飾（他們的表演服幾乎快造成全球水鑽與亮片的短缺）。伯克利音樂學院的 Ray Seol 指出，Stray Kids 展現了一種更進步的「男子氣概」——這是一種不同於西方、帶有韓國特色的陽剛之美，深受粉絲喜愛。 成員們也努力營造真實感。K-pop 粉絲對於「虛假」或應公司要求的互動非常敏銳。該團體定期透過直播與粉絲聊天，舉辦生日特輯，並分享創作過程的幕後花絮。這創造了一種親近感，讓粉絲覺得自己與偶像之間有著直接聯繫。 Stray Kids 也常談論心理感受，尤其是焦慮感。在「dominATE」紀錄片中，每位成員都對著鏡頭傾訴自己的不安全感。鉉辰提到，他花了很長時間才接受「展現脆弱」是沒問題的，並體悟到「受傷的青草聞起來更香」。這種感性也體現在音樂中。他們的歌詞觸及了年輕聽眾（13-24 歲的主力粉絲群）初入社會的煩憂。《My Pace》探討了與他人比較的危險，《Grow Up》則安撫聽眾：「即便大人也會犯錯，你已經做得很好了。」一位倫敦的青少年粉絲說，她以前因害怕顯得軟弱而不敢表達情感，但 Stray Kids 教會她：情感是人類的一部分。 Stray Kids 體現了文化中長期存在的世代鴻溝。自流行音樂誕生以來，父母總是對孩子在房間裡聽的音樂感到困惑。隨著串流媒體的興起，聽眾可以隨時隨地獲取任何人的作品，這種現象更加顯著。 Stray Kids 的巨大成功反映了 21 世紀媒體的巨變。在過去幾十年，電視、廣播和報紙是音樂界的「造王者」：他們決定誰值得曝光，進而左右歌手的興衰。 但現在情況已大不相同。Spotify 前首席經濟學家 Will Page 表示：「消費者就是新的廣播員。」Stray Kids 雖然相對較少受到傳統媒體關注，卻依然從首爾、雪梨一路紅到聖保羅。正如他們在《MEGAVERSE》中所言：「規矩由我們制定，我們的音樂迴盪在銀河之中。」 小分享:奧茲維新集中營的叛亂 The Great Sonderkommando Revolt of 1944 Article written by:Sky HISTORY WW2 On 7 October 1944, the inhuman tyranny of Auschwitz was suddenly challenged in the most astounding way. A group of prisoners, known as the Sonderkommando, fought back against the SS, in an act of rebellion that shocked their complacent captors. So just what was the Sonderkommando, and how did they orchestrate their uprising? The Sonderkommando In a place that was as close to Hell as anything that has ever existed on Earth, the men of the Sonderkommando inhabited their own special circle of anguish. They weren't just prisoners – they were forced to assist in the mass killings of other prisoners. Largely made up of Jews, the Sonderkommando were men deemed fit and able enough to help the Nazis process new arrivals – shepherding them from the trains, giving them false reassurance, leading them to the gas chambers and disposing of the mountains of corpses in the crematoria. Some of these corpses were of their own friends and relatives. They had no say in the matter – their choice was either to do as they were told, or face a swift execution themselves. It was a queasy, morally sickening position to be forced into – particularly as the men of the Sonderkommando were granted special privileges like better (or at least, less disgusting) living quarters, more food and "perks" like cigarettes and medicines. They were also less likely to be arbitrarily gunned down just because a Nazi officer felt like it. The sense of being forced into being "collaborators" was too much for the men to bear. One Sonderkommando prisoner who would survive the genocide, Filip Muller, later recounted how he his crushing feeling of guilt led him to follow one group of prisoners right into the gas chamber. As he put it, one of the girls in the doomed group stopped him, saying "We must die, but you still have a chance to save your life. You have to return to the camp and tell everybody about our last hours… They ought to fight, that's better than dying here helplessly." Of course, death for the Sonderkommando was still inevitable – it was simply postponed. Their slave labour meant they knew the truth of the camp and the industrialised slaughter taking place there. That in turn meant they had to be regularly slaughtered themselves, to make way for a new "generation" of Sonderkommando. It was the 12th generation who would rise up against their cruel masters. The October revolt The Sonderkommando uprising wasn't some spontaneous outburst of anger against the SS. It was a carefully thought-out plan that overcame incredible logistical odds. And some of the key players were female Jewish prisoners working in a munitions factory within the sprawling Auschwitz complex. In the months leading up to October, these women had painstakingly smuggled gunpowder from the factory to the secret resistance movement within the Sonderkommando. They used ingenious techniques, like hiding the tiny packages of powder in the false bottoms of food trays, and even in the nooks of corpses being sent to the crematoria. All the while enduring the nerve-jangling possibility of being found out. The gunpowder was used by the Sonderkommando to create makeshift bombs and grenades. This careful preparation came to a head on 7 October, when – during a roll call – one of the prisoners calmly walked up to a Nazi officer and with a triumphant "Hurrah!" struck him with a hammer. What followed was chaos, as the SS found themselves attacked on all sides by prisoners brandishing hammers, knives and explosives. According to accounts, one SS guard noted for his extreme sadism was nonchalantly thrown into a crematorium oven alive. Some of the prisoners also cut their way through the barbed wire to flee into the woods, while the SS opened fire with machine guns. It was a brief, delicious taste of vengeance for the Sonderkommando, killing three SS men and injuring around a dozen. But, inevitably, the Nazis crushed the revolt. The escaped prisoners were recaptured and executed. Hundreds of Sonderkommando prisoners were massacred, as were the brave women who helped them. But, despite all of this, some knew that the tide would turn again some day, and this time for good. A month after the revolt, and weeks before his own death, a Sonderkommando prisoner called Chaim Herman wrote a message for his family, and closed it with these words: "I am sending you my last farewell forever, these are my last greetings, I embrace you most heartily for the last time and I beg you once more, do believe me that I am going away calmly, knowing you are alive and our enemy is broken." 1944年10月7日：奧斯威辛特遣隊起義 1944 年 10 月 7 日，奧斯威辛那泯滅人性的暴政突然遭到了極其驚人的挑戰。一群被稱為「特遣隊」的囚犯向黨衛軍（SS）展開反擊，這場叛亂震驚了那些心滿意足的捕獵者。那麼，「特遣隊」究竟是什麼樣的組織？他們又是如何策劃這場起義的呢？ 特遣隊（The Sonderkommando） 在一個與人間煉獄無異的地方，特遣隊的成員們處於一種特殊的痛苦深淵中。他們不僅僅是囚犯，更被迫協助對其他囚犯進行大規模屠殺。特遣隊主要由猶太人組成，納粹認為這些人體格健壯，足以協助處理新抵達的人員——包括將他們從火車上引導下來、給予虛假的安慰、帶領他們進入毒氣室，並在火葬場處置堆積如山的屍體。而這些屍體中，有些甚至是他們自己的親友。 他們對此毫無選擇——唯一的生路就是聽命行事，否則將面臨立即處決。這是一種令人作嘔、在道德上極其痛苦的處境。尤其諷刺的是，特遣隊成員被賦予了某些「特權」，例如較好（或至少沒那麼噁心）的居住環境、更多的食物，以及香菸和藥品等「福利」。此外，他們也比較不會僅僅因為納粹軍官的一時興起就遭到隨意槍殺。 這種被迫成為「共犯」的感覺讓這些人難以承受。其中一位大屠殺倖存者菲利普·穆勒（Filip Muller）後來回憶說，那種壓倒性的罪惡感曾讓他一度跟著一群囚犯直接走進毒氣室。然而，那群走向死亡的人中，有一位少女阻止了他，她說：「我們必須死，但你仍有機會保住性命。你必須回到營區，告訴所有人關於我們最後時刻的事……他們應該戰鬥，這總比在這裡無助地死去要好。」 當然，對特遣隊來說，死亡終究是不可避免的，只是被推遲了而已。由於他們的奴隸勞動意味著他們掌握了集中營與工業化屠殺的真相，這反過來意味著他們必須被定期處決，好讓位給新一梯次的「特遣隊」。而最終對殘酷主子發起反抗的，正是第 12 梯次的特遣隊。 十月反抗 特遣隊的起義並非針對黨衛軍的自發性怒火爆發，而是一個克服了重重物流困境、精心策劃的計畫。其中一些關鍵角色是在龐大的奧斯威辛建築群內，於軍火工廠工作的猶太女囚。 在 10 月之前的幾個月裡，這些婦女含辛茹苦地將火藥從工廠偷運到特遣隊內部的秘密抵抗組織中。她們使用了精巧的技術，例如將微小包裝的火藥藏在餐盤的假底層，甚至藏在送往火葬場的屍體縫隙中，同時還要承受隨時可能被發現的極度恐懼。 特遣隊利用這些火藥製作了簡易的炸彈和手榴彈。這份精心的準備在 10 月 7 日達到了頂點。當時在點名期間，一名囚犯平靜地走向一名納粹軍官，高喊著勝利的「萬歲！」（Hurrah!），並用鐵錘擊中了他。 隨之而來的是一片混亂，黨衛軍發現自己陷入了囚犯們用鐵錘、刀具和炸藥展開的四面圍攻。根據記述，一名以極度虐待狂著稱的黨衛軍守衛，被若無其事地活生生扔進了火葬場的焚化爐。部分囚犯還剪斷了刺鐵絲網逃往森林，而黨衛軍則以機關槍開火掃射。 對於特遣隊而言，這是一場短暫而甘甜的復仇，他們擊殺了三名黨衛軍並傷及十餘人。然而，納粹最終不可避免地鎮壓了這場叛亂。逃跑的囚犯被抓回並處決，數百名特遣隊成員遭到屠殺，那些提供幫助的英勇女性也未能倖免。 儘管如此，有些人知道局勢總有一天會扭轉，而且會是徹底的扭轉。起義一個月後，就在自己去世前幾週，一位名叫海姆·赫爾曼（Chaim Herman）的特遣隊囚犯給家人寫下了一段話，並以這段文字作結： 「我向你們送上永別。這是最後的問候，我最後一次由衷地擁抱你們。我再次請求你們，務必相信我是平靜地離去的，因為我知道你們還活著，而我們的敵人已經支離破碎。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Master’s or Mandarin? China’s graduates face a whole new set of gruelling tests They prefer certainty to good pay Feb 5th 2026|4 min read Around 2024 Mr Wang, a tutor for people taking** graduate-admissions tests**, saw the number of students in his classes plummet by more than half. At first he thought something had gone badly wrong with his teaching. But comparing notes with others in the industry, he found the problem was pervasive. Mr Wang had also casually posted an ad offering his services as a tutor for the national civil-service exam. He was shocked to receive hundreds of replies. His newly opened class was filled with top talent, including two students who had flown from Hong Kong after graduating there. “Holy shit,” Mr Wang thought. “The winds have changed.” He is right. Young Chinese are rethinking the options they face when they complete undergraduate studies. Between 2023 and 2026 the number of people who registered to take exams for admission to master’s courses fell by a third, from 4.7m to 3.4m. Meanwhile, between 2021 and 2026, the number who applied (and passed checks) to take the national civil-service exam more than doubled to 3.7m, a record high. Interest in the latter now exceeds the former for the first time (see chart). An attraction of a master’s degree is that it can upgrade one’s human capital (at least, in theory), while delaying entry into the job market. But the civil service offers a far more immediate reward: stable, if staid, employment. Stella Zhou, who is 24, attended a tutoring camp for the civil-service exam. For three months she started the day at 9am and slogged through thousands of practice questions, only retiring to her dormitory after 9pm. “My bum hurt from sitting all day,” she gripes. Last year about 20% of those who took the exam for admission to a master’s course were accepted. The national civil-service exam is far more competitive. This year there are 38,000 positions available, meaning about 99% of those who took the written test in November (including many postgraduates) will be disappointed by the time the process, which also includes interviews, wraps up in the middle of the year. A 26-year-old woman, Ms Ma, is studying for a master’s degree in law. Some 80% of her class are planning to take the civil-service exam. It is a “battle royale”, she says (having a master’s degree confers little advantage for civil-service jobs, most of which do not require one). Because success is so unlikely, many are also sitting provincial- or city-level civil-service exams as a less prestigious back-up. The reason is clear: a bleak job market. Ms Ma, who is from the eastern province of Shandong, had never thought she would be interested in the civil service. She changed her mind after working as an intern at a small company: her colleagues were often not paid on time. When China was booming, government jobs were thought dull (“If you become a civil servant, you can see the whole of your life,” as a common saying goes). Now, as the economy falters, they are highly sought-after. Ms Zhou, who is from the south-western region of Chongqing, received an offer of 300,000 yuan ($43,000) per year from JD.com, an e-commerce giant, to work in its procurement arm. But she turned it down to try her luck with the civil service. Young people increasingly prefer certainty to good pay. Between 2020 and 2022, when China imposed a strict “zero-covid” policy, many students swarmed into postgraduate studies as a way of postponing the job hunt during economic turbulence (in China, a master’s often takes three years). Since then, the number sitting the master’s entrance exam has dropped. It has become clearer that staying in education produces diminishing returns. A survey in 2024 by Zhaopin, a hiring platform, found that by the spring recruitment round, 44.4% of postgraduates had received a job offer—one percentage point lower than those with bachelor’s degrees and 12 points below those with vocational training. It might be expected that many would apply for a master’s after failing the civil-service exam. But many graduates fear the job market could get worse. Better to take the plunge sooner rather than later, some reckon. So the rise in applications for the civil service and fall in demand for graduate courses are two sides of the same coin: a weak economy. It could become a self-reinforcing trend: the more that talented youngsters **turn their backs on **the private sector and seek government jobs, the less vigorous China’s economy will become. ■ 中國畢業生面臨全新嚴峻考驗：比起高薪，他們更求穩定 2026年2月5日 | 閱讀時間 4 分鐘 約莫在 2024 年，專門輔導研究生入學考試的王老師發現，他班上的學生人數驟減了一半以上。起初，他以為是自己的教學出了問題，但與同業交換意見後，他發現這是整個行業普遍面臨的困境。與此同時，王老師隨手發布了一則國家公務員考試（國考）的補習廣告，驚訝地收到數百則回覆。他新開設的班級擠滿了頂尖人才，其中甚至有兩名學生是從香港畢業後專程飛回來的。王老師心想：「天哪，風向變了。」 他是對的。中國年輕人正在重新思考大學畢業後的出路。2023 年至 2026 年間，報考碩士班入學考試的人數減少了三分之一，從 470 萬人降至 340 萬人。與此同時，2021 年至 2026 年間，通過審核報考國考的人數翻了一倍多，達到 370 萬人的歷史新高。對後者的興趣已首度超越前 。 碩士學位的吸引力在於理論上能提升「人力資本」，同時延緩進入職場的時間。然而，公務員職位提供了一個更直接的回報：穩定（儘管沉悶）的就業。24 歲的周小姐參加了國考衝刺班，三個月來，她每天早上 9 點開始埋頭苦讀數千道練習題，直到晚上 9 點後才回宿舍。「整天坐著，坐到我屁股都痛了，」她抱怨道。 去年，碩士入學考試的錄取率約為 20%，而國考的競爭更為激烈。今年僅提供 38,000 個職位，這意味著 11 月參加筆試的人（包括許多研究生）中，約有 99% 的人最終會失望而歸。26 歲的馬小姐正在攻讀法律碩士，她班上約 80% 的同學都計劃報考公務員。她形容這是一場「大逃殺」（儘管碩士學位對大多數不要求學歷的公務員職位並無顯著優勢）。由於成功機會微乎其微，許多人也報考了省級或市級公務員考試，作為退而求其次的備選。 原因很明顯：就業市場低迷。來自山東省的馬小姐從未想過自己會對公務員感興趣，但在一家小公司實習後，她改變了主意——因為她的同事經常無法準時領到薪水。在中國經濟蓬勃發展的時期，政府工作被認為是枯燥的（當時流行一句話：「當了公務員，一眼就能望穿一生」）。 現在，隨著經濟步履蹣跚，這些職位變得炙手可熱。來自重慶的周小姐曾獲得電商巨頭京東（JD.com）提供的採購部職位，年薪高達 30 萬人民幣（約 43,000 美元），但她拒絕了，決定轉向公務員試試運氣。年輕人越來越傾向於選擇「確定性」而非「高薪」。 2020 年至 2022 年中國實施嚴格的「動態清零」政策期間，許多學生湧入研究所，將其視為經濟動盪期推遲求職的一種方式（在中國，碩士學位通常需要三年）。從那時起，報考研究所的人數開始下降，人們愈發意識到，留在教育體系中的邊際收益正在遞減。招聘平台「智聯招聘」2024 年的一項調查顯示，在春季招聘中，僅有 44.4% 的研究生獲得錄取通知（Offer），這比大學畢業生低 1 個百分點，比技職生低了 12 個百分點。原以為許多人在國考失利後會轉而考研，但不少畢業生擔心就業市場會進一步惡化，因此有人認為，與其等待，不如儘早投入職場放手一搏。 因此，公務員報考熱與研究所需求降溫，實為經濟疲軟的一體兩面。這可能演變成一種自我強化的趨勢：越多優秀人才背離私營部門轉向政府職位，中國經濟的活力就越發衰微。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How Poland can keep its place at the heart of Europe If it turns inward, the country and continent will lose out May 22nd 2025|5 min read TWICE IT** VANISHED** from the map, swallowed up by its rapacious neighbours. After it emerged from the second world war as a Soviet satellite, it endured decades of oppression. Today, Poland has transformed itself into Europe’s most overlooked military and economic power—with a bigger army than Britain, France or Germany and living standards, adjusted for purchasing power, that are about to eclipse Japan’s. Yet, just when Poland should stand proud and tall once more, is it about to throw away its influence? That is the question Poles face in the decisive run-off vote to elect their president on June 1st. One vision, from the candidate of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, is a brand of right-wing nationalism that feeds off conflict with Poland’s neighbours and the European Union. The other, from the centre, is that, in a dangerous world, Poland needs Europe to magnify its strengths, just as Europe needs Poland as a source of security and economic dynamism. Unfortunately, at the moment the right may have the upper hand. For the past three decades, Poland has shown how much a country can achieve by European integration and good economic policy. Since 1995 income per person has more than trebled. Since it joined the EU in 2004 Poland has never known recession apart from briefly at the height of the covid-19 shutdown. During those two decades, its average annual growth has been almost 4%. The fruits of that growth are on display across the country. Warsaw, the capital, boasts Europe’s tallest building outside Russia, the Varso tower; and below it bustles with designer shops and cafés, IT startups and fashion houses. Out in the once-neglected countryside fine roads, often built with EU money, criss-cross vistas of well-tended fields, farms and new houses. Poles used to flock abroad to find work, but for some years now home has been a stronger draw. Manufacturing is booming, thanks to Poland’s proximity to Germany, continuing to do well even as its western neighbour, like much of Europe, has stagnated. When Germany, under its new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, starts a planned new burst of infrastructure and defence spending, Poland is likely to be a beneficiary. Long attuned to the threat from Russia, Poland has used its wealth to enhance its security. It now musters the largest army in Europe after Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, and the third-largest in NATO. It spends well over 4% of its GDP each year on defence, far above the 2% that has been the NATO target since 2014, and plans to raise that to over 5% next year. This has translated into influence. These days the group that counts in European security is sometimes dubbed the four musketeers: the young addition to Britain, France and Germany is Poland, like the superlative swordsman d’Artagnan. Tellingly, its prime minister, Donald Tusk, travelled to Kyiv earlier this month with his three counterparts to stress that Europe is ready to stand by Ukraine even as America’s commitment has weakened. Poland’s stance is in sharp distinction to the rest of the “Visegrad Four”. Hungary under Viktor Orban and Slovakia under Robert Fico have both taken the side of Russia rather than Ukraine; and the Czech Republic is expected to tilt in that direction after elections in October. Given Poland’s record, much of it achieved during the total of ten years in which PiS has been in power, you might conclude that it could continue its renaissance with either candidate in June’s run-off election—especially as the role of president in Poland is less powerful than that of prime minister. However, that would be a mistake. Under the constitution, the president’s veto can be overridden only by a three-fifths majority in the Sejm, the lower house, which Mr Tusk does not command. The current president, Andrzej Duda, is a former PiS politician who has blocked or delayed many of the new government’s reforms and is now termed out. PiS wants his successor to be Karol Nawrocki, a fierce ideologue who would be even less accommodating than Mr Duda. Mr Nawrocki is almost certain to use his powers to block Mr Tusk’s agenda, so as to pave the way for a PiS victory in the next parliamentary elections. To win the presidency, he would depend on support from far-right parties that exploit growing anti-Ukrainian feelings; one is openly antisemitic. This matters because Mr Tusk is trying to unravel PiS’s capture of the state while it was most recently in office, from 2015 to 2023. In that time, while pursuing mostly sensible economic and security policies, PiS systematically took over independent institutions, including the judiciary, the media, the civil service, the central bank and the banking system. PiS’s fights with Brussels over the rule of law caused Poland to be temporarily shut out of some of the EU’s aid programmes. By contrast, Mr Tusk is a committed European—he previously served as the president of the European Council in Brussels. Under him Poland has co-operated with other European countries on security, diplomacy and defence to the benefit of all. Were Poles to use the presidential election to vote in Rafal Trzaskowski, a Tusk ally who is Warsaw’s mayor, EU co-operation would be easier and Poland’s influence would grow further. The world has changed since Mr Tusk took over. With another Donald back in the White House, the task of building up Europe’s strategic autonomy is not just a luxury but an urgent necessity. Poland could not only set an example in security, but also serve as a powerful voice for supporting Ukraine and deterring Russia. Economically, Poland is an example to central and eastern European countries; and Mr Tusk could be a proponent of the economic reforms the EU desperately needs. Don’t throw it away Next week’s election is finely balanced. In the first round the candidates of the hard right took around 52% of the vote. Were Mr Nawrocki to win the second round, both Poland and Europe would suffer. Europe would lose a source of dynamism, and Poland would risk losing the place at the heart of Europe it has worked so hard to claim. 波蘭如何守住其歐洲核心地位 若轉向內化，該國與歐洲大陸都將面臨損失 2025年5月22日 | 閱讀時間 5 分鐘 波蘭曾兩度從地圖上消失，被貪婪的鄰國吞併。在第二次世界大戰後成為蘇聯衛星國，經歷了數十年的壓迫。如今，波蘭已轉型為歐洲最被忽視的軍事與經濟強權——其軍隊規模大於英國、法國或德國，且經購買力平價調整後的生活水平即將超越日本。然而，正當波蘭應該再次昂首挺胸之際，它是否即將拋棄自己的影響力？ 這正是波蘭人在 6 月 1 日舉行的關鍵總統選舉第二輪投票中所面臨的問題。一種願景來自法律與公正黨（PiS）的候選人，這是一種以與鄰國及歐盟衝突為養分的右翼民族主義；另一種則來自中間派，認為在危險的世界中，波蘭需要歐洲來放大其實力，正如歐洲需要波蘭作為安全與經濟活力的來源。不幸的是，目前右翼可能佔據上風。 在過去的三十年裡，波蘭展示了一個國家透過歐洲整合和良好的經濟政策能取得多少成就。自 1995 年以來，人均收入增長了三倍多。自 2004 年加入歐盟以來，除了在新冠肺炎停擺的高峰期短暫出現過衰退外，波蘭從未經歷過經濟衰退。在這二十年間，其年均增長率幾乎達到 4%。 經濟增長的成果在全國各地隨處可見。首都華沙擁有俄羅斯以外歐洲最高的建築物——華沙塔（Varso tower）；塔下則是熙熙攘攘的設計師商店、咖啡館、資訊科技新創公司和時裝店。在曾經被忽視的農村，通常由歐盟資金修建的優質公路縱橫交錯，映襯著整齊的田野、農場和新房屋。 波蘭人曾成群結隊地出國找工作，但幾年來，家鄉的吸引力已變得更強。製造業蓬勃發展，這得益於波蘭鄰近德國的優勢，即使其西方鄰國（與歐洲大部分地區一樣）處於停滯狀態，波蘭仍能持續表現良好。當德國在其新任總理弗里德里希·梅爾茨（Friedrich Merz）的領導下，開始計劃中的新一輪基礎設施和國防開支衝刺時，波蘭很可能成為受益者。 波蘭長期以來一直對俄羅斯的威脅保持警惕，並利用其財富來增強安全。它現在擁有的軍隊規模在歐洲僅次於俄羅斯、烏克蘭和土耳其，在北約中排名第三。波蘭每年將超過 GDP 的 4% 用於國防，遠高於北約自 2014 年以來設定的 2% 目標，並計劃明年將這一比例提高到 5% 以上。 這轉化成了影響力。如今，在歐洲安全領域發揮作用的集團有時被稱為「四個火槍手」：繼英國、法國和德國之後的年輕新成員就是波蘭，就像那位卓越的劍客達太安（d’Artagnan）。值得注意的是，波蘭總理唐納德·圖斯克（Donald Tusk）本月早些時候與其他三位同行一起前往基輔，強調即使美國的承諾有所減弱，歐洲也準備好支持烏克蘭。波蘭的立場與「維謝格拉德集團」（Visegrad Four）的其他成員形成了鮮明對比：維克多·奧班領導下的匈牙利和羅伯特·費科領導下的斯洛伐克都站在俄羅斯而非烏克蘭一邊；而捷克共和國預計在 10 月選舉後也會轉向該方向。 鑑於波蘭的紀錄（其中大部分是在 PiS 執政的累計十年中取得的），你可能會得出結論：無論 6 月份的第二輪選舉中哪位候選人勝出，波蘭都能繼續其復興——特別是波蘭總統的角色權力不如總理。然而，那將是一個錯誤。 根據憲法，總統的否決權只能由下議院（Sejm）五分之三的多數票推翻，而圖斯克先生並不具備這種優勢。現任總統安傑伊·杜達（Andrzej Duda）曾是 PiS 的政治人物，他阻撓或延遲了許多新政府的改革，現在即將卸任。PiS 希望他的繼任者是卡羅爾·納夫羅茨基（Karol Nawrocki），他是一位激進的意識形態家，會比杜達先生更不配合。納夫羅茨基幾乎肯定會利用他的權力來阻止圖斯克先生的議程，以便為 PiS 在下一次議會選舉中獲勝鋪路。為了贏得總統職位，他將依賴極右翼政黨的支持，這些政黨利用日益增長的反烏克蘭情緒，其中一個政黨甚至是公開的反猶太主義。 這之所以重要，是因為圖斯克先生正試圖清理 PiS 在 2015 年至 2023 年執政期間對國家的掌控。在那段時間裡，PiS 在奉行大多合理的經濟和安全政策的同時，系統性地接管了獨立機構，包括司法機構、媒體、公務員體系、中央銀行和銀行系統。PiS 與布魯塞爾在法治問題上的爭鬥，曾導致波蘭暫時被排除在歐盟的一些援助計劃之外。 相比之下，圖斯克先生是一位堅定的親歐人士——他此前曾擔任布魯塞爾歐洲理事會主席。在他領導下，波蘭在安全、外交和國防方面與其他歐洲國家合作，惠及所有人。如果波蘭人利用這次總統選舉投票給拉法烏·特扎斯科夫斯基（Rafal Trzaskowski，圖斯克的盟友，現任華沙市長），歐盟合作將變得更加容易，波蘭的影響力也將進一步增長。 自圖斯克先生接任以來，世界已經發生了變化。隨著另一位「唐納德」（指川普）回到白宮，建立歐洲戰略自主的任務不再是奢侈品，而是迫在眉睫的必然。波蘭不僅可以在安全方面樹立榜樣，還可以成為支持烏克蘭和威懾俄羅斯的強大聲音。在經濟上，波蘭是中東歐國家的典範；圖斯克先生可以成為歐盟迫切需要的經濟改革支持者。 不要拋棄它 下週的選舉勢均力敵。在第一輪投票中，硬右派候選人獲得了約 52% 的選票。如果納夫羅茨基先生在第二輪獲勝，波蘭和歐洲都將受苦。歐洲將失去一個活力的源泉，而波蘭將面臨失去它努力爭取到的歐洲核心地位的風險。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How Japan’s prime minister will use her massive new mandate A remarkable election victory that will reshape Japanese politics for years to come Feb 8th 2026|TOKYO|4 min read TAKAICHI SANAE gambled her position as Japan’s prime minister by calling a snap election. Her bet has paid off. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) triumphed on February 8th. The LDP won a commanding two-thirds supermajority in parliament’s powerful lower house, even without the support of its coalition partner. The result gives Ms Takaichi, who is both a fiscal dove and a security hawk, a massive mandate, while marking the LDP’s return to unquestioned dominance in Japanese politics. Such a resounding victory was hardly guaranteed. Although Ms Takaichi herself has been unusually popular since taking office last October, her party remained far less so. The result shows that Ms Takaichi’s personal appeal is a potent force. Together with its partner, the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), and several allied independents, the LDP’s ruling coalition entered the election with 233 seats in the 465-seat chamber, for a majority of just one. They have secured 352. The LDP also benefited from the collapse of the mainstream left-of-centre opposition: the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), formed by the merger of two long-standing parties, lost more than half of the total seats they had held heading into the election. While several smaller upstart parties secured footholds in the Diet, none is strong enough to challenge the LDP. The LDP has lost power only twice since its foundation in 1955. **Following a turbulent period **of opposition rule in 2009-12, the party reclaimed its dominance under Ms Takaichi’s mentor, Abe Shinzo, the prime minister until 2020. But in recent years, it has stumbled from scandal to scandal; in the two most recent elections, an upper-house contest last summer and a lower-house vote in October 2024, the party lost its majorities, leaving it leading a minority government. The LDP turned to Ms Takaichi as party leader in October. She brought in Ishin as a new partner, producing a slender majority. Ms Takaichi has appealed to voters eager for change, or at least the appearance of it. The country’s first female prime minister, she has cut a welcome contrast to previous ones, thanks to her middle-class upbringing and plain-spoken style. A former heavy-metal drummer, she has performed confidently on the world stage, including with Donald Trump, the leader of Japan’s most important ally. (Mr Trump endorsed Ms Takaichi ahead of the election.) A diplomatic spat with China helped her to consolidate support at home. Her big-spending pledges have at times caused bond markets to shudder, but tend to appeal to voters. On the campaign trail, Ms Takaichi electrified audiences. She lived up to her pledge to “work, work, work, work, work”: during the 12-day election period, she covered more ground than any other party leader, racking up 12,480km, according to a tally by Yomiuri, a newspaper. She also dragged her fusty party into the digital era, becoming a force on social media. The hastily-assembled CRA, meanwhile, failed to inspire. Combining the Constitutional Democratic Party (the successor to the country’s historic main centre-left outfit, the Democratic Party of Japan), and the LDP’s former coalition partner, Komeito, produced a muddle rather than synergy. Online, the party acquired the unflattering nickname “5G”, a play on the Japanese word for “old man”, oji-san, in reference to the fact that its top leaders were all older male political dinosaurs. The remarkable election result will reshape Japanese politics for years to come. The leaders of the CRA will probably resign; whether the alliance itself survives remains unclear. Smaller leftist parties also suffered big losses, suggesting that voters see their ideological pacifism as out of step with today’s turbulent world. Upstart parties have proven more dynamic than the traditional opposition. The far-right Do It Yourself party (Sanseito) picked up a handful of seats, albeit fewer than they had targeted. Team Future (Mirai), a techno-optimist party founded in May, was a surprise breakout, emerging as an alternative for many independent voters, and winning 11 seats. With its imposing new majority, the LDP will be able to ignore opposition sniping. Ms Takaichi will emerge from the election stronger and bolder. Potential challengers inside the party will fall silent, leaving her to rule for the foreseeable future. With a supermajority in the lower house, the ruling coalition will be able to control the legislative process, as it can override the more fractious upper house (where it lacks a majority). Ms Takaichi can also pursue her preferred policies. She has pledged a “responsible and proactive fiscal policy”, including a temporary two-year cut to the consumption tax for food and big investments in industrial policy to support critical industries. She also wants to spearhead more reforms to strengthen Japan’s armed forces and security apparatus. She has called for lifting restrictions on arms exports to help boost Japan’s defence industry; she favours the creation of a new national intelligence agency. The fly in the ointment? Though Ms Takaichi has made quick work of her domestic political foes, other adversaries, from bond market vigilantes to her counterparts in Beijing, will not prove so easy to overcome. ■ 日本首相將如何運用她的龐大民意授權：一場將重塑未來數年日本政壇的重大選舉勝利 2026年2月8日 | 東京 | 閱讀時間約4分鐘 高市早苗以解散國會提前改選，賭上了她的日本首相寶座。事實證明，她賭贏了。執政的自由民主黨（LDP）於 2 月 8 日贏得大勝。自民黨在權力核心的眾議院中，即便不依賴聯盟夥伴的支持，也單獨拿下了具備主導權的三分之二「超級多數」席位。此結果賦予了兼具「財政鴿派」與「國安鷹派」色彩的高市女士極大的民意授權，同時標誌著自民黨重返在日本政壇無可置疑的霸權地位。 如此輝煌的勝利絕非預料中的必然。儘管高市女士自去年 10 月就任以來展現了罕見的高人氣，但她所屬的政黨卻沒那麼受歡迎。選舉結果顯示，高市女士的個人魅力是一股強大的政治力量。自民黨與其夥伴「日本維新會」（Ishin）以及幾位盟軍獨立人士組成的執政聯盟，在選前於 465 席的眾議院中僅佔 233 席，僅比過半數多出一席；而選後，他們成功奪下 352 席。 自民黨的獲勝也受惠於主流中間偏左反對陣營的潰敗：由兩大長期在野黨合併組成的「中間改革聯盟」（CRA），失去了選前持有席位的一半以上。雖然幾支新興小黨在國會取得立足點，但目前尚無足夠力量挑戰自民黨。 自 1955 年成立以來，自民黨僅失去過兩次政權。在 2009 年至 2012 年動盪的在野時期後，該黨在高市女士的導師安倍晉三帶領下奪回統治地位。然而近年來，自民黨深陷各類醜聞；在去年夏天的參議院選舉及 2024 年 10 月的眾議院投票中，該黨皆失去多數優勢，只能領導少數政府。去年 10 月，自民黨轉向推舉高市女士為黨魁，她引入維新會作為新夥伴，勉力維持微弱的多數。 高市女士成功吸引了渴望改變（或至少是改變的表象）的選民。作為日本首位女性首相，她憑藉中產階級的出身與直爽的言論風格，與過往的首相形成鮮明對比。這位前重金屬鼓手在國際舞台上表現自信，包括與日本最重要的盟友領導人唐納德·川普（Donald Trump）的互動（川普在選前曾公開支持高市）。此外，與中國的外交糾紛也有助於她在國內鞏固支持。雖然她擴大支出的承諾一度令債券市場感到不安，但這對選民極具吸引力。 在競選期間，高市女士令觀眾熱血沸騰。她實踐了自己「工作、工作、工作、工作、工作」的諾言：根據《讀賣新聞》統計，在為期 12 天的競選期內，她奔波的路程超過任何其他黨魁，總計達 12,480 公里。她還將保守陳腐的自民黨帶入數位時代，成為社群媒體上的重要勢力。相比之下，倉促組成的「中間改革聯盟」則未能激發選民熱情。由立憲民主黨（其前身為日本史上主要的中間偏左勢力民主黨）與自民黨前盟友公明黨合併，產生的只有混亂而非綜效。在網路上，該聯盟獲得了「5G」這個帶有貶義的綽號，這是對日語「大叔」（Oji-san）的戲稱，諷刺該聯盟的高層領袖全都是年長的男性政治恐龍。 這場卓越的選舉結果將重塑未來數年的日本政治。「中間改革聯盟」的領袖們可能會辭職，該聯盟能否維持仍是未知數。其他小型左翼政黨也遭受重創，顯示選民認為其意識形態上的和平主義與當今動盪的世界脫節。新興政黨展現出比傳統在野黨更強的活力。極右翼的「參政黨」（Sanseito）獲得了少數席位，儘管少於其預期目標。於去年 5 月成立、主張科技樂觀主義的「未來隊」（Mirai）則成為異軍突出的黑馬，成為許多獨立選民的替代選擇，並贏得了 11 個席位。 憑藉龐大的新多數優勢，自民黨將能忽視反對黨的抨擊。高市女士將在選後變得更強大、更果敢。黨內潛在的挑戰者將會噤聲，讓她在可預見的未來掌握統治權。擁有眾議院的超級多數後，執政聯盟將能掌控立法進程，因為它有權推翻意見紛歧的參議院（執政聯盟在參議院尚無多數）。 高市女士也可以推行她偏好的政策。她已承諾實施「負責且積極的財政政策」，包括為期兩年的糧食消費稅減免，以及對關鍵產業的大規模工業投資。她還希望帶頭進行更多改革，以加強日本的武裝部隊與安全機構。她呼籲放寬武器出口限制以提振日本國防工業，並贊成建立新的國家情報機構。唯一的隱憂在於：雖然高市女士迅速擊敗了國內的政敵，但其他對手——從債券市場的「糾察隊」到北京的領導層——可能不會那麼容易被克服。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Taiwan’s new opposition leader wants to talk to Xi Jinping Cheng Li-wun tells The Economist she hopes to meet China’s president early this year Jan 29th 2026|TAIPEI|5 min read RISK COMES naturally to Cheng Li-wun, Taiwan’s opposition leader. She began her career as a student activist in the 1990s, seeking independence for her homeland and castigating the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party at the time. Then she stunned colleagues by joining the KMT. Now, as that party’s new leader, she is making her biggest gamble yet. As China steps up military drills around Taiwan, which it sees as its territory, she is blocking efforts to boost defence spending. She thinks Taiwan’s people should accept that they are Chinese. And she hopes to bring her party back to power by pursuing reconciliation with China’s leader, Xi Jinping. **“The most important task of my tenure is to advance peace across the Taiwan Strait,” **she told The Economist in an interview on January 27th. To that end, she revealed that after a nine-year hiatus, the KMT will resume dialogue with China’s Communist Party in early February, starting with exchanges between their think-tanks. She says she hopes to visit China in the first half of 2026 to meet Mr Xi (who sent her a congratulatory telegram after her election in October, expressing hope that they could work together towards unification). “We must stop deliberately vilifying everything related to China,” she says. It is a controversial strategy, even for some within her party. The KMT lost the past three presidential elections to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which views Taiwan as a separate country. Opinion polls show that a majority of Taiwan’s people distrust China’s government, have little appetite for unification and consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Ms Cheng’s platform is also troubling for America, which is committed to helping the island defend itself but insists Taiwan must spend much more on its own armed forces. American officials believe Mr Xi has ordered his generals to be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027. Yet Ms Cheng, 56, believes that she can help avert an attack—and win round voters by the time of the next presidential election, in 2028. She admits that her views on national identity are out of step with public opinion but blames the DPP’s efforts to “de-Sinicise” Taiwan. Besides, she believes that national identity will not be the defining political issue of the next few years. “What matters more is cross-strait relations,” she says. “That’s what I believe will truly determine how people vote.” Her message plays on two main fears. One is that if the DPP wins again in 2028 China’s leadership could lose hope of peacefully unifying Taiwan with the mainland.** “Once it holds no expectations for Taiwan, the only way it can resolve or address the Taiwan issue would be through means none of us wish to see,**” she says. The other fear is that American support for Taiwan is wavering. She cites President Donald Trump’s demands that Taiwan increase defence spending to 10% of GDP and shift to America 40% of its semiconductor industry, which produces most of the world’s top-end chips. *“For many Taiwanese, piecing together this information makes them feel that America is abandoning Taiwan,”* she says. Critics view such talk as scaremongering. Although China has developed formidable capabilities to invade or blockade Taiwan (and often practises doing so), it is far from clear that it could succeed without suffering huge losses and devastating the global economy. Mr Xi has also just purged his military leadership. DPP leaders accuse Ms Cheng of echoing Chinese propaganda and endangering Taiwan’s security by blocking defence spending. Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, has pledged to increase military spending to 5% of GDP by 2030. He has also proposed a $40bn supplementary defence budget this year, mainly for American weapons. Yet both plans are being blocked in parliament by the KMT and its allies, which together hold a majority. In Ms Cheng’s telling Mr Lai is to blame for not providing more details of his military spending plans. The figure he has proposed “crowds out all other needs”, she says. She declines to specify how much Taiwan should spend on defence, but says it can never match China’s firepower. Instead, she argues Taiwan’s security should be achieved through “reasonable” military spending combined with negotiations with Mr Xi. And she faults Mr Lai for refusing to accept the consensus agreed with China in 1992, when the KMT was in power. That stipulated that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are part of “one China”, while allowing for different interpretations. Because the DPP rejects that formula as legally invalid (and a trap), China has suspended official talks since it came to power in 2016. Embracing the 1992 consensus today “would significantly reduce the likelihood of military confrontation”, Ms Cheng says. As to the desired outcome of such negotiations, Ms Cheng chooses her words carefully. In meeting Mr Xi, she says her main goal is to secure an explicit public commitment that both sides should work to maintain peace, acknowledging that war would bring “unimaginably catastrophic consequences”. Can he be trusted? To avoid damaging its international image, China must “be true to its word”, she says. “Credibility is paramount.” For the longer term, she declines to say whether the ultimate goal should be peaceful unification (as a former KMT president has suggested). Within her four-year term, she says it would already be a big achievement to set up a framework for maintaining peace. “As for whether the status quo might change thereafter, I only hope it occurs under circumstances acceptable to people on both sides,” she adds. Her talk of reconciliation is all the more striking, given her past. Though her father was a soldier in the Nationalist army that fled to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949, she became a student protester who was drawn to the DPP. She left it in 2002, disillusioned by what she saw as corruption and intolerance of dissent within its ranks. Joining the KMT three years later, she quickly earned a reputation as a combative public speaker. But she only recently became more outspoken about her own sense of Chinese identity. Whether she will be the KMT’s presidential candidate in 2028 is unclear: she says she is focusing on her current job. But as the party’s chairwoman, she will shape its platform for local elections this November, as well as the presidential vote.** Already, she is shaking up Taiwan’s politics in ways that could alter the precarious balance of relations between Taiwan, China and America. The stakes have never been higher. And Ms Cheng is all in. ■** 台灣新任反對黨領袖欲與習近平對話 鄭麗文接受《經濟學人》訪問時表示，希望能於今年初會晤中國國家主席 2026年1月29日 | 台北 對台灣反對黨領袖鄭麗文而言，「風險」似乎是與生俱來的本能。她的職業生涯始於 1990 年代的學生運動，當時她追求台灣獨立並強烈抨擊當時的執政黨——國民黨（KMT）。隨後，她加入國民黨的舉動震驚了昔日戰友。如今，作為該黨的新任領導人，她正進行一場人生中最大的豪賭。在中國不斷加強對台軍事演習之際，她正阻撓增加國防開支的計畫；她認為台灣人民應該接受自己是中國人，並希望透過與中國領導人習近平尋求和解，帶領國民黨重返執政。 「我任期內最重要的任務就是推進台海和平，」她在 1月27日接受《經濟學人》專訪時表示。為此，她透露國民黨將在 2月初恢復中斷九年的國共對話，首波將從智庫交流開始。她表示，希望在 2026年上半年訪問中國並會晤習近平（習近平在去年 10月她當選黨主席後曾致電賀電，表達共同推動統一的期望）。她說：「我們必須停止刻意醜化與中國相關的一切。」 這是一項充滿爭議的策略，即使在國民黨內部亦然。國民黨已連續三屆總統大選敗給主張台灣是主權獨立國家的民進黨（DPP）。民意調查顯示，大多數台灣民眾不信任中國政府，對統一興趣缺缺，且認同自己是台灣人而非中國人。鄭麗文的政綱也讓美國感到不安；美國雖致力於協助台灣自我防衛，但堅持台灣必須大幅增加軍事支出。美國官員相信，習近平已下令要求解放軍具備在 2027年前奪取台灣的能力。 然而，現年 56歲的鄭麗文相信，她能幫助化解攻擊，並在 2028年下屆總統大選前贏回選民支持。她坦言自己的國家認同觀點與主流民意脫節，但她將此歸咎於民進黨推行「去中國化」的結果。此外，她認為國家認同不會是未來幾年的核心政治議題。她強調：「更重要的是兩岸關係，這才是真正決定民眾投票取向的關鍵。」 她的論點觸及了民間兩大恐懼。首先，若民進黨在 2028年再次勝選，中國領導層可能會對和平統一失去希望。她表示：「一旦中方對台灣不再抱有期待，解決台灣問題的方式將會是我們所有人都不願見到的。」另一個恐懼則是美國對台支持正在動搖。她舉例，美國總統川普要求台灣將國防開支提高至 GDP 的 10%，並要求將全球領先的半導體產業 40% 移至美國。她說：「對許多台灣人來說，這些訊息拼湊起來讓他們感到美國正準備遺棄台灣。」 批評者認為這種說法是危言聳聽。儘管中國已具備強大的侵略或封鎖能力，但在不承受巨大損失及摧毀全球經濟的情況下，中國能否成功仍是未知數。且習近平近期才剛清洗了軍方高層。民進黨領袖指責鄭麗文附和中國宣傳，並透過阻撓國防預算危害台灣安全。台灣總統賴清德已承諾在 2030年前將軍事支出提高至 GDP 的 5%，今年更提出 400億美元的國防追加預算，主要用於採購美製武器。然而，這兩項計畫目前在國民黨及其盟友佔多數的國會中遭到攔阻。 在鄭麗文看來，賴清德應為未提供軍費細節負起責任。她認為提議的金額將「擠壓到其他所有需求」。她拒絕具體說明台灣應投入多少國防預算，但表示台灣的火力永遠無法與中國匹敵。相對地，她主張台灣的安全應透過「合理」的軍費支出結合與習近平的談判來實現。她批評賴清德拒絕接受 1992年國民黨執政時達成的共識（即「九二共識」），該共識規定海峽兩岸同屬「一個中國」，但允許各自表述。由於民進黨認為該公式缺乏法律效力且是陷阱而拒絕接受，中國自 2016年民進黨上台後便中斷了官方對話。鄭麗文表示，現在擁護九二共識「將顯著降低軍事對抗的可能性」。 至於談判的預期結果，鄭麗文用詞謹慎。她表示，會晤習近平的主要目標是獲得一項明確的公開承諾，即雙方應致力於維持和平，並承認戰爭將帶來「難以想像的災難性後果」。習近平值得信任嗎？她說，為了避免損害國際形象，中國必須「言而有信」，「誠信至關重要」。 至於長遠目標是否為「和平統一」（如某位國民黨前總統所言），她不願定論。她表示，在她的四年任期內，若能建立維持和平的框架已是大功一件。她補充道：「至於現狀此後是否會改變，我只希望這是在兩岸人民都能接受的情況下發生。」 考慮到她的背景，這番求和言論更顯得引人注目。她的父親是 1949年隨軍來台的國民黨老兵，但她曾是投身民進黨的學運人士。2002年，她因不滿黨內腐敗與不容異己而離開。三年後加入國民黨，她很快以辭鋒犀利的政治評論員聞名。但直到近期，她才更公開地表達自己的中國認同感。 目前尚不清楚她是否會成為國民黨 2028年的總統候選人，她表示正專注於當前職務。但身為黨主席，她將主導今年 11月地方選舉及未來大選的政綱。她已經在撼動台灣政局，其方式可能徹底改變台、中、美之間脆弱的平衡關係。這場賭局的代價前所未有地高，而鄭麗文已傾力孤注一擲。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1) Donald Trump again defended the actions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Minneapolis. The president said that ICE agents’ killings of Alex Pretti and Renee Good were caused by “Democrat ensued chaos”. Braving freezing temperatures, protesters took to the streets across America. Tim Walz, Minnesota’s governor, urged Mr Trump to withdraw federal agents from the state “before they kill another American in the street”. 2) The price of an ounce of gold broke the $5,000 barrier for the first time. Demand for the metal—which cost $2,770 an ounce a year ago—shows no sign of slowing as investors dump bonds and currencies in the face of Mr Trump’s erratic attitude towards international trade. A weakening dollar has also made gold more affordable for those outside America. 3) Taiwan said it was monitoring “abnormal” changes to China’s top military brass. On Saturday Zhang Youxia, China’s top general, was put under investigation, reportedly for leaking nuclear secrets to America. General Liu Zhenli, the army’s chief of staff, is also being investigated. President Xi Jinping has set a deadline of next year for the People’s Liberation Army to** be capable of** taking Taiwan. 4) Alex Honnold successfully scaled Taipei 101, one of Asia’s tallest skyscrapers, without ropes or a safety net. The American’s 508-metre ascent was broadcast on Netflix, sensibly with a ten-second delay, and took an hour and a half. Standing atop the building’s spire, Mr Honnold** proclaimed** his achievement to be “sick”. 5) Israel said it would partially reopen Gaza’s Rafah border crossing with Egypt, a vital entry point for aid, after the body of the final Israeli hostage in the enclave is located. Israel’s army has launched a “large-scale operation” to retrieve the remains of Ran Gvili. The crossing was supposed to have reopened during the first phase of a ceasefire that was agreed in October. 6) Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that American security guarantees for post-war Ukraine were “100% ready”, with documents waiting to be signed and sent to American and Ukrainian lawmakers for ratification. The Ukrainian president’s comments suggest that tri-lateral talks between America, Russia and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi over the weekend had not been entirely fruitless. Talks are expected to continue this weekend. 7) Britain’s ruling Labour Party barred Andy Burnham, the mayor of Greater Manchester, from standing as its candidate in a forthcoming by-election, saying it would be too costly to run a mayoral campaign to replace him. Figures on the party’s left strongly criticised the decision. Mr Burnham is widely seen as a contender to challenge Sir Keir Starmer, the unpopular prime minister, for the party’s leadership. 8) In Melbourne anti-immigration demonstrators clashed with marchers protesting against Australia Day, which marks the landing of the First Fleet of British convicts in Sydney Cove in 1788. Riot police were reportedly deployed. Every year Australians get tangled in an argument over the event, which is seen by many indigenous Australians as celebrating colonisation. 1) **唐納·川普（Donald Trump）再次為移民暨海關執法局（ICE）**在明尼阿波利斯的行動辯護。總統表示，ICE 探員殺害艾力克斯·普雷蒂（Alex Pretti）與芮妮·古德（Renee Good）事件是由「民主黨導致的混亂」所引起的。抗議者冒著嚴寒走上全美街頭。明尼蘇達州州長提姆·華茲（Tim Walz）敦促川普先生在聯邦探員「於街頭殺害另一名美國人之前」，將其撤出該州。 2) 黃金價格首次突破每盎司 5,000 美元的關卡。黃金在一年前的價格為每盎司 2,770 美元，由於投資者面對川普先生對國際貿易的反覆態度而拋售債券與貨幣，目前對黃金的需求毫無放緩跡象。美元走弱也使得美國境外的投資者更容易負擔黃金。 3) 台灣表示正在監控中國軍方高層的「異常」變動。週六，中國最高將領張又俠遭到調查，據報導是因為向美國洩露核機密。陸軍參謀長劉振立大將也正在接受調查。習近平主席已為中國人民解放軍設定了明年必須具備奪取台灣能力的期限。 4) 艾力克斯·霍諾德（Alex Honnold）在沒有繩索或安全網的情況下，成功攀登了亞洲最高摩天大樓之一的台北 101。這位美國人的 508 公尺攀爬過程在 Netflix 上直播（基於安全考量設有 10 秒延遲），耗時一個半小時。霍諾德先生站在建築物的尖塔頂端，宣稱他的成就「酷斃了」。 5) 以色列表示，在尋獲位於加薩境內最後一名以色列人質的遺體後，將部分重新開放加薩與埃及之間的重要援助入境點——拉法跨境口岸（Rafah crossing）。以色列軍隊已發起一項「大規模行動」以追回藍·格維里（Ran Gvili）的遺體。該口岸原定於去年 10 月達成的停火協議第一階段期間重新開放。 6) 弗拉迪米爾·澤倫斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）聲稱，美國對戰後烏克蘭的安全保障已「100% 準備就緒」，文件正等待簽署並送交美烏兩國立法機關批准。這位烏克蘭總統的言論顯示，週末在阿布達比舉行的美、俄、烏三方會談並非完全沒有成果。預計會談將於本週末繼續進行。 7) 英國執政黨工黨禁止大曼徹斯特市長安迪·博納姆（Andy Burnham）參加即將舉行的補選，理由是為替換他而進行的市長選舉競選活動成本過高。黨內左翼人士對此決定表示強烈批評。博納姆先生被廣泛認為是挑戰民調低迷的首相**施凱爾爵士（Sir Keir Starmer）**黨魁地位的有力競爭者。 8) 在墨爾本，反移民示威者與抗議**澳洲日（Australia Day）**的遊行者發生衝突；澳洲日是為了紀念 1788 年英國第一艦隊囚犯抵達雪梨灣。據報導現場已部署防暴警察。每年澳洲人都會捲入對該紀念日的爭議，因為許多澳洲原住民將此日視為對殖民統治的慶祝。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Does Japan have a “foreigner problem”? Yes—but it is not what populist politicians say it is Jan 8th 2026|4 min read JAPAN is consumed by talk of a “foreigner problem”. The story goes that the country has been overrun by ill-mannered migrant workers, misbehaving tourists and opportunistic foreign investors. But Japan’s real problem is not that it hosts too many foreigners. It is that it has too few. Foreigners moved to the centre of political debate after the upstart Do It Yourself (Sanseito) party rode a “Japanese first” platform to big gains in last year’s upper-house election. In October the panicked ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) chose as its new leader Takaichi Sanae, who launched her campaign for the job bylambasting foreign tourists who, she said without evidence, had been “kicking” sacred deer in Nara, an ancient capital. In Japan’s polite political culture, this was nearly as provocative as Donald Trump’s false claim that Haitian immigrants were eating American pets. Since becoming prime minister, Ms Takaichi has proposed tightening the screws on foreigners in the hope of winning voters back to the LDP. Her administration has talked of crackdowns on people who overstay visas, taxes on tourists, restrictions on property purchases and caps on foreign labour. A package of measures may be put forward later this month. Vilifying outsiders may make for good politics. But in the long run it is misguided. The true causes of voters’ frustrations are economic struggles. Cracking down on foreigners will not heal the underlying malaise. If anything, it will make it worse. The backdrop is demographic change. Japan’s population is expected to decrease by 30% to 87m in 2070. Ms Takaichi’s mentor, the late Abe Shinzo, recognised that Japan needed to open up if it was to keep thriving. When he served as prime minister he let in more migrant workers and encouraged tourism. The number of foreign residents in Japan has doubled since 2010 to 3.7m. The number of foreign visitors has quadrupled over the same period, reaching some 40m last year. Many foreigners live in Japan on temporary work visas. Such programmes are better than no immigration at all. But in Japan, where migrants are often treated as expendable cogs, not people who might settle and have families, such schemes hold back integration, which in turn causes tension. And as the foreign population in Japan has risen, mainstream politicians have often been reluctant to talk about it. That has helped populists paint the arrivals as a “silent invasion”. Some popular worries reflect real problems that can be fixed. Stricter oversight of foreign investors who buy land next to sensitive sites such as military bases is wise. Imposing Japanese-language requirements for permanent residence is reasonable, too. Over-tourism has turned Kyoto’s best-known temples into mosh pits during cherry-blossom season. But broader fears about social breakdown and loss of traditions are overstated. Japan is an island country with strong borders. It faces no surge of refugees from war or poverty. Its neighbours are either prosperous or North Korea, which locks its people in. Foreigners are only about 3% of Japan’s population; the average across the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, is 15%. And there is plenty of room for tourism to grow. Japan already relies on foreigners in industries including hospitality, farming and nursing. Migrants help sustain many of the traditions that nativists fear losing: they catch and harvest the raw ingredients for Japanese cuisine; in some ageing rural communities they help carry portable shrines during festivals. Japan will need far more workers in the coming decades to maintain even modest growth. That is why business leaders and governors tend to favour admitting more foreigners, not fewer. As for curbing tourism, that would mean stifling Japan’s second-largest export, after cars. Instead of discouraging tourists, Japan could** lure **more of them to the many beautiful places that are currently off the beaten track. (Even Kyoto has plenty of spectacular yet barely visited sites.) Instead of cracking down on foreign workers, it should design an immigration system that attracts and selects newcomers with useful skills, integrates them into society and ensures that they pay their fair share of health-care and welfare costs. The real problem is not foreigners. It is the failure to take advantage of one of Japan’s greatest strengths—that it is a wonderful place to live and work. ■ 日本真的有所謂的「外國人問題」嗎？ 有——但並非民粹政治人物所宣稱的那種 2026 年 1 月 8 日｜閱讀時間 4 分鐘 日本正被有關「外國人問題」的討論所籠罩。流行的說法是，日本已被不守規矩的移工、行為失當的觀光客，以及投機取巧的外國投資者所「淹沒」。然而，日本真正的問題並非外國人太多，而是外國人太少。 外國人議題之所以成為政治焦點，是因為新興的「自己動手黨」（Sanseito）在去年的參議院選舉中，憑藉「日本優先」的政綱取得顯著進展。10 月，驚慌失措的執政黨自民黨（LDP）選擇高市早苗為新任黨魁。她在競選期間，毫無證據地抨擊外國觀光客，指稱他們在古都奈良「踢踹」神聖的鹿群。在日本一向溫和的政治文化中，這樣的言論幾乎可與唐納．川普聲稱海地移民吃美國人寵物的虛假指控相提並論。 高市上任首相後，為了重新贏回選民支持，提出多項針對外國人的強硬政策，包括打擊逾期居留者、對觀光客課稅、限制外國人購置不動產，以及對外籍勞工設置上限。一套完整的措施可能將於本月稍晚提出。 妖魔化外來者或許有助於短期政治操作，但長期而言卻是誤入歧途。選民不滿的真正根源在於經濟困境，而非外國人。打壓外國人無法治癒結構性問題，反而可能使情況惡化。 其背景是人口結構的劇烈變化。日本人口預計將在 2070 年減少 30%，降至 8,700 萬人。高市的政治導師、已故前首相安倍晉三早已意識到，日本若要持續繁榮，必須對外開放。在他任內，日本引進更多移工並鼓勵觀光發展。自 2010 年以來，外國居民人數已倍增至 370 萬；外國旅客數量更在同期間成長四倍，去年達約 4,000 萬人次。 許多外國人在日本持短期工作簽證居留。這類制度固然勝過完全不接受移民，但在日本，移民往往被視為可替換的勞動齒輪，而非能夠定居並建立家庭的成員，這種作法阻礙了社會融合，也因此引發緊張。隨著外國人口增加，主流政治人物卻長期避而不談，反倒讓民粹勢力將移民描繪成一場「無聲入侵」。 部分民眾的擔憂確實反映了可解決的問題。加強對購買軍事基地等敏感地點附近土地的外國投資者之監管是明智的；對申請永久居留者設立日語能力要求亦屬合理。過度觀光確實讓京都的知名寺院在櫻花季期間人滿為患。 然而，對於社會崩解與文化流失的恐懼被嚴重誇大。日本是島國，邊境管控嚴密，並未面臨戰爭或貧困所引發的難民潮。其鄰國不是富裕國家，就是將人民封鎖在國內的北韓。外國人僅占日本人口約 3%；而經合組織（OECD）成員國的平均比例為 15%。日本的觀光成長空間仍然相當大。 日本早已在旅宿、農業與護理等產業仰賴外國勞工。移民實際上也在維繫那些排外者所擔憂失去的傳統：他們捕撈與收成日本料理所需的原料；在一些高齡化的鄉村社區中，他們協助在祭典時抬神轎。未來數十年，日本若要維持即便是溫和的經濟成長，也將需要更多勞動力。正因如此，企業領袖與地方首長多半支持增加而非減少外國人。至於抑制觀光，等同於扼殺日本僅次於汽車的第二大出口產業。 與其打擊觀光，日本更應將旅客引導至仍未被充分探索的美麗地區（即便是京都，也仍有眾多壯麗卻鮮少造訪的景點）。與其限制外籍勞工，不如設計一套能吸引具實用技能的新移民、促進其社會融合，並確保其公平負擔醫療與福利成本的移民制度。真正的問題不在於外國人，而在於日本未能善用自身最重要的優勢之一——它是一個極適合生活與工作的國家。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China and Taiwan both see lessons in America’s** raid** on Venezuela It won’t change China’s calculus but is a case study for “decapitation” strikes Jan 8th 2026|Taipei|4 min read China’s public is used to seeing flashy footage of its armed forces parading new weaponry through Beijing, conducting peacekeeping patrols in Africa or staging elaborate drills around disputed territory, especially Taiwan. But nobody under 45 can claim to have lived through an actual Chinese military strike on another country. And among older generations who did, most would rather forget the war of 1979 in which Vietnam repelled a Chinese invasion. No wonder, then, that many Chinese people were transfixed by reports of America’s dramatic night-time extraction of Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela. China’s government swiftly denounced the raid, but details and discussion of it circulated widely online. Among the more nationalist comments, there was also a common refrain: could this be a template for a Chinese attack on Taiwan? Similar thoughts have been raised in Taiwan itself and in America, with prominent figures arguing that the raid could set a precedent for China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to conduct—and legitimise—an assault on the island. **In truth, Mr Maduro’s capture will probably have little direct impact on China’s approach to Taiwan. **Rhetorically, Chinese officials have already started to use the operation to bolster their long-standing portrayal of America as a global bully and serial violator of international law. But the Trump administration’s legal justifications are of little interest to China. More pertinently, China has refrained from attacking thus far, not because it fears foreign reprimand, but owing to its own military limitations and concerns that America would intervene. Even so, there are lessons to be drawn for both China and Taiwan. Chinese special forces have been planning “decapitation” strikes on Taiwan’s leadership for years. In 2015 China’s state television revealed that the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, had built a mock-up of Taiwan’s presidential palace in the desert in northern China to practise an assault. The training site has tripled in size since 2020. Models of other Taiwanese ministries have been built, according to satellite images obtained by a Japanese think-tank in October. China’s focus on decapitation seemingly intensified after the success of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in rallying resistance to Russia’s invasion. Decapitation drills have been included in China’s recent military exercises around Taiwan, too. The latest, on December 29th and 30th, involved dozens of warships and military aircraft as well as long-range rocket fire. They simulated a blockade and operations to prevent foreign forces intervening. They also rehearsed strikes on pro-independence figures, according to Senior Colonel Zhang Chi of China’s National Defence University. China would need to do more than kill or capture Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, as that would leave intact the rest of the government, which has a clear line of succession. The PLA is thus likely to use decapitation strikes as part of a bigger operation, potentially a full-scale invasion. Still, the PLA’s own elite units have yet to conduct any operations of note at home, let alone abroad. Nor has China yet established the high-level integration of space, air, ground and other forces that is needed for such operations, despite reforms that Mr Xi introduced more than a decade ago to achieve that. So China is likely to scrutinise America’s raid on Caracas, just as it has studied other significant foreign operations with potential relevance to Taiwan, including the D-Day landings and the Falklands war. Taiwan will likewise be hungry for insight into the American raid. Its armed forces are better equipped and trained than Venezuela’s. But they have long worried about Chinese decapitation strikes, potentially involving sleeper agents already in Taiwan. Hsu Szu-chien, the island’s deputy defence minister, told reporters on January 5th that Taiwan’s armed forces had protocols to respond to various types of Chinese aggression. Those included the so-called Wan Chun plan to protect the president, details of which are secret. The Venezuela raid showed the importance of strengthening preparedness and ensuring weapons are upgraded and maintained, he said, linking the episode to his government’s recent efforts to boost defence spending—blocked by the opposition. One detail of particular interest to Taiwan is the apparent failure of Venezuela’s Chinese-made JY-27 air-surveillance radars. Their manufacturer describes them as jam-resistant, and Chinese state media have claimed they can detect incoming missiles and advanced stealthy aircraft, including America’s F-22 fighter jets. Though the radar’s failure in Venezuela may have been due to poor maintenance, operator error or even sabotage, any suggestion that America exploited a weakness could affect China’s perception of its own vulnerability in a Taiwan conflict. Versions of the same radars also protect the mainland. Operation nations But perhaps more significant for both sides is what the Venezuela operation says about the Trump administration’s willingness to use force and its new focus on the western hemisphere. Taiwanese officials suggested that it could deter China by demonstrating America’s willingness to deploy military might against autocracies. On the other hand, mainland officials may be quietly encouraged by Mr Trump’s suggestion that his next targets could be Mexico, Colombia—or even Greenland. That does not necessarily mean giving Mr Xi carte blanche on Taiwan. But if America is bogged down in its own backyard, China could reap the benefits all the same. ■ 中美兩國皆從美國突襲委內瑞拉中汲取教訓 這不會改變中國的盤算，但卻是「斬首」行動的案例研究 2026年1月8日 | 台北 | 閱讀時間 4 分鐘 中國大眾已經習慣看到其武裝部隊展示新式武器、在非洲進行維和巡邏，或在爭議領土（特別是台灣）周邊進行精密的演習。但 45 歲以下的人，幾乎沒人親歷過中國對另一國採取真正的軍事行動；而經歷過 1979 年中越戰爭的長輩  (1979年中國因邊境衝突及不滿越南入侵柬埔寨，發動「對越自衛反擊戰」。解放軍攻入越南北部，雙方死傷慘重；中方宣稱達到目標後撤軍，此後兩國在邊境對峙多年。)，多數也寧願遺忘那場被越南擊退的往事。因此，當美國戲劇性地在夜間將尼古拉斯·馬杜洛（Nicolás Maduro）從委內瑞拉帶走時，許多中國人感到震驚且目不轉睛。 中國政府迅速譴責了這次突襲，但相關細節與討論在網路上廣泛流傳。在民族主義色彩濃厚的評論中，也出現了一個共同的疑問：這是否能成為中國攻擊台灣的範本？ 同樣的想法在台灣和美國也被提出，一些知名人士主張，這次突襲可能為中國領導人習近平發動——並合法化——對台攻擊開創先例。 事實上，馬杜洛的被捕可能對中國應對台灣的方式影響甚微。在說法上，中國官員已開始利用這次行動，強化其長期以來將美國形塑為「全球霸權」及「國際法慣犯破壞者」的形象。然而，川普政府的法律依據對中國來說並不重要。更貼切地說，中國至今未發動攻擊，並非擔心國際譴責，而是出於自身軍事限制以及對美國可能介入的擔憂。 即便如此，中台雙方仍能從中汲取教訓。中國特種部隊多年來一直在籌劃對台灣領導層進行「斬首」行動。2015 年，中國中央電視台揭露解放軍（PLA）在內蒙古沙漠建造了台灣總統府的模擬建築以練習進攻。根據日本智庫去年 10 月取得的衛星影像，該訓練場自 2020 年以來已擴大三倍，並增建了台灣其他部會的模型。自烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基成功號召抵抗俄羅斯入侵後，中國對斬首行動的關注顯然有所加強。 近期中國在台灣周邊的軍事演習也納入了斬首演練。最近一次在 12 月 29 日至 30 日的演習中，涉及數十艘軍艦、軍機及遠程火箭，模擬了封鎖及防止外國勢力干預的行動。根據中國國防大學張弛大校的說法，他們還演練了針對「台獨分子」的打擊。 然而，中國僅僅殺害或抓捕台灣總統賴清德是不夠的，因為這會留下擁有明確繼任順序的政府運作體系。因此，解放軍很可能將斬首行動視為更大規模行動（可能是全面入侵）的一部分。 儘管如此，解放軍的精銳部隊尚未在國內執行過任何顯著行動，更不用說在海外。儘管習近平十多年前就推動改革以實現軍事轉型，但中國尚未建立起執行此類操作所需的高度太空、空域、地面及其他力量的整合。因此，中國很可能會仔細研究美國對卡拉卡斯的突襲，就像他們研究其他與台灣衝突相關的國外行動一樣（如諾曼第登陸和福克蘭戰爭）。 台灣同樣渴望從這次美國突襲中獲得洞察。台灣武裝部隊的裝備與訓練雖優於委內瑞拉，但長期以來一直擔憂中國的斬首攻擊，且可能涉及已潛伏在台灣的臥底特務。台灣國防部副部長徐斯儉於 1 月 5 日告訴記者，軍方已有應對各類侵略的預案，其中包括保護總統的「萬鈞計畫」（細節屬機密）。他表示，委內瑞拉突襲事件顯示了加強戒備及確保武器更新維護的重要性，並藉此聯繫政府近期提升國防預算的努力——儘管目前仍遭到在野黨阻撓。 台灣特別感興趣的一個細節是：委內瑞拉所使用的中國製 JY-27 防空雷達顯然失效了。製造商宣稱該雷達具備抗干擾能力，中國官媒曾吹噓其能偵測導彈及先進隱形戰機（包括美國的 F-22）。儘管在委內瑞拉的失敗可能是由於維護不良、人為疏失甚至內部破壞，但任何關於美國利用漏洞的暗示，都可能影響中國對自身在台灣衝突中脆弱性的評估。同款型號的雷達也負責保衛中國大陸。 行動國家 但對雙方而言，更具深遠意義的或許是：這次委內瑞拉行動展現了川普政府使用武力的意願，以及對西半球的新焦點。台灣官員暗示，這可能透過展示美國對獨裁政權部署軍事力量的決心，進而威懾中國。 另一方面，中國官員則可能因川普暗示下一個目標可能是墨西哥、哥倫比亞甚至格陵蘭而暗自感到鼓舞。這並不代表習近平在台灣問題上得到了「空白支票」，但如果美國被拖入自家後院的泥淖，中國仍可能從中獲利。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

"Watch who you’re calling childless Women in America are having as many babies over their lifetimes as they did two decades ago A set of public signs showing women, pregnancy, baby care, strollers, and children playing Dec 18th 2025 | 5 min read **A colony of **sentient lizards, living on a distant planet. It comprises 100 females and 100 males. Each lives for 100 years. There is only one male and one female of any age (eg, one 15-year-old female, one 74-year-old male). The planet is safe and peaceful: no lizards die from disease or violence. But every year the two 100-year-olds pass away. And every year two babies are born, the fruits of an unusual reproductive cycle. At age 24 every female produces a male baby; at 26, a female. She will never have any more. The population of Planet Lizard is thus fixed at 200. Now imagine an asteroid hits Planet Lizard, altering its atmosphere and climate. At first little seems to have changed. All the lizards miraculously survive, and they rejoice at their good fortune. But it soon becomes clear something is wrong: the two females, aged 24 and 26, who are due to produce baby lizards do not. The population shrinks to 198. The next year, the same thing happens. The colony dwindles to 196. Concern turns to panic. Prophecies of extinction are splashed across the front pages of lizard newspapers. Councils of senior lizards are convened to devise plans to revive fertility. Nothing works. Ten years after the asteroid struck, the remaining 180 lizards are resigned to their fate: ageing, death and extinction, two by two. And then: a miracle. The two females who failed to have babies at 24 and 26 are suddenly fertile, at 34 and 36. Soon, two infants are born, to general ecstasy. The next year, the miracle is repeated. And so on. The population stabilises and (a century later) climbs back to 200. Ultimately, the asteroid changed the timing of lizard births but not their number. This fable may seem silly, but it contains a lesson. For decades, across the West, the commonest measure of how many children women have, on average—the total fertility rate (tfr)—has been dropping. It has fallen well below the “replacement rate” (needed to keep a population constant) of 2.1. Between 2007 and 2022 America’s tfr dropped from 2.1 to just 1.6. Warnings of probable population decline, including from this newspaper, abound. Pronatalists are casting around frantically for solutions. A shrinking (human) population could be cause for concern. It means fewer working-age people to support the old. Fiscal crisis could loom. Fewer minds would yield fewer innovative ideas. Less scope for division of labour would mean a less efficient economy. But tfr has flaws. It measures the number of children a hypothetical woman might have in her life, based on current birth rates for women of different ages. To calculate it, you start by dividing the total number of births to a given group of women (aged, say 15-19 or 35-39) by the number of women in that group. Those group birth rates are then added up and multiplied by the number of years in each group (ie, five). The result is the number of children a woman will have if, aged 15-19, she has the same number of babies as the average woman of 15-19 is having today, then the same number at 20-24 as the average woman of 20-24 is having today, and so on. It is almost sure to be wrong. That does not make TFR useless. It captures what demographers call “tempo”—the timing of an event, like a birth. But as a measure of “quantum”—the total number of births—it is likely to mislead. In effect it assumes that a young woman will have babies not only at the same rate as her contemporaries, but also at the same rate as women five or ten years older. That is not necessarily so. A different measure, the completed fertility rate (CFR), captures the average number of births a woman has by the end of her child-bearing years (put at 44). America’s CFR has not fallen at all over the past two decades. In fact, according to an analysis of census data by Mike Konczal, a former Biden administration economist, it has risen slightly, from 1.91 in 2000 to 1.97 in 2024. Chart: The Economist Back on Planet Lizard, the TFR dropped to zero overnight. After ten years, when females started having babies again, it jumped back to 2. The CFR never budged. The timing of births simply shifted, and eventually the tfr caught up with the cfr. In a doomsday scenario, in which the asteroid did render the lizards infertile, the cfr would have dropped to meet tfr. Which scenario is playing out in the West? Many demographers, including Lyman Stone, of the Institute for Family Studies, a think-tank, point out that tfr is typically a strong predictor of cfr. But there is evidence that women are deferring, not forgoing, childbirth. In 2000 by age 26 the average American woman had produced one child; the average 32-year-old, 1.6 children; the average 40-year-old, 1.9. In 2024 the average 26-year-old had 0.6 children and the average 32-year-old 1.2. But the average 40-year-old has still had 1.9, having delayed in her 20s and caught up in her 30s. Economies of scales Does this mean, as with the lizards, that tfr will rise to meet cfr? Historical examples are suggestive. As women delayed childbearing in Sweden the tfr dropped sharply in the 1980s, before recovering in the 1990s (though it has fallen since). The cfr, at around 2, barely budged. In America the question is pertinent. The commonest ages are 33 and 34, because of a baby boom in 1990 and 1991. Women aged 34 have had, on average, 1.46 children each. As this group approaches their 40s, many more births may be on the way. As for younger women, those born in 2000 have had fewer children than those born in 1990 had had by 2015. Perhaps they will catch up—but that won’t be known for at least a decade. To be sure, an average of just under two births per woman is still not “replacement level”. But if that truly is the long-term average, panic is scarcely justified. It would mean a gradual population decline: tricky, but much more manageable than implied by TFR. It is easy to fear the end times. But the problem may be one that humans, like our faraway lizards, never face. 美國女性一生中生育的孩子數量，與二十年前其實一樣多 2025 年 12 月 18 日｜閱讀時間 5 分鐘 想像一下，在一顆遙遠的星球上，有一個由具備感知能力的蜥蜴所組成。這個社會共有 100 隻雌性與 100 隻雄性蜥蜴。每一隻蜥蜴都能活到 100 歲，而且每個年齡層都恰好只有一隻雄性與一隻雌性（例如：只有一隻 15 歲的雌蜥蜴，一隻 74 歲的雄蜥蜴）。這顆星球安全又和平，沒有任何蜥蜴死於疾病或暴力。然而，每年都會有兩隻 100 歲的蜥蜴自然死亡；同時，也會誕生兩隻新生蜥蜴，這來自一種特殊的繁殖週期。每隻雌蜥蜴在 24 歲時會生下一隻雄性幼蜥；在 26 歲時，會生下一隻雌性幼蜥。此後，她將不再生育。於是，「蜥蜴星球」的人口始終固定在 200。 接著，想像一顆小行星撞擊了蜥蜴星球，改變了它的大氣與氣候。一開始，看似毫無異狀。所有蜥蜴奇蹟似地存活下來，並為自己的幸運而歡欣鼓舞。但很快地，問題浮現了：原本應該在 24 與 26 歲生育的兩隻雌蜥蜴，沒有生下幼蜥。人口減少到 198。隔年，同樣的事情再度發生，人口降至 196。憂慮迅速轉為恐慌，關於滅絕的預言登上蜥蜴報紙的頭版。長老議會召開，試圖找出恢復生育力的方法，但一切都徒勞無功。 十年後，剩下的 180 隻蜥蜴只能接受他們的命運：逐漸老去、死亡，然後滅絕——每年少兩隻。 然後，奇蹟出現了。 那兩隻在 24 與 26 歲未能生育的雌蜥蜴，竟然在 34 與 36 歲時重新恢復生育能力。不久後，兩隻幼蜥誕生，整個星球陷入狂喜。隔年，奇蹟再次發生。接著年復一年。人口穩定下來，並在一個世紀後回升至 200。 最終，小行星改變的只是蜥蜴生育的「時間點」，而非「總數」。 這個寓言或許看來荒謬，但其中蘊含了一個重要教訓。數十年來，西方國家最常用來衡量女性平均生育子女數的指標——總和生育率（Total Fertility Rate，簡稱 TFR）——持續下降，且已遠低於維持人口穩定所需的「更替水準」2.1。2007 年至 2022 年，美國的 TFR 從 2.1 降至僅 1.6。各種關於人口即將衰退的警告不絕於耳，其中也包括本刊。鼓吹提高生育率的人士正四處尋找解方。 人口萎縮確實值得憂慮。這意味著勞動年齡人口減少，難以支撐高齡人口；財政危機可能浮現；創新思維的數量下降；分工的空間縮小，經濟效率隨之降低。 然而，TFR 本身存在缺陷。它是根據不同年齡層女性「當前」的生育率，推算出一名假想女性一生可能生育的子女數。計算方式如下：先將某一年齡組（例如 15–19 歲或 35–39 歲）的出生總數，除以該年齡組女性人數，得出該組的生育率；再將各年齡組的生育率加總，並乘以每組的年數（通常為五年）。結果是一個假設：一名女性在 15–19 歲時的生育行為，會與當今該年齡層女性相同；在 20–24 歲時，也會與當今該年齡層女性相同，依此類推。這種假設幾乎必然與現實不符。 這並不代表 TFR 毫無用處。它確實能反映人口學家所稱的「節奏」（tempo）——事件（如生育）發生的時間點；但作為衡量「總量」（quantum，即一生生育數）的指標，它往往具有誤導性。它實際上假設年輕女性不僅會以同齡人的生育率生育，未來也會以年長女性目前的生育率生育，而這並非必然。 另一個指標——完成生育率（Completed Fertility Rate，CFR）——則計算女性在生育年齡結束（通常定為 44 歲）時，平均實際生育的子女數。根據前拜登政府經濟學家 Mike Konczal 對美國人口普查資料的分析，美國的 CFR 在過去二十年間並未下降，反而略有上升，從 2000 年的 1.91 提高至 2024 年的 1.97。 回到蜥蜴星球：TFR 曾在一夜之間降為零；十年後，當雌蜥蜴重新開始生育時，TFR 又回升至 2。但 CFR 始終未曾改變。生育的時間只是延後，最終 TFR 追上了 CFR。若小行星真的使蜥蜴永久不孕，那麼 CFR 才會下滑，與 TFR 接軌。 那麼，西方世界正在經歷的是哪一種情況？ 許多人口學家（包括家庭研究所的 Lyman Stone）指出，TFR 通常是 CFR 的良好預測指標。然而，越來越多證據顯示，女性是在延後生育，而非放棄生育。 2000 年時，26 歲的美國女性平均已有 1 名孩子；32 歲者為 1.6；40 歲者為 1.9。到了 2024 年，26 歲女性平均只有 0.6 名孩子，32 歲為 1.2；但 40 歲女性仍是 1.9——她們只是把原本 20 多歲的生育延到 30 多歲完成。 規模經濟 這是否意味著，美國的 TFR 會像蜥蜴一樣，最終回升以追上 CFR？歷史案例提供了一些線索。瑞典在 1980 年代女性延後生育時，TFR 曾急劇下降，並於 1990 年代回升（儘管之後再度下滑）；但 CFR 始終穩定在約 2。 在美國，這個問題尤為關鍵。由於 1990 與 1991 年的嬰兒潮，當前人數最多的女性年齡層為 33 與 34 歲。34 歲女性目前平均已有 1.46 名孩子。隨著她們邁入 40 多歲，更多出生可能仍在路上。至於年輕世代，2000 年出生的女性，到目前為止生育數少於 1990 年出生者在 2015 年時的水準。她們是否會「追上來」，仍需至少十年才能確認。 誠然，每名女性平均不到兩個孩子，仍低於更替水準。但若這真是長期趨勢，恐慌其實並不必要。這代表的是一個緩慢、可控的人口下降，而非 TFR 所暗示的危機規模。人類很容易想像末日降臨。但這個問題，或許終究不會真正發生——正如那些遙遠星球上的蜥蜴一般。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

He Yanxin was the steward of a women-only language The last natural inheritor of nushu died on October 23rd, aged 86 Nov 27th 2025|5 min read In the summer of 1949, the year the Communists came to power in China, you might have found He Yanxin, then ten, sitting with her grandmother under a tree. It was cooler there, in the heat of the day. An ordinary scene, except that her grandmother was** inscribing** characters on the palm of Yanxin’s small hand. As she did so, Yanxin would sing the character, then jump up to draw it with a twig on the sand. For her, these lessons were fun. But she wondered why writing this script made her grandmother cry, sometimes so much that she could not see. Years passed; the Cultural Revolution violently came and went; she brought up six children **amid the strains of poverty **and a hard marriage. Then, from the early 1980s, researchers began seeking her out. She was not easy to find. Her home, Heyuan village, was tucked away in the foggy, vertiginous sandstone peaks of Jiangyong County in Hunan, in China’s south-east. But the visitors came because Jiangyong was the only site of a mysterious ancient language used by women only. They had heard Yanxin knew it, one of very few; but once they found her, with her tough demeanour and her straight gaze, she would tell them, firmly, no. The language was called nushu, “women’s script”. The characters were thin, slanting and graceful; locally they were called “long-legged mosquitoes” and “the words of ants”. Standard Chinese ideograms were chunky by comparison. Visually it was easy to learn, with each character representing one syllable; but to sing it well (for it was sung rather than spoken) required knowing the local dialect. It was therefore a natural medium for rural women denied education, as they all were until Mao’s time. Young unmarried women especially would meet to sing and sew nushu on fans, handkerchiefs and belts. When a bride left to live in the groom’s house, the “Third Day Books” of commiserations and hopes for her were naturally written in nushu, women to women. Nobody knew for sure how old it was. Some said a beautiful concubine in the medieval Song dynasty had invented it, others that it was the work of Yaoji, goddess of clouds and rain. Its secrecy was also disputed. Women certainly kept it to themselves, but men would have ignored it anyway. China was—still is—a patriarchy. Nushu was overwhelmingly filled with the grief and bitterness of women who had exchanged their own families for abusive husbands, hateful mothers-in-law and bound feet that kept them home. Rather than moonlight and flowers, its most common images were of closed rooms, lost friends and pain like the slash of a sword. One of Yanxin’s favourite images was of frost and snow on plum blossom: harsh beauty that destroyed life. Yet this was not a language of resistance. Many Third Day Books reminded a woman of her **“Three Obediences”: as a child, to her father; as a wife, to her husband; as a widow, to her sons. **Brides were reminded to “serve your father-in-law with a smile”. Desperate or resigned, by 1960 Yanxin did not need these songs. In earlier times there had been “sworn sisterhoods”, among the singers, “wisteria from the same root” which often proved stronger than ties of blood. But she herself had only one sworn sister, and they had lost touch. Learning nushu had also been an education, but under Mao all girls, like boys, could go to school. Then, slaving for her family, she had no time for it. One of her daughters asked if she would teach her, but she refused. What good was it? What money did it earn? It was useless. Yet her subsequent claim that she knew nothing of nushu did not hold up for long. A Japanese researcher, Endo Orie, having got that denial on the doorstep, handed her a pen and paper. Clumsily, out of practice, she began to draw the characters; but rapidly they became graceful, and Ms Endo urged her to go on; to write her life. At that point, her husband was gravely ill in hospital. Even there he continued to blame her. She visited him but, like a boat without wind, she could do nothing. One night in the house alone, rather than despair, she made a start on Ms Endo’s commission. Nushu made her cry too, but fortified her more. It was precious as gold to see the determined progress of the characters down the page. Her story poured out of her as if she had only been waiting to recover this near-dead language in order to speak. There was so much to say. She was still a baby when her father was killed by a rapacious landlord, knocked to the ground and hit until his blood ran out. After childhood, she had barely one good day. With her father gone, no man sowed rice for them; at 19, she had to be married off. She refused, skipped the ceremony and for a few years was happy to live apart from him. When she finally went to her husband’s house, it was pure oppression. She felt like a baby bird that could not chirp, let alone fly. Her mother-in-law hovered in the kitchen, criticising her cooking and complaining to her son, who then “served up the beating”. Having abandoned his studies, he tried farming, while she hauled rocks in the mines. This bitter therapy of nushu inspired her for the next two decades to help scholars research it. She also accepted the status of an “inheritor”, the last woman to learn nushu naturally, in the family. She even acquired a nushu sister, Hu Xin, an eager young student, and helped her through her divorce as well as her chanting exercises. They would walk through the streets of Heyuan with their arms around each other. She still had huge reservations, though. The nushu of the 21st century was not what she had learned. Men had now found uses for it, as a tourist lure. In Jiangyong you could buy trinkets with nushu inscriptions, often misspelled, and get a fan free with a bucket of fried chicken. In Pumei village an imposing nushu museum offered writing courses. But the songs were bland and pretty now, and young women very different. No one needed to understand—as she, now, fully understood—why her grandmother had so often wept as she inscribed the words of ants. ■ 何燕心是女性專屬語言的守護者 自然傳承女書的最後一人於10月23日辭世，享壽86歲 2025年11月27日｜5分鐘閱讀 女書，又名江永女書，是一種獨特的漢語書寫系統。女書是一種專門由女性使用的文字，起源於中國湖南省南部永州的江永縣一帶，一般用於書寫當地的漢語方言（土話）。女書早期在江永縣及其毗鄰的道縣、江華瑤族自治縣的大瑤山、以及廣西部分地區的婦女之間流行、傳承。由於女書在文化大革命期間被嚴重破壞，再加上隨著時代的發展及人口外流，現在女書正瀕臨失傳 2004年9月20日，女書的最後一位自然傳人陽煥宜去世。 1949年夏天，也就是共產黨在中國掌權的那一年，你或許會看到當時只有十歲的何燕心，和她的祖母坐在一棵樹下。白天的酷熱中，那裡比較涼爽。那是一個再普通不過的場景，唯一不同的是，她的祖母正把文字寫在燕心小小的手掌上。每寫一個字，燕心就會把那個字唱出來，接著跳起來，用一根小樹枝在沙地上描畫。對她來說，這些課程很有趣。但她不明白，為什麼書寫這種文字會讓祖母哭泣，有時甚至哭得什麼都看不清。 歲月流逝；文化大革命猛烈地來了，又過去了；她在貧窮與艱難的婚姻中撫養了六個孩子。接著，從1980年代初開始，研究者開始尋找她。她並不容易被找到。她的家鄉何園村，隱藏在湖南省江永縣霧氣瀰漫、陡峭險峻的砂岩山峰之中。但訪客仍然前來，因為江永是唯一已知仍存在一種神祕古老語言的地方——一種只由女性使用的語言。他們聽說燕心懂得這種語言，是極少數之一；但當他們終於找到她時，面對她堅毅的神情與筆直的目光，她會堅定地告訴他們：不。 這種語言叫做女書，「女人的文字」。字形纖細、傾斜而優雅；在當地被稱為「長腳蚊子」或「螞蟻的字」。相比之下，標準漢字顯得厚重笨拙。從視覺上看，它很容易學，每個字代表一個音節；但要唱得好（因為它是唱出來的，而不是說出來的），就必須懂得當地的方言。因此，對於那些被剝奪教育機會的農村女性而言，這是一種自然的表達媒介——直到毛澤東時代之前，所有女性皆如此。尤其是未婚的年輕女子，常常聚在一起唱誦女書，並將它繡在扇子、手帕與腰帶上。當新娘離開娘家、搬進夫家時，為她準備的「三朝書」(「三朝書」是新娘出嫁第三天，由女性親人或閨中密友所贈特定形式的女書作品，讓我們從它開始，傾聽女書訴可憐的故事。 這是寫在一條藍色布帕上的「女書」(圖一)。 「女書」指的不僅是婦女的書寫創作，更是女人用自己所創造出來的文字，書寫而成的作品)——寫滿安慰與祝福——理所當然地是以女書書寫，由女人寫給女人。 沒有人確切知道女書有多古老。有人說它是中世紀宋朝一位美麗的妃子所創；也有人說它出自雲雨女神瑤姬之手。它是否祕密流傳，也眾說紛紜。女性確實只在彼此之間使用它，但男性本來也會忽視它。中國是一個——至今仍然是——父權社會。女書的內容，幾乎完全充滿了女性的悲傷與苦澀：她們離開原生家庭，換來的是暴力的丈夫、刻薄的婆婆，以及把她們困在家中的纏足。女書中最常見的意象，不是月光與花朵，而是封閉的房間、失散的朋友，以及如刀劍劃過般的疼痛。燕心最喜愛的一個意象，是覆著霜雪的梅花：殘酷的美，卻摧毀生命。然而，這並不是一種反抗的語言。許多三朝書都提醒女子她的「三從」：幼時從父、出嫁從夫、夫死從子。新娘被告誡要「笑臉侍奉公公」。 到1960年，無論是出於絕望或認命，燕心已不再需要這些歌。在更早的年代，歌唱女書的女性之間會結成「結拜姊妹」，稱為「同根紫藤」，其情誼往往比血緣更深。但她自己只有一位結拜姊妹，而且早已失去聯絡。學習女書曾經也是一種教育，但在毛澤東治下，女孩與男孩一樣可以上學。之後，她為家庭勞碌奔波，沒有時間再碰它。她的一個女兒曾問她是否願意教她，她拒絕了。那有什麼用？能賺多少錢？毫無價值。 然而，她後來聲稱自己對女書一無所知，並沒有維持太久。一位日本研究者遠藤織枝，在門口得到這樣的否認後，把筆和紙遞給她。她笨拙地、因為久未使用而生疏地，開始描畫那些字；但很快地，字形又變得優雅起來。遠藤女士鼓勵她繼續寫下去，寫她的一生。那時，她的丈夫正重病住院。即便如此，他仍然責怪她。她去探望他，但就像一艘無風的船，她什麼也做不了。某個夜晚，她獨自在家，沒有陷入絕望，反而開始動筆，完成遠藤女士的請託。女書也讓她落淚，但同時給了她力量。看著那些字堅定地一行行往下延伸，彷彿黃金般珍貴。她的故事從她心中傾瀉而出，彷彿她只是一直在等待重新找回這種幾乎死去的語言，好讓自己得以說話。 她有太多要說的事。她還是個嬰兒時，父親就被一名貪婪的地主殺害——被打倒在地，反覆毆打，直到血流乾為止。童年之後，她幾乎沒有過一天好日子。父親死後，家中沒有男人耕田；十九歲時，她被迫出嫁。她拒絕了，跳過婚禮，並在幾年內與丈夫分居，過得還算快樂。當她終於搬進夫家，那完全是一場壓迫。她覺得自己像一隻不會鳴叫、更別說飛翔的小鳥。婆婆在廚房裡盤旋，批評她的菜、向兒子抱怨，而他隨後便「端出一頓打」。他放棄了學業，嘗試務農，而她則在礦場裡搬運石頭。 這種苦澀的女書療癒，激勵她在接下來的二十年間協助學者研究女書。她也接受了「傳承人」的身分，成為家族中最後一位自然學習女書的女性。她甚至結交了一位女書姊妹——一名熱心的年輕學生胡欣——不僅在誦唱練習上指導她，也陪伴她度過離婚的艱難。她們常常手挽著手，走在何園村的街道上。 然而，她心中仍有極深的保留。二十一世紀的女書，已不是她所學的那個樣子。男人如今也找到了利用它的方式，把它變成觀光誘餌。在江永，你可以買到刻著女書（往往拼寫錯誤）的紀念品，只要你買一桶炸雞還會附送一把扇子。在蒲美村，一座氣勢宏偉的女書博物館提供書寫課程。但現在的歌詞變得平淡又漂亮，年輕女性也已大不相同。沒有人再需要理解——正如她如今完全理解的那樣——為什麼她的祖母在書寫那些「螞蟻的字」時，會一再落淚。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Nov 10th 2025 4 min read By Tom Standage, Editor, The World Ahead 2026 This is Donald Trump’s world—we’re all just living in it. The disruptor-in-chief was the biggest factor shaping global affairs in 2025, and that will be the case for as long as he remains in the White House. His norm-shattering approach has caused turmoil in some areas (as in trade) but has also delivered diplomatic results (as in Gaza) and forced necessary change (as with European defence spending). As the Trumpnado spins on in 2026, here are ten trends and themes to watch in the coming year. 1. America’s 250th. Expect to hear wildly diverging accounts of America’s past, present and future, as Republicans and Democrats describe the same country in irreconcilably different terms to mark the 250th anniversary of its founding. Voters will then give their verdict on America’s future in the midterm elections in November. But even if the Democrats take the House, Mr Trump’s rule by bullying, tariffs and executive orders will go on. 2. Geopolitical drift. Foreign-policy analysts are divided: is the world in a new cold war, between blocs led by America and China, or will a Trumpian deal divide the planet into American, Russian and Chinese “spheres of influence”, in which each can do as they please? Don’t count on either. Mr Trump prefers a transactional approach based on instinct, not grand geopolitical paradigms. The old global rules-based order will drift and decay further. But “coalitions of the willing” will strike new deals in areas such as defence, trade and climate. 3. War or peace? Yes. With luck, the fragile peace in Gaza will hold. But conflicts will grind on in Ukraine, Sudan and Myanmar. Russia and China will test America’s commitment to its allies with “grey-zone” provocations in northern Europe and the South China Sea. As the line between war and peace becomes ever more blurred, tensions will rise in the Arctic, in orbit, on the sea floor and in cyberspace. 4. Problems for Europe. All this poses a particular test for Europe. It must increase defence spending, keep America on side, boost economic growth and deal with huge deficits, even though austerity risks stoking support for hard-right parties. It also wants to remain a leading advocate for free trade and greenery. It cannot do all of these at once. A splurge on defence spending may lift growth, but only slightly. 5. China’s opportunity. China has its own problems, with deflation, slowing growth and an industrial glut, but Mr Trump’s “America First” policy opens up new opportunities for China to boost its global influence. It will present itself as a more reliable partner, particularly in the global south, where it is striking a string of trade agreements. It is happy to do tactical deals with Mr Trump on soyabeans or chips. The trick will be to keep relations with America transactional, not confrontational. With rich countries living beyond their means, the risk of a bond-market crisis is growing 6. Economic worries. So far America’s economy is proving more resilient than many expected to Mr Trump’s tariffs, but they will dampen global growth. And with rich countries** living beyond their means**, the risk of a bond-market crisis is growing. Much will depend on the replacement of Jerome Powell as chair of the Federal Reserve in May; politicising the Fed could trigger a market showdown. 7. Concerns over AI. Rampant spending on infrastructure for artificial intelligence may also be concealing economic weakness in America. Will the bubble burst? As with railways, electricity and the internet, a crash would not mean that the technology does not have real value. But it could have wide economic impact. Either way, concern about AI’s impact on jobs, particularly those of graduates, will deepen. 8. A mixed climate picture. Limiting warming to 1.5°C is off the table, and Mr Trump hates renewables. But global emissions have probably peaked, clean tech is booming across the global south and firms will meet or exceed their climate targets—but will keep quiet about it to avoid Mr Trump’s ire. Geothermal energy is worth watching. 9. Sporting values. Sport can always be relied upon to provide a break from politics, right? Well, maybe not in 2026. The football World Cup is being jointly hosted by America, Canada and Mexico, whose relations are strained. Fans may stay away. But the Enhanced Games, in Las Vegas, may be even more controversial: athletes can use performance-enhancing drugs. Is it cheating—or just different? 10. Ozempic, but better. Better, cheaper GLP-1 weight-loss drugs are coming, and in pill form, too. That will expand access. But is taking them cheating? GLP-1s extend the debate about the ethics of performance-enhancing drugs to a far wider group than athletes or bodybuilders. Few people compete in the Olympics. But anyone can take part in the Ozempic games. Wherever you stand on performance-enhancing drugs, I hope you will find The World Ahead 2026 to be a valuable and effective supplement to your media diet, boosting clarity and foresight. 2025 年 11 月 10 日｜4 分鐘閱讀 作者：Tom Standage，《The World Ahead 2026》主編 這是唐納・川普的世界——我們都只是生活在其中而已。這位「破壞式領導人」在 2025 年對全球局勢造成的影響最大，只要他仍在白宮，情況就會如此。他打破慣例的作風在某些領域帶來動盪（如貿易），卻也在其他地方取得外交成果（如加薩），並迫使一些必要的改變（例如歐洲的國防支出）。隨著「川普龍捲風」在 2026 年持續旋轉，以下是明年值得關注的十大趨勢與主題。 1. 美國 250 週年。 你將會聽到共和黨與民主黨對於美國過去、現在與未來截然不同的敘述，幾乎無法調和，以紀念建國 250 週年。選民會在十一月的期中選舉中對美國的未來作出裁決。但即使民主黨奪回眾議院，川普透過施壓、關稅與行政命令的治理方式仍將持續。 2. 地緣政治漂移。 外交政策分析人士意見分歧：世界是否正步入由美國與中國主導的新冷戰，或是會被川普式交易切割成美國、俄羅斯與中國各自為政的「勢力範圍」？兩者都別太指望。川普偏好憑直覺、以交易為導向的方式，而非宏大的地緣政治框架。舊有的全球規則秩序將進一步漂移與衰退，但「志願者聯盟」會在國防、貿易、氣候等領域達成新協議。 3. 戰爭或和平？答案是：兩者皆是。 運氣好的話，加薩脆弱的和平會維持下去。但烏克蘭、蘇丹與緬甸的衝突將持續。俄羅斯與中國會透過「灰色地帶」挑釁來測試美國對盟友的承諾，包括北歐與南海。隨著戰爭與和平的界線愈加模糊，北極、太空軌道、海底與網路空間的緊張局勢會升溫。 4. 歐洲的難題。 上述情勢對歐洲特別是考驗。歐洲必須增加國防預算、維持與美國的關係、提升經濟成長並處理龐大赤字，但緊縮政策又可能推升極右派的支持度。歐洲同時想維持自由貿易與綠色政策的倡導者角色，但不可能一次做到所有事。大幅提升國防開支也許能提振成長，但幅度有限。 5. 中國的機會。 中國面臨通縮、增速放緩與產能過剩等問題，但川普「美國優先」的政策為中國拓展全球影響力帶來新契機。中國將自我定位為更可靠的合作夥伴，尤其是在全球南方，並積極簽署一系列貿易協定。中國樂於與川普在黃豆或晶片等個別議題上做戰術性交易。關鍵在於保持雙邊關係以交易為主，而非走向對抗。 6. 經濟憂慮。 到目前為止，美國經濟面對川普關稅的韌性比許多人預想的更高，但這些關稅終究會拖累全球成長。另外，隨著富裕國家透支生活，債券市場危機的風險正在上升。五月美聯儲主席鮑威爾的接任者將備受關注；若將聯準會政治化，可能引發市場對決。 7. AI 的隱憂。 人工智慧基礎設施的瘋狂投資，可能掩蓋了美國經濟的潛在疲弱。泡沫會破嗎？就像鐵路、電力與網際網路一樣，就算泡沫破裂，也不代表這項科技沒有真正的價值。但它可能帶來廣泛的經濟衝擊。不論如何，大眾對 AI 取代工作、特別是大學生工作的憂慮，將加深。 8. 氣候的複雜局面。 將升溫控制在 1.5°C 已不可能，而川普厭惡再生能源。但全球排放量可能已經見頂，綠色科技在全球南方蓬勃發展，企業也將達成甚至超越其氣候目標——但會低調行事，以避免惹怒川普。地熱能源值得關注。 9. 運動與價值衝突。 運動向來是逃離政治的途徑，不是嗎？2026 年未必如此。足球世界盃由美國、加拿大、墨西哥共同主辦，而三國關係緊張；球迷可能減少前往。但在拉斯維加斯舉辦的「增強運動會」（Enhanced Games）可能更具爭議：選手可以使用提升表現的藥物。這是作弊，還是另一種競賽方式？ 10. 更好的 Ozempic。 更有效、價格更低的 GLP-1 類減重藥物即將問世，還會推出口服版本，讓更多人能使用。但使用這些藥算作弊嗎？GLP-1 讓提升表現藥物的倫理辯論擴大到遠超過運動員或健美者。能參加奧運的人很少，但「Ozempic 競賽」人人都能參加。 無論你對提升表現藥物的看法如何，我希望《The World Ahead 2026》能成為你媒體飲食裡一種有價值且有效的補充品，提升你的清晰度與前瞻視野。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The hidden risks in Taiwan’s boom A weak-currency policy is punishing consumers and storing up financial risk Taiwan is ENVIED for its exporting prowess: it is home to all of the world’s cutting-edge chipmaking. Just as extraordinary, but much less appreciated, is its towering current-account surplus, the result not just of a trade boom but of a long-undervalued currency. This aided Taiwan’s export-led rise, but it has long outlived its purpose. While manufacturers have been coddled, ordinary Taiwanese consumers have been deprived of the fruits of growth, and financial risks are building up. It is time for Taiwan to loosen its grip on its currency. Taiwan’s vast surpluses have been years in the making. For decades its central bank, known as the cbc, has kept the currency undervalued, giving manufacturing exporters a competitive boost. According to the GDP-adjusted Big Mac index, our measure of how far exchange rates depart from their underlying values, the Taiwan dollar is 55% undervalued against the American dollar—the most in the world. As a consequence, in this century Taiwan has run the world’s biggest current-account surplus as a share of output, once entrepots and petrostates are excluded. And lately, thanks to the artificial-intelligence boom, Taiwan’s imbalances have gone into overdrive. In October its goods-trade surplus hit a record high of 31% of GDP in annualised terms—a quadrupling since the pandemic. According to the latest data for this year, Taiwan’s current-account surplus has reached 16% of gdp. By comparison, China, the archetypal **surplus **economy, is running a current-account surplus of just 3%. The problem with all this is that the cheap currency has become a costly and dangerous anachronism. For a start, it no longer delivers the benefits it once did. Taiwan is no longer an industrialising economy; its annual GDP per person now exceeds that of Japan. Its stock of foreign reserves, at $600bn, is large enough to cushion the impact of a Chinese blockade or a financial crisis. And the best of Taiwan’s chip- and computer-makers, which are responsible for three-quarters of total exports and nearly half of nominal GDP, can shrug off a stronger currency. A 20% appreciation in the Taiwan dollar would knock perhaps eight percentage points off the operating margins of TSMC, the world’s leading chipmaker—still leaving them plumper than Alphabet’s or Apple’s. At the same time, the costs and distortions of having an undervalued currency are mounting. First, it is a tax on consumers. In an economy that depends on imports for food, fuel and goods, the cheap currency has shifted purchasing power from ordinary households to exporters. The result has been that even by export-economy standards, Taiwan saves too much and consumes too little. Since 1998 private consumption as a share of output has tumbled by 20 percentage points. A policy that was meant to help Taiwan get rich is now depriving ordinary Taiwanese. Another distortion is that the cheap currency is inflating property prices. Printing currency to buy foreign exchange has flooded Taiwan’s financial system with liquidity and pushed down interest rates. That combination lies behind a quadrupling of house prices since 1998. And the weak-currency policy has seeded risk deep in the heart of Taiwan’s financial system—a third** distortion.** To recycle the proceeds of its surpluses Taiwan has leant on its life-insurance industry, which has poured nearly $1trn of households’ savings largely into American Treasuries. But that has created a giant currency mismatch, because Taiwan-dollar liabilities are being funded with American-dollar assets. An abrupt move in either currency could wipe out the insurers, threatening a financial crisis. Why, then, has the policy persisted? One reason is the export lobby. Taiwan’s chipmakers could withstand a stronger currency, but existing policy has propped up a cohort of manufacturers that subsist on thin margins and would be severely hurt by an appreciation. Such firms make up perhaps 70% of manufacturing employment. Another reason is the CBC’s unusual power. Printing Taiwan dollars to hoover up foreign-currency assets has minted handsome profits, which are remitted to the government and have become a big source of revenue. Central-bank transfers make up 6% of total government receipts, compared with a rich-world average of 0.4%. This bolsters the CBC’s political authority, allowing its powerful governor to cow critics into submission (something the CBC denies). The situation is becoming increasingly precarious. One risk is that further depreciation in the American dollar destabilises Taiwan’s life insurers, which have become too big to fail. A second danger is that American trade-surplus hawks take flight again, using tariffs and their security leverage to force Taiwan to revalue. That could happen at any time: unlike South Korea, Japan or China, Taiwan has yet to clinch a trade deal with Donald Trump. Fears of such a clash after “Liberation Day” were enough to spark an abrupt 9% appreciation of the currency against the greenback in May. That is why Taiwan must unpick its outdated economic model—and build a better one. The CBC should gradually loosen its grip on the currency. Inevitably, the transition will be fraught with political and financial risks. Manufacturers kept on life-support by Taiwan’s export subsidy will have to scale back or shut down. Too rapid an appreciation could blow up the life-insurance industry. But these risks can be managed. Taipei 101 Taiwan’s government, with gross debt of just 23% of GDP, has room to help retrain laid-off workers. Insurers will suffer losses, but can manage the transition if they are given time. The CBC also has a crucial advantage: gently strengthening a currency is easier than doing the opposite, as Javier Milei is discovering in Argentina. The cbc can always print Taiwan dollars to fend off speculators pre-empting a stronger currency. The key is for the cbc to establish a long-term path for the currency, as Singapore does. China, too, has managed a modest yuan appreciation in recent decades. And in return, ordinary Taiwanese will at last be able to enjoy more of the fruits of their country’s** extraordinary export miracle**. ■ 台灣繁榮背後的隱藏風險 ** 疲弱匯率政策正在懲罰消費者並累積金融風險** 台灣因其出口實力而備受稱羨：它掌握了全球所有最先進的晶片製造技術。同樣非凡但較不被注意的，是其龐大的經常帳順差，這不僅源自貿易熱潮，也歸因於長期被低估的貨幣。這種政策曾助長台灣的出口導向成長，但如今早已不合時宜。製造業者雖受庇護，普通台灣消費者卻被剝奪了成長的果實，而金融風險也正在累積。台灣應是時候放鬆對匯率的控制。 台灣龐大的順差已經累積多年。數十年來，其中央銀行（央行）刻意維持貨幣低估，讓製造業出口商享有競爭優勢。依據經濟學人利用 GDP 調整的巨無霸指數（衡量匯率偏離其基本價值的程度），新台幣相對美元被低估達 55%——為全球最高。 因此，本世紀以來，在剔除轉口國與產油國後，台灣的經常帳順差占 GDP 比重為全球之最。近來拜人工智慧熱潮所賜，台灣的不平衡更達到極致。今年 10 月，其貨物貿易順差在年化計算下達 GDP 的 31%，創下歷史新高——是疫情前的四倍。依據最新資料，今年台灣的經常帳順差達到 GDP 的 16%。相比之下，被視為順差典型國的中國，經常帳順差僅為 3%。 問題在於，這種便宜的匯率已成為昂貴且危險的時代錯誤。首先，它已不再帶來過去的好處。台灣不再是工業化初期的國家；其人均 GDP 已高於日本。其外匯存底高達 6000 億美元，足以緩衝中國封鎖或金融危機的衝擊。而台灣頂尖的晶片與電腦製造商——負責三分之二的出口及近一半的名目 GDP——完全有能力承受較強的匯率。即便新台幣升值 20%，對全球領先的台積電而言，營業利益率或許只會減少約八個百分點，仍將高於 Alphabet 或 Apple 的水準。 同時，低估匯率所造成的成本與扭曲正不斷升高。首先，這相當於對消費者課稅。在高度依賴進口食物、能源與商品的經濟體中，便宜匯率將購買力從家庭移轉至出口商。結果是，即使以出口導向國家來看，台灣的儲蓄仍過高而消費過低。自 1998 年以來，民間消費占 GDP 比重下降了 20 個百分點。這項原本要協助台灣致富的政策，如今反而剝奪了一般民眾的福祉。 另一項扭曲是房價飆漲。為買進外匯而印製新台幣，使台灣金融體系充斥流動性並壓低利率。這個組合促成自 1998 年以來房價的四倍成長。同時，疲弱匯率政策也在台灣金融體系核心埋下風險——第三項扭曲。為了消化龐大的順差，台灣依賴壽險業者，他們將近 1 兆美元的家庭儲蓄主要投入美國公債。然而，這造成巨大的貨幣錯配，因為新台幣負債由美元資產支撐。一旦匯率劇烈變動，可能使保險公司遭受重創，甚至引發金融危機。 那麼，為何此政策仍持續？其一是出口利益集團。晶片製造商雖可承受更強的新台幣，但既有政策卻支撐著一群依賴微薄利潤的製造商，這些企業在升值下將遭受重擊。此類公司約占製造業就業的 70%。另一原因是央行的特殊權力。為購入外匯而印鈔，使央行獲得可觀收益，並繳回政府，成為重要財源。央行移轉收入占政府總收入的 6%，遠高於富裕國家平均的 0.4%。這增強了央行的政治影響力，使其強勢總裁得以壓制批評者（央行否認此說）。 情勢正變得愈發危險。一項風險是美元若進一步走弱，台灣壽險業可能動搖，而它們已經「大到不能倒」。另一個風險是美國再度出現打擊貿易順差的鷹派，利用關稅及安全槓桿逼迫台灣升值。這情況可能隨時發生：與南韓、日本或中國不同，台灣至今仍未與特朗普達成貿易協議。今年「解放日」之後，人們對此可能性的擔憂，便引發新台幣在 5 月對美元突然升值 9%。 因此，台灣必須拆解其過時的經濟模式，並打造更健全的體系。央行應逐步放鬆對匯率的控制。不可避免地，這段過程將伴隨政治與金融風險。那些靠出口補貼維生的製造商將不得不縮編或關閉。升值過快則可能引爆壽險業。但這些風險皆可管理。 台灣政府的優勢在於，其公共債務僅占 GDP 的 23%，有能力協助受影響的勞工再培訓。保險公司雖將承受損失，但若給予時間，仍能完成調整。央行也握有一項關鍵優勢：溫和升值比反向操作容易得多，正如阿根廷的米雷伊（Javier Milei）所體會的。央行隨時可以印鈔，阻止投機者提前押注升值。 關鍵在於，央行應比照新加坡，制定明確的長期匯率路徑。中國過去數十年也曾成功推動人民幣溫和升值。作為回報，普通台灣人終於能享受到其國家驚人成就的更多果實。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

All over the rich world, fewer people are hooking up and shacking up Social media, dating apps and political polarisation all play a part Nov 6th 2025|New York and Singapore|14 min read “I don’t date conservative or moderate men,” says Nancy Anteby, a 30-year-old New Yorker who works in social media. “I only date** liberal **men.” Politics is not her only concern. She is also looking for someone ambitious, with a stable career, who is Jewish and, perhaps most important, shares her desire to start a family. Finding dates who tick all of these boxes is not easy. “Very often a man will disappoint you,” she laments. Then again, she recently realised, “I don’t need to rely on a man to have the life that I dream of.” Ms Anteby is far from unusual. Across America 41% of women and 50% of men in her age band (25-34) were single in 2023, a share that has doubled over the past five decades. Nor is America exceptional in this regard. Between 2010 and 2022 the share of people living alone (an admittedly imperfect measure of singlehood, but one for which data are more widely available) rose in 26 of the 30 members of the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. Marriage rates are falling across much of Asia, including in China and India and especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. And singlehood is accelerating across different age cohorts. In Europe each new generation is less likely to be married or living with a partner than previous ones at the same age (see chart). This relationship recession is hitting not just those wanting to marry or move in with a steady partner, but also those looking for a date or casual sex. Younger people are socialising less, dating less and starting to have sex later in life than previous generations. They are also having less sex in general (as, alas, are most of us). Michael Rosenfeld, a sociologist at Stanford University, has found that the reduction in dating owing to the covid-19 pandemic produced 13.7m more singles in America in 2022 than if the singlehood rate (conservatively defined) had stayed at the level of 2017. To generate an estimate of the global increase in plus-nones, The Economist extrapolated from his data, while also taking into account sharp falls in marriage rates in a number of Asian countries, which predate the pandemic. We calculate that over the past decade such effects have swollen the ranks of single people around the world by at least 100m. Two’s a crowd Dating, sex, marriage and divorce are all intensely personal choices, and their effects are felt most directly by those making them. The fact that more people feel able to choose to be single now than in the past, when there was far greater social and economic pressure to marry, could be considered one of the great emancipations of the past half century. Untold numbers have been liberated from unhappy unions. But not all those who remain single have chosen to do so. A study of singles in 14 countries found that only 40% said they were “not interested in being in a relationship”. A smaller survey of single Americans by the Pew Research Centre in 2019 did find that 50% were not interested in dating. Yet only 27% said they were not dating because they enjoyed being single. The rest gave reasons including being too busy, too old, or because no one would want to date them. No less than 34% of singles in the 14-country study said they did not want to be alone but found it “difficult to attract a mate”, with 26% describing themselves as “between relationships”. In short, there are growing numbers of lonely hearts, pining for a partner but unable to secure one. Don’t want a ring on it There is an alarming mismatch in this regard between women and men. In the Pew survey, 62% of single women did not want to date, whereas only 37% of single men felt the same way. America and South Korea, among other countries, have big, vocal movements of young men who feel they have been unfairly deprived of romantic opportunities. All over the world, a high proportion of unmarried young men is strongly associated with elevated levels of violence and crime. Even relatively small shifts in coupling rates, when multiplied across a whole population, can have far-reaching effects on society as a whole. The biggest impact will be on fertility rates, since married women tend to have more children than single ones. This will be especially marked in East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, where only 2-4% of babies are born to unmarried mothers. All the world over, however, the rise of singlehood will be a further drag on already slowing birth rates. The effects will also be felt in property markets (more demand for housing, since more people will be living alone) and government finances (less public spending on maternity wards and schools and, in time, more on care homes). The fact that a large proportion of single people would rather be in a relationship (whether they are still looking for one or have given up hope) suggests that either there is some sort of dating-market failure that is preventing compatible people from finding one another, or that society is changing in ways that are making large numbers of singles incompatible. In practice, it seems to be a bit of both. In Asia, where singlehood is growing fastest, a mix of structural and cultural changes is increasing incompatibility. Start with demography. China’s one-child policy has created a huge imbalance in the ratio of men to women. When it comes to those of peak marriageable age, the country will have 119 men for every 100 women by 2027. In all, there may be 30m-50m “excess men” in China, reckons Xiaoling Shu of the University of California, Davis. Singlehood in China, like most places, is not evenly distributed. Instead, it is disproportionately concentrated among men who are poorer and poorly educated, and thus less attractive as mates, and among highly educated women (of which more later). China’s one-child policy makes it an outlier, but heterosexual men in other countries with a strong cultural preference for sons will also struggle to find partners. Sex-selective abortions resulted in 111 boys being born in India in 2011 for every 100 girls, according to census data. The natural ratio is about 105. Although the distortion has since become less extreme, we calculate that around 20m more boys than girls were born in India in 2000-15. Improved opportunities for women to go to university and enter the workplace are also fuelling the growth in singlehood in East Asia, argues Wei-Jun Jean Yeung of the National University of Singapore. As women gain financial independence, they no longer need a husband to support them. They also have more to lose by getting married. “There’s still a culture of patriarchy in Asia where women carry most of the responsibilities of caring for children and domestic housework,” says Dr Yeung. “The opportunity cost of getting married may be high: women think that if they get married they may have to give up working to take care of their in-laws, parents and children, plus do housework.” One result of this is that well-educated women are also disproportionately likely to be single in a number of Asian countries. “The best-educated, urban, college-educated women are becoming more egalitarian in their gender attitudes,” says Dr Shu of women in China. “Many college-educated men are hostile towards feminist ideas or even feminists…[they] think these women are hurting their prospects and interests at a personal level.” In South Korea the gap between women’s opportunities and men’s sexist expectations is particularly wide. Around half of young Korean men think they are discriminated against (other than having to do military service, they are not). Some 60% complain that feminism demeans them. They also tend to be terrible slouches when it comes to housework. Little wonder, then, that ambitious young women are far less keen on marriage than they are. A similar pattern of singlehood pertains in America and Europe, despite their less ingrained gender roles. Until roughly the middle of the 20th century, far more men went to university than women. As a result there were far more couples in which the man was better educated than the other way round. More recently, however, women have surpassed men in studiousness. Across the OECD on average 51% of women aged 25-34 had a university degree in 2019, compared with 39% of men. That makes the old pattern impossible to sustain. “Highly educated women who still want to marry up won’t find enough candidates,” says Albert Esteve, the director of the Centre for Demographic Studies in Barcelona. “So the question is, are they going to start marrying down?” If mathematics were the only driving force, rather than cultural norms, there would have been a big rise in the share of couples where the woman is better educated. Yet the expectation that women should marry up is hard to dispel. Researchers in Germany, for example, found that highly educated women over the age of 30 were more likely to remain single than settle for a man with less education. There is some evidence that more women are beginning to marry down in terms of education, but it is not happening to nearly the degree that might have been expected. What is more, Mr Esteve has found that educated women are “picking the best non-educated men” by coupling with those who earn more than they do. In effect, they are simply switching from one form of marrying up to another. Educated women’s hesitance to marry down is not wholly irrational. In a number of countries, men are not adapting well to changing times. In Australia, for example, those who earn less than their female partners are more likely to beat or berate them. But people can change. A study in America found that marriages where the woman is better educated than the man were more likely to break down among older cohorts, but not among younger ones. Changes in relative levels of education explain some of the increase in singlehood in Western countries, but not all of it. Another part of the explanation lies in technology, and the huge shifts it has brought in how people meet their mates. For about 60 years after the end of the second world war, the most common way that heterosexual couples met was through friends, according to a study published in 2019 by Mr Rosenfeld and colleagues. But after the introduction of smartphones in the late 2000s, the proportion who met online surged. In 2013 that became the most common way for couples to get together. Yet online dating is fundamentally different from the old-fashioned sort. When looking for a date, Kristian Del Rosario, a 27-year-old lawyer who lives in New York City, is able to winnow down matches on Hinge, a popular app, using all manner of criteria. She looks at a man’s age (no more than six years older than her, but “beggars can’t be choosers”), job, religion, political views, whether they smoke marijuana (“I cross them off”) and how tall they are, which is important to her. “I’m five-six and I’ve literally had men who were like five-five, who tried to match with me,” she says. “Well, that’s definitely not happening.” People have always been finicky when choosing a long-term mate, at least when sober. But social media and online dating have turbo-charged pickiness, allowing people to filter candidates not just for the sorts of things that have always been important (age, religion, ethnicity and education), but also for all sorts of other attributes, such as their political views or narcotic preferences, not to mention their height and weight. One consequence is that many people now lie: researchers in Germany found that online daters claim to be a little taller and a little less overweight than the average person. Another is that many struggle to find dates. Reporting in the Wall Street Journal suggests that most women on Bumble, an online dating app, screen out all men who are less than six feet tall. That rules out about 85% of men at a stroke. To be sure, women have long tended to prefer taller men—but not to such an extreme. Most young British women say that kindness, honesty and a sense of humour are far more important in a partner than looks, according to polling by Ipsos. So why do so many online daters write off all kind, honest, funny men of average height? Part of the answer is found in online and social-media cultures that promote unrealistic ideals. In the “manosphere”, online communities united by the idea that men are oppressed, young “incels” (involuntarily celibate men) complain that women are selfish and manipulative for not sleeping with them. Misogynistic social-media influencers such as Andrew Tate advise them to become hyper-masculine and to dominate women. Women have their own (less nasty) version of this echo chamber. Some vet potential dates on private social-media forums where others post the names and pictures of men they say have cheated on them or are abusive. That may help make dating safer, but some women use them simply to complain about bad dates or men who spurned them. This can be off-putting for the 41% of women who say they often come across videos or social-media posts in which women share negative dating experiences. It is also daunting for men, who are afraid of asking women out in case they are publicly shamed, says Daniel Cox of the Survey Centre on American Life, part of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank. Some social-media personalities with big followings create unrealistic expectations about courtship, says Sabrina Zohar, a dating coach based in Los Angeles with 1.3m followers on TikTok. She charges clients $9,999 for a three-month membership, during which she feels obliged to spell out such basic principles as, “If somebody doesn’t text you every day, it doesn’t mean that they don’t like you.” Unrealistic expectations are probably as old as dating and relationships, but a generation of young people who have grown up with personalised music playlists and online entertainment may be less willing to set their preferences aside. “You can filter your news feeds, right? You can curate your online life,” says Mr Cox. “How easy is it to do that when you’re thinking about prospective relationships?” That also extends to ideology. As men have drifted to the right and women have become more liberal in America and parts of Europe, politics is getting in the way of pillow-talk, he says. Wedded to devices New technology not only fosters pickiness about whom to date, it also absorbs a lot of time, leaving less for socialising and group activities—tried-and-tested ways of meeting partners. In America the amount of time 15-to-24-year-olds spend hanging out face-to-face has fallen by more than a quarter over the past decade, whereas the amount of time spent gaming has increased by about half (and nearly doubled for young men). Time spent streaming, surfing or gaming even seems to be displacing sex. Almost everywhere in the rich world people are having sex less often than before, and many more are having none at all. Brits aged 18-44, for instance, have gone from copulating five times a month in 1990 to twice a month in 2021, notes Soazig Clifton of University College London. Researchers have posited, variously, that this is because they are too busy, more stressed, are watching porn instead, or are simply distracted by Netflix. As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes more adept, growing numbers of people are turning to it, rather than humans, for intimate relationships. People who spend their late teens and 20s watching television, playing computer games or chatting with AIs may be reducing their chances of ever finding a mate, since they are missing their best chance to hone their dating skills and learn how to weather the ups and downs of relationships. “Dating is really not like riding a bike,” says Mr Rosenfeld. “You need constant practice to be good at it and if you are out of practice for a while, it’s harder.” In other words, singlehood, which is already reshaping Western society, is likely to keep growing for some time to come, with all the consequences—good and bad—that it entails. At some point it will surely plateau, but it shows no signs of doing so yet. Until recently, demographers had thought that, once men’s attitudes caught up with women’s emancipation, a new equilibrium would be reached. “Men would do a bit of cleaning and housework to be attractive, and happy families would be produced again,” says Mr Esteve. Yet even in egalitarian Scandinavia, he notes, “regardless of how beautiful are the men”, marriage and fertility rates are still falling. “Why is this happening?” he asks. It is the 100m plus-nones question. ■ 全世界富裕國家中，越來越多人不交往、不同居 社群媒體、交友軟體與政治對立，都扮演了重要角色 2025 年 11 月 6 日｜紐約、新加坡｜閱讀時間 14 分鐘 「我不跟保守派或中間派男性約會。」30 歲、在紐約從事社群媒體工作的南希·安特比（Nancy Anteby）這麼說。「我只跟自由派的男人約會。」 她的條件不只政治立場。她希望對方有上進心、穩定工作、是猶太人，最重要的是，願意和她一起組家庭。要找到符合這些條件的人並不容易。「很多時候男人會讓你失望。」她感嘆。但她最近也發現：「就算沒有男人，我也能過上自己想要的生活。」 安特比並不特別。美國 25～34 歲的人中，2023 年有 41% 的女性與 50% 的男性是單身，這比例在五十年間幾乎翻倍。 這現象也不只出現在美國。2010～2022 年間，在 OECD 30 個主要富裕國家中，有 26 國的獨居人口增加。亞洲的結婚率也大幅下降，包括中國、印度，尤其是日本、韓國與台灣。 不只追求婚姻或同居的人受到影響，連只是想談戀愛或尋求性關係的人也愈來愈少。年輕人社交變少、約會變少、開始發生性行為的年齡更晚，整體行為次數也都大幅下降。 史丹佛大學社會學家羅森菲爾德（Michael Rosenfeld）發現，疫情造成的約會減少，使美國 2022 年約多出 1370 萬名單身者。 《經濟學人》根據此資料並考量多個亞洲國家婚姻率下降後推估，過去十年間，全球至少增加 1 億名單身者。 兩個人的世界，也可能變得擁擠 戀愛、性、婚姻與離婚都是個人選擇，影響最直接的是當事人。如今更多人能自由選擇單身，而非因社會壓力被迫結婚，這對許多人來說是一種解放。但並非所有單身者都「想」單身。對 14 國的研究顯示，只有 40% 的單身者說他們不想進入關係。 2019 年美國皮尤調查也發現，50% 的單身美國人不想約會；但真正因「喜歡單身」而不約會的只有 27%。其他人則是太忙、太老，或覺得沒人會想跟他們交往。 在 14 國研究中，有 34% 單身者表示不想孤單，但「難以吸引對象」；26% 說自己「正在兩段關係之間」。 總結來說，想要伴侶卻找不到的人越來越多。 男與女的期待差距正急速擴大 在皮尤研究中，62% 的單身女性不想約會，但同意的男性只有 37%。 一些國家（如美國、韓國）甚至出現一大群覺得自己被「剝奪戀愛機會」的男性團體。而全球統計顯示，未婚男性比例過高常與暴力與犯罪上升相關。即使是交往率的小變化，擴大到整個人口後，也會造成巨大影響。 其中最大效應是 生育率下降——已婚女性通常比單身女性更常生育。 對日本、韓國這種未婚生子極少（僅 2–4%）的國家影響更大。 此外，更多人獨居後，也會影響房市（更大量的小宅需求）、公共預算（托嬰與學校需求下降，但長照需求上升）。 許多想脫單的人之所以無法，是因為： 1. 交友市場失靈，讓適合的人找不到彼此 2. 社會變化加劇了人與人之間的不相容性 實際上，兩者同時發生。 亞洲：人口失衡與傳統文化，使單身潮更嚴重 首先是人口結構。中國的一胎化讓男女性比例嚴重失衡。到 2027 年，中國適婚年齡層中，每 100 名女性竟有 119 名男性。 整體而言，中國可能有 3000–5000 萬名「多餘的男人」——大多來自較貧困、教育程度較低的背景，不易找到配偶。 高度受教育的女性也更常保持單身。 印度也有類似情況。2011 年印度每 100 名女生出生就有 111 名男生。雖然情況略改善，2000–2015 年間仍多出生了約 2000 萬名男性，未來同樣會面臨婚配問題。同時，越來越多亞洲女性受高等教育並投入職場，經濟獨立後就不再需要靠婚姻生活。 但婚姻對女性的「代價」仍然很高： 她們常得承擔照顧公婆、父母與小孩的責任，外加大部分家務。 因此許多女性認為「結婚＝失去自由、職涯停滯」。 在中國、韓國等地，受高等教育的女性反而最不願結婚。 原因之一是：許多大學畢業男性仍抱持傳統、甚至反女權觀念，認為女性進步「損害」了他們的利益。 在韓國，情況更極端： · 一半年輕男性覺得自己被歧視 · 60% 認為女權主義貶低男性 · 男性在家務分擔上極度不均 難怪許多有抱負的女性更不願意結婚。 西方：教育、文化與科技，使配對更困難 在歐美，雖然性別角色較平等，但單身率也快速上升。 其中一個原因是教育。女性的受教育程度已全面超越男性。2019 年在 OECD，25–34 歲女性中 51% 有大學學歷，男性只有 39%。 傳統「男方學歷較高」的婚配模式因此無法維持。 理論上，女性應該開始願意「嫁給學歷較低但其他條件不錯的男人」。 然而研究發現，許多高學歷女性寧願保持單身，也不願降低標準。有些女性的確開始「學歷下嫁」，但比例遠比預期低。 而且即便如此，她們通常還是會選「收入比自己高的男性」——換句話說，從「學歷門當戶對」轉成「收入門當戶對」。 在一些國家，收入較低的男性對伴侶較容易有攻擊、貶低等行為，這也讓女性更猶豫。然而新研究顯示，年輕世代的「女高男低」婚姻，其實不一定比較容易破裂。 教育差異能解釋部分單身潮，但遠遠不是全部。 科技重塑了人們相遇的方式：更挑剔、更孤立 在二戰後的 60 年間，異性戀情侶最常透過朋友介紹而相識。但智慧型手機普及後，網路交友迅速崛起。 2013 年起，網路成為人們最主要的交友方式。 但網路交友跟傳統交往方式完全不同。 以 27 歲的紐約律師德爾羅薩里奧（Kristian Del Rosario）為例，她在 Hinge 上篩選對象的條件非常細：年齡、工作、宗教、政治立場、是否用大麻、身高…… 「我 5 呎 6（約 168 公分），很多 5 呎 5（165 公分）的男生想跟我配對——不可能。」 人們本來挑剔，但科技讓「挑剔」變成系統化。 不只基本條件，就連政治理念、使用什麼毒品、身高體重，都能瞬間排除。 許多人因此美化自己的個資，以免被刷掉。 有報導指出，Bumble 上大多數女性直接排除身高不足 6 呎（183 公分）的男性——一下就淘汰了約 85% 的男性。 雖然女性一向偏好高個子，但並沒有到這麼極端的地步。 同時，網路和社群文化也製造了不切實際的想像： · 男性圈子裡（manosphere）充斥抱怨女性不給機會的聲音 · 女性圈子裡則有私密社群公開「黑名單」 這些現象都讓人更害怕踏出第一步。 此外，花大量時間在滑手機、追劇、打遊戲，也大幅壓縮了社交和面對面互動的時間。 過去十年，美國 15–24 歲的面對面相處時間下降超過四分之一，遊戲時間則幾乎翻倍。 性行為頻率也在下降，某些人甚至轉向 AI 建立「親密關係」。 年輕時不練習社交與約會技能，未來要脫單的難度只會更高。 羅森菲爾德說：「約會不像騎腳踏車。你不練就會退步。」 單身潮短期內不會停止 單身正重新塑造西方社會，而且短期內看不出頂峰。 原本學者以為，隨著男性態度逐漸調整、與女性更平權後，會恢復平衡。 但即使在北歐等最平等的地方，婚姻與生育仍不斷下降。 這讓人口學家不禁問：「這到底是怎麼回事？」 答案，正是那個價值上百萬、遍布全球的—— 「1 億單身者」之謎。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Hong Kongers support gay marriage. Their leaders, not so much The city has rejected** reform** even as other places in Asia embrace it Nov 6th 2025|Hong Kong|3 min read In 2023 Hong Kong’s highest court ordered the city’s government to introduce rules offering a degree of legal recognition to unions between people of the same sex. That Hong Kong had no legal framework relating to civil partnerships, it argued, contravened freedoms enshrined in the city’s Bill of Rights. The justices ruled that this problem had to be remedied by the end of October 2025. That deadline has just come and gone—and with much less effect than campaigners had hoped. In September, as the deadline approached, Hong Kong’s executive asked lawmakers to vote on a bill that would have granted limited rights to gay couples who got married or entered into civil partnerships abroad. Yet the proposal was roundly rejected, with 71 of 87 lawmakers voting against it. The city’s government now says that it will protect same-sex partnerships using** “administrative measures”**. Hong Kongers are sceptical: “It’s difficult to see how a mere administrative framework can deal with the legal inequalities,” says Azan Marwah, a barrister. The handful of lawmakers who supported the bill argued that greater recognition of same-sex marriages would help reinforce Hong Kong’s claim to be an open and cosmopolitan world city. The dissenters pushed back; they argued that the bill could subvert “traditional values” and teach children that homosexuality is “normal”. Some have framed homosexuality as a Western import. “It is all misleading information that [the public have] been receiving,” says Donald, a gay man. “But unfortunately, we do not have a voice or a platform to let people know that these are all just lies.” Ordinary Hong Kongers are more supportive of gay rights than debates among their politicians might suggest. A survey in 2023 found that 60% of them support same-sex marriage, a big increase from only 38% a decade ago. Some of the city’s insurance companies have started to let gay people register partners on their life-insurance policies. The territory has hosted LGBT-friendly events such as the Gay Games, a sporting event, and Pink Dot, a festival similar to gay-pride gatherings in the West. Yet although most Hong Kongers are happy to know people from sexual minorities, says Priscilla, a trans woman, “if one of your family members is LGBT, this would be a disaster.” Civil-society groups that have worked to change perceptions and to stand up for the rights of sexual minorities have found it much harder to operate since China forced Hong Kong to pass a sweeping national-security law in 2020 (China’s Communist Party likes to promote “traditional” family values and is anyway deeply suspicious of any interest group that it cannot control). Activists say Hong Kong’s government has recently withdrawn financial support for LGBT-friendly events and rejected requests to hold them in public spaces. Nowadays politicians “look up north” to decide what policies to support, says Tim, a gay Hong Konger. “They don’t want to do anything progressive, because they don’t know what Beijing would think.” Many Asian countries stigmatise or even criminalise same-sex relationships. But things have been improving in parts of the continent: in January Thailand became the third Asian country to legalise same-sex marriage, after Taiwan and Nepal. All this amplifies frustration among Hong Kongers, who sense their lawmakers are growing less likely to take a similar step. Many LGBT people in the city think they are unlikely to see change within their lifetimes. But “you have to push with whatever freedom you have,” says Donald. “That is the only way we can get people to understand who we are, and accept us.” ■ 香港人支持同性婚姻，但領導人卻不太願意 城市拒絕改革，亞洲其他地方卻在前進 2025年11月6日｜香港｜閱讀時間約3分鐘 2023年，香港最高法院要求政府推出某種形式的法律，給予同性伴侶一定程度的法律承認。法官指出，香港完全沒有任何有關民事伴侶的法律制度，這違反了《香港人權法案》所保障的自由。法院裁定，政府必須在2025年10月底前解決這個問題。如今期限已經過了，但結果卻讓支持者非常失望。 隨著期限逼近，政府在9月提出一項法案，打算讓在海外結婚或登記民事伴侶的同性伴侶，在香港能獲得有限的權利。不過，這個提案被立法會以87票中的71票否決。政府現在表示，會用「行政措施」來保障同性伴侶。不過，香港人並不太相信這種說法。「很難想像光靠行政手段就能解決法律上的不平等，」大律師馬亞然（Azan Marwah）說。 支持法案的少數議員認為，更廣泛地承認同性婚姻，能夠加強香港作為一個開放、國際化城市的形象。但反對者則說，這會破壞「傳統價值」，甚至讓孩子以為同性戀是「正常的」。有些人還把同性戀說成是「西方輸入」的東西。「這些都是誤導性的資訊，」一名同性戀者唐納（Donald）說，「但可惜的是，我們沒有發聲的平台，讓大家知道這些其實都是謊言。」 事實上，普通香港人對同性戀的接受程度，比政客之間的辯論所顯示的要高得多。2023年的一項調查顯示，六成香港人支持同性婚姻，比十年前的38%大幅上升。部分保險公司也開始讓同性伴侶可以登記為受益人。香港也舉辦過多場LGBT友善活動，例如同志運動會（Gay Games）以及類似西方同志遊行的Pink Dot活動。 不過，跨性別女性Priscilla說：「雖然大家都說可以接受身邊有同志朋友，但如果家人其中一個是同志，那就變成災難了。」自從中國在2020年強迫香港通過《國安法》後，很多民間團體推動性小眾權益的活動變得困難許多。（中國共產黨強調「傳統家庭價值」，而且對任何它無法掌控的團體都非常警惕。） 有活動人士說，香港政府最近撤回對同志友善活動的資金支持，甚至拒絕讓他們在公共空間舉辦活動。同志人士Tim說：「現在的政客都『向北看』，他們不敢推動任何進步的政策，因為不知道北京會怎麼想。」 許多亞洲國家仍然歧視甚至刑罰同性戀關係，但部分地區情況已開始改善。今年1月，泰國成為繼台灣和尼泊爾之後第三個合法化同性婚姻的亞洲國家。這讓香港人更感到沮喪——因為他們的政府似乎越來越不可能跟上。 許多香港的同志覺得，在自己有生之年恐怕看不到真正的改變。不過，唐納說：「你還是要盡量去爭取，只要還有一點自由，就要繼續努力。因為這是唯一能讓人了解、接受我們的方式。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

What is Taiwan’s plan B? It is starting to hedge against the risk that America abandons it Oct 23rd 2025|Taipei|6 min read Officials in Taiwan were quietly optimistic when Donald Trump was re-elected. Among his advisers were several diehard China hawks determined that America stand by its vow to help Taiwan defend itself against any attack from the Chinese mainland. Taiwanese diplomats and military commanders also recalled Mr Trump’s first term, when he increased arms sales and official contacts with the island. Besides, Taiwan has a “silicon shield”: it is home to the world’s biggest producer of the semiconductors that are used by America’s AI industry. Less than a year later, Taiwan is confronting one of its deepest fears: what happens if America abandons it? Officially, American policy has not changed. But Mr Trump is preoccupied with negotiating a trade deal with China that could also encompass Taiwan. He hinted at that in May by suggesting that such a deal would be “great for unification and peace”. Although American officials later walked that back, Mr Trump jangled nerves in Taiwan again on October 19th by saying that he expected to discuss the island in a planned meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in South Korea at the end of October. And these are not the only shocks. Mr Trump has hit Taiwan with steeper trade tariffs than those he has imposed on Japan and South Korea; demanded that the island increase defence spending to 10% of GDP (from 2.5% last year); and asked TSMC, its chipmaking giant, to move much of its production to America. Other troubling signs include his putting off planned stopovers in America by Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, and failing to approve new arms sales to the island. Meanwhile, most of the China hawks have been purged from his administration, giving way to isolationist officials who want to secure the American homeland at all cost. And Chinese officials have been pressing long-standing demands for America to water down its commitment to Taiwan, possibly by explicitly opposing any move to declare formal independence. Taiwan’s government says its relationship with America remains strong. In recent weeks, however, Taiwanese officials have been scrambling to adjust their public messaging, private diplomacy, economic policy and defence planning in response to these developments. Their primary aim is to convince Mr Trump to sustain America’s commitment to Taiwan. But they are also starting to hedge against the risk that he makes a strategic “grand bargain” with Mr Xi at the island’s expense. The shift was evident in President Lai’s national-day address on October 10th. His remarks on mainland China were notably restrained. Since Mr Lai took office in 2024 he has made a series of public comments that have angered China and unnerved some American officials, including in last year’s national-day address. China has staged large military exercises in response, accusing Mr Lai of separatism and warning that he was “playing with fire”. This time, Mr Lai trod gingerly, apparently to avoid disrupting Mr Trump’s trade talks. Another contrast with last year’s address was Mr Lai’s pledge to boost defence spending. He vowed to increase it to more than 3% of GDP in 2026 and to 5% by 2030. He also unveiled plans to build an air-defence system called “T-Dome” over Taiwan. And he pledged to supplement regular defence spending with a “special defence budget” later this year. Although that may struggle to get through parliament, officials say it could be worth as much as $33bn and that a lot of it could be spent on American weapons. Those plans are part of an effort to convince Mr Trump that Taiwan is investing in its own defence. And the way they were presented reflects a recognition that previous lobbying in America was too geared towards China hawks whose influence is fading. Even the branding of “T-Dome” was meant to get Mr Trump’s attention by encouraging comparisons to his “Golden Dome” missile-defence system. Mr Lai also took the unusual step of appearing on a popular American right-wing radio show on October 7th. Not only did he tout his defence plans: he said Mr Trump should win a Nobel peace prize if he got Mr Xi to abandon the use of force against Taiwan. Shortly afterwards, Mr Lai met Matt Schlapp, a right-wing American political activist (Taiwan’s top military think-tank had invited him to visit Taipei). While this charm offensive plays out, Mr Lai has been quietly** boosting defence ties with partners other than America**. In his national-day address he said his government would “collaborate with the military industries of advanced nations”. Taiwanese officials are reluctant to be more specific, citing the risk that China penalises countries involved. But the focus is on drones and such “asymmetric” capabilities. And the outreach appears to have focused on Europe of late, as countries there increase their own defence spending in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. European governments and companies were somewhat better represented than usual at Taiwan’s biggest defence show in September. Germany’s trade office in Taipei took part for the first time; it set up a pavilion showcasing four German firms. Airbus turned up, too; it showed off a tactical aerial drone. In Poland that same month, a Taiwanese defence-industry delegation agreed with Polish and Ukrainian counterparts to co-operate in manufacturing aerial drones. European and other non-American partners are unlikely to provide Taiwan with big-ticket weapons, given the risk of Chinese recriminations. But there is scope for discreet co-operation between defence companies. Taiwan is an alternative supplier of high-tech electronic components for countries trying to become less reliant on China, including in the defence sector, says Lai Chun-kuei of the Taiwanese government’s Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology. In exchange, Taiwan wants technology and expertise to help build its own capabilities. Some critics say all this is too little, too late. Even if Mr Trump and his supporters approve of Taiwan’s defence spending, they have deeper differences with the island’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party on issues such as gender, green energy and the death penalty, says Alexander Huang, a former envoy in Washington for the main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Mr Lai’s defence-spending plans could also face resistance between now and the island’s next presidential election in 2028. Cheng Li-wun, who was chosen as the KMT’s new leader on October 18th, is opposed to boosting the defence budget. Certainly none of these plans is sufficient to compensate should American security guarantees vanish. The hope in Taiwan, though, is not that it can find a substitute for America. It is that it can bolster its own capabilities just enough to keep Mr Xi convinced that the costs of an invasion, even if successful, outweigh the benefits. Without America, that may not be achievable. But there is no other good plan B. ■ 當美國拋棄台灣時：台灣的「B計畫」是什麼？ —— 台灣開始為「美國可能不再挺台」做準備 2025年10月23日｜台北｜約6分鐘閱讀 當川普再次當選美國總統時，台灣官員其實一開始還頗為樂觀。因為他的顧問團隊裡有幾位堅定的「反中鷹派」，主張美國應履行承諾，協助台灣抵禦來自中國大陸的攻擊。許多台灣外交與軍方人士也記得川普第一任期時，他曾增加對台軍售與官方往來。此外，台灣擁有所謂的「矽盾」—— 全世界最大半導體製造商就設在台灣，而美國的人工智慧產業仰賴這些晶片。 但不到一年，台灣便面臨最深的恐懼：如果美國真的拋棄台灣，該怎麼辦？ 表面上，美國的對台政策並未改變，但川普如今正全力推動與中國的貿易協議，而台灣問題似乎也在其中。他今年5月曾暗示，這樣的協議「有助於統一與和平」。雖然美國官員事後急忙澄清，但10月19日，川普又表示他預計月底在南韓與習近平會面時，會「討論台灣問題」，再度讓台北神經緊繃。 而這並不是唯一的警訊。川普對台灣祭出的貿易關稅比日本、南韓更高；他要求台灣將國防預算從去年的GDP 2.5%一口氣提高到10%；還要求台積電把大部分生產線搬到美國。此外，他推遲了賴清德總統原訂的美國過境行程，也遲遲未批准新的對台軍售案。 更糟的是，川普政府中的多位「挺台鷹派」已被撤換，取而代之的是一群「美國優先」的孤立主義官員，強調要不惜一切保護美國本土安全。同時，中國方面也持續施壓，要求美方在對台立場上「鬆綁」，甚至希望美國明確表態反對台灣任何形式的「法理獨立」。 儘管台灣政府對外仍強調「台美關係堅若磐石」，但近來可以明顯看出，台北正加緊調整其公開發言、外交策略、經濟政策與國防布局，以因應新局。主要目的是想說服川普維持美國對台的安全承諾，同時也要為最壞的情況——川普與習近平達成「大交易」犧牲台灣——預做準備。 這樣的轉變在賴清德10月10日的國慶演說中尤為明顯。相較去年，他談論中國的語氣顯得格外克制。自2024年上任以來，賴清德曾多次發表讓北京不滿、讓部分美國官員不安的言論，去年國慶演說後更引來中國大規模軍演，指控他是「頑固的分裂分子」。但今年，他明顯收斂，顯然是為了避免干擾川普的對中談判。 與去年相比，賴清德也在演說中宣布要大幅提升國防預算。他承諾2026年將提高至GDP的3%以上，2030年達到5%。同時，他宣布啟動名為「T-Dome」的全島防空系統計畫，並將在年底提出特別國防預算，估計規模可達330億美元，主要用於購買美國武器。 這些舉措旨在向川普展示：台灣願意自我防衛、分擔責任。甚至「T-Dome」這個名稱，也刻意呼應川普任內的「黃金圓頂」（Golden Dome）飛彈防禦系統，好讓他印象深刻。 賴清德甚至在10月7日罕見地登上美國右翼廣播節目，強調台灣的防衛努力，並稱如果川普能讓習近平放棄武力犯台，「那他值得拿諾貝爾和平獎」。之後，他還會見了美國保守派政治人物馬特・施拉普（Matt Schlapp），這是由台灣國防智庫邀請他訪台。 在積極拉攏美方的同時，賴清德也悄悄強化與其他國家的防務合作。他在國慶演說中提到，台灣將「與先進國家的軍工產業合作」。台灣官員對細節三緘其口，以免引來中國報復，但外界普遍認為重點在於無人機與「非對稱作戰」能力，最近則特別著眼於歐洲。 歐洲國家因應俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，國防支出大幅增加，也讓台歐互動升溫。九月舉行的台灣國防展上，歐洲代表團規模明顯擴大。德國經濟辦事處首度設立展區，展示四家德國企業；空中巴士（Airbus）也到場展示戰術無人機。同月，在波蘭，台灣代表團與波蘭、烏克蘭的國防業者簽署合作協議，共同生產無人機。 雖然歐洲與其他非美國夥伴不太可能提供台灣大型武器，以免激怒北京，但雙方在軍工企業層面的低調合作仍有空間。台灣本身也能為歐洲提供高科技電子零件，幫助他們降低對中國的依賴；作為交換，台灣希望獲得技術與專業，強化自己的軍工實力。 然而，也有批評者認為這一切為時已晚。前駐美代表、現任國民黨要角黃介正指出，即使川普陣營欣賞台灣提升國防支出，他們在性別議題、綠能政策與死刑等價值觀上，與民進黨仍存在深刻分歧。新任國民黨主席鄭麗文（10月18日當選）也公開反對提高國防預算。 可以肯定的是，這些措施都不足以彌補若失去美國安全保障所造成的缺口。但台灣的希望並非要找到取代美國的選項，而是要讓中國相信：即便能攻下台灣，代價也將高到不值得。 若沒有美國的支持，這目標恐怕難以實現。 但除了這條路，台灣也沒有更好的「B計畫」。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Kim Seong Min risked everything to escape from North Korea The activist, poet and broadcaster died on September 12th, aged 63 Sep 25th 2025|5 min read He could not shake the shackle off. At the other end of it was a North Korean officer, who went with him everywhere. If Kim Seong Min as much as used the lavatory, the officer came along too. For three days they were yoked like this, hostile twins, while the train crept through northern North Korea. The punishment for his crime, leaving North Korea without permission as a captain in the army, was public execution. But he was hatching a plan. As the lavatory became ever filthier, the officer at last let him go by himself. Once in, jumping to swing on a ceiling beam, he kicked out the wood-frame window and tumbled after. The train was going at around 50 miles an hour, but he was lucky; he landed in the soft-turned soil of a sesame field. Then, his broken shackle still dangling, he ran away. It was his second escape. On his first, a well-tried route from Pyongyang to China by wading across the Yalu river, he had been picked up by the Chinese police, lightly tortured, handed to North Korean agents, tortured more and put on the train. After his jump, he was more successful. Undetected he got back to China, worked in a coal-briquette factory, managed to get counterfeit papers and three years later, in 1999, flew to South Korea as easily as any businessman. Yet his business was very different. It was to broadcast truth, by all means possible, back into his home country. His reasons for escaping from North Korea were both proximate—disciplinary trouble in his army unit, illegal letters to his uncle in China—and slower-growing. For all his boyhood and for most of his ten years of military service he was completely loyal to the Supreme Leaders, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il: singing the songs of gratitude, cursing his country’s enemies. He never made much of a soldier, because he wanted to be a poet; a fine poet, like his father. It was rare that he even put on a uniform; assigned as he was to the arts and propaganda unit in Camp 620, he sat writing most of the time.** On marches or when training he made up poems to help the tedious stuff along.** What began to bother him more were the leaflets. On some mornings, when he left his tent, the ground would be white with them, dropped from South Korean planes. They described how much food there was in South Korea, and how high car production was. He also had a radio, illegally tinkered with, that could pick up South Korean signals. These told him one day that Kim Jong Il had been born not under a rainbow on the slopes of sacred Mount Paektu, but in a military camp in Russia’s far east. He wanted to dismiss these tales as propaganda, which of course he wrote himself. All the same, he knew that North Korea made relatively few cars, and that not only scarcity, but famine, stalked the land. In one scathing poem he talked of a man sacrificing his sister’s chastity for a handful of rice, and wondered why that rice should be cherished “above all else”. It was common to see corpses in the streets; he had once come upon a pile of 20, emaciated and writhing with maggots, outside a railway station. As for the Supreme Leader’s newly humdrum birthplace, it sounded like a lie, but could be true. A doubt was sown. The leaflets also talked a lot about “freedom”. He was not sure exactly what that meant. But if it was a place, it might be worth going to. By 2004, after five years in South Korea, he knew it was. Freedom was “our breath”. Since the South Korean government, under its short-lived “Sunshine” policy of conciliation with the hermit kingdom, had stopped proclaiming freedom northwards, he set up Free North Korea Radio (FNKR) to do the job instead. He used short-wave to reach them; his tiny staff, almost all exiles, used pseudonyms. A brave band of stringers north of the demilitarised zone interviewed ordinary North Koreans, using small digital recorders, phones with prepaid Chinese SIM cards and Chinese memory sticks. Those were transferred hand-to-hand back to Seoul. When any of his team in the North fell silent, presumably arrested or killed, he was devastated. North Koreans who dared to tune in found a station that was, in some ways, familiar: broadcasting in their own dialects, often on subjects they especially enjoyed. “Hello, my compatriots!” cried Mr Kim. Quite unfamiliar was the sound of their own countrymen (their voices electronically distorted) attacking the regime. They could also hear from exiles in Seoul about bright clothes, mains hot water and overflowing food tables, the things that had most dazzled Mr Kim. At his first debrief in 1999 he had not only been offered a Coke, a Sprite and rice wine, but a different drink for every day of the year. In the buffet, realising his new power, he took five fried eggs. The cook merely replaced them. Money for his station was a struggle. The Americans gave funding, and also helped send out his programmes, but he did not want to be seen as their puppet. Attacks on FNKR were legion, as were threats to himself. He was sent untraceable, disturbing packages containing dolls stuck with knives, or dead mice. But nothing could deter him. His countrymen had been told repeatedly that they lived in heaven on earth. He and his team told them, for one hour twice a day, 365 days a year, that on the contrary they were slaves of the dictator, trapped like frogs in a deep well. Real heaven was freedom: to dress, to practise religion, to hold contrary opinions, as you liked. Heaven was freedom of choice. Several of his poems, though, told a more nuanced story. He mourned the things he could not forget: the white forsythia at the foot of Moran Hill, the path at the edge of his village, the shyness of a sister, one of four, he had left behind. He remembered his mother in her sweat-stained apron, knitting late at night, or standing by the Taedong river in her homespun jacket. She was always smiling. **But he felt he had “gently laid a handful of dirt” on her. In South Korea, “this foreign land that is not foreign”, he kept calling for her. **Some ties were more easily cast off than others. ■ 〈金成民——用自由的聲音打破北韓沉默〉 一位真正勇敢的人——金成民。 他是一位脫北者、詩人、也是廣播主持人。 他在 2025 年 9 月 12 日離世，享年 63 歲。 但他的一生，像是一首關於自由的長詩。 金成民曾是北韓軍隊的上尉。 他的「罪行」，就是想離開北韓。 那在北韓，是會被公開處決的。 他第一次逃跑失敗，被抓回去，又被拷打。 第二次，他被鐵鍊綁在一名軍官身邊，一起搭著慢慢行駛的火車。 上廁所時，軍官也要跟著。 三天後，廁所髒得軍官受不了，終於讓他自己去。 他一進去，就跳起來，用力踢破窗戶，從火車上滾了出去。 時速大約 80 公里，但他幸運地落在鬆軟的芝麻田裡。 鐵鍊還掛在腳上，他就這樣拼命地跑。 他再次逃到中國，在煤磚工廠打工，靠假證件過活。 三年後，也就是 1999 年，他終於飛到了南韓。 但他的「新事業」，不是賺錢，而是用廣播把真相傳回北韓。 他年輕時，其實是忠於金日成與金正日的。 他會唱頌揚領導者的歌，也寫愛國詩。 但有一天，他在軍營外看到地上滿滿的傳單， 上面寫著：「南韓有很多食物，有汽車工廠。」 他起初不信，還以為那是敵人的宣傳。 直到他偷偷改裝收音機，聽到了南韓的節目。 那裡說，金正日不是在白頭山的彩虹下出生， 而是在俄羅斯遠東的一個軍營。 那一刻，他心裡的信念開始動搖。 他看到飢荒，看過街上餓死的人。 他寫詩，寫一個男人為了米飯犧牲妹妹的尊嚴。 他開始懷疑： 「如果自由是一個地方，那應該值得去一趟。」 到了南韓，他明白—— 自由就是「我們的呼吸」。 於是他創立了「自由北韓廣播電台」， 用短波把節目傳進北韓。 節目裡的聲音有時會被改音， 但聽眾聽得出，那是他們自己的語言。 「北韓的同胞們，你們好！」 節目裡，他這樣喊著。 他講南韓的生活：五彩的衣服、熱水、滿桌的食物。 這些，讓他第一次覺得自己真正活著。 資金不多，美國給了一些幫助， 但他不想被說成是美國的傀儡。 他收到過恐嚇信，甚至有人寄來插著刀的娃娃、死老鼠。 可他從未退縮。 他說：北韓人被告訴自己住在「人間天堂」， 但真正的天堂，是「選擇的自由」。 在他的詩裡，也有溫柔的一面。 他想念母親，想念村口的小路， 想念那株白色的迎春花。 他說：「我好像在母親的墳上，輕輕放下一把土。」 即使在南韓——這個「不陌生的異鄉」， 他仍然不停呼喚母親的名字。 有些枷鎖，可以掙脫。 但有些牽掛，永遠留在心裡。 è 這就是金成民的故事—— 一個用詩與廣播，讓北韓聽見自由聲音的人。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Are red-light face masks worth the hype? Used properly, the right ones can help combat the signs of ageing Sep 26th 2025|3 min read HOLED UP AT home when no one else is looking, people indulge in their covert, sometimes embarrassing, self-care routines. One of the newest involves donning a mask that would make the greatest movie villains envious. Strap it around the face, switch it on and ominous coloured light starts to emanate from the eye and mouth holes. All in the name of eternal youth and vitality. Light-emitting diode (LED) face masks are all the rage. Depending on the colour you choose, manufacturers promise they will rid your face of acne, reverse skin discolouration and even fight off wrinkles. The most popular is the red-light mask, which uses red and near-infrared (NIR) light. These, designers claim, stimulate skin regeneration and reverse the signs of ageing. Such claims are more than marketing hype. Red light has the longest wavelengths in the visible spectrum, and so can safely penetrate deeper into the skin than light with shorter wavelengths. The light then stimulates colour-sensitive molecules called chromophores in subsurface skin layers. These encourage the growth of cells called fibroblasts, which are among the first to respond to injuries or damage to the skin. They are responsible for the production of two skin proteins, collagen and elastin. High amounts of collagen are important for youthful-looking skin, boosting its elasticity and firmness. Numerous experiments bear out the positive effects that red and NIR light can have on skin. A study published in 2007 in the Journal of Photochemistry and Photobiology asked 76 people aged between 35 and 55 who showed visible signs of ageing to use red light on the right half of their faces, leaving the left as a control. Four weeks later, the authors concluded that the right sides of participants’ faces already looked younger. Biopsies taken from some confirmed the presence of increased collagen. Shoshana Marmon, director of dermatological research at New York Medical College, notes that small studies have indeed shown benefits for acne, skin texture and wrinkles. But those benefits are modest. For best results, she recommends using red-light masks at least three times a week for 8-12 weeks, alongside moisturisers, a broad-spectrum sunscreen and a retinoid (a class of products derived from vitamin A). “You can add the light mask on top of those basics,” says Dr Marmon, “but it shouldn’t replace them.” Anti-ageing is the tip of the iceberg. Tests conducted in the 1990s by researchers at NASA—first in plants, then on rats and human tissue—found that light from LEDs helped wounds heal faster (as cell growth is slowed in zero gravity, astronauts who were injured in space would have a harder time healing than they do on Earth). Light can also be harnessed to treat a variety of skin ailments from psoriasis and vitiligo, by way of acne scarring and rosacea, to cancer. New research has even demonstrated that light’s ability to heal subsurface tissue means it may be useful in treating traumatic brain injuries. Not every face mask can deliver the full benefits of red-light therapy. Research shows the optimal treatment for minimising wrinkles and rejuvenating skin would use a combination of red light, with a wavelength of at least 633nm, and NIR light of at least 830nm. The built-in bulbs must also produce light of sufficient power density, ideally 10-50 milliwatts per square centimetre—a new definition, perhaps, of youthful glow. 《紅光面罩真的那麼神嗎？》 📅 2025年9月26日｜約3分鐘閱讀 你有沒有在家偷偷做過一些只有自己知道的「美容小儀式」？ 像是敷面膜、貼痘痘貼、還是用那種會發光的奇怪機器？ 最近，一種「紅光面罩」的美容產品超級紅。 戴上去整張臉都發亮，看起來就像電影反派登場一樣， 但大家說它能讓你變年輕、變緊緻——真的嗎？ 這些所謂的「LED光療面罩」可不只一種顏色。 不同顏色的光據說有不同功效： 像是藍光可以對付痘痘，綠光能改善膚色不均， 而最受歡迎的，就是「紅光面罩」。 廠商宣稱紅光能刺激皮膚再生、減少皺紋， 還能讓肌膚更有彈性、更年輕。 聽起來是不是很夢幻？ 但其實，這些說法並非全是噱頭。 紅光的波長比其他可見光長， 這代表它能「更深入」地穿透皮膚， 而不會造成傷害。 當紅光進入皮膚後， 會刺激到一種叫做「發色團」（chromophores）的分子， 它們能活化皮下的細胞， 特別是「纖維母細胞」（fibroblasts）。 這些細胞在皮膚受傷或老化時會率先行動， 負責製造膠原蛋白（collagen）和彈性蛋白（elastin）。 這兩者正是讓肌膚看起來緊緻、有彈性的關鍵。 那紅光真的有效嗎？ 根據2007年一項發表在《光化學與光生物學期刊》的研究， 76位年齡介於35到55歲、有明顯老化跡象的受試者， 被要求只在臉的右半邊照紅光， 左半邊則作為對照組。 四週後，右邊的臉竟然看起來真的比較年輕！ 而且皮膚切片也證實——膠原蛋白真的增加了。 美國紐約醫學院皮膚研究主任 Shoshana Marmon 醫師指出， 小規模的研究確實顯示紅光對於改善痘痘、膚質和皺紋有幫助， 但效果「有限」。 她建議想要看到明顯變化的人， 最好一週使用三次，連續八到十二週， 同時搭配保濕霜、防曬乳，還有A醇產品。 她說：「紅光面罩可以加在你的保養程序裡， 但不能取代它們。」 事實上，抗老只是光療應用的一小部分。 早在1990年代，美國NASA的研究人員 就在植物、老鼠和人體組織上做過實驗。 他們發現LED光可以加速傷口癒合。 這對太空人來說特別重要—— 因為在太空失重環境下，細胞修復會變慢。 除此之外，光療還能用來治療多種皮膚問題， 像是牛皮癬、白斑、痘疤、酒糟性皮膚炎，甚至癌症。 最近的研究甚至發現， 紅光可能也能幫助治療創傷性腦損傷。 不過，可不是每一款紅光面罩都有效。 研究顯示，真正能減少皺紋、活化肌膚的關鍵在於： 紅光波長要至少 633奈米， 近紅外線（NIR）則要達到 830奈米。 燈的能量密度也要夠強—— 理想值大約是 每平方公分10到50毫瓦。 只有符合這些條件， 你才可能真的「由內而外」發出青春的光芒。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

不唸書的下場是我們的政治越來越愚蠢了? Is the decline of reading making politics dumber? As people read less they think less clearly, **scholars **fear Sep 4th 2025 The experiment was simple; so too, you may have thought, was the task. Students of literature at two American universities were given the first paragraphs of “Bleak House” by Charles Dickens and asked to read and then explain them. In other words: some students reading English literature were asked to read some English literature from the mid-19th century. How hard could it be? Very, it turns out. The students **were flummoxed by legal language and baffled by **metaphor. A Dickensian description of fog left them totally fogged. They could not grasp basic vocabulary: one student thought that when a man was said to have “whiskers” it meant he was “in a room with an animal I think…A cat?” The problem was less that these students of literature were not literary and more that they were barely even literate. Reading is in trouble. Multiple studies in multiple places seem to be showing the same thing. Adults are reading less. Children are reading less. Teenagers are reading a lot less. Very small children are being read to less; many are not being read to at all. Reading rates are lower among poorer children—a phenomenon known as “the reading gap”—but reading is down for everyone, everywhere. In America, the share of people who read for pleasure has fallen by two-fifths in 20 years, according to a study published in August in iScience, a journal. YouGov, a pollster, found that 40% of Britons had not read or listened to any books in 2024. Reading for displeasure is little better: as Sir Jonathan Bate, an English professor at Oxford University, has said, students “struggle to get through one novel in three weeks”. Even the educated young, another greybeard said, have “no habits of application and concentration”. Such laments should be treated with caution: almost the only thing bookish sorts love more than books is complaining about books and reading. They always have done: the greybeard above was Dickens in, ironically, “Bleak House”. Almost as soon as people stopped fretting about the arrival of reading—Socrates feared it would “produce forgetfulness” in those who used it; Ecclesiastes says that “of making many books there is no end”—people started fretting about its decline. As Ecclesiastes also says, “there is nothing new under the sun”. Arguably, however, what is happening now is new. It is not just that people are reading less, though they are; the texture of what is being read is changing, too. Sentences are getting shorter and simpler. We analysed hundreds of New York Times bestsellers and found that sentences in popular books have contracted by almost a third since the 1930s. Open the Victorian bestseller “Modern Painters” by John Ruskin and you will find that its first sentence is 153 words long. It contains the stern advice that you should not trust the “erroneous opinion” of the public and includes a subheading that reads: “Public opinion no criterion of excellence”. Open Amazon’s current non-fiction bestseller, “The Let Them Theory” by Mel Robbins, and you will find that its first sentence is just 19 words long. A subheading reads “How I Changed My Life”. Among its stern advice is that, to get things done, you should count backwards like NASA at a rocket launch because, “Once you start the countdown, 5-4-3-2-1, there’s no turning back.” This is a reminder that Ruskin knew a thing or two. Smartphones are blamed for dwindling reading habits—and certainly the number of distractions has increased. But reading has always been a bother. “A big book”, said Callimachus, an ancient Greek poet, “is a big evil.” This is particularly true after lunch. You sit down to read then, as one writer noted, the sun streams in, the day feels “50 hours long”, the reader “rubs his eyes” then finally places the book “under his head and…falls into a light sleep”. Given that that particular reader was a fourth-century monk and ascetic he was probably not distracted by Snapchat. So it is not merely that distractions have increased: the sheer desire to read seems to have declined. In the Victorian era, self-improvement societies flourished. In the Scottish hills, shepherds “maintained a kind of circulating library”, writes Jonathan Rose in his magnificent book “The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes”. Each shepherd left books in the crannies of walls for other shepherds to read. In Victorian mill towns, workers saved up to buy books. In one Scottish locale, a boy noticed a ragman reading a book. The book—which the ragman lent him—was Thucydides. The boy was Ramsay MacDonald, who would go on to become Britain’s first Labour prime minister. Today that zeal for personal advancement has diminished. Some blame the high cost of books and closing of libraries for modern intellectual apathy—but books have never been cheaper. In Roman times, a book cost three-quarters of a camel (ie, a lot). In the Victorian era, a copy of Lord Byron’s “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage” cost a labourer about half a week’s income. And yet, by the end of the 18th century, literacy rates among Scotland’s autodidacts were among the highest in the world. Today “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage” is free on Kindle, and readers can find plenty of other books that cost less than a coffee. But reading rates keep falling. A blunter explanation is that people just cannot be bothered. Professor Bate got everyone in a bate with his comments about students not reading: saying such things, he admits, might seem “old fogeyish”. Speak to professors, however and they all lament their students’ waning attention spans. When Professor Rose began teaching, he taught “Bleak House”. He would not attempt it today, he says, partly because of “constant pressure” from university deans to “assign less and less and less reading” and partly because “students simply won’t read it”. In multiple surveys young people describe reading as “boring” and “a chore”. It is possible to say: who cares? English professors may well lament a fall in literacy, but that may be simple self-interest: less a concern about a declining custom than a declining number of customers. Yet literacy affects more than university reading lists. For one thing, increasing literary sophistication seems to lead to increasing political sophistication. At its simplest, Athenians in the fifth century BC could begin to practise “ostracism”—voting to banish people by writing their name on ostraka, scraps of pots—because, as William Harris, an academic, points out, they had achieved “a certain amount of literacy”. By contrast, decreasing** literary sophistication** may lead to decreasing political sophistication. Our analysis of Britain’s parliamentary speeches found that they have shrunk by a third in a decade. We also analysed almost 250 years of inaugural presidential addresses using the Flesch-Kincaid readability test. George Washington’s scored 28.7, denoting postgraduate level, while Donald Trump’s came in at 9.4, the reading level of a high-schooler. This is not inherently a bad thing. Often simple prose is good prose, and few people have ever wished politicians’ speeches to be longer. Professor Bate is more pessimistic. Lose the ability to read complex prose and he fears you may also lose the ability to develop complex ideas that “allow you to see nuance and to hold two contradictory thoughts together”. The medium is the message, and the message is currently 280 characters long. (“Bleak House”, by contrast, weighs in at around 1.9m characters.) There will be other losses from a reading decline. Few engines of social mobility are more effective than reading: just ask the Scottish shepherds. Rich children may do it more, but reading is an egalitarian invention. No one—not your nanny, not your tutor, your friends or your posh school—can impel you to devour a book except you. Reading is not merely a tool: it is also one of life’s great pleasures, as Dickens knew well. As Joe, the kind blacksmith in “Great Expectations”, says: “Give me a good book…and sit me down afore a good fire, and I ask no better.” Once people forget that, things really will feel bleak. ■ 大家好，今天要跟大家聊一個有點沉重，但也很有趣的主題：「閱讀的衰退，會不會讓政治變笨？」 故事要從一個實驗開始。美國兩所大學的文學系學生，被要求閱讀狄更斯《荒涼山莊》開頭的幾段文字，然後解釋其中的意思。聽起來簡單吧？結果——非常難。學生們完全被法律語言搞糊塗，被隱喻卡住。甚至有人以為「whiskers（鬍鬚）」是指「房間裡有動物吧？像是貓？」——可以想像教授們有多頭大。 問題不只是學生「不夠文學」，而是，他們甚至「不太識字」。 📉 各種研究都指出：我們正在「集體不讀書」。成年人讀得少，孩子讀得少，青少年讀得更少。連小朋友被爸媽念故事書的機會也下降了，許多甚至完全沒有。這就是所謂的「閱讀鴻溝」。 在美國，20 年內，閱讀休閒書籍的人數下降了 40%。英國情況也差不多：2024 年，四成的英國人一本書都沒讀。即使是大學生，他們也覺得讀一本小說要三週以上，好像在爬山。教授們說得更直接：年輕人「沒有專注的習慣」。 當然啦，學者抱怨年輕人不讀書，好像從古至今都一樣。蘇格拉底就曾擔心，文字會讓人健忘。《傳道書》裡也寫過：「著書多，沒有窮盡。」但現在的狀況似乎真的有點不一樣。 📖 文章裡提到一個有趣的發現：我們的句子越來越短。 《紐約時報》暢銷書裡的句子，平均比 1930 年代縮短了三分之一。 維多利亞時代的暢銷書《現代畫家》第一句長達 153 個字，還附帶哲學性的標題：「大眾的意見不是衡量優秀的標準。」對照現在 Amazon 的暢銷書，開頭只有 19 個字，標題則是「我如何改變人生」。更別提「方法」是：倒數 5 秒就能逼自己行動，像火箭發射一樣。 這種對比，不只是風格變了，而是「思維的深度」也可能跟著流失。 📱 很多人怪智慧型手機，說它搶走了我們的注意力。確實，分心比以前更容易。但其實「讀書本來就麻煩」。古希臘詩人就說過：「大本的書，就是大麻煩。」甚至在四世紀，一位修士寫道：讀到一半就打瞌睡，把書當枕頭。顯然，他也不是因為 Snapchat而分心的。 真正不同的是：想要讀的慾望，變少了。 維多利亞時代，工人和牧羊人拼命自學。他們會把書藏在石牆縫裡，輪流傳閱。有人甚至因為向破布商借到一本修昔底德，而啟發了政治志向，最後成為英國第一位工黨首相。那種對「知識改變命運」的熱情，如今似乎消失了。 有人說，是因為書太貴或圖書館關閉。但事實上，現在的書比歷史上任何時候都便宜。《哈羅德遊記》當年要一個工人半週工資才能買，而現在 Kindle 上免費。問題不是買不起，而是：大家懶得讀。 📚 教授們無奈地承認，他們已經不敢再開《荒涼山莊》這樣的大本書課程了。原因不只是學校壓力，而是學生根本「讀不下去」。在調查裡，年輕人直接說：讀書「很無聊」、「很累」。 那問題來了：我們真的需要擔心嗎？ 其實，閱讀和政治之間有著微妙的關係。古雅典能夠實行「陶片放逐法」，就是因為有足夠的識字率。識字能力，直接影響了政治參與和思考深度。 現代數據也反映了這點。英國國會的演講篇幅，十年內縮短了三分之一。美國總統的就職演說，用可讀性測試來比：華盛頓的演講屬於研究所等級；川普的演講，只有高中程度。 這不一定是壞事。簡單的文字，往往也能清楚有力。但學者們擔心的是：如果我們失去閱讀複雜文本的能力，就可能也失去思考複雜問題的能力。 無法同時容納矛盾，無法理解細微差異。當政治只剩下 280 個字的推文，深度自然也消失了。 最後還有一個更現實的問題：閱讀是社會流動的最佳工具之一。當年蘇格蘭牧羊人靠閱讀跨越階級，今天卻連免費的經典書籍都吸引不了人。閱讀，不只是學習的工具，更是一種生活的樂趣。 正如狄更斯筆下的鐵匠 Joe 說的：「給我一本好書，再加上一個暖爐，我就心滿意足。」 如果我們忘記了這種樂趣，人生可能真的會變得更「荒涼」。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

**The rise of **beer made by AI Customers love it Aug 27th 2025 WHEN BECK’S, a storied German brewery founded in the city of Bremen in 1873, celebrated its 150th anniversary in 2023 it decided to bring in a new brewmaster to mark the occasion: ChatGPT, an artificial-intelligence (AI) chatbot. The company asked it to whip up a recipe using only hops, yeast, water, and malt. The result was “Beck’s Autonomous”, a lager with a subtle sweetness, a hoppy** texture**, and quite a head. One Daily Mail reporter considered it better than the brewery’s standard lager. Beer and AI may seem an unlikely pairing, but Beck’s is far from the only brand to have asked for input from the technology. Atwater Brewery, an American firm, introduced an AI-designed citrusy India pale ale (IPA) in 2023 and last year St Austell Brewery in Britain used AI to create a tropical IPA dubbed “Hand Brewed by Robots”. In March Coedo Brewery in Japan asked an AI model to analyse the preferences of people in their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s, and then developed four craft beers, one for each age range. In general the response from customers, brewers say, has been overwhelmingly positive. “It gives us access to new recipes that we didn’t think about before,” says Prinz Pinakatt, boss of the beer business for Tilray Brands, Atwater’s New York-based parent company. Machine-learning tools can parse the minutiae of complex flavours, analyse the ingredients and equipment that an individual brewery has available, and then concoct new recipes while tweaking sweetness, acidity, hop level and other attributes to ensure the end product appeals to discerning customers. Beau Warren, who opened the Species X Beer Project brewery in America in 2021, knows this firsthand. In 2022 he started training AI models on a number of parameters—his proprietary recipes, different types of yeast, water acidity, various hops, the ingredients in the brewery cellar, the typical makeup of lagers, stouts and other beers—and, by 2024, began using it to guide the brewing process. In one instance, after being asked to make a new lager, the bot suggested mixing Maris Otter malt, usually found in stouts, with Belgian candi syrup. “I would never have thought of doing that in a lager, ever,” he says. “We brewed it anyway, and I thought it was one of the best lagers I’ve ever made.” His customers apparently thought the same: Mr Warren says patrons usually rated the AI-crafted beers better than any of the beers thought up by he and his fellow brewers. (That said, the AI beers at Species X are no more: the brewery closed down last autumn owing to financial difficulties.) Scientists are also intrigued about what bots might tell them about the chemistry of beer. In 2024 researchers from KU Leuven, a university in Belgium, analysed the chemical makeup of 250 Belgian beers, including lagers, blonds and West Flanders ales. They then trained machine-learning algorithms to model the effects of adding or subtracting different aroma compounds, such as glycerol and lactic acid, on the taste. “The models we develop help us to understand the complex relationship between the chemistry of a beer, its taste, and how consumers will like it,” says Kevin Verstrepen, a bioscience engineer who led the research team. Of course, it will take more than a chatbot to replace a human brewer. Ingredients must be poured, brew kettles must be tended and the beers must be tasted—whether they were made totally by human hands, or brewed, at least in part, by robots. “Yes, AI will become more and more part of the brewing process, but the brewing itself, the craft, is still the emphasis,” says Mr Pinakatt. “It will be very difficult to have machines make our beers.” ■ 當 Beck’s——這家創立於 1873 年、位於德國不來梅的老字號啤酒廠——在 2023 年迎來 150 週年慶時，他們決定邀請一位特別的釀酒師：人工智慧聊天機器人 ChatGPT。 公司要求它只使用啤酒的基本原料——啤酒花、酵母、水和麥芽——來設計一份新配方。最後誕生的是一款名為「Beck’s Autonomous」的拉格啤酒。這款酒帶有微微的甜味、濃郁的酒花香氣，還有豐厚的泡沫。根據《每日郵報》的記者試喝後表示，甚至比 Beck’s 的經典款還要好。 乍聽之下，啤酒和 AI 好像是八竿子打不著的組合，但 Beck’s 絕不是唯一嘗試的品牌。美國的 Atwater Brewery 在 2023 年推出了一款由 AI 設計的柑橘風味 IPA。隔年，英國的 St Austell Brewery 也用 AI 釀造出一款熱帶風味的 IPA，名字叫「Hand Brewed by Robots」。2024 年 3 月，日本的 Coedo Brewery 更是請 AI 分析不同年齡層——20、30、40、50 歲——的口味喜好，再釀出四款各自對應的精釀啤酒。總體來說，消費者的反應非常正面。 「這讓我們得到以前從沒想過的配方。」Atwater 母公司 Tilray Brands 啤酒業務負責人 Prinz Pinakatt 說。機器學習工具能精細分析複雜的風味、配料和釀酒設備，接著設計出新配方，並調整甜度、酸度、啤酒花的濃度等元素，確保最終的產品能打動挑剔的消費者。 美國的 Species X Beer Project 釀酒廠創辦人 Beau Warren 就深有體會。他在 2022 年開始訓練 AI 模型，輸入了自己的獨家配方、各種酵母、水的酸鹼度、不同的啤酒花、以及啤酒的種類數據。到 2024 年，他正式讓 AI 參與釀造過程。有一次，他要求 AI 設計一款新的拉格，結果 AI 建議把通常用在世濤啤酒的「Maris Otter 麥芽」，與比利時糖漿混合在一起。Warren 說：「我從來沒想過拉格會這樣做，但我們還是照著釀了，結果發現這是我喝過最好喝的拉格之一。」顧客的評價也很高，普遍認為 AI 釀造的酒比他和同事設計的更好。不過，儘管酒很受歡迎，Species X 最後還是在去年秋天因財務問題關閉了。 不只是釀酒師，科學家也對 AI 在啤酒化學上的應用充滿興趣。2024 年，比利時魯汶大學的研究團隊分析了 250 款當地啤酒，從拉格、金色啤酒到西佛蘭德艾爾。他們用機器學習模型來模擬不同化學物質——像是甘油和乳酸——對風味的影響。研究負責人、生命科學工程師 Kevin Verstrepen 說：「我們開發的模型能幫助理解啤酒化學成分、口感，以及消費者喜好的複雜關係。」 當然，AI 不會完全取代釀酒師。畢竟，原料要有人投入，釀酒槽要有人照看，啤酒最後也必須有人品嚐。Pinakatt 說：「是的，AI 會越來越多地參與釀酒過程，但釀酒的核心仍然是工藝與手藝。要完全靠機器來釀酒，是非常困難的。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Erotic writing is becoming more explicit Gardening metaphors are out. Other things are very much in Feb 27th 2025 START WITH the nipples. The lover does in “Mistress and Mother”, a steamy romantic novel from the 1990s. Though, since it was written three decades ago, they are not always called “nipples”. Instead, the author also discreetly describes them as “little buds”. Other erotica from this era has a similarly hearty, horticultural air: in another novel, the paramour enjoys his lover’s “rosebuds”; in a third, he moves lower to her enfolding “petals”. In other books there is swelling, blooming and, of course, “seed”. The aim is oblique eroticism. The overall effect is of an unexpectedly energetic gardening catalogue. But eroticism is changing. Open “Onyx Storm”, the latest romantasy book (a genre that blends romance and fantasy) by Rebecca Yarros, and things are rather clearer. Hardy perennials are out. Words like “hard” are in—as too are words including “cock”, “fuck” and “straddle”. And people are buying it. Sales of erotica are booming: thanks to pre-orders, “Onyx Storm” had already been on Amazon’s bestseller list for 19 weeks by the time it was published in January. After release, it shifted almost 3m copies in a week. It sold faster than any novel in America in the past 20 years. There is now a vast variety of erotica available, including cosy erotica (knitwear is torn off), Austen erotica (Mr Darcy has assets even more impressive than £10,000 a year) and fairy erotica. There is even erotica featuring—readers may wish to brace themselves—physicists. These titles contain such explicit lines as, “Your dissertation on liquid crystals’ static distortions in biaxial nematics was brilliant, Elsie.” Sex is not entirely novel for the novel, as readers of E.L. James and Alan Hollinghurst will know. But it is more frank and frequent. “The spiciness seems to be increasing,” says James Daunt, chief executive of Barnes & Noble and Waterstones, two bookshop chains. Look at the corpus of English fiction and the word “nipples” has doubled in frequency since the year 2000, while “orgasm” has quintupled; use of the word “clit” is 14 times higher. In some ways this is unexpected. It was once assumed that erotica was a male pursuit and that its appeal was not merely the sex but the sin. Obscenity was legally defined in Britain in 1868 by a judge called—in a detail no novelist would dare attempt—Justice Cockburn. “Nine-tenths of the appeal of pornography”, wrote Bertrand Russell, a philosopher, “is due to the indecent feelings concerning sex which moralists inculcate in the young.” Obscenity laws were relaxed in Britain in the 1960s in the wake of the “Lady Chatterley’s Lover” trial, but the illicit thrill remained. The world has changed since then. The moralists have faded. Whatever hold the patriarchy had on publishing has waned. Yet the sex remains, and it is women who are driving it. Most of these books are being written, edited and published by women. They are bought, in vast numbers, by women. The novels are promoted by women on social-media platforms, particularly TikTok, using hashtags such as #Spicybooks and #Steamyreads, then appear on Amazon with the phrase “TikTok made me buy it!”, which sounds less like an endorsement than a defence. As the interest in #Darkromance shows, this sex is not all nice. In Ms Yarros’s books, the hero pins the heroine violently to the floor in wrestling matches; in the romantasy novels of Sarah J. Maas, who has sold almost 40m copies, faeries do things that would make Tinker Bell blush. What has driven this is new digital formats, such as audiobooks. (Ms Yarros and Ms Maas dominate those charts, too.) The e-book has been especially consequential. It is discreet—no one can see what you are reading on a tablet. And it lets authors self-publish cheaply, as Ms James did in 2011 with “Fifty Shades of Grey”, a story of sadomasochism. It was later republished by Vintage, but romance lovers retained the habit of reading books digitally. Authorial autonomy online means it is “impossible to police” what goes into books, says Hal Gladfelder of the University of Manchester. The ubiquity of internet pornography means that even to try to do so would feel “ridiculous”. In one sense this new generation of erotic prose is more realistic than what came before. Floral analogies are out; proper body parts are in. But in another sense, it is not remotely realistic. Everyone is gorgeous; names like “Xaden” and “Aetos” dominate; most characters have remarkable powers, if not superpowers. In Ms Yarros’s books, the hero and heroine, who are long-term lovers, can creep into each other’s minds, where they find each other thinking hot thoughts in an italic font, such as “How do you want me to take you?” and “You’re astounding” rather than, as might be the fear, “Did I switch the tumble dryer on?” or “It was definitely your turn to take the bins out.” It is easy to smirk, but writing about sex is tricky—as a trawl through the back catalogue of the Bad Sex in Fiction Awards shows. The now-defunct prize, which ended during the pandemic, was set up in 1993 by Britain’s Literary Review to “highlight and gently discourage redundant, poorly written or unnecessarily pornographic descriptions of sex in fiction”. Given that the contenders in its final years included such phrases as she “offer[ed] her moist parts to my triumphant phallus” and her vagina was “slowly chugging my organ as a boa constrictor swallows its prey”, perhaps the discouragement was too gentle. Part of the difficulty in writing about sex is what Julian Barnes, an English writer, called “the naming of parts”: “At the basic level, he put his what into her—or indeed his—what?” “Boa constrictor” is probably best avoided, but, as Mr Barnes observed, almost all terms are tricky. “Where between the Latinate and the Anglo-Saxon do you pitch it?” Being biological can be as bad as being too oblique, as a contender for the Bad Sex award in 2019 clearly showed. “I have 8,000 nerves in my clitoris,” explained one character. “Your penis gets by on 4,000.” (Such a pronouncement would leave most lovers unsure whether to take notes or take flight.) At times characters seem to be enjoying sex as little as the reader. In a nominated work of 2019 a character, in a moment of high passion, “screamed as though [she] were being run over by a train”. The reader can only sympathise. Most winners of the prize were, unsurprisingly, men: the male gaze does not always improve male prose. But the internet is changing the balance of power in fictional sex, just as it has in actual sex. Male misbehaviour is called out by such things as the “menwritingwomen” Reddit thread. (John Updike—the “penis with a thesaurus”—features heavily.) A popular parody pokes fun at a man writing a woman’s morning: “Cassandra…breasted boobily to the stairs, and titted downwards.” Eroticism always “reflects what is going on in society at the time”, says Sharon Kendrick, a popular British romantic author. In the liberal 1970s, literary lotharios were in fashion. The arrival of the AIDs pandemic in the 1980s brought on a period of “sexual fastidiousness” and heroes who had one true love and a condom. The new generation of erotic prose may be easy to mock. But it is reflecting a society in which women can often get precisely what they want. That should give any feminist a bit of a thrill. ■ 情色寫作變得更加直白 園藝隱喻退場，露骨詞彙登場 從乳頭開始。至少在《情婦與母親》這本1990年代的火辣愛情小說中，戀人是這樣的。不過，三十年前的作品裡，它們不一定被稱為「乳頭」，作者還會含蓄地稱之為「小花苞」。 那個年代的情色作品普遍有著濃厚的「園藝風格」：另一部小說裡，情人讚嘆伴侶的「玫瑰花蕾」；在第三部作品中，他往下移動，探索她環抱的「花瓣」。書中不乏「膨脹」「綻放」，甚至「種子」的意象。當時追求的是含蓄的情慾，整體讀來更像一本精力充沛的園藝型錄。 如今情色風格已然轉變。打開麗貝卡．亞羅斯（Rebecca Yarros）的最新浪漫奇幻小說《縱橫風暴》（Onyx Storm），場景截然不同。多年生植物退場，取而代之的是「硬」這樣的直白字眼——以及「屌」「幹」「跨坐」等詞彙。讀者也買單。情色文學銷量正大幅成長：靠著預購，《縱橫風暴》在1月出版前已連續19週位居亞馬遜暢銷榜。出版後一週內就賣出近300萬冊，成為過去20年美國銷售速度最快的小說。 現在市面上情色作品種類繁多，包括「溫馨型情色」（毛衣被撕裂）、「奧斯汀風情色」（達西先生的資產不僅僅是一年一萬英鎊）以及「精靈情色」。甚至還有主角是物理學家的作品，其中出現這樣火熱的句子：「你那篇關於液晶雙軸靜態扭曲的論文真是太出色了，艾爾希。」 性在小說中並非全新元素，EL．詹姆斯（E. L. James）與艾倫．霍林赫斯特（Alan Hollinghurst）的讀者早就知道。但現在它更直接、更頻繁。Barnes & Noble 與 Waterstones 兩大連鎖書店的執行長詹姆斯．道恩特（James Daunt）說：「辣度似乎在提升。」英語小說語料庫顯示，自2000年以來，「nipple（乳頭）」的使用頻率翻倍，「orgasm（高潮）」增加五倍，「clit（陰蒂）」更是高出14倍。 某種程度上，這樣的轉變出乎意料。過去人們認為情色主要是男性的嗜好，其吸引力來自於「性」與「禁忌」。1868年英國對「猥褻」的法律定義，由一位名叫——小說家恐怕不敢編造——寇克本（Cockburn）的大法官所作出。哲學家羅素曾寫道：「色情吸引力的九成，源於道德家在年輕人心中灌輸的猥褻情緒。」英國的猥褻法在1960年代《查泰萊夫人的情人》審判後逐漸鬆動，但禁忌帶來的刺激仍然存在。 而今世代不同了。道德家退場，父權在出版界的掌控力也減弱。然而性仍在，只是推動它的已是女性。這些作品大多由女性撰寫、編輯與出版，也被女性大量購買。社群媒體上，特別是在TikTok，女性讀者以 #Spicybooks 與 #Steamyreads 等標籤推廣，最後在亞馬遜出現「TikTok讓我買的！」的字樣——聽起來更像是一種辯解，而非背書。 不過，這些作品的性愛並非總是溫柔。#Darkromance 的流行便是一例。亞羅斯的小說裡，男主角會在角力中將女主角猛然壓倒在地；莎拉．J．馬斯（Sarah J. Maas）的浪漫奇幻小說裡，精靈的行徑足以讓小叮噹(奇妙仙子)臉紅。 推動這股浪潮的，是新的數位載體，例如有聲書（亞羅斯與馬斯在榜上同樣稱霸）。電子書尤其關鍵：它能保有隱私——沒人能看出你在平板上讀什麼；它也讓作者能以低成本自費出版，正如2011年E. L.詹姆斯的《格雷的五十道陰影》，後來雖由Vintage再版，但浪漫讀者已經習慣於數位閱讀。 曼徹斯特大學的哈爾．格拉德費爾德（Hal Gladfelder）指出，網路讓作者完全自主，因此「幾乎不可能審查」。在網路色情遍布的今天，即使想管制也顯得「荒謬」。 某種程度上，這一代的情色小說比過去更「寫實」：花卉隱喻消失，身體部位直接點名。但另一方面，它又一點也不寫實。角色人人俊美，名字不是「薩登」（Xaden）就是「艾托斯」（Aetos），多數還擁有非凡甚至超能力。亞羅斯筆下的情侶甚至能進入彼此的心靈，讀到對方用斜體字傳遞的火熱心思，例如「你想要我怎麼要你？」或「你太驚人了」，而不是「我有把烘衣機關掉嗎？」或「今天明明是你該倒垃圾吧？」 固然容易譏諷，但性愛描寫確實困難。《壞性描寫獎》（Bad Sex in Fiction Award）的歷年入圍作證明了這點。該獎於1993年由《英國文學評論》創立，目的是「提醒並溫和地勸阻多餘、拙劣或過度色情的性描寫」。不過，最後幾年的參賽句子像是「她將濕潤的部位奉獻給我勝利的陽具」或「她的陰道像蟒蛇吞食獵物般，慢慢啃食我的器官」，恐怕勸阻力道還不夠。 英國作家朱利安．巴恩斯（Julian Barnes）曾指出，寫性愛最大的困難在於「命名部位」：「最基本的層面就是，他把他的什麼放進了她——或他的——什麼？」「蟒蛇」的比喻或許最好避免，但正如他所說，幾乎所有詞彙都帶有難題——要在拉丁學術語與盎格魯粗俗語之間找到平衡並不容易。 過於生物學化同樣尷尬。2019年某部入圍作品中，角色竟在高潮時宣稱：「我的陰蒂有八千條神經，你的陰莖只有四千。」（這樣的話恐怕會讓伴侶不知該做筆記還是落荒而逃。）另一位角色則在激情時刻「尖叫得像被火車輾過」，讓讀者不禁同情。 這個獎項多數得主毫不意外地都是男性：男性凝視並不總能讓文字更好。而網路正在改變情色書寫中的權力分配，就像在真實性別關係中一樣。男性的失誤經常被公開嘲諷，例如 Reddit 的「menwritingwomen」版面（常客包括「拿著字典的陽具」約翰．厄普代克）。還有人戲仿男性筆下的女性日常：「卡珊卓……胸部晃動地走下樓梯，並一路抖動著往下走。」 英國暢銷愛情作家莎朗．肯德里克（Sharon Kendrick）說，情色書寫一向「反映當下社會氛圍」。在自由奔放的1970年代，浪子角色當道；1980年代愛滋疫情帶來「性謹慎」時代，小說英雄變成只有一位真愛、而且會戴保險套。 新一代情色小說或許容易被取笑，但它反映的，正是一個女性常能獲得她們真正渴望的社會。這對任何一位女權主義者而言，應該都能帶來一絲快意。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

**“Comrade” **is making a comeback in China Or so the government hopes Jul 24th 2025|Beijing DURING THE decades when Mao Zedong ruled China, it was common for people to address each other as tongzhi: “comrade”. Like its English equivalent, the word has an egalitarian ring, as well as a hint of revolutionary fervour. But after Mao’s death in 1976, and the market reforms that followed, the term tongzhi started to feel a little dated. Less** ideological** greetings took its place: like xiansheng (“mister”), meinu (“beautiful woman”) and laoban (“boss”). So** it caused a stir **when the People’s Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece, published an opinion piece this month calling for the word tongzhi to return to everyday speech. Modern greetings can sound frivolous or phoney, the author complained. Some are even “sugar-coated bullets”, they warned, using a Maoist term for bourgeois customs that *corrupt* the working class. Better, then, to return to the greeting used “back when people were simple and honest”. The party often tries to stoke nostalgia for the days of high socialism in order to bolster its support. In recent years local governments have encouraged “red tourism” at sites like Mao’s hometown to teach people about the history of the party (needless to say, they are given a version without all the bloodshed). Some firms send employees on “red” teambuilding courses where they dress up as **guerillas **from the 1930s and trek along muddy mountain paths. In 2015 party members, though not the general public, were told to call each other tongzhi again as a way of “purifying” political culture. The term seems unlikely to make a comeback outside the party, however. For one thing, since the 1990s tongzhi has become a popular slang term for gay people, catching on because it sounded neither pejorative nor clinical, unlike most of the alternatives. For a time one of China’s biggest LGBT-rights organisations, based in the capital, was known as the “Beijing tongzhi Centre” (it closed in 2023 under political pressure). But many people have criticised the idea for another reason. Since the death of Mao, China has become far richer—but the wealth has not been spread evenly. The country’s Gini coefficient , a common measure of** income inequality,** rose sharply in the 1990s and is now higher than that of America, according to official estimates. Inequalities have particularly started to sting as the economy has sputtered. “Who should you call tongzhi?” asked one person in a post on Weibo, a social-media platform. “Someone with the same rights, assets…work and salary. Those earning 2,000 yuan ($280) a month can hardly call those earning 20,000 yuan their tongzhi.” There is little sense of camaraderie between China’s haves and have-nots. ■ 「同志」在中國重現風潮？ ** 政府寄望重新流行** ** 2025年7月24日｜北京** **在毛澤東主政的數十年間，中國人彼此之間常以「同志」相稱。這個詞彙與英文 **comrade 相似，既帶有平等意味，也蘊含革命熱情。然而， 1976年毛澤東逝世、隨後市場改革推行後，「同志」逐漸顯得過時，取而代之的是更少意識形態色彩的稱呼，例如「先生」、「美女」與「老闆」。 因此，當中共喉舌《人民日報》本月發表評論文章，呼籲讓「同志」回歸日常用語時，引起了社會關注。文章批評現代稱呼顯得輕浮甚至虛假，部分更是「糖衣炮彈」——這一毛澤東時期的用語指資產階級風俗對工人階級的腐蝕。評論認為，應回到「人們樸實誠懇的年代」的稱呼方式。 中共時常試圖喚起對高社會主義時代的懷舊情緒，以鞏固支持。近年地方政府推廣「紅色旅遊」，引導民眾參觀毛澤東故鄉等景點，學習黨史（當然，版本中略去血腥部分）。部分企業也會安排員工參加「紅色」團建活動，換上上世紀三○年代游擊隊裝束，踏上泥濘山道。2015年，黨員（但非公眾）曾被要求恢復以「同志」相稱，以「純化」政治文化。 然而，「同志」重回大眾語境的可能性似乎不大。其一，自1990年代起，「同志」在中國成為同志族群的流行稱謂，因為它既不帶貶義，也不似其他詞語般生硬。一度，中國最大之一的同志權益組織——「北京同志中心」便以此為名（該中心於2023年在政治壓力下關閉）。 此外，更多人批評的原因在於現今社會的巨大貧富差距。毛澤東去世後，中國雖然更加富裕，但財富分配並不均衡。中國的吉尼係數 (收入平等的指數) 在1990年代急劇上升，目前官方估計高於美國；相比之下，。隨著經濟放緩，不平等感尤為強烈。有人在社交媒體微博上發文質疑：「你要叫誰同志？權利、資產、工作和薪水都一樣的人嗎？月薪2000元的人，怎麼能叫月薪2萬元的人同志？」如今，中國的貧富兩端之間，已難再找到真正的同志情誼。 ■ -> 小分享 男性廢退：失落、孤僻、漫無目的，生而為「男」我很抱歉？苦苦掙扎的男性困境，我們能怎麼做。 Of Boys and Men: Why the Modern Male Is Struggling, Why It Matters, and What to Do about It -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Why all Indians are** rule-breakers** Because the state makes it impossible not to be Jul 3rd 2025|4 min read IF YOU HAVE ever relaxed with a cold Kingfisher beer at the end of a long, sweaty day in Mumbai, the party capital of India, you have almost certainly broken the law. Specifically, you violated section 40 of the Bombay Prohibition Act of 1949, under which you must hold a permit to drink booze. A first offence is punishable by a fine of 10,000 rupees ($115) and up to six months in prison. Welcome to India, where everything is against the law. According to Vidhi, a legal think-tank in Delhi, India has 7,305 crimes at the national level, three-quarters of which attract imprisonment. India is hardly alone in overcriminalisation. But even America, not exactly known as soft on crime, had a more modest 5,199 federal crimes at last count in 2019. China imposes the death penalty for 46 crimes. In India the number is 301 (though rarely applied). The central government’s ardour for lawmaking and punishment is infectious. India’s 28 states, which control vast swathes of policy, are no less assiduous in regulating everyday life. The state of Uttarakhand, to pick one, requires couples in live-in relationships to register (and pay a fee) within 30 days of shacking up. Failure to comply attracts a fine and up to three months in prison. What of love lost? The unhappy couple must de-register (and pay another fee). Uttarakhand is particularly energetic but few states pass up the chance to make citizens visit the registrar. Then there are tax rules that make almost everyone cower. Renters paying over a lowish threshold must withhold a proportion of the rent from landlords and deposit it with the state as tax, which can involve obtaining a special tax number and hiring an accountant. Some people must pay income tax four times a year. Penalties for errors or delays are high. In June the authorities increased fines for misreported income or false deductions to “up to 200% of the tax due, 24% annual interest, and even prosecution”. There is no leeway for honest mistakes. Businesses have it worse. Companies that grow beyond even a small size must compulsorily register for a goods-and-services tax, disincentivising expansion. They must register in each state in which they have any activity, even if they have no physical presence there. They must also pay taxes withheld from buyers every month, regardless of whether they have been paid. Big companies have legal and compliance departments. Small ones struggle. A convoluted tax code means it is easy to mess up. Beyond the big-ticket items of crime and tax there exists a third category of rules so baffling it defies labels. Cities build fancy new elevated roads only to set speed limits as low as 30km per hour (18mph). Local authorities brick up entrances to public spaces for “safety reasons”. Airport security confiscates packets of spice mixes but allows packets of noodles that contain packets of spice mixes. It is hard to escape the sense that there is no logic behind the rules. That is because there isn’t, say people who have worked with government. Policy can be made just because an official says “I think it’s a good idea.” To save energy, a central-government minister says air-conditioners should function only between 20°C and 28°C,** boasting of** a “first-of-its-kind experiment”. A minister in Kerala wants to fine people who use their phones while crossing the street. In Goa, a holiday state, a new policy makes it mandatory for beach shacks to serve “freshly cooked Goan cuisine”. The tourism minister stipulates that this means fish curry and rice, though there is no such clause. The usual excuse for India’s surfeit of laws and rules is colonialism’s legacy. Indeed, in 2023 India decriminalised 183 defunct provisions in 42 laws. The government is working on a second rationalisation and setting up a deregulation commission to ease the burden on business. A tax bill is in the works. These are welcome moves. But the deeper problem lies in the attitudes of politicians and bureaucrats. “We think the state must have a say in every aspect of an individual’s life,” says Arghya Sengupta of Vidhi. “Everything is game for legislation.” The outcome is to make Indians less law-abiding, not more. Why follow the rules when everything is verboten? Why start a business or expand a successful one if it will only attract attention and more compliance? One high-ranking official complains that the state sets impossibly high standards and then claims that Indians are lawless. But “You have made it impossible for them to follow the law.” ■ 為什麼印度人都違規？ 因為國家讓人無法不違規 2025年7月3日 如果你曾在孟買──印度的派對之都──結束一整天汗流浹背的日子後，輕鬆地來一瓶冰涼的金飛蛇啤酒，那麼你幾乎可以確定已經違法了。具體來說，你違反了《1949年孟買禁酒法》第40條，根據該法令，飲酒必須持有特別許可證。首次違規可處10,000盧比（約115美元）罰金，甚至可被判處6個月徒刑。 歡迎來到印度——一個萬事皆可能違法的國度。根據德里法律智庫 Vidhi 的統計，印度全國層級的刑事罪行多達7,305項，其中四分之三可處以監禁。印度並非唯一法律過度氾濫的國家；但即使是對犯罪向來強硬的美國，2019年統計時聯邦刑事罪也只有5,199項。中國對46種罪行處以死刑，而印度的數字是301項（雖然極少執行）。 聯邦政府對立法與懲罰的熱情，已傳染至地方。印度的28個邦也熱衷於干預日常生活。舉例來說，北阿坎德邦規定同居情侶必須在30天內登記並繳交費用，否則將面臨罰款與最高三個月的徒刑。若情變分手，還需重新登記取消，並再次繳費。雖說北阿坎德的作法格外積極，但其他邦也幾乎不放過任何一次讓人民跑一趟登記處的機會。 然後是令人膽寒的稅務規定。租金超過一定門檻的房客必須預扣部分租金作為稅金代繳給政府，這往往涉及申請特殊稅號，甚至需聘請會計師。有些人一年必須報繳四次所得稅。錯誤或延誤的罰金極高。今年6月，當局更提高了錯報收入或虛報扣除的罰則：罰金最高為應繳稅額的200%、年息24%，甚至可能遭起訴。誠實錯誤亦無從通融。 企業的處境更為艱難。公司一旦規模稍有擴張，便強制要求登記營業稅（GST），反而成為擴張的阻力。此外，只要企業在某個邦有業務行為（即使沒有實體據點），就必須向該邦登記並繳稅。即使尚未收款，也要預繳從買家那邊預扣的稅金。大公司尚有法務與稽核部門處理，小公司則苦不堪言。複雜的稅制也讓出錯變得再容易不過。 除了刑事與稅務這類重大事項外，還有一類荒謬至極、難以歸類的規定。城市建好高架道路，卻將限速設為30公里／小時。地方政府為了「安全」封磚公園出入口。機場安檢沒收香料包，卻放行內含香料的泡麵包。這些規則彷彿毫無邏輯。 事實上，這正是問題所在。與政府合作過的人坦言，政策常常是官員一句「我覺得這是個好主意」就拍板定案。例如中央部長為了節能，宣稱冷氣溫度應限定在20°C到28°C之間，還說這是「全球首創實驗」。喀拉拉邦的部長建議，行人過馬路時若滑手機應處罰。在渡假勝地果阿邦，新規定則強制海灘小吃店必須供應「現煮的果阿料理」，觀光部長進一步定義為「魚咖哩與米飯」，但法條中卻未明文規定。 這一切的常見藉口，是「殖民遺產」。確實，印度於2023年廢除42部法律中的183條過時條文，並正著手進行第二波法規清理，同時設立「去管制委員會」以減輕企業負擔，稅改法案也正在制定中。這些都是正向發展。 然而，根本問題出在官僚與政治人物的思維模式。Vidhi 的阿加雅‧森古塔（Arghya Sengupta）指出：「我們總認為，國家應該參與個人生活的每一個層面，什麼都可以立法。」 這樣的結果不是讓人民更守法，而是更習於違法。當所有事都被禁止，誰還想遵守規則？誰又願意創業或擴張事業，只為招來更多監管？一名高層官員不滿地說，國家設定了高不可攀的標準，卻又責怪印度人無視法律。但真正的問題是：「你讓他們根本無法守法。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Simon Groot scattered better plant seeds across the world The seedsman from Enkhuizen died on July 6th, aged 90 What started him thinking was a cabbage. Not any old cabbage, but the variety, “Glory of Enkhuizen”, which his family company, Sluis and Groot, had produced in that town in North Holland in 1899. It was a beautiful cabbage, round, compact, with a light-green head framed in darker leaves. It could weigh as much as three kilograms, had a sweet flavour, and was easy to grow, as it did all over Europe. But not here. Simon Groot was walking in the highlands of Java, on a sales trip for the company in 1965, when he came across a field of them. They were a sorry sight, sparse and with misshapen heads. Clearly the seed was not quite right, messed up or mixed in, adulterated somehow; he hated nothing more than bad seed. But it was also clear that these cabbages, which shrugged off frost, did not enjoy a semitropical climate and could not cope with local pests and diseases. Meanwhile the farmers who had sown them, unable to sell them, remained as poor as ever. For 16 years he brooded on this. It became his mission. In 1981, when Sluis and Groot was sold to Sandoz, he branched out on his own to improve the seeds, crops, trade and nutrition of the tropical parts of the world. **The staple grains *(especially wheat in India and rice in China) had been hybridised already, with great success, but lowly vegetables had been ignored. He, by contrast, loved them. Producing fine vegetable and flower seed had been the family business since 1867, when venerable, bearded Groots had* pioneered **the work in Enkhuizen. Seeds had been lucky for the town, too; because of close contacts with local farmers, it did not suffer the famine that followed the war. For him the vegetables of tropical Asia were a cornucopia of species he had never met before. Amaranth, with grain-heads like huge catkins; kangkong, or water spinach, growing in any fresh water; mung beans, full of protein in both seeds and sprouts; daikon, tatsoi, choy sum. All were packed with vitamins and good nutrition. As a seedsman more used to cauliflowers and potatoes, he was fascinated. As a market man, here was a huge chance. He surpassed his own expectations. By the 2020s the seeds produced by his company, East-West Seed, had improved the incomes of 20m small farmers in more than 80 countries, from Asia to Latin America to Africa. The company’s red-arrow logo was as well-known to them as the sign for Coca-Cola. He also set up a programme in which successful farmers trained their neighbours. With better seed, farmers stayed in farming, market traders had more to sell and consumers had healthier diets. That simple formula lifted everyone. Seeds came first, carefully bred by cross-pollination to produce the right traits. But the farmers were key. He talked to them constantly, a tall and almost colonial figure in his white clothes and sun-hat, to learn to think with them. Most of them had plots of only one or two hectares, so vegetables were an ideal crop. Routinely, though, the glossy packets they started with had bad genetics inside. They then saved the seed from their crop from year to year, because they were poor and it cost nothing. So, inevitably, their harvests declined. Yet they were most reluctant to change. When he set up his first base in the Philippines in 1982 and, after many months, produced his first **hybridised **seed, farmers were loth to try it. The plant was ampalaya or bitter gourd, not unlike a fat, warty cucumber, astringent but useful to bulk out a stir-fry; so many farmers already grew it. The new variety was called “Jade Star”. It could resist downy mildew, its chief threat, but almost all the trial crops failed. Hence the importance of any farmer who had succeeded passing on his knowledge of how to handle the seeds, space them, **fertilise and irrigate **them. Seed was all about trust: trust that the tiny speck you sowed would grow into the plant you imagined. Both would take time to appear. Over decades, though, the farmers were won over. When the crops did well, they were extraordinary: healthy, profuse and vigorous. As more vegetables were hybridised, tomatoes began to flourish in the Indonesian lowlands, where they could not grow before; productivity per plant of bird’s eye chili, a Thai favourite, increased by 30-40%, and long beans grew like forests. Farm incomes doubled and sometimes even tripled. Certain cases became famous. One woman did so well with chai sim, a leaf vegetable, that she built a kitchen and bought a motorbike. Another produced a pile of pumpkins worth $3,500 from $6-worth of seed. Hybridisation meant that seed from the crop could not be kept, because the second crop would be unreliable. But he set the price of new seed as low as he could. In 2017 the company sold 24m “value-packs”, enough for a small plot, for the equivalent of a dollar each. Any profits went to growth and research. The farmers seemed to take this system in their stride. When he visited them in later years they cheered for joy and held parties for him. In 2019 he was awarded the World Food Prize, a nutritional equivalent of the Nobel. His work, however, was far from done. In Asia he still hoped to shift more farmers away from rice; the world had plenty of that, and carbohydrates, as well as meat, were starting to feature too much in Asian diets. Plants needed constant fortifying to adapt to climate change. And he had barely made a start on Africa, where small farmers were struggling terribly and the potential for growth was so obvious. In one of his late interviews he appeared with an array of home-grown vegetables in front of him. His tomatoes and French beans, laid out on a dark-wood table, looked as glossy and beautiful as a still life from the Dutch Golden Age. The vegetable he most often chose to pose with, however, was not the “Glory of Enkhuizen”. It was the warty, bitter, ugly “Jade Star”, which had transformed the lives of his farmer-friends 6,000 miles away. ■ 西蒙・格魯特將更優良的種子撒播至全球各地 來自恩克赫伊曾（Enkhuizen）的種子商於7月6日辭世，享壽90歲。 讓他開始思考的，是一顆高麗菜。不是普通的高麗菜，而是「恩克赫伊曾的榮耀」（Glory of Enkhuizen）這個品種，早在1899年，他的家族公司 Sluis and Groot 就在荷蘭北部的這座小鎮育出這種高麗菜。這是一種漂亮的高麗菜，圓潤緊實，淺綠色的菜心外圍包著深綠色葉片。重量可達三公斤，味道甘甜，容易種植，在歐洲各地都表現良好。 但在這裡卻不行。1965年，西蒙・格魯特在爪哇高地為公司出差推銷種子時，發現一片種滿這種高麗菜的田地。這些菜看起來慘兮兮，稀疏又畸形。很明顯，種子有問題，可能是品質不佳、混雜或遭到摻假；而他最痛恨的，正是壞種子。更重要的是，這種耐霜的高麗菜根本不適合在亞熱帶氣候中生長，也無法抵禦當地的病蟲害。種下它們的農民無法出售這些作物，仍一貧如洗。 他為此苦思了16年，最終這成了他的使命。1981年，Sluis and Groot 被賣給了瑞士的山多士公司（Sandoz），他決定自行創業，致力於改善熱帶地區的種子、農作物、貿易與營養狀況。當時主要糧食（特別是印度的小麥與中國的稻米）已透過雜交育種成功改良，但蔬菜這類「不起眼」的作物卻遭到忽視。然而，他恰恰最愛蔬菜。自1867年起，他家族便開始培育優良的蔬菜與花卉種子，那些鬍鬚滿面的格魯特祖先在恩克赫伊曾率先展開這項事業。種子對這座城鎮也是福氣，因為與農民密切合作，它在戰後逃過了飢荒。 對他來說，熱帶亞洲的蔬菜簡直像是裝滿新奇物種的寶庫：像巨大花穗的莧菜、可在淡水中生長的空心菜、種子與芽都富含蛋白質的綠豆、白蘿蔔、塌棵菜與菜心……它們全都營養豐富、含有大量維生素。對這位習慣花椰菜和馬鈴薯的種子商來說，一切都令人著迷。從市場角度來看，這更是個巨大機會。 他甚至超越了自己最初的期望。到了2020年代，他創立的「東西種子公司」（East-West Seed）所生產的種子，已提升了全球80多國、2千萬小農的收入，範圍涵蓋亞洲、拉丁美洲與非洲。公司那個紅箭頭的標誌對他們而言如同可口可樂的標誌般熟悉。他還建立了一套制度，讓成功的農民教導鄰里。種子好，農民就能繼續耕作，市場有更多貨源，消費者也吃得更健康。這簡單的循環讓所有人受益。 種子是根本，透過雜交育種培育出理想性狀。但農民才是關鍵。他常常親自與農民對話，一身白衣、戴著太陽帽，身形高大、神似殖民地官員，只為學著與他們一同思考。他們大多只有一兩公頃的小田地，因此蔬菜是理想作物。然而，開始種植時買的精美包裝裡，常常裝著劣質基因的種子。他們因貧窮而習慣自行留種，年復一年，導致產量不斷下滑。 但他們極不願意改變。1982年，他在菲律賓設立第一個基地，花了好幾個月才培育出第一批雜交種子。當時的作物是「苦瓜」（Ampalaya），一種像疙瘩黃瓜、味道澀卻常用來炒菜的蔬菜；許多農民本來就種它。他的新品種名為「翡翠之星」（Jade Star），可抵抗霜黴病——這是主要威脅——但幾乎所有試驗作物都失敗了。這也凸顯出，成功的農民如何傳授種植技巧（如種子處理、株距、施肥、灌溉）至關重要。種子全憑信任：相信那顆微小的顆粒會長成你心中想像的植株。而這兩者都需要時間培養。 數十年過後，農民終於被說服。當作物成功時，成果驚人：健壯、繁茂又旺盛。隨著越來越多蔬菜被雜交改良，番茄在印尼低地得以生長，這 在以前是不可能的；泰國愛吃的朝天椒單株產量提高三到四成；長豆長得像森林一樣。農民收入翻倍甚至三倍。有些案例成了佳話。有位婦人種菜心賺了足夠的錢蓋廚房、買機車；另一位用6美元的種子種出價值3500美元的南瓜。 雜交種的缺點是：收成後的種子無法再用，第二代品質不穩。但他總是盡可能將種子售價壓低。2017年，公司販售了2400萬包「超值小包裝」種子，足夠種一小塊地，每包只要一美元左右。利潤全投入成長與研發。農民對這制度似乎欣然接受。多年後他回訪時，農民會歡呼迎接，還為他開派對。 2019年，他榮獲「世界糧食獎」，這被視為營養界的諾貝爾獎。但他自認任務遠未完成。在亞洲，他仍希望更多農民轉作非稻米作物——世界上稻米與碳水已過剩，亞洲飲食中碳水與肉類佔比過高。他還指出，植物需不斷強化，以因應氣候變遷。而在非洲，他才剛起步；那裡的小農情況艱難，但潛力巨大。 在晚年一次受訪時，他面前擺滿自家種的蔬菜。紅蕃茄、四季豆擺在深色木桌上，彷彿一幅荷蘭黃金時代的靜物畫。但他最常與之合影的蔬菜，卻不是那顆「恩克赫伊曾的榮耀」，而是那顆疙疙瘩瘩、苦澀難看、卻改變了6000英里外農民命運的「翡翠之星」。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Can men and women be just friends? The answer matters more than you think Jun 19th 2025|Istanbul and Seoul “Men and women can’t be friends because the sex part always gets in the way,” says Harry in When Harry Met Sally (1989). Decades later, Turkey’s religious authority echoed this sentiment, warning that friendships between men and women lead to adultery. While studies show men in platonic friendships often overestimate women’s attraction to them, it doesn’t mean such friendships are doomed. Most people can control their urges, and cross-sex friendships bring important social benefits. A large study by Meta and NYU analysed 1.8 billion Facebook users, creating a “cross-gender friendship index” (WHMSI). A score of zero means complete gender segregation; one means equal numbers of same- and cross-sex friends. Conservative Muslim societies like Libya and Iraq score just 0.1, while countries in Africa and South America show higher mixing. Western countries average around 0.5-0.6. Interestingly, regions with higher female labour-force participation have more cross-sex friendships. Nigeria, where women work nearly as much as men, scores 0.67; India, with far fewer women working, scores 0.34. Sexual freedom also correlates with cross-sex friendships. In conservative societies, women’s behaviour is seen as tied to family honour, discouraging interaction with men. In Turkey, where few women work outside the home, informal gender segregation persists. This limits women’s career progress and reinforces stereotypes that women are emotional or unreliable. In East Asia, South Korea’s WHMSI score is low. Many men there don’t consider being friends with women, believing their interests are too different. This cultural divide contributes to workplace inequality and even a rise in involuntary celibacy among men. Do cross-sex friendships make people less sexist, or do less sexist cultures produce more of them? Likely both. A German study found that boys with female friends became more egalitarian over time, while girls’ views were unaffected. Encouraging cross-gender friendships early may help. In an experiment called “Buddy Up”, preschoolers paired with opposite-sex classmates later showed more willingness to play together. This supports the idea that positive contact between groups reduces prejudice, whether between ethnicities or genders. Cross-sex friendships, though simple, may be a key step toward real equality. 「男人和女人不能當朋友，因為性總是會介入。」這是1989年電影《當哈利碰上莎莉》中的一句台詞。幾十年後，土耳其宗教機構也發表類似警告，認為男女友誼會導致通姦。研究發現，男性在柏拉圖式友誼中常高估女性對自己的好感，但這並不代表這類友誼注定失敗。大多數人能控制欲望，且異性友誼對社會有重要益處。 Meta和紐約大學分析了18億名Facebook用戶，建立了「跨性別友誼指數」（WHMSI）。分數0表示完全性別隔離，1表示同性與異性朋友數量相等。保守的穆斯林社會如利比亞和伊拉克得分僅0.1，而非洲及南美一些國家異性友誼較常見。西方國家平均約0.5-0.6。有趣的是，女性勞動參與率較高的地區，異性友誼也較多。例如，奈及利亞女性工作比例接近男性，得分0.67；印度女性工作比例低，得分僅0.34。 性自由也與異性友誼有關。在保守社會，女性行為被視為家庭榮譽的象徵，限制了與男性的交往。在土耳其，少數女性能在外工作，非正式性別隔離盛行，阻礙女性職場晉升並加深「女性情緒化、不可靠」的刻板印象。 在東亞，南韓的異性友誼指數很低。許多男性認為男女興趣差異太大，難以成為朋友。這種文化隔閡助長了職場不平等，也讓非自願單身男性增加。 異性友誼是否讓人更不性別歧視，或是較不性別歧視的文化產生更多這類友誼？答案可能是雙向的。德國一項研究發現，與異性朋友相處的男孩，隨時間變得更支持性別平等，而女孩觀點則未受影響。 從小鼓勵異性友誼或許能改善現況。美國一項「Buddy Up」實驗讓學齡前兒童與異性搭檔進行遊戲，數月後，參與實驗的男孩更願意與女孩一起玩耍。這印證了「正向接觸能減少偏見」的理論，無論是族群間還是性別間。 異性友誼看似簡單，卻可能是實現真正平等的重要一步。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Is the “manopause” real? If it is, it is nothing like the menopause HOT FLUSHES; insomnia; joint pains; loss of libido: for many women, the menopause is no fun. Why exactly women become infertile decades before they die is a much-debated mystery in evolutionary biology. Besides humans, the only other mammals whose females experience so early a menopause in the wild seem to be some species of whale. But equal opportunity is the spirit of the age. These days health influencers, supplement companies and even some doctors talk about a male version of the menopause—variously called the “manopause”, “andropause”, or, for acronym-lovers, “ADAM”, which stands for “androgen deficiency in the ageing male”. Symptoms include a flagging libido, tiredness, shrinking muscles and growing body fat. Do men really suffer from menopause, or something like it? On one level, obviously not. Menopause is defined by the end of a woman’s** menstrual periods**, and therefore the loss of her ability to reproduce, usually by her early 50s. Men, by contrast, can stay fertile well into old age. For instance, Al Pacino, an American actor, fathered a child at 83. In menopause, a woman’s levels of the sex hormones oestrogen and progesterone fall sharply and suddenly. In most men levels of testosterone, the main male sex hormone, likewise start falling during middle age. But unlike in women there is no sudden drop. Levels decline gently, at a rate of around 1% a year, and often stay within the normal range for a man’s entire life. Sometimes symptoms that might be ascribed to a manopause may arise from the realities of middle-aged life. Tiredness is a common result of juggling work with family responsibilities. Flabbiness and atrophying muscles are the wages of years of sedentary office work and too little exercise. That being said, some proportion of men do suffer from male hypogonadism, a medical condition in which the testicles do not produce as much testosterone as they should. Estimates of its prevalence vary widely: one review paper, published in 2020, cited one American study of ageing men that estimated 20% of those in their 60s might be sufferers. But a separate European study put the figure for the same age group at just 3.2%. The causes of hypogonadism are not always clear (though obesity seems not to help). But unlike the female menopause, it is not an inevitable consequence of ageing. Menopausal women can be treated with hormone-replacement therapy (HRT). This aims to replace the missing sex hormones, and thus relieve unpleasant symptoms, using tablets or gels. Similarly, a growing number of men take testosterone-replacement therapy (TRT) to the same ends. Prescriptions have boomed in the past 20 years, **though there is not yet a firm consensus **on when men actually need it. Still, testosterone—the original anabolic steroid—really is, in some ways, a fountain of youth. Men taking it will put on muscle, lose fat and recover faster from exercise (hence why taking testosterone is considered doping in most sports). The pros and cons of TRT are a subject for another article. But take care: side-effects can include baldness and, ironically, infertility. Add external testosterone and the body will compensate by making less. Reduced production in the testes can slow or even stop sperm production. By trying to relieve the symptoms of the supposed male menopause, men who take TRT risk replicating the defining feature of the female original. ■ 熱潮紅、失眠、關節疼痛、性慾減退：對許多女性而言，更年期並不好受。 女性為何會在死亡前數十年便喪失生育能力，一直是演化生物學中的一大謎團。除了人類之外，目前已知在野外出現如此早期更年期的哺乳動物，似乎只有某些種類的鯨魚。 然而，「平權」是當今時代的精神。如今，健康意見領袖、保健品公司，甚至一些醫生，開始談論一種男性版的「更年期」——這種現象有各種名稱，如「男性更年期」（manopause）、「雄性更年期」（andropause），或對喜愛縮寫的人而言，稱作「ADAM」，即「老年男性雄激素缺乏症」（Androgen Deficiency in the Ageing Male）。其症狀包括性慾減退、疲倦、肌肉萎縮與體脂增加等。 但男性真的會經歷更年期，或者說類似的情況嗎？ 某種程度上，答案顯然是否定的。更年期是指女性月經的停止，從而失去生育能力，通常發生於50歲出頭。而男性則不同，他們即使進入老年仍能保持生育能力。例如，美國演員艾爾·帕西諾（Al Pacino）在83歲時仍育有一子。 女性在更年期間，雌激素與黃體素等性激素會急遽且迅速地下降。而男性的主要性激素——睪固酮，則多半從中年開始逐年緩慢下降。但與女性不同的是，這種下降沒有劇烈斷崖式的變化，其速率大約每年1%，且通常一生中都仍維持在正常範圍內。 有時，被歸咎為「男性更年期」的症狀，其實可能源自中年生活的現實。工作與家庭責任兩頭燒導致的疲倦極為常見；身體鬆弛與肌肉萎縮則多半是長年久坐辦公、缺乏運動的後果。 儘管如此，的確有部分男性罹患「男性性腺機能低下症」（male hypogonadism），即睪丸無法產生足夠睪固酮的醫學狀況。其盛行率因研究而異。一篇2020年發表的綜合文獻指出，美國一項針對老年男性的研究估計，60多歲男性中約有20%可能患病。但另一項歐洲研究則認為，同齡族群的患病率僅為3.2%。其成因不總是明確（但肥胖似乎無助於改善）。不過，與女性更年期不同，這並非老化過程的必然結果。 女性更年期可透過荷爾蒙補充療法（HRT）進行治療，使用藥丸或凝膠補充缺乏的性激素，以緩解不適症狀。類似地，越來越多男性也選擇接受睪固酮補充療法（TRT）以達成同樣目的。過去20年間，相關處方快速增加，但何時應該開始治療，目前醫界尚未有明確共識。 不過，睪固酮——這種最早的合成代謝類固醇——在某些層面上確實堪稱「青春之泉」。服用睪固酮的男性會增肌、減脂，且運動後恢復得更快（這也是為何在大多數運動項目中，睪固酮被視為禁藥的原因）。至於TRT的利與弊，則是另一篇文章的主題。但必須小心：副作用可能包括禿頭，以及具有諷刺意味的——不孕。因為外源性睪固酮會使身體自我調節，減少睪固酮的自然產量。睪丸內的生成量降低後，可能導致精子產量減少，甚至完全停止。換句話說，為了緩解所謂男性更年期的症狀，服用TRT的男性反而可能重現女性更年期最關鍵的特徵。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. If China invaded Taiwan, who would enter the war? Japan and the Philippines would struggle to stay out. But what about the rest? At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, French President Emmanuel Macron raised a key question: What if China launches a major military operation against Taiwan? His cautious stance reflects broader global uncertainty. A report by the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) warns that if the U.S. stays out of such a conflict, most other countries likely would, too. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth countered that China would face “devastating consequences” if it attacked Taiwan. But confidence in America's commitment is fading, especially after Donald Trump’s suggestion that Taiwan aid would be negotiable. Some in the Pentagon even doubt Taiwan’s ability to resist. If the U.S. does intervene, Japan and the Philippines would be most directly affected. Japan might limit its role to missile and submarine support. The Philippines, with 175,000 nationals in Taiwan, would be cautious, though tensions in the South China Sea could escalate if China gets bogged down. South Korea, Australia, and India would be under U.S. pressure to help. South Korea would focus on deterring North Korea, offering logistics support at most. Australia, a key U.S. partner, has made no commitment but risks straining ties if it stays out. India would likely remain on the sidelines militarily but assist with intelligence and naval operations. Southeast Asia—home to 900,000 nationals in Taiwan—would mostly try to stay neutral due to trade ties with China, though the U.S. would seek base access in Thailand and Singapore. In Europe, concern is growing. France, Italy, and Britain have deployed naval assets to the region. While direct military support is unlikely, EU-wide sanctions—particularly trade restrictions—could significantly impact China, though such a move remains a difficult political challenge. 1. 如果中國入侵台灣，誰會參戰？ 日本與菲律賓最難置身事外，但其他國家又會怎麼選擇？ 在新加坡舉行的香格里拉對話中，法國總統馬克宏提出了一個關鍵問題：如果中國對台灣發動大規模軍事行動，世界各國會如何反應？他的謹慎態度反映了全球對此情勢的普遍不確定。一份由美國智庫「新美國安全中心」（CNAS）發表的報告警告，如果美國選擇不介入，大多數其他國家也可能選擇袖手旁觀。 美國國防部長皮特‧赫格塞斯反駁稱，中國若動武將面臨「毀滅性後果」。但對美國承諾的信心正在減弱，尤其是在川普曾表示援助台灣需經過「協商」之後。一些五角大廈官員甚至懷疑台灣有能力堅持抵抗。 若美國選擇介入，最直接受影響的將是日本與菲律賓。日本可能僅限於提供飛彈或潛艦支援。擁有17.5萬名國民在台灣的菲律賓將更為謹慎，不過若中國軍隊陷入苦戰，南海的緊張局勢可能升高。 南韓、澳洲與印度也會面臨美國的施壓。南韓將優先關注北韓可能趁機挑釁，頂多提供後勤支援。澳洲雖是美國的重要盟友，卻尚未做出承諾，若選擇不參與，可能損及與美方的關係。印度則多半會專注於中印邊界防禦，但預料會在情報與反潛作戰上提供協助。 東南亞地區約有90萬持護照者在台灣工作與生活，考量與中國的貿易依賴，多數國家可能選擇保持中立；不過，美國可能尋求使用泰國與新加坡的空軍與海軍基地。 至於歐洲方面，對中國可能入侵台灣的擔憂也日益升高。法國、義大利與英國已向亞太地區派遣軍艦。雖然直接軍事支援可能性不高，但歐盟若能統一對中國實施制裁，特別是貿易限制，可能對中國造成重大衝擊，儘管這樣的決定在政治上仍極具挑戰性。 2. Taiwan thinks the unthinkable: **resisting China **without America Its plan was to hold off a Chinese attack until America turned up. What now? Taiwan’s defence strategy has long hinged on surviving a Chinese assault for at least a month—enough time for the U.S. to intervene. But confidence in that rescue is weakening, especially as American political rhetoric grows more uncertain. Donald Trump’s ambivalence on defending Ukraine and previous remarks belittling Taiwan’s chances have rattled nerves on the island. “Strategic ambiguity,” the U.S. policy of neither committing to nor denying military support, was meant to deter reckless moves by either China or Taiwan. But now, ambiguity fuels anxiety. Taiwan’s opposition accuses America of being unreliable, while Beijing remains unsure whether a quick win is even possible after observing Russia’s failed blitz on Ukraine. The ongoing war in Ukraine has shifted Taiwan’s focus. Now the goal is prolonged resistance. At a recent Taiwan Trilateral Forum in Berlin, Taiwanese officials stressed the need to demonstrate the island’s ability to fight over an extended period. The logic: buying time for international aid and challenging China’s legitimacy. There’s growing awareness of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities—from its reliance on imports for chip manufacturing to its energy dependence. Public sentiment is shifting too: previously anti-nuclear groups are reconsidering for national security’s sake. Taiwan is boosting civilian resilience through stockpiles, training drills, and learning from countries like Israel and Finland. New President Lai Ching-te is more open than predecessor Tsai Ing-wen, publicly leading resilience efforts to bridge partisan divides. Diplomatically, such efforts let allies support Taiwan without provoking China through arms deals. Some Taiwanese quietly debate a final step: preparing for resistance even under occupation. Though controversial, it reflects a sobering realization from Ukraine—survival requires preparation, unity, and the will to endure. 台灣思考難以想像的未來：在沒有美國援助下抵抗中國 台灣的防衛策略長期以來依賴於一個前提：能夠撐過中國的攻擊至少一個月，好讓美國有時間介入。然而，對這場「及時救援」的信心正日益動搖，特別是在美國的政治言論越來越不確定的情況下。川普對烏克蘭防衛問題的模糊態度，以及過去輕視台灣自保能力的言論，已讓台灣人心惶惶。 美國長期奉行的「戰略模糊」政策──不明確表示是否會軍援台灣──原意是為了防止中台任何一方魯莽改變現狀。但如今，這種模糊反而成了焦慮的來源。台灣在野黨指責美國靠不住，而北京則因俄羅斯閃電戰在烏克蘭的失敗，也開始懷疑自己是否真能迅速取勝。 烏克蘭戰爭的持久性也迫使台灣重新思考防禦戰略。如今的重點轉為長期抗戰。在最近於柏林舉行的台灣三方論壇中，台灣官員強調，必須向國際展示其具備持久作戰的能力。其戰略邏輯在於拖延時間以等待國際支援，並挑戰中國的正當性。 對台灣脆弱性的認識也在上升，從對半導體製造原料的進口依賴，到能源供應的脆弱性。輿論也出現轉變：原本反對核能的團體，現在也開始重新評估能源政策與國安的關係。政府正透過糧食、水、藥品和能源儲備、全民演習等方式，強化民間韌性，並向以色列和芬蘭等國學習。 新任總統賴清德比前總統蔡英文更願意公開推動這些防衛努力，希望彌合黨派分歧。這也為盟友提供不需出售武器就能援助台灣的外交空間，減少激怒中國的風險。 一些台灣人也開始默默討論最後一步：即便被佔領，也要準備抵抗。雖然這在島內極具爭議，但從烏克蘭的經驗來看，這反映出一個嚴峻的現實：要生存，必須提前準備、保持團結，並有堅持到底的決心。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1) 流行歌曲越來越短 Hit songs are getting shorter The trend is not as bad as it sounds Summer hits are getting shorter. Sabrina Carpenter’s Short n’ Sweet and Charli XCX’s Brat were full of two-minute tracks, reflecting a broader trend. The average Billboard Hot 100 hit has dropped from 4:22 in 1990 to 3:34 in 2024—the shortest since the 1960s. Technology has shaped this shift. Early records allowed only a few minutes per side, while CDs and cassettes allowed longer songs. Now, streaming and TikTok reward brevity. Artists are paid after 30 seconds of streaming, prompting quicker hooks and shorter runtimes. TikTok virality also favors snappy, attention-grabbing tunes—though longer songs like Lola Young’s “Messy” can still succeed. Short songs aren’t necessarily low quality. While some are throwaway tracks like the 34-second “Steve’s Lava Chicken”, others—like Ray Charles’s “Hit the Road Jack”—are timeless classics. Producers say that short songs, especially for **emerging **artists, are key to grabbing attention. Just like good editing in writing, trimming songs can bring clarity and impact. To stand out in today’s crowded music scene, short and sweet might be the smartest strategy. 熱門歌曲變得越來越短 這個趨勢並沒有看起來那麼糟 今年夏天的熱門歌曲越來越短。Sabrina Carpenter 的《Short n’ Sweet》與 Charli XCX 的《Brat》充滿了兩分鐘左右的曲目，反映出一個更廣泛的趨勢。Billboard Hot 100 榜上的熱門歌曲平均時長，從 1990 年的 4 分 22 秒，下降到 2024 年的 3 分 34 秒，是自 1960 年代以來最短的紀錄。 這一變化受到科技的影響。早期唱片一面只能容納幾分鐘的音樂，後來 CD 與卡帶允許更長的播放時間。如今，串流平台與 TikTok 更偏好簡短作品。串流播放在達到 30 秒後才開始付費，因此藝人更傾向於快速進入副歌並縮短整體長度。TikTok 的爆紅機制也鼓勵創造吸睛、節奏快的音樂——儘管像 Lola Young 的《Messy》這種較長的歌曲也能成功。 短歌不等於低品質。有些可能只是隨性之作（例如只有 34 秒的《Steve’s Lava Chicken》），但也有像 Ray Charles 的經典名曲《Hit the Road Jack》這樣的永恆之作。 製作人表示，對新進歌手來說，短歌是吸引注意力的關鍵。就像寫作時的精簡編輯，刪減歌曲內容能帶來更清晰且有力的表現。在競爭激烈的音樂市場中，「短而精」或許是最聰明的策略。 2) 西方媒體decline, 而中國話語權擴張 China and Russia are deploying powerful new weapons: ideas The West is retreating from the battle of** the narrative** As Western media funding declines, China and Russia are aggressively expanding their global media influence. Russia-backed African Initiative in Mali trains journalists with covert ties to its intelligence services. China’s Xinhua now has 37 bureaus across Africa and offers scholarships to shape foreign journalists. Both countries are using platforms like Facebook to amplify their messages—CGTN is now the most-followed news outlet on the site, surpassing CNN and the New York Times. Russia’s RT and Sputnik are expanding in Africa and Latin America, often sharing resources with local state-run networks. China’s StarTimes is now Africa’s second-largest digital TV provider. Studies show that exposure to Chinese ads correlates with more pro-China media coverage abroad. Meanwhile, Western broadcasters like Voice of America face budget cuts, and independent outlets like Moldova’s Ziarul de Garda struggle to survive. Turkey is also entering the media fray, launching Somali-language news and hiring ex-BBC staff. Through “narrative laundering” and strategic ad spending, authoritarian powers are shaping global opinion while the West retreats. BBC chief Tim Davie warns the democratic world is at risk without renewed investment in international broadcasting. 中國與俄羅斯部署的新武器：思想 西方正在從敘事戰場撤退 隨著西方媒體資金縮減，中國與俄羅斯正積極擴張其全球媒體影響力。俄羅斯在馬利的「非洲倡議」訓練記者，背後實際上與其情報機構有關聯；中國新華社則已在非洲設立 37 個分部，並提供獎學金培養外國記者。兩國也透過 Facebook 等平台擴大聲量——中國的 CGTN 已成為該網站上追蹤人數最多的新聞媒體，超越 CNN 和《紐約時報》。 俄羅斯的 RT 與 Sputnik 正在非洲和拉丁美洲擴展，常與當地官方媒體共享資源；中國的星空傳媒（StarTimes）則已成為非洲第二大數位電視供應商。有研究顯示，觀看中國廣告的民眾，更容易接受親中媒體的敘事。 與此同時，西方媒體如美國之音（VOA）正面臨預算削減，獨立媒體如摩爾多瓦的《Ziarul de Garda》也艱難維生。土耳其也加入戰局，推出索馬利語新聞，並聘請前 BBC 員工。 透過「敘事漂白」與廣告投資，威權政權正在重塑全球輿論，而西方卻節節敗退。BBC 總裁提姆·戴維（Tim Davie）警告：若不重新投資國際廣播，民主世界將面臨失語風險。 3) 全球趨勢: 大家越來越喜歡生女孩! Leaders | Phew, it’s a girl! The stunning decline of the preference for having boys Millions of girls were aborted for being girls. Now parents often lean towards them The global trend of sex-selective abortions—millions of girls aborted for being girls—is sharply declining. In 2000, 1.6 million girls were “missing” at birth; in 2025, that number is down to 200,000. Countries like China, India, and South Korea, once plagued by skewed sex ratios, have seen major corrections. This shift reflects the weakening of deep-rooted sexism and brings social benefits: fewer “bare branches”—men unable to marry—means less violence and instability. Remarkably, in some places, mild girl preference is emerging. Parents now increasingly choose girls through IVF, adoption, and even family planning.** Reasons include perceptions that girls are easier to raise or better caretakers, and growing concern over boys’ struggles: they lag in education, face higher incarceration rates, and lack role models in schools.** Governments are exploring boy-focused interventions, like delaying school entry or boosting vocational training. Meanwhile, cheap early pregnancy tests and future gene-editing may further shift family planning. The decline of gendercide is worth celebrating. But a new imbalance—this time favoring girls—could bring fresh challenges, especially in dating and relationships. A future with more women than men might be peaceful, but not without complications. 領袖專欄｜呼！是女孩！ 對男孩偏好驟降的驚人趨勢 曾有數百萬女孩僅因性別遭到墮胎，如今父母卻越來越偏好她們 全球因性別選擇而進行的墮胎現象——數百萬女孩僅因為是女性而被終止生命——如今正迅速下降。2000 年，出生時「失蹤」的女孩數量達 160 萬；到了 2025 年，這個數字已降至 20 萬。中國、印度與南韓這些曾飽受性別比例失衡困擾的國家，已見明顯改善。這項轉變顯示根深蒂固的性別歧視正在減弱，並帶來社會正面影響：如未婚男性（被稱為「光棍」）數量減少，暴力與社會不穩也隨之下降。 更令人驚訝的是，在某些地區，對女孩的溫和偏好正悄然浮現。透過試管嬰兒、收養或生育規劃，越來越多父母選擇女孩。原因包括：女孩被認為較容易教養、日後能照顧父母，以及對男孩處境日益憂心——他們在學業表現落後、犯罪率更高，學校中也缺乏男性榜樣。 各國政府開始思考針對男孩的政策干預，例如延後入學年齡、加強職業訓練等。與此同時，早期血液性別檢測與未來可能普及的基因編輯技術，也可能進一步影響家庭的生育選擇。 性別歧視式墮胎的衰退值得慶賀。但新的性別失衡——這次是偏愛女孩——可能引發新的挑戰，特別是在戀愛與婚姻關係上。雖然女性多於男性的世界或許更加和平，但未必就沒有複雜問題。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. Can China Undermine Taiwan’s Will to Resist? China appears to be ramping up its psychological campaign against Taiwan, aiming for a “Peiping model” — a bloodless takeover by convincing the island that resistance is futile. While the People’s Liberation Army rehearses blockades, Chinese influence efforts are already in motion. Espionage prosecutions in Taiwan have surged, and even members of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are under investigation. Taiwan is politically divided. President Lai Ching-te’s DPP disavows reunification with China, while the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) favors closer ties. The KMT and the populist Taiwan People’s Party dominate the legislature and have clashed with Lai, cutting defense budgets and passing controversial laws that weaken the executive branch. Beijing is leveraging local ties, such as with KMT leader Fu Kun-chi, who represents Hualien. After his visit to China, Beijing lifted a ban on pomelo imports—from Hualien only—boosting his popularity at home despite national criticism. Public morale is faltering. Polls show declining trust in the U.S., rising fears of eventual unification with China, and dissatisfaction with the DPP, especially among young voters focused on domestic issues like housing and wages. Despite a strong preference among Taiwanese to maintain the status quo, fewer believe it’s sustainable. China's cognitive warfare seems to be working, sowing doubt and fatigue.** The real test of Taiwan's resilience may come sooner than expected.** 中國能削弱台灣的抗拒意志嗎？ 中國正加強對台灣的心理戰，目標是實現「北平模式」——不戰而屈人之兵，讓台灣相信抵抗毫無意義。雖然解放軍仍在演練封鎖行動，但滲透與認知作戰早已展開。台灣近年來間諜案激增，甚至連執政的民進黨都有成員遭調查。 台灣政局分裂。總統賴清德領導的民進黨堅決反對與中國統一，而在野的國民黨（KMT）主張與中國加強交流，與民眾黨聯手掌控立法院，並與賴政府對立，刪減國防預算，通過削弱總統職權的法案。 中國也利用地方政治力量，如代表花蓮的國民黨立委傅崐萁。傅赴中國後，中方僅解除對花蓮文旦的進口禁令，讓他在當地人氣上升，儘管在全國範圍內受到批評。 民心開始動搖。民調顯示對美國的不信任上升，對「被統一」的預期增加，而對民進黨的支持減弱，尤其是年輕選民更關心房價與薪資等民生議題。 雖然逾八成台灣人希望維持現狀，但相信能長期維持的比例不斷下降。中國的認知戰似乎奏效，正在削弱台灣的信心與意志。台灣的真正考驗，可能比想像中來得更快。 2. Podcast: Increasingly the sense is that China’s not quite ready for an invasion, that President Xi Jinping doesn’t trust the PLA to be able to do it quickly enough and at acceptable cost. So the feeling now is that just as likely as an invasion or perhaps more likely than invasion is some kind of **blockade or quarantine or siege **of the island to exert unbearable pressure on it. 愈來愈多的跡象顯示，中國目前尚未準備好發動對台灣的全面入侵。外界普遍認為，中共領導人習近平對解放軍的能力仍存疑，擔心軍事行動無法迅速完成，且代價過高。因此，與其說中國準備入侵台灣，更可能、甚至更可行的策略，是對台實施某種形式的封鎖、隔離或圍困，藉此對台灣施加無法承受的壓力，逼使其屈服。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. Why the MAGA (Make America Great Again) economy is thriving The world’s largest market is becoming two 1) America is increasingly splitting into two distinct economies: one liberal, the other conservative or "MAGA." This divide is evident in consumer behavior, economic activity, and industrial composition. Conservatives favor brands like MyPillow, Black Rifle Coffee, and Jeremy’s Razors—products often marketed with overt patriotism or anti-woke sentiments. Liberals tend to mock these as scams or culturally backward, but the MAGA economy is thriving nonetheless. 美國正日益分裂為兩個截然不同的經濟體系：一個是自由派的，另一個是保守派或所謂的「MAGA」派。這種分裂在消費行為、經濟活動以及產業結構上表現得非常明顯。保守派偏好像 MyPillow、Black Rifle Coffee 和 Jeremy’s Razors 這類品牌——這些產品通常以強烈的愛國情懷或反覺醒文化的形象進行行銷。自由派則常嘲諷這些品牌是騙局或文化上的倒退，然而，MAGA 經濟體依然蓬勃發展。 2) Despite Democratic areas contributing two-thirds of U.S. GDP, Republican regions still generate around $10 trillion annually, which would rank as the world’s third-largest economy. These areas are also seeing rising incomes and population growth. For example, nearly half of all Americans earning over $1 million in 2024 lived in Trump-voting states. 儘管民主黨地區貢獻了美國三分之二的國內生產總值（GDP），共和黨地區每年仍創造約10兆美元的經濟產值，若單獨計算，將堪稱全球第三大經濟體。這些地區的收入與人口也在持續成長。例如，在2024年，將近一半年收入超過100萬美元的美國人居住在投票支持川普的州。 3) Consumer preferences and spending habits differ sharply by political affiliation. Democrats spend more on dining out and public transport; Republicans spend more on cars and nursing homes. Events like Trump’s 2016 victory and the COVID-19 pandemic further widened these gaps. MAGA regions were less economically impacted by lockdowns and have shifted towards manufacturing, while liberal regions moved into tech and information sectors. 消費者的偏好與消費習慣在政治立場上呈現明顯差異。民主黨支持者較常外出用餐並花更多於公共交通；而共和黨支持者則在汽車與療養院方面的支出較高。川普於2016年當選以及COVID-19疫情等事件進一步擴大了這些差距。MAGA 地區在封鎖期間受到的經濟衝擊較小，並逐漸轉向製造業發展；相對地，自由派地區則愈加集中於科技與資訊產業。 4) Surveys show** stark partisan divides **in economic outlooks and inflation expectations. Market data also reflect the split: companies aligned with Republican values like Fox, John Deere, and Harley-Davidson have outperformed liberal-associated firms like Etsy and Lululemon over the past decade. Investment funds focused on Republican-aligned companies have also outpaced their Democratic counterparts. 調查顯示，民主與共和兩黨支持者在經濟前景與通膨預期方面存在明顯分歧。市場數據同樣反映這種分裂：與共和黨價值觀相符的企業，如福斯新聞（Fox）、約翰迪爾（John Deere）和哈雷機車（Harley-Davidson），在過去十年中的表現超越了與自由派相關的公司，如 Etsy 和 Lululemon。以共和黨傾向企業為主的投資基金，其績效也領先於專注於民主黨企業的基金。 5) Though the MAGA economy may face challenges, such as Trump’s tariffs, strong internal migration to red states and robust consumer confidence suggest its resilience. This bifurcation isn’t just ideological—it’s reshaping America’s markets, workplaces, and consumer culture in real, measurable ways. 儘管 MAGA 經濟可能面臨如川普關稅等挑戰，但由於大量人口內部遷移至紅州以及強勁的消費者信心，顯示出其韌性。這種經濟分化不僅是意識形態上的對立，更在實質上、可量化地重塑美國的市場、職場與消費文化。 2. Lessons from the US-China trade war 1) In a recent Money Talks podcast from The Economist, hosts Mike Bird and Ethan Wu examine the evolution and future of U.S.-China economic relations, focusing on Donald Trump’s trade war and the broader shift towards economic warfare. Once** touted by** Trump as “easy to win,” the trade war has proven more complex and disruptive. Despite recent tariff de-escalations, the economic relationship between China and the U.S. is clearly fracturing, creating real-world consequences like disrupted shipping and reactive stockpiling. 2) China has taken note of America’s economic power and is reassessing its vulnerability. Dan Wang, a China expert, highlights how China has been preparing for potential autarky—economic self-sufficiency—by studying how to withstand U.S. sanctions. The broader message is that China sees the economic tools wielded by the U.S., like financial sanctions, as potent threats. 3) Eddie Fishman, a former Obama-era sanctions architect and author of Chokepoints, argues that economic weapons go far beyond tariffs. A key example is the U.S.'s ability to unilaterally cut countries off from the dollar-based global financial system, causing significant economic pain. This immense power can be executed swiftly through executive orders, making it a modern “weapon of mass economic destruction.” 4) The hosts point out that the current tension may lead to a long-term global realignment, with countries diversifying away from the U.S. economy to protect themselves. Asian investors and sovereign wealth funds are already reconsidering their exposure to U.S. assets due to perceived instability. 5) Overall, the podcast underscores that while tariffs may grab headlines, deeper and more sophisticated forms of economic warfare—like sanctions, tech bans, and financial system exclusion—pose greater long-term risks. The global economy is moving away from a unified system toward fractured, politically-aligned blocs, and both the U.S. and China are preparing for a more adversarial future. · 在近期《經濟學人》的 Money Talks 播客中，主持人 Mike Bird 與 Ethan Wu 探討美中經濟關係的演變與未來，焦點放在川普發動的貿易戰以及更廣泛的經濟戰手段。川普曾聲稱這場貿易戰「容易取勝」，但事實證明其影響更為複雜且具破壞性。儘管近期關稅有所緩解，美中之間的經濟關係已明顯破裂，導致現實問題如航運混亂與企業囤貨。 · 中國注意到美國的經濟力量，開始重新評估自身的脆弱性。中國問題專家王丹指出，中國早已開始為可能的經濟自給自足（自力更生）做準備，並研究如何承受美國制裁。整體訊息是，中國將美國所掌握的經濟工具（如金融制裁）視為強大威脅。 · 歐巴馬政府時期的制裁設計者、同時也是《Chokepoints》一書作者 Eddie Fishman 指出，經濟武器的範圍遠超過關稅。美國有能力單方面切斷其他國家與以美元為基礎的全球金融體系的連結，透過總統行政命令即可迅速執行，造成極大經濟痛苦，堪稱現代版「經濟大規模毀滅性武器」。 · 主持人指出，當前緊張情勢可能導致長期的全球經濟重組，各國為了自保，正開始從美國經濟中撤資。亞洲投資者與主權財富基金已重新思考對美資產的曝險程度，因為這些資產正被視為不穩定風險源。 · 總結來說，該播客強調，雖然關稅易引起關注，但更深層、更複雜的經濟戰手段——如制裁、科技禁令與排除於金融體系之外——才是真正的長期風險。全球經濟正從一體化走向分裂，逐漸形成政治陣營分明的經濟集團，而美中雙方都正為更加對立的未來做準備。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Trump is a threat to Asia’s giant insurers Not just its exporters May 8th 2025|Hong Kong and Singapore Shorter version 1) Taiwan, despite its high-tech economy and strong exports, still has surprisingly cheap prices—Big Macs, for example, are the cheapest among tracked countries. This hints that the Taiwanese dollar (TWD) is undervalued. Despite Taiwan’s massive current-account surplus and booming chip exports, its currency has stayed stable for years. 台灣儘管擁有高科技經濟和強勁的出口，物價卻出奇地便宜——例如，在所有受追蹤的國家中，台灣的巨無霸漢堡價格是最便宜的 (台幣81元)。這顯示出台幣（TWD）可能被低估了。儘管台灣擁有龐大的經常帳盈餘與蓬勃發展的晶片出口，其匯率多年間卻一直相當穩定。 2) But in early May, that changed. The TWD suddenly** surge**d by 5%—its biggest move since the 1980s. Ironically, this shift happened while many expected the dollar to rise under Trump’s trade threats. Instead, the U.S. dollar weakened, forcing Taiwanese exporters to convert foreign earnings before they lost more value. 然而在五月初，情況發生了變化。台幣突然上漲了5%，創下自1980年代以來最大的單日波動。諷刺的是，這一變動發生在許多人預期川普貿易威脅會推升美元的情況下。然而，美元反而走弱，迫使台灣出口商趕緊將外幣收益兌換為台幣，以避免資產進一步貶值。 3) Taiwan’s life insurers may have played a key role in the surge. They face a currency mismatch—holding mostly U.S.-dollar assets but paying policies in TWD. As the local currency strengthened, they rushed to hedge, creating more demand for TWD and amplifying its rise. 台灣的壽險公司可能在這波台幣升值中扮演了關鍵角色。它們面臨貨幣錯配的風險——資產大多為美元計價，但保單給付卻以台幣支付。隨著台幣升值，壽險業者急於進行避險操作，進一步推升了對台幣的需求，加劇了升值幅度。 4) The central bank, which usually keeps the currency stable, did not** intervene** at first—possibly to avoid attention during sensitive trade talks with the U.S., which monitors Taiwan for currency manipulation. But after the sharp moves on May 5th, it was forced to act. 台灣央行一向致力於維持匯率穩定，但起初並未干預——可能是為了在與美國進行敏感貿易談判期間避免引起關注，畢竟美國正將台灣列為匯率操縱的觀察對象。然而，在5月5日出現劇烈波動後，央行被迫出手干預。 5) Though the central bank insists the currency is not part of trade negotiations, its quiet role in guiding the TWD is under renewed scrutiny. It can prevent the currency from rising further—but not from drawing more attention, especially if the U.S. dollar keeps sliding. 儘管台灣央行堅稱匯率問題並非貿易談判的一部分，但其在引導台幣匯率上的低調角色再次受到關注。央行可以阻止台幣進一步升值，但若美元持續走弱，台幣仍難以避免成為外界關注的焦點。 2. Business | Silicon surprise Huawei and other Chinese chip firms are catching up fast But they still depend on America and its allies in a few vital areas May 8th 2025|Shanghai 1) China’s chip sector is booming despite U.S. sanctions aimed at slowing its progress. Cambricon, a local AI chipmaker, has seen its share price soar 350% over the past year, far outpacing Nvidia. 儘管美國實施制裁試圖放緩中國的發展，中國晶片產業依然蓬勃發展。當地 AI 晶片製造商寒武紀（Cambricon）在過去一年股價飆漲了 350%，遠遠超越輝達（Nvidia）的漲幅。 2) The U.S. has blocked the sale of Nvidia’s H20 chip to China and plans to replace its export licensing system with stricter measures. Yet Chinese AI labs remain active, with tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent expanding data centers. 美國已禁止對中國銷售輝達的 H20 晶片，並計劃以更嚴格的措施取代現行的出口許可制度。然而，中國的 AI 實驗室依然活躍，阿里巴巴與騰訊等科技巨頭仍在擴建資料中心。 3) Breakthroughs like DeepSeek’s lower chip requirements and underground supply chains have helped. At the same time, Chinese firms are advancing rapidly. Huawei’s new CloudMatrix cluster reportedly outperforms Nvidia’s NVL72, although it uses more power. Other firms like Cambricon and Hygon are releasing chips designed to replace Nvidia’s A100. 像 DeepSeek 降低晶片需求的技術突破，以及地下供應鏈的協助，使中國持續推進。同時，中國企業也快速進步。據報導，華為最新的 CloudMatrix 晶片叢集效能已超越輝達的 NVL72，雖然耗電較高。寒武紀與海光等公司也推出了用來取代輝達 A100 的 AI 晶片。 4) China is also progressing in memory tech. CXMT is catching up in high-bandwidth memory (HBM), a field dominated by firms from South Korea and the U.S. Domestic toolmakers like AMEC and Naura are developing** alternatives** to previously U.S.-controlled chipmaking equipment. 中國在記憶體技術方面也有進展。長鑫存儲（CXMT）正在追趕高頻寬記憶體（HBM）技術，該領域原由南韓與美國企業主導。國內設備製造商如中微公司（AMEC）與北方華創（Naura）也正開發替代過去由美國控制的晶片製造設備。 5) Still, China has limitations. Huawei’s chips rely on some foreign** components**. China lacks access to ASML’s cutting-edge lithography tools and remains behind in manufacturing the most advanced chips. TSMC, banned from supplying these to China, may still be involved indirectly—though denied by all parties. 儘管如此，中國仍面臨限制。華為的晶片仍依賴部分外國零件，中國也無法取得 ASML 的先進光刻機，且在製造最先進晶片方面仍落後。台積電雖被禁止向中國供應這類晶片，但外界猜測其仍可能間接參與，儘管各方均予以否認。 6) Software remains a challenge. Nvidia’s CUDA dominates AI development, and Huawei’s alternative, CANN, is buggy and unpopular. 軟體仍然是一個挑戰。 Nvidia 的 CUDA 主導著人工智慧的發展，而華為的替代方案 CANN 則有缺陷且不受歡迎。 7) Despite hurdles, Chinese firms are increasingly embracing local chips out of necessity. What was once a government push is now a national mission, backed by rising **private sector **support. ■ 儘管面臨障礙，中國企業出於需要越來越多採用國產晶片。這項曾經由政府推動的事業如今已成為一項國家使命，並得到了私營部門日益增多的支持。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. China’s secret weapon in the trade war As China grapples with steep U.S. tariffs—145% on exports—millions of** manufacturing **jobs are at risk. Goldman Sachs estimates 16 million workers are tied to goods for America, and Nomura warns of up to 15.8 million job losses long-term. 當中國面臨美國高達145%的出口關稅時，數百萬製造業工作岌岌可危。高盛估計，有1,600萬名工人從事出口到美國的商品生產，而野村證券則警告，長期來看可能會有高達1,580萬個工作崗位流失。 To soften the blow, Beijing has turned to its booming** gig economy**. Once eyed with suspicion, the sector is now seen as an economic lifeline. About 84 million workers, from delivery drivers to ride-hailing drivers, power this vast informal economy—far outnumbering the 54 million at state-owned enterprises. 為了緩解衝擊，北京轉向蓬勃發展的零工經濟。這個曾經備受懷疑的行業，如今被視為經濟的救命稻草。大約有8,400萬名工人，從外送員到共乘司機，支撐著這個龐大的非正式經濟體系——人數遠超國有企業的5,400萬名員工。 Meituan, for example, employs 7.5 million couriers earning $11 billion annually, with its workforce up 41% since 2021. JD.com recently entered the delivery space, aiming to hire 100,000 riders by July, fueling a hiring boom despite investor worries over rising labor costs. 例如，美團僱用了750萬名外送員，每年支付工資達110億美元，自2021年以來其勞動力規模增長了41%。京東最近也進軍外送市場，計劃在7月前招聘10萬名騎手，儘管投資者對勞動成本上升感到擔憂，但這仍引發了一波招聘熱潮。 The government is now encouraging these companies to offer social benefits, with JD.com promising to cover social-security premiums and Meituan piloting pension contributions. But many drivers remain skeptical, suspecting that these costs will ultimately come from their wages. 政府現在鼓勵這些公司提供社會福利，京東承諾將支付社保費用，美團則試點推行養老金繳納計畫。但許多騎手仍持懷疑態度，擔心這些成本最終還是會從他們的薪資中扣除。 Yet the gig economy’s resilience is not guaranteed. Analysts warn that rising costs or automation—like Meituan’s delivery drones and autonomous vehicles—could threaten these jobs. Still, for now, the gig sector offers China a critical cushion as it weathers the storm of the trade war, keeping both the economy and millions of workers afloat. 然而，零工經濟的韌性並非保證無虞。分析師警告，成本上升或自動化技術——例如美團的配送無人機和自駕車——可能威脅到這些工作。儘管如此，就目前而言，零工行業為中國在貿易戰風暴中提供了一個關鍵的緩衝，幫助經濟和數百萬勞工維持生計。 2. Edible rats are China’s latest live-streaming stars Cooking them on camera beats standing in a factory all day, and pays much better Once a factory worker, 38-year-old Xing Jianli now earns far more by **live-streaming **from her peony fields in Heze, Shandong. On a good day, she makes 3,000 yuan ($400)—about a month’s factory wage. She’s part of a wave of rural Chinese turning to live-streaming to sell farm products like flowers, poultry, and fruit directly to online buyers. 38歲的邢建麗曾是工廠工人，如今她靠在山東菏澤的牡丹花田裡直播銷售，收入遠超過以往。她好日子一天能賺3,000元（約400美元）——相當於工廠一個月的工資。她是越來越多中國農村居民轉向直播，直接向線上買家銷售花卉、家禽和水果的浪潮之一。 While urban influencers like “Lipstick King” Li Jiaqi dominate luxury sales, rural streamers are revitalizing local economies. In 2023, Kuaishou saw 1.4 billion agricultural orders, a 56% jump from the year before, while Alibaba reported 441 billion yuan in sales from China’s poorer villages between 2021 and 2024. 雖然像「口紅一哥」李佳琦這樣的城市網紅主導著奢侈品銷售，但農村主播正為地方經濟注入活力。2023年，快手上的農產品訂單達14億筆，比前一年激增56%；阿里巴巴則報告，2021至2024年間，中國貧困村莊的銷售額達到4,410億元。 **Middlemen **like 30-year-old Feng Yanhui also profit, buying from farmers and reselling via livestreams. Local governments are boosting the trend, offering training to returnees from cities. Heze even hosted a live-streaming competition, bringing in local celebrity Li Xiaoxia to inspire farmers. 像30歲的馮艷輝這樣的中間商也從中獲利，他向農民收購產品，再透過直播轉售。地方政府正在推動這股潮流，為返鄉的城市務工人員提供培訓。菏澤甚至舉辦了一場直播比賽，邀請當地網紅李曉霞來激勵農民。 Some streamers focus on selling rural life itself. The “Huanong Brothers” from Jiangxi became online stars live-streaming their bamboo rat farm, drawing 3.6 million Douyin fans. Li Ziqi from Sichuan gained over 28 million Weibo followers with serene videos of farming, cooking, and nature, reportedly selling 1.6 billion yuan in goods in 2020. Others grab attention with extreme stunts, like binge-drinking. 有些直播主專注於「銷售鄉村生活」本身。來自江西的「華農兄弟」透過直播竹鼠養殖場成為網紅，吸引了360萬抖音粉絲。來自四川的李子柒則以寧靜優美的農耕、烹飪與自然影片，在微博上獲得超過2800萬粉絲，據報導她在2020年銷售金額達到16億元人民幣。另一些人則透過極端行為吸引關注，例如狂飲烈酒等噱頭。 As competition grows, veterans like Heze’s Li Hui remain confident—this year, he expects to sell half a million peonies via his stream. For many, live-streaming has become a **lucrative **escape from factory drudgery and a lifeline for China’s rural economy. 隨著競爭日益激烈，像菏澤的老將李輝依然充滿信心——他預計今年透過直播能賣出50萬株牡丹花。對許多人而言，直播已成為逃離工廠苦差事的有利出路，也成了中國鄉村經濟的重要生命線。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

來聽聽我們在羅浮宮欣賞了哪些作品 以及對蒙娜麗莎的陰謀論 (?) -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

今天第一個景點就過門不入 第二個景點在入了門之後看了天花板就走人 第三個景點看了根柱子 品嘗美味的法式料理和蛋糕 獲得彼此相認的信物 馬上收聽這一集，就能看懂以上的敘述 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. Steve Witkoff, America’s envoy to Russia, met Vladimir Putin in Moscow as part of a renewed push to end the war in Ukraine. It was their fourth meeting. Donald Trump called the coming days “very important” for peace efforts. Ukrainian and European leaders oppose elements of America’s plan, which they argue would** legitimise** Russia’s territorial gains. 美國駐俄羅斯特使史蒂夫·威特科夫（Steve Witkoff）在莫斯科會見了弗拉基米爾·普丁（Vladimir Putin），這是為了重新推動結束烏克蘭戰爭的努力。他們已是第四次會晤。唐納·川普（Donald Trump）表示，未來幾天對於和平進程「非常重要」。然而，烏克蘭和歐洲領導人反對美國計劃中的一些內容，認為這些內容將使俄羅斯在領土上的擴張合法化。 2. Kash Patel, America’s FBI director, said in a social-media post that the agency arrested a county judge in Wisconsin. The post was deleted, but federal law-enforcement officials confirmed that Hannah Dugan, the judge, was in custody. She is accused of obstructing immigration officials’ attempt to arrest an illegal migrant who was appearing in her courtroom in a separate case. 美國聯邦調查局（FBI）局長卡什·帕特爾（Kash Patel）在社群媒體上發文表示，該機構逮捕了威斯康星州的一名郡法官。雖然該貼文後來被刪除，但聯邦執法官員證實，法官漢娜·杜根（Hannah Dugan）已被拘留。她被指控妨礙移民官員逮捕一名在她法庭上出庭、涉及另一案件的非法移民。 3. China said that some American imports would be exempt from its 125% tariffs, and asked businesses to submit lists of essential American goods. Earlier Mr Trump insisted that the two countries were engaged in trade talks—despite China’s denial that any such negotiations were taking place. Chinese officials have demanded that America “cancel all unilateral tariff measures” before beginning discussions. 中國表示，部分美國進口商品將可免除125%的關稅，並要求企業提交美國重要商品的清單。稍早，川普先生堅稱兩國正在進行貿易談判——儘管中國方面否認有任何此類協商正在進行。中國官員要求，美國必須「取消所有單方面的關稅措施」後，才能開始談判。 4. The Trump administration reversed its cancellation of around 1,500 student visas. Citing a decades-old immigration law, the government had attempted to deport students for infractions as minor as a speeding ticket. Some were targeted for allegedly participating in pro-Palestinian campus protests. Dozens of lawsuits were filed in response. The government said immigration authorities are developing the “framework” for a new policy. 川普政府撤銷了約1,500份學生簽證的取消決定。政府援引一項數十年前的移民法，曾試圖以如超速罰單這樣微小的違規行為來驅逐學生。有些學生則因被指控參與支持巴勒斯坦的校園抗議活動而成為目標。此舉引發了數十起訴訟。政府表示，移民當局正在制定一項新政策的「框架」。 5. India stepped up its response to an attack in Kashmir that killed 26 people. The country’s army began house-to-house searches and deployed soldiers in the region. Upendra Dwivedi, the head of India’s army, visited Srinagar, Kashmir’s largest city. Earlier soldiers from India and Pakistan exchanged fire along the countries’ border in Kashmir. No casualties were reported. 印度加強了對喀什米爾襲擊事件的回應，該事件造成26人死亡。印度軍隊開始逐家逐戶搜索，並在該地區部署士兵。印度陸軍參謀長烏潘德拉·德維迪（Upendra Dwivedi）也前往喀什米爾最大城市斯利那加（Srinagar）視察。稍早，印度與巴基斯坦士兵在喀什米爾邊境交火，但未傳出傷亡。 6. Iran said it would expand co-operation with Russia in agriculture, banking and energy, and sign a $4bn deal with Russian firms to develop oil fields. The pair also agreed to create a regional gas hub in Iran, potentially also involving Qatar and Turkmenistan. Both countries face Western sanctions and are seeking deeper ties. 伊朗表示，將在農業、銀行和能源領域擴大與俄羅斯的合作，並將與俄羅斯企業簽署一項價值40億美元的油田開發協議。雙方還同意在伊朗建立一個地區天然氣中心，可能也會邀請卡達和土庫曼斯坦參與。由於兩國都面臨西方制裁，因此正尋求加深雙邊關係。 7. British retail sales rose by 1.6% quarter on quarter in the first three months of the year. Figures in March rose by 0.4%; economists had predicted a drop. Good weather helped, especially for clothing and outdoor goods. But the mood is darkening: consumer confidence has dropped and American tariffs threaten growth. Big retailers, including Tesco and Sainsbury’s have warned of slowing profits. 英國今年第一季的零售銷售額較前一季成長了1.6%。三月份的銷售數據上升了0.4%，而經濟學家原本預測會下滑。良好的天氣帶來了助力，特別是對服裝和戶外用品的銷售。不過，整體氣氛正在轉差：消費者信心下降，美國關稅也威脅到經濟成長。大型零售商，包括樂購（Tesco）和聖茲伯里（Sainsbury’s）等，都警告說利潤正在放緩。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

As Chinese drills begin, Taiwan expels mainland influencers The government is drawing new lines around acceptable speech Apr 1st 2025|TAIPEI IN THE AIR and seas around Taiwan, China’s armed forces launched large-scale military exercises on April 1st, warning that the “reunification” of the self-ruling island—by military means if necessary—was “an unstoppable trend”. On the same day, Taiwan’s government took action against what it regards as the growing threat from within. Zhao Chan, a woman from the mainland whose online posts promoted Taiwan’s forced takeover by China, was deported. “I love the party and love my country,” she shouted as journalists jostled around her at Taipei’s airport. “Have I done anything wrong?” 在台灣周邊的空域與海域，中國的武裝部隊於4月1日展開大規模軍事演習，並警告稱對這個自治島嶼進行「統一」（如有必要將以武力）是「無法阻擋的趨勢」。同一天，台灣政府針對它所認為日益增長的內部威脅採取了行動。一名來自中國大陸、名叫趙婵的女子，因其網路言論主張中國應以武力統一台灣而被驅逐出境。「我愛黨、我愛國，」她在台北機場被媒體包圍時高喊道，「我到底做錯了什麼？」 Ms Zhao, who calls herself “Xiaowei” online, often posts videos featuring a large Chinese flag, saying things such as: “Come on, my fellow Taiwanese, let’s unite and go home together!!!” She is one of three social-media influencers—all of them women from the Chinese mainland who had married Taiwanese men—who were told in March they were no longer welcome to live on the island. Also ejected was Liu Zhenya (pictured), who liked to make videos of her daughter singing patriotic Chinese songs in front of iconic buildings in Taipei. “Maybe I’ll wake up tomorrow morning and find the entire island filled with five-star red flags,” Ms Liu had said in a video cheering another Chinese military drill last year. “The very thought fills my heart with joy.” 趙婵女士在網路上自稱「小薇」，她經常發布影片，背景通常是飄揚的大陸國旗，並說著類似「加油，我的台灣同胞們，我們一起團結回家吧！！！」這樣的言論。她是三位被台灣政府驅逐的中國大陸網紅之一——這三人皆為嫁給台灣男性的陸籍女性。這些人於三月被告知不再受歡迎，無法繼續在台灣居住。另一位被驅逐的是劉振亞，她喜歡拍攝女兒在台北地標建築前唱愛國歌曲的影片。劉女士曾在一段為中國軍演歡呼的影片中說道：「也許明天一早醒來，我會看到整個島上飄滿五星紅旗，光是這個想法就讓我心潮澎湃。」 Taiwan’s** national immigration agency **decided last month that posts such as these were “advocating military aggression” and “promoting the elimination of our nation’s *sovereignty*”. It revoked the trio’s residency permits and declared that they would have to leave the country within ten days. Ms Liu appealed; she said Taiwan’s government was wrong to separate her from her husband and children. But she left before she could be kicked out, as did Zhang Yan, a third influencer. Ms Zhao was the last to go, having handed herself into authorities the day after the deadline to depart expired. 台灣的國家移民署上個月裁定，這些貼文是在「鼓吹軍事侵略」並「宣傳消滅我國主權」。因此，當局撤銷了這三人的居留許可，並命令她們在十天內離境。劉振亞提出了申訴，表示台灣政府不該將她與丈夫和孩子分開。但她在被強制驅離前自行離境，第三位網紅張晏也同樣選擇自行離開。趙婵是最後一位離開的人，她在離境期限過後一天主動向當局報到。 The deportations have sparked a debate about free speech in Taiwan. Some say the government has gone too far. If any of the influencers was actually helping the Chinese armed forces attack or infiltrate Taiwan, that would be a security threat, wrote Bruce Liao, a law professor at National Chengchi University. “But if she is only talking about it then no matter how disgusting it is, it’s still just speech.” Such freedoms are what distinguish Taiwan’s democracy from authoritarian regimes, he added. 這些驅逐事件在台灣引發了關於言論自由的爭論。有些人認為政府做得太過火。國立政治大學法律系教授廖元豪指出，如果這些網紅當中有人實際協助中國軍方攻擊或滲透台灣，那確實構成國安威脅，「但如果她只是談論這些事情——無論多麼令人反感——那仍然只是言論。」他補充說，正是這樣的自由，才讓台灣的民主制度有別於威權政體。 Others retort that Taiwan needs to rebalance freedom of speech with national-security concerns. Chinese influencers in Taiwan have sometimes made videos** echoing official Chinese propaganda**. As it staged the latest wargames around Taiwan, China’s military declared Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s president, a “parasite”. It published a crude cartoon depicting Mr Lai as a green maggot, dangled from a pair of chopsticks while Taiwan burned below. 其他人則反駁說，台灣需要重新平衡言論自由和國家安全問題。台灣的中國有影響力人士有時會製作呼應中國官方宣傳的影片。中國軍方在台灣周邊舉行最新軍事演習時，稱台灣總統賴清德為「寄生蟲」。該報刊登了一幅粗俗的漫畫，將他描繪成一隻綠色的蛆蟲，懸掛在一雙筷子上，而台灣則在熊熊烈火中。 “We are living in a time when a Chinese blockade is imminent,” and yet pro-Chinese propaganda is flooding Taiwan’s media, says Raymond Sung of the Taiwan National Security Institute. Cracking down on Chinese influencers may only be the government’s “first step” in building a “unified national will to stand against the first wave of Chinese attack,” he says. Muzzling Taiwanese who support Chinese invasion could be next. The justice ministry has said it is thinking about new legislation after public consultations. 台灣國家安全研究所的宋雷蒙德表示，“我們生活在一個中國封鎖迫在眉睫的時代”，然而親中宣傳卻充斥著台灣媒體。他說，打擊中國有影響力的人物可能只是政府建立「統一的國家意志以抵抗中國第一波攻擊」的「第一步」。下一步可能是壓制支持中國入侵的台灣人。司法部表示正在考慮在公眾諮詢後制定新的立法。 If the deported influencers were hoping for a hero’s welcome on the mainland, they may be in for a shock. They have already drawn ridicule from Chinese netizens, who accuse them of milking patriotism for money while enjoying all the benefits of living in Taiwan. “Now they’re getting what they wished for: a return to the motherland’s embrace,” said one influencer inside China. “They can plant red flags here, too.” 如果這些被驅逐的網紅原本期待在中國大陸獲得英雄式的歡迎，那她們可能要大失所望了。她們已經遭到中國網民的嘲諷，指責她們一邊打著愛國的旗號賺錢，一邊享受在台灣生活的各種好處。「她們現在如願以償了：回到了祖國的懷抱，」一位在中國的網紅諷刺道，「在這裡她們也可以插紅旗啊。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

今天很悠哉地漫步在巴黎左岸 像拍廣告一樣，在巴黎左岸喝咖啡 在充滿時光韻味的小巷弄中迷路 似乎聞到的空氣都是上個世紀留下的 熱心的老奶奶為我們指路 雖然有著語言的隔閡，但我們能清楚感受到奶奶的愛與熱情 讓我們對巴黎的印象多增添一點溫暖 在巴黎的第二天，我們對這個城市的印象是什麼呢? 聽到最後，讓我們跟你分享 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

There is a vast hidden workforce behind AI Will they become redundant as the technology develops? Apr 10th 2025| SUMMARY When DeepSeek, a Chinese AI firm, released a cheap and efficient large language model in 2024, it challenged long-held beliefs about the resources needed to build AI—hardware, energy, and especially human labor. Behind every AI model lies a workforce, largely unseen, responsible for annotating data such as labeling images and transcribing audio to help machines "understand" the world. 2024 年，中國人工智慧公司 DeepSeek 發布了廉價高效的大型語言模型，挑戰了人們長期以來對建立人工智慧所需資源（硬體、能源，尤其是人力）的看法。每個人工智慧模型背後都有一支很大程度上看不見的勞動力，負責註釋數據，例如標記圖像和轉錄音頻，以幫助機器「理解」世界。 Though often dismissed as “unsexy,” this data work is foundational. Since Fei Fei Li’s ImageNet project in the 2000s, firms have outsourced** annotation** to low-cost labor markets, like India and rural China. While firms like Scale AI and iMerit professionalized the field, many annotators still earn low wages and face tight monitoring. 儘管這些數據工作常常被認為是“不夠吸引人”，但卻具有基礎性。自 21 世紀李飛飛( ai教母--李飛飛，史丹佛大學首位紅杉講席教授，美國國家工程院院士，美國國家醫學院院士， 美國文理科學院院士。)的 ImageNet 專案以來，企業已將註釋工作外包給印度和中國農村等低成本勞動市場。儘管 Scale AI 和 iMerit 等公司使該領域專業化，但許多註釋員的工資仍然很低，並且面臨嚴格的監控。 However, the nature of annotation is changing. Basic labeling tasks are declining as AI matures and begins to label its own data or use pre-labelled datasets. Advanced models require higher-skilled annotators—often with PhDs or coding expertise—to handle nuanced tasks like evaluating chatbot responses or checking AI-generated synthetic data. 然而，註釋的性質正在改變。隨著人工智慧的成熟並開始標記自己的數據或使用預先標記的數據集，基本標記任務正在減少。高階模型需要更高技能的註釋者（通常具有博士學位或編碼專業知識）來處理細微的任務，例如評估聊天機器人的回應或檢查人工智慧產生的合成資料。 This human input remains crucial. AI’s complexity, especially in language models, demands human judgment to ensure accuracy, ethical alignment, and cultural nuance. For example, ChatGPT’s frequent use of the word “delve” reflected the linguistic habits of its African annotators, illustrating how human influence shapes AI output. 這種人力投入仍然至關重要。人工智慧的複雜性，尤其是在語言模型方面，需要人類的判斷來確保準確性、道德一致性和文化細微差別。例如，ChatGPT 頻繁使用「delve」一詞，反映了其非洲註釋者的語言習慣，說明了人類的影響如何塑造人工智慧的輸出。 Although the industry aims for fully self-training AI, models still rely heavily on humans—especially for feedback,** edge cases**, and *ethical oversight*. As AI advances, the demand may shift but not disappear. Annotators, once likened to parents guiding AI's early steps, are evolving into advisors helping AI navigate a complex world. 儘管該行業的目標是實現完全自我訓練的人工智慧，但模型仍然嚴重依賴人類——尤其是在反饋、邊緣情況和道德監督方面。隨著人工智慧的進步，需求可能會改變但不會消失。註釋者曾經被比喻為引導人工智慧早期發展的父母，現在正在演變成幫助人工智慧探索複雜世界的顧問。 In short, far from being obsolete, human annotators remain essential to AI’s development—just in new and more sophisticated roles. 簡而言之，人類註釋者遠未過時，他們對於人工智慧的發展仍然至關重要——只是扮演著新的、更複雜的角色。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How America could end up making China great again A big beautiful opportunity 1) Editor’s note (April 5th 2025): On April 4th, China retaliated against Donald Trump’s tariffs, imposing a 34% duty on American goods. 編者按（2025年4月5日）：在4月4日，中國針對唐納·川普的關稅措施進行報復，對美國商品徵收34%的關稅。 2) While Trump escalates trade pressure on China and emphasizes U.S. military alliances in Asia, Beijing sees opportunity amid the chaos. His tariffs, now totaling 65% on some Chinese goods, come as China faces deflation, a housing slump, and weak consumption. Rerouting exports through countries like Vietnam to avoid tariffs now seems less viable. 當川普加大對中國的貿易壓力，並強調美國在亞洲的軍事同盟時，北京卻在混亂中看到了機會。他對部分中國商品徵收的關稅總額已達65%，正值中國面臨通縮、房市低迷與內需疲弱之際。透過越南等國重新佈局製造鏈以規避關稅的策略，如今也變得不那麼可行。 3) Despite economic strains, China is more prepared than during Trump’s first term. President Xi Jinping’s vision of a declining U.S. role now appears more credible. His push for technological and economic self-sufficiency has reduced China’s reliance on America, with growing use of the yuan in global payments. 儘管經濟承壓，中國比川普第一任期時準備得更充分。習近平主席所描繪的美國全球影響力衰退的願景，如今看來更具可信度。他推動科技與經濟自給自足，已降低中國對美國的依賴，人民幣在國際支付中的使用也日益增加。 4) China’s industrial strength is often underestimated. It outpaces Western rivals in fields like electric vehicles and drones. AI companies like DeepSeek suggest innovation can flourish despite U.S. tech sanctions. Xi’s apparent shift towards supporting entrepreneurs has also helped lift Chinese markets—MSCI’s index is up 15% in 2025. 中國的工業實力經常被低估。在電動車與無人機等領域，中國已超越西方競爭對手。像 DeepSeek 這類的人工智慧公司顯示，即使面對美國的科技制裁，創新仍能蓬勃發展。習近平近期對企業家的支持態度轉變，也推動了中國股市上揚——MSCI 中國指數在2025年上漲了15%。 5) Property markets in cities like Shanghai are stabilizing. The government is injecting stimulus, with 10.4 trillion yuan in new bonds to support consumption and refinance local debts. Yet to fully unlock growth, China must stop stifling private enterprise and restore business confidence. 上海等城市的房地產市場正逐漸穩定。政府正注入刺激資金，發行總額達10.4兆元人民幣的新債券，以提振消費並協助地方政府償還債務。然而，要真正釋放經濟成長潛力，中國仍需停止打壓民營企業，恢復市場信心。 6) Geopolitically, Trump’s foreign policy offers China more room to maneuver. Although U.S. hawks claim a pivot from Europe will strengthen its China containment strategy, Trump’s admiration for Xi and inconsistent messaging, including outreach via Senator Steve Daines, reflect confusion. MAGA-era isolationism undermines America’s traditional leadership role. 在地緣政治上，川普的外交政策為中國提供了更多操作空間。儘管美國鷹派聲稱從歐洲轉向將強化其圍堵中國的戰略，川普對習近平的欣賞以及他反覆無常的訊息——包括透過參議員史蒂夫·戴恩斯（Steve Daines）釋出善意——卻顯示出混亂。「讓美國再次偉大」時代的孤立主義，正在削弱美國傳統的全球領導地位。 7) Xi sees a chance to increase China’s influence, especially in the Global South, by promoting green investment and stable trade. If China also takes stronger climate action, it could gain global credibility. Meanwhile, doubts over America’s willingness to defend Taiwan—especially if it produces its own semiconductors—play to China’s strategic advantage. 習近平看到了擴大中國影響力的機會，特別是在全球南方國家，透過推動綠色投資與穩定貿易來實現。如果中國進一步加強氣候行動，還可能提升其全球信譽。與此同時，外界對美國是否願意保衛台灣的疑慮——尤其在美國自製先進晶片的情況下——正為中國帶來戰略上的優勢。 8) But risks remain: a deepening trade war could spur global recession or new sanctions. Whether China can seize the moment depends on Xi. Yet ironically, it’s Trump who has opened the door. 但風險依然存在：加劇的貿易戰可能引發全球經濟衰退或帶來新一輪制裁。中國能否把握這個時機，端視習近平的決策。然而諷刺的是，打開這扇機會之門的，正是川普。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, met European leaders in Paris. Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, and Sir Keir Starmer, Britain’s prime minister, said that Europe should maintain sanctions on Russia. They also reiterated their willingness to deploy a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine after a peace deal. Earlier France pledged €2bn ($2.2bn) in defence aid. 烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基在巴黎會見歐洲領導人。法國總統馬克宏和英國首相凱爾史塔默爵士表示，歐洲應維持對俄羅斯的制裁。他們也重申願意在和平協議達成協議後在烏克蘭部署歐洲「保證部隊」。稍早時候，法國承諾提供 20 億歐元（合 22 億美元）的國防援助。 2. Vladimir Putin said it was “wrong” not to take Donald Trump’s ambitions to annexGreenland seriously. Russia’s president also said he planned to expand his country’s military capability in the Arctic, and expressed concerns over NATO activity in the region. J.D. Vance, America’s vice-president, will visit Greenland on Friday; his itinerary was scaled back following uproar in the country over the trip. 弗拉基米爾·普丁表示，大家該認真對待唐納德·川普吞併格陵蘭島的野心。俄羅斯總統也表示，他計劃擴大俄羅斯在北極的軍事能力，並對北約在該地區的活動表示擔憂。美國副總統萬斯將於週五訪問格陵蘭島；由於這次旅行在該國引發軒然大波，他的行程被縮減。 3. Anthony Albanese, Australia’s prime minister, said the country would hold its next federal election on May 3rd. Mr Albanese’s left-leaning Labor Party edged into power only narrowly during Australia’s last election in 2022. Australians may end up with a **minority **government; both Mr Albanese and his main rival Peter Dutton, from the right wing of the Liberal Party, are unpopular with voters. 澳洲總理安東尼·阿爾巴內塞表示，該國將於 5 月 3 日舉行下一次聯邦選舉。在 2022 年澳大利亞上次選舉中，Albanese 先生領導的左傾工黨僅以微弱優勢獲勝。澳洲人最終可能會組成少數政府；阿爾巴尼斯先生和他的主要競爭對手、來自自由黨右翼的彼得·達頓(Peter Dutton)都不受選民歡迎。 4. Turkey dismissed international** condemnation** of the jailing of Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul and a rival to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Officials said Western countries should view Mr Imamoglu’s detention with “common sense”; Mr Imamoglu’s party calls the allegations against him politically motivated. Nearly 1,900 people have been arrested in protests across Turkey following his arrest last week. 土耳其駁回了國際社會對伊斯坦堡市長、總統雷傑普·塔伊普·艾爾多安的競爭對手埃克雷姆·伊瑪莫格魯被監禁的譴責。官員表示，西方國家應該以「常識」來看待伊瑪莫格魯的拘留；伊瑪莫格魯的政黨稱對他的指控是出於政治動機。上週他被捕後，土耳其各地的抗議活動中已有近 1,900 人被捕。 5. Robert F. Kennedy junior, America’s health secretary, announced that the Department of Health and Human Services would reduce its full-time staff from 82,000 to 62,000. Roughly half would be dismissed; the rest had already decided to leave the department after Donald Trump returned to the presidency. Mr Kennedy, long critical of HHS before his appointment, said that the decision would “streamline” the agency. 美國衛生部長小羅伯特‧甘迺迪宣布，衛生與公共服務部將把全職員工從 82,000 人減少到 62,000 人。大約一半的人會被解僱；唐納德·川普重返總統職位後，其他人已經決定離開該部門。甘迺迪先生在任命之前長期批評美國衛生與公眾服務部，他表示這項決定將「精簡」該機構。 6. Six Russian tourists died when a submarine sank in Egypt’s Red Sea. Fifty people—39 other foreign tourists, who were all rescued, and five Egyptian crew members—were on board, exploring the coral reef near Hurghada, a resort city. Several Egyptian tourist boats have capsized in recent years. The latest incident could further** turn off travellers**, an important source of cash for the struggling economy. 一艘潛水艇在埃及紅海沉沒，六名俄羅斯遊客死亡。船上有 50 人，其中包括 39 名全部獲救的外國遊客，以及 5 名埃及船員，他們正在探索度假城市赫爾格達附近的珊瑚礁。近年來，多艘埃及旅遊船傾覆。最新的事件可能會進一步令遊客望而卻步，而遊客是陷入困境的經濟的重要現金來源。 7. Fenix International, the parent company of OnlyFans, a subscription platform for adult entertainment, was fined £1.05m ($1.4m) by Ofcom, Britain’s media watchdog, over inconsistencies in its age-verification process. Ofcom said the website failed to provide accurate information about its use of third-party facial estimation technology to screen the age of its users, who must be over 18 to enter. Fenix International 是成人娛樂訂閱平台 OnlyFans 的母公司，因年齡驗證流程不一致而被英國媒體監管機構 Ofcom 罰款 105 萬英鎊（140 萬美元）。 Ofcom 表示，該網站未能提供有關其使用第三方面部估計技術來篩選用戶年齡的準確信息，用戶必須年滿 18 歲才能進入。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

在火車上過了一晚，終於從維也納抵達巴黎啦! 幸運的是，能夠在巴黎有一個親切又好客的沙發主 是我們在挪威卑爾根的沙發聚會上認識的朋友 -- Delphine~~ 第一天，不免俗地去了巴黎鐵塔、凱旋門、香榭大道…… 但，為什麼我們對巴黎的刻板印象會碎光光呢? 聽到最後就知道了 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. London’s Heathrow airport has been closed until midnight on Friday after a fire at a nearby electrical substation caused power outages. Heathrow, one of the world’s busiest airports and Britain’s main international hub, said it expected significant disruption over the coming days and advised passengers not to travel to it. More than 16,000 homes are also without power and 150 people have been evacuated. 倫敦希斯洛機場因附近一座電力變電站起火導致停電，將關閉至週五午夜。希斯洛機場是全球最繁忙的機場之一，也是英國主要的國際航空樞紐。機場方面表示，未來幾天將出現嚴重的航班中斷，並建議旅客不要前往機場。此外，超過16,000戶家庭停電，150人被撤離。 2. European leaders failed to agree on a military-aid package worth €5bn ($5.4bn) for Ukraine at a summit in Brussels. Some countries, including France and Italy, reportedly balked at the proposed** expenditure**. There was greater consensus, however, on imposing further sanctions on Russia. Only Hungary dissented from that plan. Earlier Ukraine launched a drone strike against a Russian airfield some 700km behind the front line. 歐洲領導人未能在布魯塞爾峰會上就對烏克蘭提供價值50億歐元（約54億美元）的軍事援助方案達成共識。据報導，法國和義大利等國對該筆支出有所顧慮。然而，在對俄羅斯實施進一步制裁方面，成員國意見較為一致，只有匈牙利持反對意見。稍早，烏克蘭發動無人機攻擊，目標為前線約700公里後方的一處俄羅斯空軍基地。 3. Donald Trump signed an executive order directing the education secretary to begin dismantling America’s Department of Education. The order stops short of abolishing it, which would require Congressional approval, and the White House said that it would still administer loans and enforce civil-rights laws. The department’s workforce has already been halved under the Trump administration. 唐納·川普簽署行政命令，指示教育部長開始拆解美國教育部。該命令並未直接廢除該部門，因為這需要國會批准。白宮表示，教育部仍將負責管理學生貸款並執行民權法規。在川普政府執政期間，該部門的員工人數已減少了一半。 4. Israel’s cabinet voted to fire Ronen Bar, the head of Shin Bet, the country’s domestic-security service. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, has long tried to blame Mr Bar for failing to prevent Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7th 2023. Tensions have risen recently as Shin Bet has investigated some of Mr Netanyahu’s aides, including over alleged** leaks of classified documents**. 以色列內閣投票決定解雇國內安全局（Shin Bet）局長羅寧·巴爾（Ronen Bar）。以色列總理班傑明·納坦雅胡（Binyamin Netanyahu）長期試圖將2023年10月7日哈馬斯襲擊以色列的責任歸咎於巴爾。近期，隨著Shin Bet對納坦雅胡的一些助手展開調查，包括涉嫌洩露機密文件，雙方的緊張關係進一步加劇。 5. M23 rebels captured the town of Walikale, a tin and gold mining hub in eastern Congo, according to the Congolese army. The town is the furthest west that the Rwanda-backed group has reached since it began a big offensive in January. On Tuesday Félix Tshisekedi, president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Paul Kagame, his Rwandan counterpart, called for a ceasefire. 根據剛果軍方消息，M23叛軍已攻占剛果東部的瓦利卡萊（Walikale），這座城鎮是重要的錫礦和黃金開採中心。自該受盧安達支持的武裝組織於今年1月發動大規模攻勢以來，這是其向西推進最遠的地點。週二，剛果民主共和國總統菲利克斯·齊塞克迪（Félix Tshisekedi）與盧安達總統保羅·卡加梅（Paul Kagame）呼籲停火。 6. Tesla recalled more than 46,000 of its Cybertrucks in America—nearly all models on the road—to replace a faulty exterior panel. It is the eighth Cybertruck recall since Tesla began delivering the electric vehicles to customers in November 2023. The carmaker said it was “not aware” of any collisions caused by the defect, which it claims has only affected 1% of its models. 特斯拉在美國召回超過46,000輛Cybertruck，幾乎涵蓋所有已上路的車型，以更換存在缺陷的外部車身面板。自特斯拉於2023年11月開始交付這款電動車以來，這已是第八次召回。該公司表示，目前“尚未得知”該缺陷導致任何事故，並聲稱問題僅影響其1%的車輛。 7. Glaciers around the world shed 450 bn tonnes of mass in 2024 because of climate change, according to new figures from the World Glacier Monitoring Service. The data outfit estimated that the three-year loss in glacier mass between 2022 and 2024 was the worst on record. The UN’s weather agency warned that melting glaciers could hinder food and water supply to 2bn people. 根據世界冰川監測服務的最新數據，由於氣候變化，2024 年世界各地的冰川將流失 4,500 億噸。該數據機構估計，2022 年至 2024 年間的三年冰川品質損失是有記錄以來最嚴重的。聯合國氣象機構警告說，冰川融化可能會阻礙 20 億人的食物和水供應。 小分享 台灣大學的學年通常從9月開始，1月放寒假，2月開春季班，6月畢業，符合大多數國際學制。而日本大學則從4月開學，8月放暑假，9月開秋季班，3月畢業。 日本的學制源於明治維新時期參考德國制度，並與日本會計年度（4月開始）對齊，以利政府預算與企業招募。此外，日本的學季安排與櫻花季相符，象徵新開始，這些文化與經濟因素使其學制獨特於全球。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Asian allies fear being dumped by Trump America’s friends in the Indo-Pacific live in dread of being abandoned like Ukraine Mar 6th 2025|SINGAPORE AND TAIPEI 亞洲盟友擔心被川普拋棄 美國在印太地區的朋友憂心被拋棄，如同烏克蘭的遭遇 2025年3月6日 | 新加坡與台北 WHO WILL be next? As America abandons Ukraine and ignores European allies, its closest friends in Asia ask whether they too will be** shaken down or cast aside**. The worries grow deeper as China flexes its muscles. In recent weeks it has conducted naval live-fire exercises off Taiwan, in the Gulf of Tonkin and as far as the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand. On February 25th, Taiwan detained a Chinese ship suspected of severing an undersea cable. 誰會是下一個？ 當美國拋棄烏克蘭並無視歐洲盟友時，其在亞洲最親密的夥伴也開始擔憂，自己是否也會遭到敲詐或被拋棄。隨著中國展現軍事實力，這種擔憂愈發加深。最近幾週，中國在台灣附近、北部灣（東京灣）以及遠至澳洲與紐西蘭之間的塔斯曼海進行了海上實彈演習。2月25日，台灣扣押了一艘涉嫌切斷海底電纜的中國船隻。 America’s Asian allies are torn between competing theories. One holds that Asia is different from Europe because China poses a far greater threat than Russia does. America thus needs Asian allies more than European ones, and will defend the “first island chain” in the Pacific—including Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines—as the best means to contain China. 美國的亞洲盟友在相互競爭的理論之間搖擺不定。其中一種觀點認為，亞洲與歐洲不同，因為中國構成的威脅遠大於俄羅斯。因此，美國比起歐洲盟友更需要亞洲盟友，並且會堅守太平洋的「第一島鏈」——包括日本、台灣和菲律賓——作為遏制中國的最佳手段。 The Trump administration, moreover, contains China hawks such as Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, and Mike Waltz, the national security adviser. They have assured friends about America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Military spending has so far been protected from cuts elsewhere. Donald Trump has hosted both the Japanese and Indian prime ministers. The administration’s language on Taiwan, a self-governing island that China claims as its own, has been toughened. 此外，川普政府內部有對中國強硬的官員，例如國務卿馬可·魯比奧（Marco Rubio）和國家安全顧問麥克·沃爾茨（Mike Waltz）。他們向盟友保證，美國對印太地區的承諾依然堅定。目前，軍事預算仍未受到其他領域削減的影響。川普已接待日本和印度的總理，而政府對於台灣——這個中國聲稱擁有主權但實際上自治的島嶼——的措辭也變得更加強硬。 The contrary view is that Mr Trump has not yet turned his mind to Asia. He thinks all allies are a burden, so will resort to threats, tariffs and demands for gains in return for protection. In his first term he threatened to withdraw American troops from South Korea. Mr Trump has proposed tariffs on microchips, and claimed Taiwan “stole” America’s semiconductor industry. Unlike his predecessor, Joe Biden, he refuses to say whether he would defend the island. He may be reverting to conventional** “strategic ambiguity”**, except that he has intimated Taiwan is not worth protecting. As for Messrs Rubio and Waltz, their loyalty to the president eclipses long-held beliefs. They reassured Europeans that Mr Trump would not forsake Ukraine. But when he did, they cheered him on. 另一種相反的觀點認為，川普尚未真正關注亞洲事務。他認為所有盟友都是負擔，因此會透過威脅、關稅和施壓來換取美國的保護。在第一任期內，他曾威脅要撤出駐韓美軍。川普還提議對微晶片（半導體）徵收關稅，並聲稱台灣「偷走」了美國的半導體產業。與他的前任拜登不同，川普拒絕表態是否會保衛台灣。他可能正回歸傳統的「戰略模糊」政策，但不同的是，他已暗示台灣不值得美國保護。至於魯比奧與沃爾茨，他們對川普的忠誠已超越了自己長期堅持的信念。他們曾向歐洲盟友保證川普不會拋棄烏克蘭，但當川普這麼做時，他們卻為他喝采。 Even as he escalates the trade war with China, Mr Trump has spoken about striking a deal with its leader, Xi Jinping, suggesting they could work to solve the world’s problems. He has mused about a three-way summit with Mr Xi and Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, to reduce nuclear stockpiles and cut defence spending. 即使川普加劇了與中國的貿易戰，他仍談及與中國領導人習近平達成協議，並暗示雙方可以合作解決全球問題。他還曾設想舉行一場三方峰會，與習近平及俄羅斯領導人普京會面，以削減核武庫並降低國防開支。 All this suggests a belief in spheres of influence. The question is whether Mr Trump thinks America’s domain begins at the first island chain or deeper into the Pacific. “Trump likely wants to avoid war more than he wants to maintain US primacy in China’s neighbourhood,” says Denny Roy of the East-West Centre, a think-tank in Honolulu. “His natural inclination is a world of empires in which the three great powers (the USA, China and Russia) **annex **their respective near-abroads and then don’t bother each other.” 所有這些跡象顯示，川普可能相信勢力範圍的概念。問題在於，他是否認為美國的勢力範圍從第一島鏈開始，還是應該深入太平洋更遠的地方。檀香山東西方中心（East-West Centre）智庫的丹尼·羅伊（Denny Roy）表示：「川普可能更希望避免戰爭，而不是維持美國在中國周邊的主導地位。他的本能傾向於一個帝國化的世界，在這個世界裡，三個大國各自吞併周邊地區，然後互不干涉。」 Opinion among Asian allies ranges from worried to alarmed. One Taiwanese official admits he cannot sleep at night. Richard Heydarian of the University of the Philippines argues that America cannot be fully relied on. Singapore, astride a major maritime trade route, is jittery. The Trump administration’s assurances thus far amount to “bureaucratic momentum”, says William Choong of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a think-tank in Singapore. “Once Trump turns his attention to this region, who knows what will happen?” 亞洲盟友的看法從憂心到驚恐不等。一名台灣官員坦言，他夜裡輾轉難眠。菲律賓大學的理查德·海達里安（Richard Heydarian）認為，美國並不完全可靠。位於重要海上貿易路線上的新加坡也感到不安。新加坡智庫—尤索夫伊薩東南亞研究院（ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute）的鍾偉倫（William Choong）表示，川普政府迄今為止的承諾只是「官僚機構的慣性運作」，他補充道：「一旦川普將注意力轉向這個地區，誰知道會發生什麼？」 One response to the uncertainty is to avoid catching Mr Trump’s eye. Ishiba Shigeru, the Japanese prime minister, said on March 3rd he had “no intention of taking sides” in the crisis between America and Ukraine. Another is to assuage the president. Mr Ishiba promised to boost the stock of Japanese direct investments in America from nearly $800bn in 2023 to $1trn. Taiwan’s most important chipmaker, TSMC, announced $100bn worth of investments to build new facilities in America. Further measures include raising defence spending and buying more American weapons and liquefied natural gas. 面對這種不確定性，一種應對方式是避免吸引川普的注意。日本首相石破茂（Ishiba Shigeru）在3月3日表示，他「無意在美國與烏克蘭的危機中選邊站」。另一種做法則是安撫川普。石破承諾將日本對美國的直接投資從2023年接近8000億美元提升至1兆美元。台灣最重要的晶片製造商台積電（TSMC）則宣布將投資1000億美元，在美國建立新設施。其他應對措施還包括提高國防支出、購買更多美國武器以及進口更多美國的液化天然氣。 Some Asians complain that paying tribute to America is no different from bowing before China—and at least Mr Xi offers his neighbours favourable trade deals. China is playing on such fears. As a recent commentary by the state-run Xinhua news agency notes: being an American ally can prove “fatal”, and countries that thought of themselves as important partners will become “discarded chess pieces”. ■ 一些亞洲人抱怨說，向美國致敬無異於向中國鞠躬——至少習近平向鄰國提供了有利的貿易協議。中國正在利用這種恐懼。正如官方新華社最近的一篇評論所指出的那樣：成為美國的盟友可能是“致命的”，而那些自認為重要合作夥伴的國家將成為“被丟棄的棋子”。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

今天是在維也納的最後一天 悠閒地逛了超市，採買中午要煮給Stephen的美味午餐 悠閒地吃飽整理完畢，在離開Stephen家之前拍了人生第一次大頭沙龍照 悠閒地到餐酒館，品嘗三種美味的葡萄酒 悠閒地與來自家鄉的朋友來個大聚餐 就搭上夜車，離開了維也納，往下個目的地前進……. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

**波蘭朋友的分享: 莫忘228歷史傷痛 因為和平不會是永遠的! ** Poland vs. Taiwan 歷史角色：兩者都曾是強權角力的棋子，但都努力尋求國家自決與國際地位。 國際戰略：兩者都位於東西對抗前線（波蘭在冷戰，台灣在美中競爭）。 民族韌性：不論是波蘭人或台灣人，都展現強大的文化韌性與民主追求，不輕易屈服於外來強權。 經濟發展：兩者在地緣危機中找到發展機遇，成為各自區域的重要經濟體。 How Poland emerged as a leading defence power Will others follow? 3-minute Version Poland is rapidly becoming a military power once again. When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Poland’s armed forces ranked ninth in NATO. Today, they are the third-largest after the U.S. and Turkey, with over 200,000 troops. Its defense budget has tripled to $35 billion, and it now spends a higher percentage of its GDP on defense than any other NATO country. 波蘭正快速重新崛起為軍事強國。2014年俄羅斯佔領克里米亞時，波蘭的軍力在北約排名第九。如今，波蘭已躍升至第三名，僅次於美國和土耳其，軍隊人數超過20萬人。國防預算也成長三倍，達到350億美元，國防支出佔GDP的比率更是北約盟國中最高的。 As Poland takes over the EU Council presidency, its top focus is security. With Russia advancing and Donald Trump’s NATO commitment uncertain, Poland is positioning itself as a key security anchor for Europe’s eastern border. Poland’s fast-growing economy and experienced prime minister, Donald Tusk, are important assets. 隨著波蘭接任歐盟理事會輪值主席國，安全無疑是其首要關注。面對俄軍持續推進、加上川普對北約態度不明確，波蘭正努力成為歐洲東部防線的關鍵堡壘。波蘭經濟快速成長，加上總理唐納德·圖斯克（Donald Tusk）經驗豐富，這些都是波蘭的重要優勢。 Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz is driving a major military buildup. Poland is buying tanks, howitzers, and rocket systems from South Korea, plus nearly $60 billion worth of American equipment, including Apache helicopters and Patriot missile systems. Poland hopes this will strengthen ties with the U.S., especially if Trump returns to office. Poland already plans to meet Trump’s proposed NATO spending target of 5% of GDP, well above other allies. 國防部長兼副總理科西尼亞克-卡米什（Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz）正大力推動軍事擴張。波蘭從韓國採購坦克、自走砲與多管火箭系統，並向美國購買近600億美元的軍備，包括96架阿帕契攻擊直升機及愛國者飛彈的整合指揮系統。波蘭希望藉此加強與美國的軍事聯繫，尤其是面對川普可能重返白宮。波蘭已計劃達成川普提出的北約國防支出佔GDP 5%的目標，遠超其他盟國。 Poland’s primary goal remains keeping America engaged. Traditionally one of the most pro-U.S. countries in the EU, Poland resisted European defense initiatives under its previous government. While Tusk is more EU-friendly, Poland still believes European defense efforts should complement, not replace, U.S. support. 波蘭的首要目標仍是確保美國的軍事承諾。波蘭一直是歐盟中最親美的國家之一，過去也曾抗拒歐盟推動的歐洲防務自主計劃。雖然圖斯克比前朝更加親歐，但波蘭依然認為，歐洲防務發展應該是為了補強北約，而非取代美國的角色。 Poland is cautious, however, about sending NATO troops to Ukraine if a ceasefire is reached. French President Emmanuel Macron floated the idea, but Poland’s government, facing a tough presidential election in May, is hesitant. Tusk’s government is trying to reverse the autocratic policies of the previous Law and Justice (PiS) government, but progress depends on winning the presidency. Polls give liberal candidate Rafal Trzaskowski a narrow lead over PiS’s Karol Nawrocki, who is skeptical of NATO and EU membership for Ukraine. 然而，波蘭對於是否在停火後派遣北約部隊進入烏克蘭則態度保留。法國總統馬克宏提出這項構想，但波蘭政府因面臨5月總統大選，不願輕率表態。圖斯克政府正試圖扭轉前任法律與正義黨（PiS）留下的威權遺毒，包括司法操控和媒體淪為宣傳機器。然而，能否推動改革取決於這次選舉結果。民調顯示，代表中間派的華沙市長查斯科夫斯基（Rafal Trzaskowski）僅以些微差距領先PiS推出的保守派候選人納夫羅基（Karol Nawrocki），後者對烏克蘭加入北約與歐盟持懷疑態度。 Poland’s coalition government is fragile, with divisions over abortion and education reforms. Another reason for Poland’s hesitation on Ukraine is the countries’ difficult history. Disputes over World War II-era massacres have strained relations, and some Poles feel unappreciated for taking in over a million Ukrainian refugees. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky often bypasses Poland in favor of bigger powers like the U.S., France, and Germany. 波蘭的執政聯盟本身也相當脆弱，內部在墮胎與教育改革議題上分歧嚴重。波蘭對烏克蘭態度保留的另一個原因是雙方歷史上的積怨。二戰期間，烏克蘭游擊隊曾在沃林地區屠殺約10萬波蘭人，至今仍是敏感話題。雖然近期烏克蘭同意讓波蘭進行遇難者遺骸挖掘，但許多波蘭人仍認為，烏克蘭對波蘭收容百萬難民及提供軍援並不感激。此外，烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）傾向直接與美國、法國、德國及歐盟溝通，對波蘭的態度冷淡，這也讓波蘭感到不滿。 Poland’s military will not be fully modernized until 2026-27, limiting its ability to deploy troops abroad in the near term. Still, Poland hopes its rising defense budget and strong economic growth will help keep NATO—and especially the U.S.—firmly committed to European security. In the end, Poland’s main goal is clear: keep Russia as far away as possible. 波蘭軍隊的現代化裝備預計要到2026至2027年才能全面到位，因此短期內很難向海外派遣大規模部隊。不過，波蘭希望憑藉持續增加的國防預算與穩健的經濟成長，確保美國對北約的承諾不動搖。波蘭的核心戰略始終如一：盡一切可能把俄羅斯擋得越遠越好。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. Donald Trump fired General Charles “CQ” Brown as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and said he would replace people in five other senior positions, in an unprecedented shake-up of the Pentagon. Mr Trump is cracking down on those he blames for pushing diversity, equity and inclusion policies. The Pentagon **was already braced **for sweeping cuts to its budget and staff. 唐納·川普（Donald Trump）解雇了查爾斯·“CQ”·布朗（Charles "CQ" Brown）將軍，撤除其參謀長聯席會議主席的職務，並表示將更換五個其他高層職位的人選，對五角大廈進行前所未有的大規模人事調整。川普正加大力度打擊他認為推動多元性、公平性與包容性（DEI）政策的官員。五角大廈原本已準備面對預算和人員的大幅削減，如今情勢更加嚴峻。 2. Hamas released six hostages in the final part of the first phase of its ceasefire agreement with Israel. In return Israel is expected to free 602 Palestinian prisoners. Israel’s army confirmed that a body repatriated on Friday was that of Shiri Bibas, another of those abducted on October 7th. The militant group had failed to return her remains on Thursday with those of her two young children. 哈瑪斯（Hamas）在與以色列停火協議第一階段的最後部分，釋放了六名人質。作為交換，以色列預計釋放602名巴勒斯坦囚犯。以色列軍方證實，上週五被送回的遺體屬於席莉·比巴斯（Shiri Bibas），她是10月7日被綁架的人質之一。哈瑪斯未能在週四與她兩名年幼孩子的遺體一同歸還她的遺骸。 3. The Vatican said that Pope Francis was** in critical condition**, after suffering a long asthma-like respiratory crisis on Saturday morning. He remains “alert”, but he is “in more pain” than in previous days. Francis was admitted to hospital on February 14th. The 88-year-old pontiff has *pneumonia* in both lungs, one of which was partly removed by surgeons when he was young. 梵蒂岡表示，教宗方濟各（Pope Francis）因週六早晨經歷長時間類似氣喘的呼吸危機，目前情況危急。儘管他仍然「保持清醒」，但「比前幾天感到更多疼痛」。方濟各於2月14日住院治療。這位88歲的教宗雙肺罹患肺炎，其中一側肺部在年輕時曾部分被外科手術切除。 4. Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said American and Russian officials would meet again within a fortnight to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. A first meeting took place—without Ukraine or its European allies—in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday. On Friday Donald Trump said Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and Russia’s, Vladimir Putin, should “get together” to end the war. Mr Trump has been fiercely critical of Mr Zelensky in recent days, while making friendly overtures towards Mr Putin. 俄羅斯副外長謝爾蓋·里亞布科夫（Sergei Ryabkov）表示，美俄官員將在兩週內再次會面，討論結束烏克蘭戰爭的可能性。首次會談於週二在沙烏地阿拉伯舉行，但未邀請烏克蘭或其歐洲盟友參加。週五，唐納·川普（Donald Trump）表示，烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）和俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普丁（Vladimir Putin）應該「坐下來談談」，以結束戰爭。近期，川普對澤連斯基態度強硬，批評不斷，卻對普丁釋出友好訊號。 5. New Zealand said that the Chinese navy had fired live rounds in international waters near the country, having conducted a similar drill in the sea between New Zealand and Australia on Friday. Three Chinese naval vessels have been stationed near Australia’s shores since last week. New Zealand’s prime minister, Christopher Luxon, said that his country was “shadowing and tracking” the fleet. 紐西蘭表示，中國海軍在該國附近的國際水域進行了實彈演習，此前於週五也在紐西蘭與澳洲之間的海域進行了類似演習。自上週以來，有三艘中國軍艦駐紮在澳洲近海。紐西蘭總理克里斯多福·路克森（Christopher Luxon）表示，紐西蘭正對該艦隊進行「監控與追蹤」。 6. The Rapid Support Forces, a Sudanese paramilitary group that has been fighting the national army for nearly two years, said it would on Saturday sign a charter with its allies to establish a government in territories under its control. The rebel government will not rule in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital. The Sudanese Armed Forces are on the brink of retaking the city from the RSF. 蘇丹準軍事組織「快速支援部隊」（Rapid Support Forces, RSF）表示，將於週六與其盟友簽署憲章，在其控制的地區成立政府。這個叛軍政府不會在蘇丹首都喀土穆（Khartoum）執政。目前，蘇丹武裝部隊正接近從快速支援部隊手中奪回該市的控制權。 7. In his annual letter to shareholders in Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffett defended the size of the investment firm’s cash and its equivalents: $334.2bn at the end of 2024, after cutting back on equities. Shareholders should “rest assured” that Berkshire would “never” prefer cash to “good businesses”. Operating profits jumped by 71% in the fourth quarter, to $14.5bn, buoyed partly by higher profits from insurance underwriting. 在致波克夏·海瑟威（Berkshire Hathaway）股東的年度信中，華倫·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）為公司持有的現金及等值資產的規模辯護。截至2024年底，該數額達到3342億美元，原因是減少了股票投資。巴菲特表示，股東們可以「放心」，波克夏「絕不會」偏好現金而放棄「優質企業」。受保險承保利潤增加的部分推動，該公司第四季營業利潤大幅增長71%，達到145億美元。 小分享 **中文： ** 台灣二二八事件發生於1947年2月28日，由於官民衝突引發全台抗議，最終遭政府武力鎮壓，造成數萬人死傷，成為台灣歷史上的重大悲劇。 English: Taiwan's February 28 Incident in 1947 began with civil unrest and escalated into island-wide protests. The government’s violent crackdown caused thousands of deaths, marking a tragic chapter in Taiwan’s history. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

因為前一天阿尼身體不適，發現還是無法硬撐著出門 所以待在家裡度過慵懶的時光 克洛伊勇敢的單槍匹馬挑戰自我，在維也納街頭趴趴走 晚上在歌劇院集合，跟駐奧地利代表處的劉主任吃飯 從家鄉聊到國際交流 度過一個在精神和肚皮都充實的夜晚 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Matthew Holehouse, our British political correspondent, considers Britain’s relationship with the European Union Has Britain’s European “reset”, at last, begun? Sir Keir Starmer last night joined an informal meeting of the European Council (the gathering of the EU’s national heads of government) for dinner at the Palais d’Egmont in Brussels to talk about the continent’s security. That alone was a gesture of rapprochement: it was the first time a British prime minister had joined a gathering of their 27 counterparts since Boris Johnson’s attendance in October 2019, in the dying months of Britain’s membership. There, as Downing Street put it, Sir Keir “set out his pitch for an ambitious UK-EU defence and security partnership” which will make “Brexit work better for the British people”. He outlined some specifics of what that new partnership might include: a greater role for Britain in EU defence missions, work to protect critical infrastructure from sabotage and (by far the most complex) deeper defence-industrial co-operation. 英國的歐洲「重置」終於開始了嗎？ 昨晚，基爾·斯塔默爵士（Sir Keir Starmer）參加了歐洲理事會（即歐盟各國政府首腦的聚會）在布魯塞爾埃格蒙宮（Palais d’Egmont）舉行的非正式晚宴，討論歐洲大陸的安全問題。光是這一舉動本身就是一種和解的姿態——這是自2019年10月鮑里斯·強森（Boris Johnson）在英國脫歐最後階段出席會議以來，英國首相首次與27位歐盟領袖會面。 在會上，根據唐寧街的說法，斯塔默爵士「提出了英國與歐盟建立雄心勃勃的國防與安全夥伴關係的構想」，以使「脫歐能更好地為英國人民服務」。他還概述了這一新夥伴關係可能包含的一些具體內容，包括：英國在歐盟防務任務中發揮更大作用、共同保護關鍵基礎設施免受破壞，以及（最為複雜的）深化國防產業合作。 It is not before time. A post-election optimism among European diplomats about the prospects for a rapprochement with Britain gave way to shrugs, as it became clear that the new government had scores more pressing priorities. Some officials were surprised at how little internal reflection the Labour Party had done in opposition as to what it really wanted, and how foggy its ideas were. While there is broad respect for Nick Thomas-Symonds, the Cabinet Office minister responsible for the reset who has a clear eye for detail, negotiations could never be a technocratic affair: they would really begin when only Sir Keir leant in and said what he wanted. “We need a political motor,” as one official put it to me recently. (The next key date, No 10 confirms this morning, will be a UK-EU leaders’ summit in Britain on May 19th.) 這一刻確實姍姍來遲。 選後，歐洲外交官曾對英國與歐盟關係改善的前景抱持樂觀態度，但隨著新政府面臨許多更為緊迫的優先事項，這種樂觀情緒逐漸變成了無奈的聳肩。一些官員對工黨在反對黨時期對自身立場缺乏深入反思感到驚訝，認為其政策構想模糊不清。 雖然負責「重置」事務的內閣辦公室部長尼克·托馬斯-西蒙茲（Nick Thomas-Symonds）因其細節把控能力受到廣泛尊重，但談判絕非純粹的技術性事務——真正的進展，只有在基爾·斯塔默爵士親自介入並明確表態時才會開始。正如一位官員最近對我所說：「我們需要一個政治動力。」唐寧街今晨證實，下一個關鍵日期將是5月19日，屆時英國將舉辦英國-歐盟領導人峰會。 As we wrote a couple of weeks ago the negotiation has strong tailwinds. The war in Ukraine, and the Trump presidency, create a new geopolitical logic for the UK-EU relationship (European officials talk of Britain as part of an “ecosystem of resilience”), which makes the rows that dominated the years after the Brexit referendum over money and judges look trivial. Speaking in Brussels this morning Mr Thomas-Symonds promised an approach of “ruthless pragmatism” (a hint, it seemed to me, that questions over alignment with EU law and the like won’t snarl things up). And Labour’s electorate affords it a lot of room for manoeuvre: 78% of the party’s voters in 2024 would support rejoining, according to YouGov. (You might read a lot about “Brexit betrayals” in the coming months; in truth, people who get angry about such stuff form a tiny part of Labour’s support.) 正如我們幾週前所寫的，這場談判正迎來強勁的順風。 烏克蘭戰爭和特朗普的總統任期為英國與歐盟關係創造了一種新的地緣政治邏輯（歐洲官員將英國視為「韌性生態系統」的一部分），這使得英國脫歐公投後數年圍繞資金和司法問題的爭議顯得微不足道。 今晨在布魯塞爾發表講話時，托馬斯-西蒙茲先生承諾將採取「冷酷的務實主義」態度（在我看來，這暗示著有關與歐盟法律對齊等問題不會成為阻礙）。此外，工黨的選民基礎也為其提供了很大的操作空間：根據 YouGov 的數據，2024 年工黨選民中有 78% 支持重新加入歐盟。 （未來幾個月，你可能會看到許多關於「背叛脫歐」的討論；但事實上，對此憤怒的人在工黨支持者中只是極少數。） The outcome will probably fall far short of what such folk hope for. The main economic elements of the mooted agreement will be slightly more efficient cross-border electricity trading, and lighter border checks on food—worth having, but hardly transformative. The result is a large mismatch between the government’s rhetoric on economic growth as a driving logic of the negotiation and the amount of additional growth we might expect to see. 最終結果可能遠遠達不到這些人所期待的程度。 目前談判中提及的主要經濟內容，僅限於提高跨境電力交易的效率和放寬食品邊境檢查——這些措施雖然有價值，但稱不上是顛覆性的變革。 因此，政府將經濟增長作為談判核心邏輯的說辭，與最終可能實現的額外增長之間，存在著巨大的落差。 But some EU diplomats like to take a long view. Sir Keir’s reset, it is now obvious, will not be a structural jump that produces a big change to the Brexit settlement. Rather it will be part of a long glidepath of Britain slowly reconverging with the bloc. The “real reset”, as one official puts it, began with Rishi Sunak, Sir Keir’s predecessor, who negotiated a fix for trade with Northern Ireland and re-entry to the EU’s scientific-research programme. Sir Keir’s renegotiation is seen by some as merely a prelude to a much deeper and more complex negotiation in the years to come. As it happens, some well-connected figures in Labour predict that the real action will come in the manifesto for the next election, with a commitment to negotiate an entirely new EU treaty. Think of it, as one EU official puts it, as a “further step in the process of normalisation”, which will “open a space for a different kind of conversation” down the line. The future of the Brexit story will be made not in giant leaps but in baby steps. 但一些歐盟外交官更傾向於從長遠角度看待問題。 現在顯而易見的是，基爾爵士的「重置」並不會帶來對脫歐協議的重大結構性改變。相反，它將成為英國緩慢重新接近歐盟的漫長過程的一部分。正如一位官員所言，「真正的重置」其實始於基爾爵士的前任——里希·蘇納克（Rishi Sunak）。蘇納克推動了解決北愛爾蘭貿易問題的協議，並促成英國重新加入歐盟科學研究計畫。而基爾爵士目前的重新談判，對某些人而言，只是未來更深入、更複雜談判的前奏。 （事實上，一些與工黨關係密切的人士預測，真正的變革將出現在下屆大選的競選綱領中，屆時可能會承諾談判一份全新的歐盟條約。） 正如一位歐盟官員所形容的，這是「正常化進程中的又一步」，將為未來開啟「另一種對話空間」。脫歐的未來，不會通過巨大的飛躍來塑造，而是一步一腳印地前行。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Giving children the wrong (or not enough) toys may doom a society Survival is a case of child’s play 給孩子錯誤（或不夠）的玩具可能會毀滅一個社會 生存就像孩子們的遊戲 Dec 18th 2024 GIVERS OF EDUCATIONAL gifts, rejoice: despite the eye-rolls you may receive on Christmas morning, you are part of a long and valuable tradition. In cultures around the world, toys have been used to teach children what they need to know about the society they live in. When the toys teach the right skills, the children are prepared for adulthood and thrive. When they do not, calamity beckons. 贈送教育禮物的人們，歡欣鼓舞吧！即使在聖誕早晨可能會收到白眼，你仍然是悠久且有價值傳統的一部分。在世界各地的文化中，玩具一直被用來教導孩子了解他們生活的社會所需的知識。當玩具教導正確的技能時，孩子們就能為成年生活做好準備並茁壯成長；反之，若玩具未能達到此目的，災難可能隨之而來。 And how. New work led by Mathilde Meyer, a PhD student at Aarhus University in Denmark, and Felix Riede, her supervisor, reveals that giving the wrong toys probably played an important part in dooming the Norse settlers who came to Greenland from Iceland in 985. 確實如此。由丹麥奧胡斯大學博士生瑪蒂爾德·梅耶（Mathilde Meyer）及其導師費利克斯·里德（Felix Riede）所主導的新研究揭示，給予錯誤的玩具可能是導致985年從冰島遷至格陵蘭的北歐殖民者滅亡的重要原因之一。 Greenland was mostly covered in ice when the Norse made the journey, save for a thin strip of fertile land along the coastline where they could farm. The settlers flourished for a few hundred years but, as the world entered a cold period (known as the Little Ice Age) in 1300, records show that they started to struggle. Summers became drier, temperatures dropped and storms strengthened. By 1400 the Norse were forced to abandon the settlements. Even so, the island remained inhabited: the Inuit people of northern Alaska arrived on Greenland in 1000 and endured long after the Norse gave up. 當北歐人展開前往格陵蘭的旅程時，該地大部分都被冰覆蓋，只有沿海一條狹窄的肥沃地帶可以用來耕作。殖民者在此繁榮了數百年，但隨著世界在1300年進入一個寒冷時期（即小冰期），記錄顯示他們開始面臨困難。夏季變得更加乾燥，氣溫下降，暴風雨愈加猛烈。到1400年，北歐人被迫放棄這些定居點。即便如此，格陵蘭仍有人居住：來自阿拉斯加北部的因紐特人於1000年抵達格陵蘭，並在北歐人放棄後仍持續生存下去。 Why the Inuit survived while the Norse did not has baffled archaeologists for decades. One idea was that the Norse did not eat more seafood (as the Inuit did) when farming conditions deteriorated. But this is not backed by evidence. Isotope studies of Norse teeth show that they were turning to the ocean for food. Archaeologists agree that the Inuits adapted successfully while the Norse did not, but nobody knows why. 為何因紐特人能生存下來，而北歐人卻無法，這個問題困惑了考古學家數十年。曾有一種說法認為，當農業條件惡化時，北歐人並未像因紐特人那樣多攝取海鮮。然而，這一說法並未得到證據支持。對北歐人牙齒的同位素研究顯示，他們確實開始依賴海洋食物。考古學家一致認為，因紐特人成功適應了環境，而北歐人卻未能做到，但沒有人知道具體原因。 To try to answer that question, Ms Meyer and Dr Riede looked at as many toys as they could find that had once been played with by the children of either culture. The Norse settlements yielded 72. The Inuit settlements, located in similar environmental conditions, yielded 2,397. For the researchers, this staggering difference implies that the Inuit gave their children more toys than the Norse did. 為了嘗試回答這個問題，梅耶女士和里德博士盡可能尋找北歐人和因紐特人孩子曾經玩過的玩具。北歐人的聚落中找到72件，而處於類似環境條件的因紐特人聚落中則找到2,397件。對研究人員來說，這個巨大差異意味著因紐特人比北歐人更頻繁地給孩子玩具。 Ms Meyer and Dr Riede then assigned each toy to one of five categories. These included toys of weapons (including harpoons, arrows and swords), tools (cooking pots, lamps and saws), forms of transport (boats and sledges), for social play (dolls and figurines) and for skill play (tops and balls). They also determined approximate times for when the toys were made, either between 1000 and 1200 or 1200 and 1400. 梅耶女士和里德博士隨後將每件玩具分為五個類別，包括武器類（如魚叉、箭和劍）、工具類（如烹飪鍋、燈和鋸子）、交通工具類（如船和雪橇）、社交遊戲類（如娃娃和人偶）、以及技能遊戲類（如陀螺和球）。他們還大致確定了這些玩具的製作時期，分別為1000至1200年或1200至1400年之間。 The categorisation process revealed that the Inuit children not only had more toys available to them, but that these toys were more diverse. For example, though the Norse children had access to only toy arrows, axes and swords, the Inuit children also had toy bows, crossbows, darts, harpoons, harpoon mountings, lances and much more. Most important, Ms Meyer and Dr Riede found that the differences in the number and diversity of toys grew dramatically over time. 分類過程顯示，因紐特人的孩子不僅擁有更多的玩具，這些玩具也更加多樣化。例如，北歐孩子只能接觸到玩具箭、斧頭和劍，而因紐特孩子還有玩具弓、十字弓、飛鏢、魚叉、魚叉支架、長矛等更多種類的玩具。最重要的是，梅耶女士和里德博士發現，玩具數量和多樣性的差異隨著時間大幅增加。 Not just fun and games They report in the European Journal of Archaeology that, although eight social-play toys were found among the Norse settlements and 23 social-play toys were found among the Inuit settlements between 1000 and 1200, over the next 200 years the gap grew to 11 social-play toys for the Norse and 158 social-play toys for the Inuit. 他們在《歐洲考古學期刊》中報告稱，儘管在1000至1200年間，北歐人聚落中發現了8件社交遊戲玩具，因紐特人聚落中則發現了23件，但在接下來的200年間，這一差距顯著擴大，北歐人的社交遊戲玩具增加至11件，而因紐特人的則達到158件。 A similar trend held for all the other categories of toy. As the years went by, toys associated with hunting at sea (a category including harpoons as well as figurines of seals and fish) became more common among the Inuit, but the Norse continued to give their children figurines of horses and birds. In essence, say the researchers, the Norse were adapting their lives to their new environment but continuing to gift old-fashioned toys. 其他玩具類別也呈現出類似的趨勢。隨著歲月流逝，與海上狩獵相關的玩具（包括魚叉以及海豹和魚的模型）在因紐特人中變得更加普遍，但北歐人依然給孩子馬和鳥的模型。研究人員表示，從本質上看，北歐人正在適應新環境的生活，但卻依然贈送過時的玩具。 Though the lack of toys may indicate that Norse society was less creative from the start, the researchers argue that their tendency to give irrelevant toys compounded any initial lack of creativity and ultimately sabotaged their survival. In contrast, the Inuits’ preference for diverse and relevant toys paved the way for their children to be more innovative and adaptive. A parable for parents if ever there was one. ■ 儘管玩具的缺乏可能表明北歐社會從一開始就較缺乏創造力，研究人員認為，他們傾向於贈送不相關的玩具，這加劇了最初創造力的不足，最終破壞了他們的生存。相比之下，因紐特人對多樣且相關玩具的偏好，為孩子們的創新與適應力鋪平了道路。如果這世上有適合家長的寓言故事，那這絕對算得上一個。 雅思托福多益的同學我們來聽看看整個完整的文章 https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2024/12/18/giving-children-the-wrong-or-not-enough-toys-may-doom-a-society -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

多瑙河，是我們從小聽到大個三個字 今天終於有機會一睹風采 多瑙河沿岸有美麗的山景，和點綴其中的小城鎮 跟挪威峽灣大不同，各有各的特色 但…可憐的阿尼為什麼無法盡情欣賞呢? 聽了就知道! -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. President Donald Trump said that Americans could feel “some pain” after Canada and Mexico vowed to retaliate against the tariffs that he imposed on their imports. Mr Trump defended the measures, saying that “it will all be worth the price that must be paid”. From Tuesday America will place levies of 25% on imports from Canada and Mexico, and increase tariffs on China by 10%. Canadian oil faces a lower levy of 10%. 美國總統唐納·川普表示，在加拿大和墨西哥誓言對其進口商品關稅進行報復後，美國民眾可能會感受到「一些痛苦」。川普為這些措施辯護，稱「這將是值得付出的代價」。從週二起，美國將對來自加拿大和墨西哥的進口商品徵收 25% 的關稅，並對中國的進口商品增加 10% 的關稅。加拿大的石油則將面臨較低的 10% 關稅。 2. Justin Trudeau, Canada’s prime minister, announced a levy of 25% on American imports worth C$155bn ($107bn). Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico’s president, promised a similar response. Meanwhile a spokesperson for the European Union said that the bloc would “respond firmly” if Mr Trump levied tariffs on imports from the bloc, according to reports. 加拿大總理賈斯汀·杜魯道宣布，對價值 1,550 億加元（約 1,070 億美元）的美國進口商品徵收 25% 的關稅。墨西哥總統克勞迪婭·欣鮑姆承諾將採取類似的回應。與此同時，據報導，歐盟發言人表示，若川普對歐盟進口商品加徵關稅，該聯盟將「堅決回應」。 3. Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s president, met Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. It is Mr Sharaa’s first official trip abroad since he led the rebellion that toppled Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s dictator since 2000, in December. Mr Sharaa and the crown prince, who is the kingdom’s de facto ruler, discussed plans to rebuild Syria and strengthen the country’s ties with Gulf states. 敘利亞總統艾哈邁德·沙拉在沙烏地阿拉伯與穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼會晤。這是沙拉自去年 12 月領導叛亂推翻自 2000 年以來執政的敘利亞獨裁者巴沙爾·阿薩德後，首次正式出訪。沙拉與這位沙烏地實際統治者——王儲穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼——討論了敘利亞重建計劃以及加強該國與海灣國家關係的議題。 4. UniCredit said it had bought a 4.1% stake in Generali, Italy’s biggest** insurer**. UniCredit, the country’s second-biggest bank, said that it had bought the shares over time and that it had no *“strategic* interest” in Generali. Last year UniCredit said it had amassed a 28% stake in Commerzbank, a German lender, and launched a takeover bid for Banco BPM, another Italian bank. 義大利第二大銀行裕信銀行（UniCredit）表示，已收購該國最大保險公司忠利保險（Generali）4.1% 的股份。裕信銀行稱，這些股份是逐步收購的，並強調對忠利保險並無「戰略性利益」。去年，裕信銀行曾表示已累積德國貸款機構德商銀行（Commerzbank）28% 的股份，並對另一家義大利銀行 Banco BPM 發起收購要約。 5. America’s government removed the protected status of 300,000 Venezuelans in the country, putting them at risk of deportation. The protections were given to migrants from countries that America deems unsafe; Venezuela has become increasingly autocratic under Nicolás Maduro. On Saturday Mr Trump said that Venezuela had agreed that it would take back migrants deported from America. 美國政府取消了境內 30 萬名委內瑞拉人的受保護身份，使其面臨被驅逐出境的風險。這項保護措施原本適用於來自美國認定為不安全國家的移民；在尼古拉斯·馬杜洛的統治下，委內瑞拉日益專制。上週六，川普表示，委內瑞拉已同意接收從美國被驅逐的移民。 6. Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state, told Jose Raul Mulino, Panama’s president, that China’s “position of influence and control” over the Panama Canal was unacceptable. Mr Rubio warned that America may “protect its rights” under the treaty governing the canal unless Panama curbed Chinese influence. Mr Mulino **downplayed **the warning, saying he did not see “any real threat” from America. 美國國務卿馬可·魯比奧告訴巴拿馬總統何塞·勞爾·穆利諾，中國對巴拿馬運河的「影響力與控制地位」是不可接受的。魯比奧警告稱，除非巴拿馬削弱中國的影響力，否則美國可能會根據管理運河的條約「維護自身權利」。穆利諾對此警告淡化處理，表示他並未看到來自美國的「任何實質性威脅」。 小分享: 泰國旅行分享 1) 網紅景點 2) 泰國養小鬼 **3) 性別平等 ** 4) 皇室至上 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, said that his cabinet had approved the Gaza ceasefire deal by 24 votes to eight on Saturday, paving the way for the agreement to take effect on Sunday. Hamas is expected to release three female hostages that day in exchange for 95 Palestinian prisoners. Mr. Netanyahu warned on Saturday that Israel will not proceed until Hamas provides a list of hostages to be released. 以色列總理班傑明·內塔尼亞胡表示，他的內閣已於週六以24票對8票批准了加沙停火協議，為該協議於週日生效鋪平了道路。哈瑪斯預計當天將釋放三名女性人質，以換取95名巴勒斯坦囚犯。內塔尼亞胡週六警告說，除非哈瑪斯提供將被釋放人質的名單，以色列將不會繼續推進該協議。 2. TikTok said it would “go dark” in America unless Joe Biden assured it that he would not enforce a potential embargo on his last day in office. On Friday the Supreme Court upheld a law forcing the app’s Chinese owner, ByteDance, to sell it by Sunday or face a nationwide ban. The outgoing administration said that enforcement is up to Donald Trump, who **takes office **on Monday. 抖音表示，除非喬·拜登保證他在任期最後一天不會執行潛在的禁令，否則該app將在美國「熄燈」。週五，美國最高法院維持了一項法律，要求該app的中國母公司字節跳動在週日前出售抖音，否則將面臨全國性的禁令。即將卸任的政府表示，執行該法律的責任將由週一上任的唐納德·川普決定。 3. Thousands of protesters, mostly women, marched in Washington in protest against Mr Trump’s inauguration. Monday’s event will be moved indoors due to freezing weather, the first time in 40 years that a swearing-in ceremony has been relocated inside the Capitol. The change will deprive him of the large outdoor crowds that he so prizes. 數千名抗議者（主要是女性）在華盛頓遊行，抗議川普的就職典禮。週一的活動因嚴寒天氣將改在室內舉行，這是40年來首次將宣誓儀式移至國會大廈內部。此舉將使川普失去他極為重視的大型戶外人群場面。 4. America’s Federal Aviation Administration groundedSpaceX’s Starship programme while an investigation into why one of the firm’s rockets exploded is conducted. The vessel burst into flames shortly after launch in Texas, possibly following an oxygen or fuel leak. The upper stage came to earth over the northern Caribbean, disrupting flights. Despite the failure, SpaceX successfully landed the rocket’s reusable booster. 美國聯邦航空管理局（FAA）暫停了SpaceX的「星艦」計劃，並對該公司一枚火箭爆炸的原因展開調查。這艘航天器在德克薩斯州發射後不久即起火燃燒，可能是因氧氣或燃料洩漏所致。火箭的上級階段墜落於加勒比海北部，導致航班中斷。儘管此次失敗，SpaceX仍成功回收並著陸了火箭的可重複使用推進器。 5. A gunman shot dead two senior judges in Iran’s Supreme Court in Tehran, before killing himself. Officials said the** motive** was unclear, but suggested that “enemies” of the state were behind the attack. The judges, Mohammad Moghiseh and Ali Razini, had presided over cases involving espionage, terrorism and dissidents. 一名槍手在德黑蘭槍殺了伊朗最高法院的兩名高級法官，隨後自殺。官員表示動機尚不明確，但暗示國家的「敵人」可能是此次襲擊的幕後黑手。被殺的法官穆罕默德·莫吉塞赫和阿里·拉齊尼曾審理涉及間諜活動、恐怖主義及持不同政見者的案件。 6. At least 70 people died in the north of Nigeria when a petrol tanker overturned and exploded. Many of the victims had been collecting leaking fuel. Such accidents are common in Nigeria, where petrol prices have soared since 2023. In October a similar blast in the Jigawa state killed 147 people in one of the country’s deadliest fuel explosions. 奈及利亞北部發生一起油罐車翻覆並爆炸的事件，至少造成70人死亡。許多受害者當時正在收集洩漏的燃油。此類事故在奈及利亞很常見，尤其自2023年以來，汽油價格大幅上漲。去年10月，吉加瓦州發生一起類似的爆炸，造成147人死亡，成為該國最致命的燃油爆炸事件之一。 小分享: 經濟學人的訃聞提到瓊瑤- 跨業交流會的企業模仿models 1) 迅速跟隨 2) 後發優勢 3) 同質化 4) 正向模仿 5) 反向模仿 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

今天去維也納城郊的森林洗森林浴 欣賞秋天時轉紅的樹葉 吸滿芬多精 做了美味的晚餐跟Jasper和新朋友瑩錡一起共享 接下來就搬到沙發主--Stephen家中 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. The biggest of the six simultaneous blazes in Los Angeles, in the Palisades neighbourhood, changed direction, threatening new areas on the western edge of the city. At least 11 people have been killed; more than 150,000 residents are under evacuation orders. California’s governor called for an independent investigation into why some hydrants failed at critical moments earlier this week. 洛杉磯六場同步大火中最大的那場，在帕利塞德斯（Palisades）地區改變了方向，威脅到該市西部邊緣的新區域。截至目前，至少有11人死亡，超過15萬名居民接獲撤離命令。加州州長呼籲進行獨立調查，以查明為何本週稍早在關鍵時刻有些消防栓失效。 2. Ukraine said it had captured two** wounded**North Korean soldiers in the Russian region of Kursk. President Volodymyr Zelensky said that the capture was a rare feat because wounded North Koreans would usually be killed by their own side “to erase any evidence” of the country’s involvement in the war—a deployment that Ukrainian and Western sources estimate at 11,000 troops. 烏克蘭表示，在俄羅斯庫爾斯克地區俘獲了兩名受傷的北韓士兵。烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤倫斯基表示，這次俘獲實屬罕見，因為北韓士兵通常會被他們自己人處決，以“消除”該國參與戰爭的任何證據。據烏克蘭和西方消息來源估計，北韓已派遣約11,000名士兵參戰。 3. The black boxes on the Jeju Air flight that crashed in South Korea on December 29th stopped recording in the crucial final four minutes. The country’s transport ministry said it would investigate why the flight data and cockpit voice-recorders on the Boeing 737-800 had stopped working. Only two of the 181 people on board survived the crash, making it South Korea’s worst aviation disaster in decades. 12月29日，一架濟州航空（Jeju Air）航班在南韓墜毀，飛機的黑盒子在關鍵的最後四分鐘停止了記錄。南韓交通部表示，將調查為何這架波音737-800的飛行數據記錄器和駕駛艙語音記錄器停止運作。這場空難僅有181名乘客中的兩人生還，成為南韓數十年來最嚴重的航空災難。 4. Germanytugged a drifting Russian oil tanker—believed to be part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” of old ships used to dodge sanctions—off its Baltic coast to safer waters. The heavily-loaded Eventin was discovered following a power outage near the Baltic island of Rügen on Friday evening. Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, called it a threat to the region’s security and tourism. 德國將一艘漂流的俄羅斯油輪拖至更安全的水域。該油輪被認為是俄羅斯為規避制裁而使用的“影子船隊”之一，由老舊船隻組成。這艘滿載的油輪名為 Eventin，於週五晚間在波羅的海的呂根島（Rügen）附近因停電而被發現。德國外交部長安娜萊娜·貝爾博克（Annalena Baerbock）表示，這艘油輪對該地區的安全和觀光產業構成威脅。 5. Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, was sworn in for a third term. In July, most Venezuelans voted against him, but the regime-controlled electoral authority claimed he had won 52% of the vote. Edmundo González, the** rightful** winner, fled to Spain. Many other opposition figures have been detained. America has offered a $25m reward for Mr Maduro’s arrest for drug trafficking. 委內瑞拉總統尼古拉斯·馬杜羅（Nicolás Maduro）宣誓就任第三任期。今年7月，大多數委內瑞拉選民投票反對他，但由政權控制的選舉機構宣稱馬杜羅獲得了52%的選票。合法當選的埃德蒙多·岡薩雷斯（Edmundo González）已逃往西班牙，許多其他反對派人士則遭到逮捕。美國針對馬杜羅的毒品走私指控，懸賞2,500萬美元以換取其逮捕。 6. Israel bombed two ports and a power station in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen. Houthi-affiliated media said that one person was killed and nine injured. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, said that the attacks were retaliation for the Iran-backed rebel group’s strikes on his country and cargo ships in the Red Sea, which began shortly after October 7th 2023. 以色列轟炸了葉門胡塞武裝控制的兩個港口和一座發電站。胡塞武裝相關媒體報導稱，襲擊造成一人死亡，九人受傷。以色列總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡（Binyamin Netanyahu）表示，此次攻擊是對伊朗支持的胡塞叛軍在紅海襲擊以色列和貨船的報復行動，該襲擊自2023年10月7日後不久開始。 7. Greenland does not want to be Danish or American but “Greenlandic,” said Múte Egede, its prime minister. Mr Trump, who** covets** the sparsely populated Arctic island for its strategic and economic potential, has refused to rule out a *military seizure*. Meanwhile Denmark proposed purchasing two inspection ships and ramping up dog-sled patrols to boost its security. 格陵蘭不想成為丹麥或美國的一部分，而是想成為“格陵蘭本身”，該國總理穆特·埃格德（Múte Egede）如此表示。美國前總統特朗普對這個人口稀少的北極島嶼垂涎已久，認為其具有重要的戰略和經濟價值，他甚至拒絕排除以軍事手段佔領該島的可能性。與此同時，丹麥提議購買兩艘巡查船並加強狗拉雪橇巡邏，以提升該地區的安全防衛能力。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. America is proposing to sell **arms **to Israel worth $8bn. The State Department notified Congress on Friday of the planned consignment, which requires approval by committees in both the House and the Senate. It includes air-to-air missiles and artillery shells among other materiel. With President Joe Biden due to leave office before the end of the month, the move constitutes something of a late show of support. 美國提議向以色列出售價值 80 億美元的武器。國務院於週五通知國會這項計劃中的軍備供應案，該提案需經眾議院和參議院的相關委員會批准。此武器供應案包含空對空飛彈、炮彈等軍事物資。在美國總統喬·拜登於本月底前即將卸任之際，此舉可被視為一種遲來的支持表態。 2. Russia vowed retaliation after claiming to have shot down eight American-supplied ATACMS missiles fired by Ukraine at the border region of Belgorod. It also claimed to have taken control of Nadiya, one of the few villages in the Ukrainian region of Luhansk it had not captured. Joe Biden only recently gave Ukraine permission to fire the ATACMS into Russia. Donald Trump says he is vehemently opposed. 俄羅斯聲稱擊落了烏克蘭向邊境地區別爾哥羅德發射的八枚美國提供的 ATACMS 飛彈，並誓言將採取報復行動。此外，俄羅斯還聲稱已控制盧甘斯克地區少數尚未被佔領的村莊之一——納迪亞（Nadiya）。喬·拜登最近才允許烏克蘭將 ATACMS 飛彈發射至俄羅斯境內。而唐納德·川普則表示他強烈反對這項行動。 3. The judge overseeing Donald Trump’s hush-money case said he would sentence the president-elect on January 10th, but added that Mr Trump would probably not face prison time. Mr Trump had argued that his conviction, on 34 felony counts, should be dismissed, because the proceedings would** impede** his presidential transition. The judge wrote that tossing the jury verdict would “undermine the Rule of Law in** immeasurable** ways”. 負責審理唐納德·川普「封口費」案件的法官表示，將於 1 月 10 日對這位當選總統進行宣判，但補充說，川普可能不會面臨監禁。川普曾辯稱，他因 34 項重罪 被定罪的判決應被駁回，因為此程序將妨礙他的總統過渡期。然而，該法官在判詞中寫道，推翻陪審團的裁決將「以難以估量的方式破壞法治」。 4. As part of an amnesty marking the 77th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence, the country’s military junta released some 6,000 prisoners. Other inmates had their sentences reduced. It is unclear if those released include some of the reportedly more than 28,000 people locked up for opposing the junta. It overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021. 為紀念緬甸獨立 77 周年的大赦行動，該國軍政府釋放了約 6,000 名囚犯，其他部分囚犯的刑期也獲得減少。目前尚不清楚被釋放者是否包括據報超過 28,000 名因反對軍政府而被監禁的人士。緬甸軍政府於 2021 年推翻了翁山蘇姬領導的民選政府。 5. Gabriel Boric, Chile’s president, travelled to the South Pole, becoming the first leader from the Americas to visit the landmark. Mr Boric’s office said the trip reaffirmed Chile’s claim to sovereignty over part of Antarctica. Seven countries, including Britain and Norway, have made territorial claims in the Antarctic, and more are racing to establish their presence on the continent. 智利總統 加布里埃爾·博里奇（Gabriel Boric） 前往南極，成為首位造訪該地標的美洲領導人。博里奇的辦公室表示，此次訪問重申了智利對南極部分區域的主權主張。目前已有包括英國和挪威在內的 7 個國家對南極提出領土要求，且越來越多國家正競相在該大陸建立存在。 6. Itooka Tomiko, the world’s oldest person, died recently at the age of 116. A statement released today by the** mayor** of Ashiya, outside Osaka, confirmed that she passed away last weekend. Ms Itooka, who was born in May 1908, became the world’s oldest person in September on the death of 117-year-old Maria Branyas Morera of Spain. 世界最長壽者 伊藤加‧富子（Itooka Tomiko） 最近逝世，享嵩壽 116 歲。今天，大阪附近的 芦屋市 市長發表聲明，證實她於上週末去世。伊藤加女士於 1908 年 5 月出生，並於 9 月接替西班牙 117 歲的 瑪麗亞·布拉尼亞斯·莫雷拉（Maria Branyas Morera） 逝世後，成為全球最年長的人士。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

今天去了貝多芬之家、貝維德宮和霍夫堡 貝多芬算是名流，宮殿城堡裡面住的是政治界的人，應該也多少涉足商業界 所以都可以算是政商名流吧 貝多芬之家很簡樸，他在此創作了第13弦樂四重奏（作品130）新的終曲樂章 我們對貝維德宮的花園印象深刻，但是也走過路過錯過了克林姆最著名的作品 在華麗的霍夫堡參觀了歐洲最美皇后的一生，感嘆是否自古紅顏多薄命 還是像我們這樣，雖然平凡但是幸福，最好了 帶著感恩之心，到Ribs of Vienna大快朵頤豬肋排 不愧是空姐推薦必吃，果真美味又滿足~ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. Lawmakers in South Korea voted to impeach the acting president, Han Duck-soo. The former prime minister has held the office for less than two weeks after replacing Yoon Suk Yeol, who had been forced out over his brief attempt to impose martial law. The opposition accused Mr Han of stalling the previous president’s impeachment process. Choi Sang-mok, the finance minister, is the next to fill the hot seat. 韓國國會議員投票彈劾代理總統韓德洙。這位前總理接替尹錫悅不到兩週便上任，而尹錫悅因短暫嘗試實施戒嚴而被迫下台。反對派指控韓德洙拖延了前總統的彈劾進程。接下來將接任這個艱難職位的是財政部長崔尚穆。 2. Azerbaijan Airlines paused more than half of its flights to Russia following reports that Russian air defences were to blame for a deadly crash of one of its passenger planes in Kazakhstan on Wednesday. Azerbaijani officials have reportedly found that the flight was struck by Russian anti-aircraft fire. Russia warned against such “hypotheses”. At least 38 of the 67 people on board died. 亞塞拜疆航空公司暫停了超過一半飛往俄羅斯的航班，此前有報導稱俄羅斯防空系統是導致週三在哈薩克發生的一架客機致命墜毀的原因。據報導，亞塞拜疆官員發現該航班是被俄羅斯的防空火力擊中的。俄羅斯則警告不要提出此類「假設」。機上67人中至少有38人喪生。 3. NATO will step up its military presence in the Baltic Sea following a suspected act of sabotage that damaged undersea power and telecommunications cables running between Finland and Estonia. Estonia’s navy said it would guard the remaining power cable; Sweden’s coast guard also said it would increase surveillance of ships. Earlier Finland seized a tanker carrying **embargoed **Russian oil to investigate its involvement. 北約將加強在波羅的海的軍事存在，此前有疑似破壞行為損壞了芬蘭與愛沙尼亞之間的海底電力和通信電纜。愛沙尼亞海軍表示將保護剩餘的電力電纜；瑞典海岸警衛隊也表示將加強對船隻的監控。早些時候，芬蘭扣押了一艘運送受禁俄羅斯石油的油輪，以調查其是否涉及此事件。 embargo vs. cargo 4. Israeli soldiers ordered some 350 patients and staff to** evacuate** from Kamal Adwan hospital in northern Gaza before torching sections of the medical facility. Israel’s army said that the hospital had served as a “Hamas terrorist stronghold”. Earlier, dozens of Palestinians were killed in an Israeli strike in the area. 以色列士兵命令約350名患者和醫護人員撤離位於加薩北部的卡邁勒·阿德萬醫院，隨後放火燒毀了該醫療設施的部分區域。以色列軍方表示，該醫院曾被用作「哈馬斯恐怖分子的據點」。稍早前，以色列在該地區的空襲中造成數十名巴勒斯坦人喪生。 5. A soldier believed to be the first North Korean prisoner captured by Ukraine has died, according to South Korea’s spy agency. He was reportedly seized in the Kursk region of Russia. Ukraine says that North Korea has supported Russia’s invasion with more than 11,000 troops–and an **estimated **3,000 of them have been killed or wounded. Neither Russia nor North Korea confirmed the claims. 據韓國情報機構表示，一名被認為是首位被烏克蘭俘虜的北韓士兵已經死亡。據報導，他是在俄羅斯庫爾斯克地區被捕的。烏克蘭表示，北韓以超過11,000名士兵支持俄羅斯的入侵行動，估計其中約3,000人已陣亡或受傷。俄羅斯和北韓均未證實這些說法。 6. America imposed sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of Georgia’s governing Georgian Dream party, for jeopardising his country’s “democratic and Euro-Atlantic future”. The pro-Russia party recently suspended efforts for the country to join the European Union, prompting protests and violent repression. Salome Zourabichvili, Georgia’s departing and pro-EU president, accuses her successor (heir) of being illegitimately elected and has refused to step down this weekend. 美國對喬治亞執政黨「喬治亞夢想黨」的創始人比齊納·伊萬尼什維利實施制裁，指控其危害喬治亞的「民主與歐洲-大西洋未來」。該親俄政黨最近暫停了該國加入歐盟的努力，引發抗議並遭到暴力鎮壓。即將卸任的親歐盟總統薩洛梅·祖拉比什維利指控她的繼任者是非法當選，並拒絕在本週末卸任。 7. China approved the construction of the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibet. It would cost an estimated $137bn to build. It would be the world’s largest infrastructure project, expected to generate three times more power than the Three Gorges dam in China. Since its announcement in 2020, the project has **sparked **rare protests in Tibet and **provoked **environmental and economic concerns downstream in India and Bangladesh. 中國批准在西藏的雅魯藏布江上建造世界上最大的水力發電大壩，預計建造成本約為1,370億美元。這將成為世界上最大的基礎設施項目，預計其發電量將是中國三峽大壩的三倍。自2020年宣布以來，該項目在西藏引發了罕見的抗議活動，並在印度和孟加拉國下游引起了環境與經濟方面的擔憂。 ALLEX Program Interview Questions 1) introduction (30 seconds) 2) Why did you choose Japan and your current major? 3) During these 5 years, how has the experience shaped your career choices? 4) Teaching demo 5) Ask your friend to use 2 adjectives to describe you, one positive and the other negative 6) How much do you want to get into the program? And what's your plan afterward? -- Hosting provided by SoundOn