The Plato Paradigm

Meno wonders why people regard knowledge as so much more valuable than opinion, given that correct opinion leads to the same results as knowledge.

The infamous road to Larissa argument supporting the notion that orthodoxy (correct opinion) is as beneficial as knowledge, given that it leads to the same destination.

Socrates tests Meno's ability to remember or "recollect" previous arguments in the conversation, but Meno is blissfully unaware of all the outrageous distortions Socrates perpetrates. Then it was prudence (phronesis) which was the guiding principle leading to acts being performed correctly and well by an individual, Now Socrates suggests that they were correct in thinking that good men could lead us correctly and well, but were incorrect in agreeing that someone leading correctly and well needed to be prudent (phronimos).

Socrates having established that there are no teachers or students of virtue, Meno wonders whether there are any good men at all, or if there are good men,  how they come about. It is the second question which Socrates begins to answer by returning to an apparent mistake they had made much earlier in claiming that people act correctly and well only when episteme (knowledge/understanding) is guiding.

Socrates finally concludes his argument demonstrating that neither sophists nor the "fine and good" think that virtue is something teachable. The number of times he asks Meno versions of this question throughout the argument suggests that Socrates would have liked Meno to notice one of the many problems in the argument. After completing the argument, we return to a consideration of the Theognis interlude, which turns out to have been not only redundant but actually unhelpful to Socrates' argument, since virtue is seen to be teachable in certain circumstances.

Socrates concludes his quotations from Theognis, overtly to demonstrate that even an individual can believe that virtue is something teachable, but then (in the same poem), that virtue is not teachable. Apart from this point being philosophically redundant (it is enough that Meno is aware that he and the Many cannot decide whether sophists and good citizens are able to teach virtue or not), it is not the case that Theognis contradicted himself. I suggest a more significant reason for the appearance of Theognis' model well-born citizen so soon after the departure of Anytus.

Socrates carries on the discussion about teachers of virtue by returning to the question whether virtue is teachable. Meno and the other politikoi are not alone in wavering on the question, since even Theognis contradicts himself in this very matter.

Socrates continues interrogating Meno about virtue being something teachable. Having agreed that virtue is not something teachable if the teachers of it disagree, and then Meno himself having shown that the sophists disagree among themselves, Meno fails to conclude the sophists are not  teachers of virtue. This has no bearing on the teachability of virtue, but we do learn that Meno has made no progress in his ability to draw conclusions.

Anytus has just left, and Socrates and Meno are now free to say what they like about him. Socrates continues his demonstration that virtue is not something teachable, given that there are no teachers of it, as appears evident from his discussion with Anytus.

Anytus leaves with a scarcely veiled threat that Socrates will get himself into trouble if he keeps badmouthing people. This is not so important as the fact that he is exemplifying what he said earlier about decent Athenian citizens making better those people who are prepared to be persuaded by them.

Socrates demonstrates to Anytus inductively that that virtue of the Athenian citizen qua Athenian citizen is not something teachable. Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides are all shown to have wanted to educate their sons, and that their sons were capable of learning, but that none of the sons ever acquired this particular arete. We'll have a look at the validity of this argument next time.

Socrates begins to test Anytus' claim that any decent Athenian citizen can teach his own virtue (arete). He ensures that Anytus thinks Themistocles is a good Athenian citizen before asking him whether he taught his virtue to his son, Cleophontus.

Anytus claims that decent ("fine and good") Athenians learn their virtue from earlier decent Athenians.

Anytus rejects sophists as teachers of his arete, and points instead to decent Athenian citizens, any of whom could teach Meno to be better.

It turns out that Anytus has no experience of sophists yet dislikes them all the same. Prompted by Socrates, Anytus states that the sophists aren't mad (presumably. because they make money out of deceiving people), but the youths who study with them are mad, the relatives who send them are madder, and the cities condoning their harmful practices are the maddest.

Socrates effectively points out to Anytus that objecting to the sophists does not follow from the criteria they had agreed upon for a good teacher. They profess to teach, and they make lots of money from teaching, indicating that they have many satisfied customers.

Anytus is shocked to discover that Socrates thinks sophists are the people Meno should be sent to in. order to become virtuous like Anytus.

Socrates has manoeuvred Anytus into agreeing that they should be looking for someone who claims to be able to teach the techne Meno wants to learn, and who already makes money from teaching that techne. Socrates equates sophia with arete and states that Meno wishes to learn a complex virtue which we, and presumbaly Antyus, see as comprising Anytus' own characteristic behaviours. Because of the critieria agreed upon, Anytus will not be able to point to himself as a suitable teacher.

Socrates suggests two criteria required to determine who are teachers worth sending Meno to. Anytus agrees to teachers being those: A. having a techne, B. making money. from the techne - but also A. promising to teach a techne, B. making money. from teaching the techne.

Socrates begins his conversation with Anytus, with the overt purpose of searching for teachers of virtue. The sequence of questions follows the pattern "To become a good craftsman should one be sent to the craftsmen?", which at first sight is an odd question when it comes to searching for teachers of virtue.

Socrates bemoans his failure to find a teacher of virtue. As luck would have it, Meno's host in Athens, Anytus, has just sat down with them, and Socrates begins to explain why Anytus will be able to help them. The father of Anytus, Anthemion, became rich from his trade at which he was an expert (a scholion tells us he was a tanner).

Socrates pretends to suspect that virtue is not episteme (knowledge, understanding) because any episteme of anything requires the presence of teachers and students. Meno accepts this fallacy but questions whether there seem to Socrates to be no teachers or students of virtue.

Socrates and Meno finally come to end of the argument following the hypothesis that virtue is teachable.

Prudence (phronēsis) is found to be all or part of virtue (aretē). Given that this has followed from the hypothesis that virtue is teachable, it would seem that phronēsis does not come to people by nature. Socrates supports this conclusion with compelling evidence. Naturally good children are not kept under guard in the acropolis until they are of an age to benefit cities, and this indicates that there are no naturally good children.

The argument following the hypothesis continues. Socrates arrives at the formulation that the intelligent soul uses things correctly, while the untintelligent soul uses things mistakenly. After this high point the argument once again deteriorates into one blatant mistake after another, without Meno noticing any wrong.

Phronesis (prudence) is regarded by some Greek philosophers as virtue itself, with the cardinal virtues being aspects of it. Phronesis in this argument is presented as an addition to the virtues, in keeping with Meno's inability to think abstractly. It is only with the addition of phronesis that anything becomes beneficial.

Socrates continues to explore the ramifications of the hypothesis that virtue, if teachable, would be an episteme (knowledge/understanding). Following the concluson that good things such as health, wealth, strength, and beauty are beneficial ony when used with intelligence (nous), but harmful when used without intelligence, this time Socrates begins considering the good things of the soul, the. first three of which are actually three of the four cardinal virtues - soundmindedness, justice, and courage. Among the many mistakes Socrates deliberately makes in an attempt to make Meno react were he to begin thinking critically, these cardinal virtues are treated as prudence (phronesis) itself, although technically that is the name often given to virtue altogether, and he treats these virtues as beneficial or harmful depending on whether they are used with or without intelligence (technically, he asks Meno, and it is Meno who allows this nonsense).

Here is the hypothesis: If virtue is some sort of knowledge, it will be teachable. Since virtue is also a good thing (it isn't - it is simply the characteristic of good things, just as bravery is the characteristic of brave things), if we find that all good things involve knowledge, then virtue will also be a knowledge, and then we'll know that it is teachable. Socrates gives Meno many opportunities to object, but Meno does not think critically, unlike Plato's readers.

Socrates applies the hypothetical method to virtue. If virtue is something like episteme (knowledge, understanding), then it is teachable or recollectable. Meno enthusiastically agrees that nothing is taught other than episteme.

Meno has once again avoided saying what virtue is, this time by reverting to his original question, what sort of thing Socrates thinks virtue is, although this time omitting the option that it is exercisable. Socrates is faced with the dilemma of either confronting Meno or going along with Meno's desire to sit back and listen to Socrates. Socrates suggests usinng a hypothesis, and entertains Meno with an example of a hypothesis from geometry. A comparison of this geometrical problem with the earlier one involving Meno's slave is instructive.

Socrates has finally broken the impasse (or rather, Meno has allowed the impasse to be broken, somehow - he's not sure how it happened). Now Meno is excited to get back to searching along with Socrates what virtue is. Or actually, he'd rather hear Socrates answer Meno's original question.

The Theory of Recollection - part 13:
The demonstration - (post mortem, part 2):

Socrates continues his sophistic and shoddy proof that the slave must have looked into his soul and found some episteme (knowledge, understanding) there. Meno is satisfied that Socrates has proved his point, although, as he says at the end, he doesn't know how.

The Theory of Recollection - part 12:
The demonstration - (post mortem):

Socrates begins his sophistic and shoddy proof that the slave must have looked into his soul and found some episteme (knowledge, understanding) there. Socrates must be extremely disappointed that Meno and all those lurking Platonists fail to react to any of the deliberate inconsistencies. He'll have to try harder next time (and he does).

The Theory of Recollection - part 11:
The demonstration - part 7 (final part):

The rest of the demonstration after the aporetic interlude is surprisingly quick. Suddenly there is a potential base line the slave hadn't seen before. Socrates has just drawn the square with the double area, so that might have something to do with it. The demonstration clearly (to us) has nothing to do. with any Theory of Recollection, but it does provide food for thought with regard to the way Socrates is misguiding Meno towards a correct answer, by eliminating the obvious wrong answers first.

The Theory of Recollection - part 10:
The demonstration - part 6:

Socrates finishes talking to Meno about the aporia of the slave, while actually referring to the aporia of Meno himself. For the first time he mentions doxa (opinion, reputation - that which seems). Opinion will become very important in the second half of the dialogue.

The Theory of Recollection - part 9:
The demonstration - part 5:

Socrates discusses with Meno the exercise so far, stressing how being numbed by the torpedo fish (using Meno's analogy) is no bad thing, but a necessary step towards searching for the truth. Vlastos' "Socratic Method" accepts that Socrates does indeed lead his interlocutors to the realization that they do not know what they thought that they did know, resulting in aporia, a necessary condition before the search for the truth may begin. This description, however, is tailored to Meno's way of thinking, and does not conform with essentially the Socratic examination of hypotheses, no matter whether the interlocutor treats them as knowledge or mere opinion. The slave had been manipulated into giving particular answers, effectively hypotheses, and they were not opinions the slave had held previously at all, let alone as opinions which he had treated as knowledge. The slave's aporia stems not from his awareness of ignorance but from his inability to find another baseline (it hasn't yet been drawn). Socrates is using the present exercise to neutralize Meno's objection to continuing beyond his own pseudo-aporia, and if the slave does eventually find the correct answer, Meno will surely be convinced that it is worth continuing to look for an answer regarding virtue.

The Theory of Recollection - part 8:
The demonstration - part 4:

The slave is surprised to discover that the double area is not constructed on the double base-line (four units) or on the only other option, the base-line between two and four units, namely. the three-unit line.
When asked to point at yet another base-line, he finds himself in an aporia, and it is worth comparing. this despairing aporia with Meno's wonderful aporia just a little while ago.

The Theory of Recollection - part 7:
The demonstration - part 3:

The slave works out, with much help from Socrates, that a square with double the area of a smaller square is not constructed on double the base line. The area of a square constructed on double the base line is quadruple. We await patiently the demonstration of Recollection.

The Theory of Recollection - part 6:
The demonstration - part 2:

The slave works out (without being taught!) that a square with a side of two units has an area of four (squares). When asked about a square with double the area (eight squares), he confidently declares that the line of the square must be double too. Meno does not react, but we should.

The Theory. of Recollection - part 5:
The demonstration - part 1:

Meno has been told to decide whether the slave is recollecting, or learning from Socrates. He should have told Meno to decide whether the slave is learning by recollecting or from Socrates. Instead of applying his nous (intellect), Meno simply watches, no matter how much Socrates tries to invalidate the demonstration.

The Theory. of Recollection - part 4:
Preparing for the demonstration

Meno is not allowed to have Socrates teach him that only recollection is learning (if Socrates teaches, then learning is not by recollection), so Meno asks for a demonstration instead, as if learning through seeing will prove that only recollection is learning. Socrates agrees to demonstrate this "difficult" task and continues to pile on the inconsistencies, but Meno is quite happy to lend Socrates one of his household staff. Sorry, the Squaring of the Slave begins only in the next episode.

The Theory. of Recollection - part 3.
Socrates continues to pile on the absurdities, and Meno conntinues to behave like a Platonist, failing to react to any of the obvious inconsistencies. The immortal soul knows everything (having seen it all, thanks to living forever), but the human knows nothing (no reason is given - it's as if there's no connection between the mental activity of the soul and the mental activity of the human). The soul has all knowledge; the human has all ignorance, and there is no mention of opinion. The reason for this ridiculous account is given; it is to encourage Meno to return to the conversation, and "help Socrates" search for virtue. The eristic argument encourages laziness, but searching requires effort. The Platonist will continue to argue for some Theory of Ideas based on Phaedo rather than this account. I ignore Platonism in this episode as well.

The Theory. of Recollection - part 2.
Socrates piles on the absurdities, but Meno behaves like a Platonist and fails to react to any of the obvious inconsistencies. To take one example, in addition to the immortal soul routinely dying and coming to be, it now has seen everything and because of this it has learned everything. Among the things that it knows is virtue. In other words, the soul has seen virtue. It has seen virtue either in this world or in Hades, the two places whose contents Socrates declares the soul to have seen. All of this the Platonist worth his salt will ignore in favour of some Theory of Ideas which so far has nowhere been mentioned (I do not refer to Platonism in this episode).

The Theory. of Recollection - part 1.
Socrates entices Meno with priests, priestesses, and poets such as Pindar. They have an account of the soul, according to which the soul is immortal and yet dies and comes back to being. Socrates has told Meno to examine whether the account is true, and yet Meno fails to object even to this absurdity.

Meno has effectively excused himself from answering again about virtue. Socrates pretends to acknowledge that neither of them knows what virtue is, in order to suggest that they search together for it. Meno immediately raises the eristic argument whereby searching is pointless - either one knows and therefore has no need of searching, or one does not know, which makes searching futile since one would not recognize the thing searched for even if found. This is actually not an eristic argument, but is Meno's appropriation of an eristic question, "Who searches for something, the one who knows, or the one who does not know?" Will Socrates be convinced by Meno's attempt to avoid further interrogation?

Meno celebrates his aporia, his lack of supply (of answers). He exploits what he has heard about Socrates and his ability to stun, like a torpedo fish, not only himself but anyone who touches him, and portrays himself as yet another one of Socrates' victims.

Socrates wraps up the series of answers Meno has given about virtue by ensuring that he cannot give a fourth answer without suddenly changing and applying some dialectical thought to the subject.

Socrates concludes his criticism of Meno's third answer about virtue by labouring the point that an action in itself is neither virtue nor vice [not correcting Meno's notion that the whole of virtue or vice is a particular action], but is virtue if done with a part of virtue (it follows that it is vice if done with a part of vice). Socrates not only shuts down any future answer about virtue which is a particular action, but he also shuts down the addition of justice or soundmindedness or any other part of virtue by treating these as parts of virtue, while he is asking about virtue as a whole. He is making it very difficult for Meno to give a fourth answer about virtue, although this is precisely what he is about to ask Meno.

Having discarded the first part of Meno's third answer concerning virtue, Socrates turns to the second part, and soon establishes that Meno is still thinking of the virtue of the man. Of all the possible ways to refute this yet again, Socrates simply adds "justly" and (instead of "soundmindedly") "piously" to the explanation of virtue, but Meno fails to predict the impending refutation.

Having treated the first part of Meno's third answer about virtue last time, this time Socrates explains why it is redundant. Having concluded sophistically last time that there is no one who does not desire good things, Socrates exploits one further assumption made by aristocrats like Meno, that virtue is a characteristic of someone exceptional. If all people desire good things, then this desiring is nothing special, and therefore not part of virtue.

After Meno's third answer to the question, "What is virtue?", that it is someone desiring fine things and being able to acquire them, Socrates begins his examination of the statement by apparently questioning whether there are people who do not desire fine things. Socrates actually indulges in some sleight of hand worthy of a sophist.

Meno's third answer regarding virtue is "Someone desiring fine things and being able to acquire them". Socrates will begin his examination of this next time, but we already consider some of the problems now.

Socrates and Meno discuss which of the three sample answers they each prefer, although it isn't clear which one Socrates prefers or why. Socrates entices Meno to continue the discussion by hinting at an initiation into the mysteries. We learn that Meno and Socrates conversed yesterday as well.

The third example Socrates gives of the sort of answer he expects from Meno is even worse than the previous two, although Meno accepts this one enthusiastically. The first answer had been that shape is the only thing which always follows colour, and Meno had called that one silly, since the recipient of the answer might not know what colour is; the second, that shape is the end of solid, was performed with Socrates "dialectically" ensuring that Meno accepted all the elements of the answer before giving the answer. Meno has now demanded to know what colour is, so Socrates' third answer is that colour is the perception of shapes according to Empedocles; this is a mirror image of the first answer (then, shape follows colour; now, colour follows shape), except that Meno has accepted all of the elements, which apparently removes the objection that this answer is silly. We are to conclude that merely accepting all the elements before being given the answer does not guarantee a good answer, or one that is intelligible to the recipient.

Meno avoids having to answer again the question what virtue is because Socrates allows him to. Immediately after Socrates' second reply regarding shape, Meno asks what colour is, and Socrates plays the erastes (lover) to Meno's eromenos (beloved), pretending to give in to the demands of the younger man.

Socrates provides a second definition of "shape" (schema), but this time ensuring that Meno agrees beforehand to the various elements forming the explanation. Things are not as obvious as they seem (obviously).

Socrates pretends to help Meno give him an answer to the question "What is virtue?", which would explain every virtue, by providing a sample answer to the question "What is shape?", applicable to all shapes. Socrates encourages Meno to criticize it, spurring him on by noting that it's now Meno's turn to answer the question "What is virtue?", which Meno apparently will avoid by any means. Although the answer about shape is very bad, Meno utilizes a stock criticism which he has heard given in an eristic setting (as hinted to by Socrates in his response). Any answer by a victim can be laughed at by pointing out how silly it is to explain X by Y when neither X nor Y is understood by a (fictional) third person.

Socrates is making a meal out of Meno's inability to give a simple answer to the question what is X in all instances of X. He would like Meno to give an answer to what is shape, for this to serve as an exercise (meletē) towards Meno's later answer regarding virtue. Socrates points out that this "What is X?" problem is applicable to all things, such as shape and colour. Meno bargains with Socrates, as if he will answer concerning virtue if Socrates answers regarding shape. We may already suspect, along with Socrates, that Meno will once more stall after Socrates' answer concerning shape, and ask for Socrates' answer concerning colour. We don't really need to know about colour and shape, but we do need to understand Meno and Socrates and their behaviour, which these apparently trivial problems are intended to facilitate.

Meno has recalled Gorgias' two answers concerning virtues perfectly, but one gives many virtues, the other only one virtue, but not applicable to all. He is thus out of options which might satisfy Socrates' question, to say what that virtue is which is in all, and it is up to Socrates to keep the conversation on virtue going. He suggests that they go back and look at shape and shapes which had been mentioned a while ago. We should note that Socrates does not talk about shapes as such, but elements of shape (the round and the straight), just as numbers were discussed even earlier according to odd and even, not particular numbers, such as sixes or sevens.

Meno's second attempt at explaining what virtue is by using Gorgias' other reply out of context is already doomed to failure, but Socrates adds to the problems by deliberately adding to Meno"s "being able to rule humans" the adverb "justly", which is only a part of the general adverb "well", thus inviting a list of many other virtues from Meno which, being virtues, are not the one virtue Socrates is supposedly looking for. Incidentally, Socrates manages to slip into a discussion of general and particular ("virtue", "a virtue") a reference to shapes ("shape", "a shape"), which will become significant later on.

Socrates once again asks Meno for an answer given by Gorgias despite having dropped the sophist from the conversation a little earlier. This second answer makes sense in Gorgias' context, but it does not follow in the present context. Socrates therefore is carefully manipulating Meno into making a series of apparent errors. We may ask ourselves why.

Socrates completes his argument moving virtue away from the "what" to the "how", from particular activities appropriate to types of people and towards virtue as the appropriate way in which any activity is done. This allows all types of people to be good in just one way, common to all - they do what they do "well" - which is in stark contrast to Meno's first answer, the list of many different virtues (= good roles) appropriate to different types of people. This is in line with Socrates' desire to receive an answer pertaining to the one aspect of virtue in all good things. His division of "well" into "justly" and "self-controlledly" is therefore all the more suspicious. Socrates incidentally shows that adverbs, nouns in the dative, and adjectives all say the same thing in different ways ("justly", "with justice", "just"); and we see that Meno is already aware of this common usage of the Greek language.

Socrates attempts to steer Meno away from regarding virtue as the task appropriate for each particular individual to do, towards the way in which anything is done (well, justly, with self-control). The means by which Socrates attempts to do this suggest that he realizes that Meno is not amenable to strict logical. We may also note that despite Socrates emphasizing that he is looking for the one aspect of virtue, he splits "well" into "justly" and "with self-control", which will become significant shortly.

Socrates explains that he is looking for the aspect of arete (virtue), the one thing which is common to all the different types of arete.

Socrates turns the tables. Instead of saying what sort of thing he thinks arete (virtue) is, he manipulates Meno into telling him what Gorgias says arete is. Meno answers in the style of Gorgias, generously and without fear. Each type of person according to gender, age, and social status has an appropriate role or task, and this is a virtue. Meno is happy to say that there are very many virtues, he is that generous. This is surely an answer befitting one who knows what arete is.

Socrates finally manages to get Meno to react despite not selecting one of the choices Meno gave him regarding the sort of thing arete (virtue) is. Meno reacts to the suggestion that someone not knowing Meno at all would not know what sort of person Meno is, but immediately turns to the scoop that Socrates doesn't know at all what arete (virtue) is ( for which reason Socrates claims not to know what sort of thing arete is).

Socrates continues his reply to.Meno's first question since Meno fails to react to any of the shocking things Socrates says. Having portrayed Gorgias as a seller of sophia, teaching people to be able to answer any question put to them, and having adopted Meno's conception of abstracts as concrete things, it follows that Gorgias' move from Attica to Thessaly has resulted in a drought of sophia in Attica, meaning that no one in Attica could possible answer Meno's question - and yet Meno fails to conclude that Socrates cannot answer his question; Socrates will have to spell this out next time.

Socrates begins his reply to Meno's first question

Meno's first question is not what it is usually considered to be. It is about the sort of thing arete (virtue) is, and not whether Socrates can tell Meno how to acquire virtue.

This is a barebones summary of my full analysis of Politeia in my 2015 book entitled Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well, Lexington Books, with special emphasis on the explicit use of paradeigmata in the dialogue.

Final part of the summary of my analysis of Hippias Major.
The original analysis was published as

Hippias Major: An Interpretation(Palingenesia XXXVII), Stuttgart 1991

My more recent article assessing Hippias Major and Minor together may be found in

“Plato on the Good: Hippias Minorand Hippias Major”, in Y.Z. Liebersohn, I. Ludlam, A. Edelheit edd. For a Skeptical Peripatetic: Festschrift in Honour of John Glucker(Studies in Ancient Moral and Political Philosophy3), Academia Verlag: Sankt Augustin 2017

What scholars tend to treat as a flawed philosophical argument is actually much worse than that. The dynamics of the dialogue require Socrates to appear impressed by Hippias, while Hippias must appear good (by being expert) to Socrates. Socrates is beneficial in that he continually applies dialectic and attempts to make Hippias think dialectically; Hippias is harmful, especially here, where he attemtps to teach Socrates eristics, the very opposite of dialectics (neither affects the other since they are both static models in this philosophical drama). The question "What is the fine?" is answered and refuted seven times.

Hippias acts as if he is the expert on reputation (eudoxia), on how to appear beneficial despite not being beneficial. Socrates is obliged to frame everything he says in a way which allows Hippias to believe that his audience of one is continually impressed by him. To create more dissonance within this stricture, Socrates invents what I call the Questioner, a rude man who criticizes Socrates; Socrates takes advice from Hippias on eristics, but is thoroughly defeated by the Questioner. This should have made Hippias review his own abilities, but he has no trouble simply distancing himself from Socrates after each refutation. The Questioner is a hybrid of two audiences, the dialectic but suitably impressed Socrates and the undialectic mocking Many - the Questioner is dialectic but mocking.

This is a four-part summary of Hippias Major. I had analysed this dialogue already in the 1980s, and published the analysis in 1991. A thorough read-through of this particularly eristic dialogue would take around 80 episodes. There are other dialogues I would like to analyse now, so it seemed reasonable to produce a short summary updating the published analysis - Hippias Major: an Interpretation.

This final episode of the Euthyphro series discusses the central idea, its aspects, the paradeigmata, the deigmata, and a red herring

The characters are not only remarkably consistent, but they are also extreme and clear-cut.

The dialogue's surface argument is philosophically unsatisfactory, to say the least

In this last section of the dialogue, we see Euthyphro choosing to walk away rather than propose another definition of the holy (to hosion). Socrates still praises Euthyphro for his wisdom, but in such a way that anyone with thicker skin than Euthyphro would rethink his prosecution of his father. Socrates claims to want to know what the holy is not only to prevent his own case from coming to court, but more generally in order to live better. This provides us with the clue we needed to explain why Socrates is bothering to talk with Euthyphro, to help Euthyphro live a better life.

The art of commerce seems not to benefit both sides, humans and gods, but humans only. Euthyphro, equating pleasant things with gratitude (keCHARISmena, with CHARIS), explains that the gods receive gratitude (i.e, thanks for goods received from them) in the form of presents. Euthyphro does not see why this is a problem, even when Socrates spells the problem out - the holy as the god-beloved has already been refuted, and those things dear to the gods (theois phila) are none other than god-beloved (theophile). With this wordplay the second definition of holy is finally refuted.

By means of question and answer, Euthyphro's suggestion that holy are those things pleasing to the gods, performed through the sacrifices and prayers of humans, is transformed into the holy being the techne of commerce, whereby humans and gods obtain from each other things which they need.

We learn a little more about dialectic. The questioner allows the questioned to feel in charge of the conversation, but it is in fact the questioner who steers the conversation by means of the type of questions asked. One of the examples in this dialogue is the sustained attempt by Socrates to turn every concept Euthyphro raises into a version of techne. He has construed Euthyphro's therapeia as techne, and now construes Euthyphro's praying and doing things pleasing to the gods as an episteme of praying and sacrificing, where episteme (knowledge, understanding) stands in for techne (the practical application of episteme). Euthyphro actually reveals his notion of the holy, and we may begin to see the consistent behaviour of Euthyphro throughout the dialogue.

When pressed to explain what the gods actually do in their therapeia, Euthyhphro avoids the question but actually reveals an important aspect of the holy. Humans, subservient to the gods, pray and do things pleasing to the gods, and these things are holy; things displeasing to the gods are disrespectful and unholy. It is up to the court of the archon basileus to turn away the anger of the gods in cases of potential disrespect (murder, not believing the gods exist), since angry gods do not provide affected households, or the polis as a whole, with the many and fine things which gods are able to provide. Hence Euthyphro's obsession with miasma.

Euthyphro attempts to explain what he means by dividing justice into the therapeia of gods and the therapeia of men, but Socrates continues to treat therapeia ("tending") as if it is techne (craft). Last time the therapeiai made animals better, while this time the therapeiai lead to positive ends, such as health. Euthyphro's portrayal of the relationship between men and gods as between slaves and masters is not quite the same as Socrates' portrayal of craftsmen as servants. Their masters accomplish good things through the craftsmen, but what good things do the gods achieve through men?

Euthyphro has defined justice as the therapeia (tending) of gods on the one hand and the therapeia of men on the other. Socrates treats therapeia as if it is techne (skill, craft, art), suggesting that there is an expert for every therapeia, and Euthyphro the expert on the gods naturally agrees. However, while the therapeia of animals leads to their improvement, the therapeia of the gods cannot possibly lead to their improvement, so that it becomes clear (!) that the two types of therapeia are different. To be clear, the therapeia of men was already a rhetorical flourish by Euthyphro, made worse by Socrates' confusion of therapeia with techne, and this does not refute per se the notion that the aspect of justice dealing with holiness is a therapeia of the gods. What has been clarified is that this therapeia should not affect the gods.

Euthyphro has made what might appear to be a division of the genus justice into two species - the tending of gods and the tending of men. He has in fact allowed the holy to become the species of justice exemplified by Socrates' court case, and being unable to leave his own court case for a single minute, he has his exemplify justice as the tending of men. When Socrates begins to use "tending" (therapeia) as if it were expertise (techne), Euthyphro goes along with it, because he regards himself as an expert on the gods' attitude towards justice among men.

Euthyphro gives the answer to Socrates' question that the holy is that part of justice which is the therapeia of the gods, while the rest of justice is the therapeia of humans.

Some background this time. Species = {GENUS: specifying difference} (e.g., Man is ANIMAL: rational: mortal). A species entails other species, and all the species together fully complete all instances of the genus. The genus ANIMAL may be divided into the species God = ANIMAL: rational: immortal; Man = ANIMAL: rational: mortal; Beast = ANIMAL:irrational: mortal; Divine Beast (e.g. Cerberus) = ANIMAL:irrational:immortal. So… Euthyphro agrees to Socrates’ suggestion that the holy is a part of the just. The subsequent example of a division of NUMBER into its two Species - {NUMBER:scalene} and {NUMBER:isosceles} indicates that Socrates is treating the holy here as if it is a species of the just. He essentially expects Euthyphro to provide the specifying difference, to say what sort of justice holiness is, i.e., the Holy is {JUSTICE: in some way}

Having just suggested that the just (to dikaion) is part of the holy (to hosion), Socrates purportedly explains what he means by adducing the poet Stasinus who says something which Socrates claims is the opposite (regarding the relationship of the terms), that where there is apprehension there also is reverence/shame. This hardly explains anything, but It does recall the shameful behavior of Euthyphro towards his authority figures, especially his father, although no such connection is made by either speaker.

Following the refutation of the holy as the godloved, and Euthyphro's reluctance to offer an alternative definition, Socrates suggests that the holy is the just (or that holiness is justice), in whole or in part.

Mentioning the legendary sculptor Daedalus eventually allows Socrates to confess that he too is an expert (sophos), albeit an unwilling one. His expertise is in changing not only his own opinions, but those of others as well. This expertise is not rhetoric but dialectic, the art of dialogos, conversation.

Having established that the godloved is merely an affect of the holy, Socrates asks Euthyphro again for something which is common to all instances of holy but is not an affect. Euthyphro complains or observes that every attempt at an answer so far has moved around. Instead of pointing out the obvious, that the (very few) suggestions so far have been wrong, Socrates begins to develop the conceit that the answers are like the statues made by Daedalus.

Socrates continues his examination of the holy as godloved with further observations on the difference between something causing an activity and something described by an activity

Socrates presents Euthyphro with active and passive participles and verbs in order to impress upon him the nature of cause and effect. An activity is logically prior to a thing described by that activity. A thing described by an activity is not the reason for that activity. This will become relevant to the discussion on the holy defined as the god-loved.

The Euthyphro Dilemma - will not be discussed in this series, since it has little to do with this dialogue or with Plato. Instead, we shall be examining the original question at 10a which is effectively the springboard for many and varied discussions about the connection between God and morality.

Euthyphro finally concludes that what is holy (to hosion) is what all (not some of) the gods love, and that what is unholy (to anosion) is what all (not some of) the gods hate. Euthyphro may seem to have switched from a definition of holy involving the removal of miasma to one involving a divine hatred of injustice, but he is simply describing two aspects of his own god-loved action (prosecuting his father).

Socrates continues to run rings around Euthyphro with gods loving just acts, hating unjust acts, all the while disagreeing with each other, and yet Euthyphro remains blithely confident that all the gods love his prosecution of his father, and is happy to have the killing at the centre of his court case appear to be hated by all the gods. The subsequent definition of holiness (hosion) and unholiness seems to make all acts outside of Euthyphro's court case either both holy and unholy, or neither holy nor unoly, but Euthyphro is to wrapped up in his court case to notice.

It becomes even more apparent that Euthyphro is concerned with to hosion rather than justice, but will use justice as a rhetorical device. Rhetoric is necessary in a court case. Socrates is not so easily influenced by rhetoric, and he dwells on the legal difficulties of Euthyphro's case.

Euthyphro is motivated by to hosion (the holy) to prosecute his father (the prosecution will remove the pollution of murder). Socrates has contrived a portrayal of the gods whereby they are in conflict with each other primarily because they disagree who among them acts justly or unjustly in any given action. This nonsensical portrayal is based on opinions held by Euthyphro, which is why Euthyphro agrees with it. Socrates finally begins to bring this new emphasis on the problematic nature of justice to bear on Euthyphro's prosecution of his father.

Socrates continues his questioning of Euthyphro's reply that the holy is what is loved by the gods. Euthyphro insists that all the gods love his prosecution of his father's unjust killing of one of their bondsmen.