When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

During this series we have encountered a wide variety of fascinating characters and controversial decisions, but even though the story of why the world went to war in 1914 is finally finished, that doesn't mean we covered everything. After over a year of content, I felt it was only right to turn the mic over to you. What still leaves you puzzled? What do you think deserves more attention? What part of the story did I miss? What decision needs more explanation? Here, I delve into the questions you sent me over the last few weeks, and we bring this series to its deserved end. Thanksss so much for your questions, not to mention your support and attention, you're the best history friends a podcaster could ask for! 

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It's been a while since I last checked in with you, and I've been sitting on some incredible news for a while now. If you'd like to know how things are about to change, then make sure you listen in!

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In our final part, we bring this saga of a series to an end by focusing our attention on the most focused on country of all - Germany. We know what Germany did from 1 August, from the declarations of war to the rape of Belgium, but what about before? What about the period 29-30 July, when the war truly became inevitable? Would it surprise you to learn that the Germans were the ones attempting to pull back from ledge?

For a preciously brief period of time, Berlin was flying the flag for peace, even if they did so with insufficient skill and far too late. Germany's sins were many, but she was among good company. As we conclude here, none of the three eastern powers emerges without fault, but what does this mean for our understanding of the July Crisis? How does it change our view of the First World War? Join me here to find out, as I propose an alarmingly simple yet nuanced way of looking at this overwritten story. Thanksss so much for joining for the ride.

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For generations, examinations of the First World War excluded arguably the most important actor - Russia. In this episode, we will hone in on the Tsar's court and his ministers. We will analyse their mindset at crucial moments in the crisis, particularly the 29-30 July, where general mobilisation was approved against Austria and Germany. What was the meaning of this act? Was it based on sound logic, or something more problematic, and did this act mean that Russia - rather than Germany - was mostly responsible for what followed? Listen in to find out history friend!

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By now we've seen the absolute worst that Europe had to offer in 1914. We've seen naive statesmen, misinformed statesmen, distrustful statesmen, desperate statesmen, and everything in between. But when it comes to the question of who was responsible or whose fault the outbreak of war actually was, how can you condense the last 60+ episodes into a coherent, satisfying answer? In this first instalment, we look at Austria-Hungary's clear role in the crisis, whether from pushing for war with Serbia, sabotaging negotiations, or keeping its German ally in the dark. Austria had a lot to answer for, and we are determined to pull no punches!

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Something special for you here - Alex and I had a great conversation about realism in international relations on his History Impossible podcast, and he was good enough to let me publish it on my feed. If you like political discussions, current affairs, and hearing a bit more about my academia journey, then have a listen to this episode. A huge thanksss to Alex for having me on, and make sure to check out History Impossible!

Check out History Impossible

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What have we learned after 65 episodes of background, analysis, and day-to-day coverage of the most consequential diplomatic failure in human history? What can we say about those responsible for what happened, and is there any value in searching for guilt? Can we distinguish between guilt or responsibility? Is it a cop out to not look for culprits? Should we search for reasons instead?

The July Crisis is a story of human failure on a catastrophic scale, but not all failures were made equally. One is drawn to the behaviour of Austria, Russia, and Germany - the three Eastern powers - who made the war possible. But did they know what they were doing? Were they knowingly moving the world towards disaster, or simply making what they believed was the best choice available to them? Here we wrap up, as much as possible, this incredible story.

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The world was at war, and there was much to do. In London, attention turned to the British Expeditionary Force. The BEF had been ruled out several times before, but that did not have to matter. How many divisions could Britain send, and to where? What of the Dominions, or India, or Egypt? How could one balance imperial possessions with European defence imperatives? At least, the Cabinet was mostly on the same page, and in Parliament, war credits were approved, though not without some vocal dissent.

The mood in Germany was both anxious and defiant. The sheer extent of the challenge posed by the Triple Entente made gathering more allies all the more urgent, but it also entailed a kind of desperation, where Germany must be prepared to fight to the end. Austria would also be pressured to clarify matters, and declare war on Russia and France. The First World War as we know it was taking shape, yet very few fully understood how it had happened. Where complex analysis was unavailable and sources lacking, governments turned to propaganda and noble causes. The war could still be seen as a kind of adventure, but within weeks, romanticism would collide with the brutal reality of industrial slaughter.

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With only hours left until the ultimatum expired, the mood in London and Berlin was anxious and excited. Was this truly it? Was the Anglo-German relationship now destined to die in a war over Belgium? Some could not bring themselves to believe it, but in London, the Cabinet was at least agreed. Once the clock struck 11PM, a war which had been impossible to imagine scarcely a few weeks ago was now the only possible policy. By now it was too late to stop the war, but who would declare it? Would Germany pre-empt Britain's ultimatum, and rip the bandage off herself? As the cheers rang out around Buckingham Palace, all that truly mattered was that, for the first time since perhaps 1815, the world was at war, and nothing would ever be the same again.

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The 1839 Treaty on Belgian neutrality was a mere scrap of paper - that was the phrase which doomed Bethmann Hollweg, and Germany, to moral condemnation. It was the excuse which conquerors of all shapes and sizes had trotted out, when what they really meant was might makes right. Britain and the allies subsequently made great capital out of this faux pas, but this had led to some important questions - foremost among them being, did the German Chancellor actually say it?

In this episode, we journey to Berlin in the final hours of peace, when Edward Goschen, the British ambassador, delivers his master's seismic telegrams, warning of the imminent rupture between the two countries if Belgium was not left alone. It was an impossible request for Germany, then locked into the Schlieffen Plan, but the language used could at least cushion the blow. Unfortunately, Bethmann reverted to the most offensive posture, discounting Belgian sovereignty and effectively challenging Britain to respond. Goschen was on hand to record these interviews, but can his record be trusted, or was he just one of the latest propagandists to emerge from the British side?

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No matter what Britain did, it was impossible for Germany to evacuate Belgium. War was inevitable. Why, then, did most of Britain not even realise it?

The straightforward image we have in our minds of Britain taking a stand against the flagrant violation of Belgium is, in fact, a somewhat airbrushed picture. We may be surprised to learn that the British warnings to Germany failed to mention war, but this was less due to any cold feet, and more from a naïve hope that Germany would declare war on Britain. It may have been hard to imagine, but had Berlin not repeatedly shot itself in the foot diplomatically by this point? Why should she be expected to show some foresight now?

In fact, Germany was preparing the diplomatic ground with its few remaining allies, so British diplomats followed her there, to the Ottoman Empire, to warn against mobilisation. Lies remained a critical currency, as Austria and the Turks maintained an air of innocence. British agents reported from Japan, from the United States, from Italy, and elsewhere, building a picture of a world at war, eagerly awaiting Britain's entry into the lists. How could Britons fail to notice what was happening? The government, however incredible it might sound, was waiting for war, even if the midnight deadline hung like a dark cloud over the world. 

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Germany's invasion of Belgium had finally begun. After several anxious days of negotiations, warnings, and second guessing, Berlin was firmly set on its path. But what path was that? War had been declared on Russia and France, and now Belgium was in their warpath, but was their any wider strategy than that devised by Moltke? Indeed, diplomacy continued despite the shattered peace, and Berlin chased after two allies in particular - the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.

In each case they would be successful, but what did it say about German policy that its own ally, Italy, had abandoned her? Condemnations could be lobbed at her from Berlin, but if its own ally wasn't believing the propaganda, that certainly suggested problems were on the horizon for Germany's PR machine. Perhaps that did not matter. If Belgium folded, France was next. But Belgium did not fold. She held out far longer and with far more tenacity than Moltke had expected. It was just one sign among many that the vaunted Schlieffen Plan was unlikely to go off without a hitch, and many more such signs were to come...

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In the evening of 3 August, Germany finally declared war on France. The war, Berlin insisted, was caused by hostile French acts, but most knew better. The Italians certainly did. In a series of painful communications between Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, Italian neutrality was crystallised. Austria could not give her the concessions she required, and the Italian people would fly to revolt rather than fight for the hated Habsburgs. But the Austrians had at least begun to reckon with the consequences of their actions - they accepted the German argument, that the war with Serbia would have to take a back seat to the showdown with Russia.

But the news was not all bad. The Ottoman Empire was moments away from finalising its commitment to the Central Powers, and Bulgaria was also amenable to the idea. Through this unlikely coalition, Germany prepared to take on the rest of the world. In London the signs were clear - Germany was planning something at Constantinople, and there was no time to lose. And yet, everyone had already lost. The failure of diplomacy is surely etched into our minds by now, but it does no harm to stress that what happened in the July Crisis was something much more, and much worse, than this.

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Finally, Sir Edward Grey was ready to make his case to the House of Commons. Parliament had been starved of news for a week, and the press had done their best to fill in the gaps, but the whole country was desperate for an update. What would the government do if the rumours were true, and Germany had invaded France? Was neutrality on the table? And what of Belgium, who was protected by a treaty? How would Grey rally the House to his side, and did it even matter if he could not, since the Cabinet had already been convinced of the need to act thanks to various pressures?

Grey was tasked with answering many of these questions, but there were many that he did not answer, and a surprising amount that he did not say. In this episode we give Grey's speech in the Commons - and the subsequent reactions - their proper attention. In a day suffused with monumental, watershed moments, not limited to Germany's declaration of war on France, Grey's speech represented the public culmination of a struggle which had gone on in private for several weeks. His seventy minute speech set the tone for what was to come, and effectively spelled out that Britain was bound to transform this European war into a world war.

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The German ultimatum to Belgium had roused the Brussels government and rallied the nation, but other than this, much was still unclear by the early afternoon of this Bank Holiday Monday. News of Belgium's determination to resist took a surprisingly long time to arrive, but more than that, how long was Germany willing to wait? Had she already begun her invasion of Belgium? Was she already at war with France? Doubts reigned supreme over what would happen next, but one man in particular was in dire need of clarity.

British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey was due to give his speech to the House of Commons imminently, but before he could, there was a lot of housekeeping to work through, to ensure that his transformative speech occurred in the best possible circumstances. At the very least, the Cabinet was no longer murmuring about a division, and those who decided to resign kept their choice quiet for now. Much would depend on the next few hours of this eventful day, but as had been the case so often by now, Berlin did much of Grey's work for him.

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The German army was firmly in control of German policy, but its next steps were obvious to any contemporary with even the slightest grasp of the situation. The detour into Belgium had been flagged long in advance by the French, and could only be looked at in one way. The solution, though not officially announced in Berlin, was to manufacture a wide range of rumours of French border violations into a kind of justification. This was brought to its logical conclusion, as the Germans tried to claim - with a straight face - that they needed to invade Belgium, because the French were about to invade there too, so it was essential for German security.

Who could possibly believe such a naked set of lies? Remarkably, the rumour mill was so effective, that it was persuasive enough within German society, and among German officials. Countless communiques emphasised the defensive nature of Germany's offensive actions, and chastised other Europeans for their lack of understanding. Berlin could try to create this alternative reality, but in truth the Schlieffen Plan was the real driving force behind their actions, and other powers could clearly see this truth. Yet, in a policy which was as cynical as it was cringeworthy, Berlin persevered, insistent to the end that offence was defence, and the invasion of Belgium was an urgent matter of national security.

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Even as Moltke examined Germany's strategic options, the world was turning against Germany. Berlin pressed its case by pointing out the Russian sins of dishonesty and pre-emption, but was anyone listening? Britain's diplomats in Berlin, St Petersburg, and Vienna had had enough. The news from Luxemburg was a clear sign of things to come, and even if they were sympathetic to the Kaiser's position, the German response was viewed as an overreaction. Declarations of war came from Berlin and Vienna, not Paris and St Petersburg, and this was bound to drown out any pleas about technicalities.

To make up for this, German officials began reporting with increasing frequency on rumours and conjecture, dressing up impossible stories about outrages and violations as proof of Russian and French responsibility. But this only made their hole deeper, and even as Berlin cried foul, it was actively moving the ball forward, into Belgium. The imperatives of the Schlieffen Plan meant the ruin of Germany's reputation, and forced German officials to cling to the delusion that the eventual triumph would all be worth it - even while they opened Pandora's Box, and unleashed the madness of a great war upon the world.

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While Germany covered itself in infamy, the German ambassador in London did his best to maintain the fragile Anglo-German relationship. His mission was ultimately doomed, but no one could accuse Prince Max Lichnowsky of failing to try. An avid Anglophile and advocate of closer ties between the two countries, Lichnowsky continued to hope that his masters in Berlin could be persuaded that it was worth making a sacrifice in the war effort, if it meant Britain stayed out of the war.

Unfortunately for him, Berlin did not agree, and had effectively written Lichnowsky off as having gone native. Lichnowsky would not spare his masters from criticism, and would insist until the end of his life that Germany had been the agent of its own misfortunate, while he was just one of many casualties.

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In this second part of my conversation with Thom, we discuss the unlawful way in which the Trump administration behaves at home, including its treatment of citizens who hold views which the President does not like. It is free speech for me, but not for thee, and we look at the historical context for these actions. Can anything stop Trump? Or are the courts as toothless as Congress and the press. Will the American people be forced to fix these things themselves, or is it already too late to return to the America we used to know? Thanksss again to Thom for joining me, and I hope you enjoyed this deep dive into modern America.

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In this first of two episodes with Thom Daly, we focus on the United States and its position in the world following the Trump administration's many blunders and betrayals in foreign policy, trade policy, and many more things besides. If you believe what Trump has done is antithetical to America and what it is supposed to represent, then you'll be in good company. Please join us for a passionate conversation, and let me know what you think.

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The traditional picture of British intervention in the First World War normally comes down to one issue - Belgium. On 4 August, Britain did declare war on Germany. However, before this monumental step took place, Britain had already made its choice - or, rather, the British Cabinet had. The Liberal government was against intervention in a majority, and we have seen countless manifestations of this position over the previous days. Asquith, Grey, and Churchill wanted to intervene, but how could they persuade their colleagues of this? In this episode, we discover that the reasons for the government's conversion to intervention came not from Belgium, or France, or even Luxemburg, but from internal political factors.

Simply put, when Grey, Asquith, Churchill and others signalled that they would resign if neutrality became policy, and when the Conservative opposition signalled that they would march to war if in power, the remaining Cabinet members faced an impossible choice. Either they could swallow their opposition, and concede to what Grey and the interventionists wanted, or they could resist, the government would collapse, and the Tories would take Britain to war regardless. As we will see in this episode, this was not much of a choice at all...

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The Schleiffen Plan demanded an invasion of the small Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, where German forces would seize key railway installations, facilitating their march into Belgium, and then to France. Of course, nobody told the Luxemburgers, but Berlin was very eager to make it clear that this unannounced invasion was not an invasion at all. Oh no, this was merely a precautionary measure, essential for German security.

If the Luxemburgers complied peacefully, all would be well. If not, well, then the Luxemburgers must be mad to face down the full might of 7/8 of the German army which barrelled towards them. As hundreds of thousands of soldiers flooded westwards, Europe was alight with diplomatic activity, complete with questions which really should have been answered by now. Peace was all but lost, but that did not mean the war had to arrive with any measure of clarity.

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Now that it was clear Germany would have to face the Entente, and likely Britain's imminent intervention, Berlin became much more active in sending diplomatic feelers across Europe. Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire, were all ideal targets. Some were erstwhile allies, others convenient partners, but could they be relied upon now, when the war had become reality?

In St Petersburg, the Russian answer to Germany's ultimatum was finally delivered, even if it took several hours for it to reach Berlin. However Sazonov might try to dress it up - however much editorialising the final meeting between he and the German ambassador endured - one thing could not be denied. Russia and Germany were now at war, and both conceived of this conflict as purely defensive in nature. Each had a point, but neither were able to pull back, and talk increasingly turned from preserving peace to preparing for war, as the desperate diplomacy of all sides did its work.

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We open with the shattered dreams of Kaiser Wilhelm II, as the British claim a 'misunderstanding' must have occurred to make Berlin believe Britain and France could remain neutral. The rollercoaster of emotions ended with Wilhelm's bitter confirmation to Moltke - he could do what he liked now. What Moltke liked to do and what he had to do were one and the same. It was time to switch back on the Schlieffen Plan, which meant world war was inevitable.

And yet, Germany delayed its declaration of war on France, even as mobilisation was announced in Paris, and Italy signalled it would remain neutral. Germany's diplomatic options had shrank dramatically. All that now existed was Vienna, and the hope that the pressure campaigns in Constantinople would finally pay off, yet there were no guarantees. The only guarantee was that war was now official, even if St Petersburg had yet to confirm it...

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In the final hours of peace, the German government was led to believe that a miracle had occurred. Incredibly, Britain had affirmed its intention not only to remain neutral, but to guarantee the neutrality of France as well. Where had such a monumental offer come from? Was it legitimate, or the product of a 'misunderstanding' between the German ambassador and the British government?

In this episode, we examine this infamous chapter in the crisis historiography. Had the British Foreign Secretary's vagueness caught up with him, or was Lichnowsky, the German ambassador, to blame? Had they got their wires crossed, or was something more fascinating going on under the surface, in a city where petitioners bombarded London with requests for support, and more information? Let's find out, as we try to understand this misunderstanding.

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After that disgraceful display in the White House, I couldn't stay silent any longer. Three years on from when I first offered my thoughts on the situation, in this very personal and raw episode, I cover the multilayered implications of the current crisis. What is Trump playing at? Is this new turn in American foreign policy going to fix anything, or is it merely emboldening Russia, weakening Ukraine, and making everyone less safe? You can probably predict where I stand, but if you feel like you're losing your mind right now, I hope you can some catharsis from this extended rant. 

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We're in the endgame now, but somehow, not everyone got the message.

There was plenty of waiting to be done. Berlin was waiting on Russia's reply to its ultimatum, and France was also expected to reply, but the generals felt they could not wait. Who knew how far Russia's mobilisation had gone, or how close Germany was to disaster? With this added time pressure, the Kaiser approved general mobilisation, as Europe reacted to the news that war would soon erupt. Yet, at the final moment, a lifeline - a message from London, that British and French neutrality could be guaranteed, if only Germany would agree to respect it. Such a momentous idea, in a day of watershed moments, characterised the final hours of European peace.

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In our final JULY episode of the July Crisis, we return to Britain, where the pressure was building to make a decision. Russian mobilisation was clearly in the air, and if the news was true, German mobilisation would soon follow. Was peace possible even now? Many in Britain insisted it could, and declared that to fight a war in the name of a far off Austro-Serbian conflict was anathema to British interests - and British honour.

But the interventionist camp was growing in strength as well. They had The Times on their side, but the Cabinet was as divided as the country. Into this tangled web of red lines and principles, Sir Edward Grey would have to navigate his colleagues somewhere. They couldn't leave France in the lurch, but the public wouldn't have it - not unless a moral case could be made. It was now known that France would respect Belgian neutrality, but Germany would not...

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Now that Berlin had accepted that war with Russia was inevitable, it remained to prepare the diplomatic ground.

German diplomacy had worked behind the scenes to court Romania and the Ottoman Empire, but the latter effort bore the most significant fruit. The Italians were less dependable, but there remained precious little time to persuade Austria to grant her the required concessions. And yet, the German ambassador kept seeking a way out when among his Russian peers. The Tsar insisted it was impossible to stop the mobilisation, but was this true? Sazonov might claim that mobilisation did not have to mean war, but could he guarantee this if Austrian troops invaded Serbia?

The scales were falling, but they had not yet hit the ground. Just as the Tsar could not offer clarity, the Kaiser's men were unable to confirm or deny their position on Belgian neutrality, despite knowing the importance of this question in London. Grey's diplomacy had been outpaced by the ultimata from Berlin, but as the hourglass drained, the German ambassador made a final desperate effort to leverage something, anything, which might persuade Russia to stand down. The message from Berlin was plain, even if it was inconsistently expressed - she did not want war, but felt forced into making it. Whether this message would resonate with European opinion, however, was another story.

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As the news of Russian mobilisation and Germany's Kriegsgefahr spread across Europe, urgent telegrams followed.

Whether in London, Berlin, or Paris, the picture was becoming clearer, but that did not mean contemporaries were content to allow the march to war. The Tsar had burned his bridges in Berlin, as the disgusted Germans scoffed at his decision to mobilise while requesting their mediation. Could he not understand that it was a provocation to prepare his entire army on their borders? Could Britain not see that Austria could give no concessions, and that this would not have made a difference anyway? Could the French not appreciate that necessity demanded she be neutralised first?

It was not cold hearted aggression or a lust for world conquest that spurred the German government forward, but the immediate threat to her security, and the worrying sign that no powers outside of her immediate alliance appeared to be listening to her anymore. Although Berlin had been honest about her intentions since Russia's step was learned of, still, somehow, the impression had set in that Germany was to blame. Grey had not given up hope, but his underlings were not enthusiastic about the prospects. In Berlin, apprehension had given way to a sense of relief. Russian mobilisation was official - surely this removed all questions of who was at fault? They had not sought the war, but if it was to be fought, these were the best possible circumstances. With a stirring sense of justice on their side, the German peacemakers took a step back, as the crisis entered its final phase.

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Russian general mobilisation was underway, and with red imperial posters announcing this grave new step, it could hardly be kept a secret. Yet, somehow, Germany seemed the only power truly in the loop. The question was, why were France and Britain unaware of it? Were they unaware, thanks to their ambassadors in St Petersburg, or had London and Paris chosen to ignore this seismic step, in their rush to blame Berlin?

The behaviour of Ambassadors Buchanan and Paleologue certainly deserves some scrutiny. Both men were on location in St Petersburg, and could see exactly what German ambassador Pourtales could see, so why had their announcements taken so long to arrive? Until they got official confirmation, the British and French governments could not be expected to act, and certainly would not restrain Russia.

The Russian government had a vested interest in maintaining this confusion, and Sergei Sazonov made little effort to spread the news with an official announcement. The news was spreading, but slowly, and Sazonov counted on the Central Powers reacting in such a manner that few would later remember who had moved first. Sazonov was fortunate in his adversaries, but in Berlin particularly, Russian mobilisation meant the end of peaceful diplomacy, even if the blind Entente refused to see it.

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By now, Europe was on a knife edge.

In Berlin, more and more rumours were pouring in that Russian general mobilisation was underway. In Vienna, no statesman was willing to make any concessions. Paris and London were both running shockingly blind. In St Petersburg, the morning of 31 July meant the official beginning of general mobilisation - with official red notices plastered across the city to drive it home.

When Ambassador Pourtales came upon these, he went immediately to Sazonov, and in their sharp conversation one thing became immediately clear to him - Russia was mobilising after all. The frightful rumours were true, and the only question now was how far along in these preparations she truly was. Pourtales fired a telegram to Berlin, informing the government that the Rubicon had been crossed.

Many miles away, the German government was biting its final fingernail when the telegram arrived. They were twenty minutes away from implementing their own measures - the Immediate Danger of War. With this confirmation, there was no denying it anymore - war was inevitable. The rolling snowball which the German Chancellor had so feared had now become unstoppable. Berlin would have no choice but to mobilise in turn, but while they did so, a critical PR campaign began, to make it clear to all of Europe and the world, where the blame truly lay. 

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The 30 July was a turning point for the British Cabinet. When the German Chancellor made his bid for British neutrality, yet refused to guarantee the independence of Belgium or to rule out annexations of French colonies, it set in motion a terrible chain of events.

Sir Edward Grey planned to use this faux pas to pile more pressure on the non-interventionists, who seemed to be growing in power every day. His Cabinet was thoroughly divided, but there was one bright spark - Ireland. Thanks to a last minute compromise between Nationalist and Unionist figures, the Home Rule crisis was postponed, for now.

Although the Cabinet was united in revelling in this good news, it was not agreed when it came to the question of intervening in the unfolding crisis. As the full details of the arrangement with France were unknown to them, non-interventionists could not imagine any reason why their country should join the war on her side. Some felt so strongly about maintaining British neutrality, in fact, that they were willing to topple their own government from the inside...

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The Russian decision to commence general mobilisation against Austria and Germany was made in the afternoon of 30 July, ultimately by the Tsar.

It took 24 hours of intense pressure by several leading Russian officials, but after backtracking the previous day, Tsar Nicholas was finally persuaded to go all in. His anxious generals were told that there was no going back - he would not change his mind again, and they could smash their telephone if they wished to guarantee it. But why were they in such a rush to mobilise the entire Russian army in the first place? Accounts of the origins of the First World War, if they cover this pivotal decision, tend to explain it as an example of Russian aggression, and proof that the Russians, rather than the Germans, were in fact responsible for the outbreak of the war. But there was more going on in the Tsar's court than this.

The Russian government had technically jumped the shark, but they had done so for several reasons which at the time, appeared justifiable. The German ambassador had warned against Russian military measures, and threatened intervention. The Austrians had begun bombarding Belgrade. Yet, by far the most consequential factor in Russia's calculations was its intelligence. This intel depicted Austria, and Germany, as preparing military forces far out of proportion to what they publicly claimed. Ironically, the Russians came to believe that their rivals were mobilising covertly, and in response, they began to do the same, with utterly catastrophic consequences for all involved...

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Welcome to our first episode of 2025! We return to a pivotal moment in the crisis, when Germany experienced yet another 180 in policy.

A day which began with a frantic German effort to pressure Austria into making concessions soon devolved into the more familiar mission - preparing the realm for war. What had caused this shift in German policy? Why had Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow given up on restraining their ally? Had they resigned themselves to a world war? The answer lay in Russia, and the preparations Russia was making to implement general mobilisation.

If the Tsar had mobilised his entire army against Austria and Germany, then it was hardly possible for Berlin to stand aside and watch. It was also impossible to imagine either side backing down, when doing so now would mean a shameful, expensive retreat, with no guarantees for security or satisfaction. The contemporaries had painted themselves into a corner, and in this episode, you could argue, the writing was now clearly on the wall.

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As Thursday 30 July progressed, one thing seemed clear to the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister - Austria had to be stopped, before the crisis deteriorated any further.

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The solution appeared to lie in drawing some commitments out of her, and perhaps preparing the ground for some kind of compromise. It was vague, but Bethmann and Jagow depended on Tschirschky, their ambassador to Vienna, to help them over the line. Could Berchtold be persuaded? Tschirschky, in fact, had gone native, but that was far from their only problem.

Having pushed matters to this point, Berchtold now feared Berlin might abandon the alliance. To get ahead of this danger, Vienna would have to raise the stakes - she would have to commit to general mobilisation. This was indeed scheduled - for 4 August! Yet in Vienna there was still little awareness of the Russian threat.

Perhaps when confronted with the mobilisation of the entire Habsburg army, Russia would back down? If she did not, then Russia would have to begin general mobilisation to defend itself, and Germany would mobilise in response. It seemed like a win-win - either the rival backs down or the ally stands resolute for your punitive war.

But the Germans were not so easily ensnared. They had begun to recognise when the Austrians suggested pointless protests or empty devices, and they pressured them for more information. The best method available was through diplomacy. In these final hours of peace, communication channels were kept open, and new proposals, each more unacceptable, emerged from Sazonov's pen.

What Sazonov neglected to tell either Vienna or Berlin as he updated his position was that Russia had upped the ante. Tsar Nicholas II had been persuaded to push the big red button after all, and the Central Powers would be forced together. Until this news leaked out though, the two allies were destined to continue their dance. 

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By the morning of 30 July 1914, the German government was undergoing something of an identity crisis. Was Berlin the resolute ally, determined to support Austria whatever the cost, or was she the rational actor, determined to avoid war, even if this proved painful? To the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister, the answer wasn't immediately clear, but they were certain that where Austria was concerned, enough was enough. It was time for Vienna to explain what it planned to do in Serbia, and if necessary, it was time to consider the possibility of compromise, by using any one of the options floated in Europe over the last few days.

The reason for this abrupt change in Germany's tone can be explained by news of Russia's mobilisation against Austria. To figures like Jagow, this confirmed that Russia would not remain aloof as Serbia was destroyed. Since the war could not be isolated, it meant nothing less than its expansion, until everyone was pulled in. It was hard to imagine Germany faring well under these circumstances, when Britain was opaque but dubious, and the Italians were insisting that the alliance did not apply since Austria was the aggressor.

Jagow and Bethmann Hollweg were thus on the same page, but how much could they get done with the Kaiser watching them so relentlessly, and blowing up in a rage at every slight that arrived by telegram. In Wilhelm's defence, the Tsar's confession that Russia had been mobilising for five days was a damning indictment of Russian policy, especially since he had asked Wilhelm to mediate from the beginning. The Kaiser did not give up, and buoyed by his Ministers, Austria was placed under maximum pressure to clarify its position and step back from the brink. Unfortunately, just as Germany's team got their act together, Austria's supporters moved into place as well, and the war edged ever closer...

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By the evening of 29 July, a new wave of panic was overcoming the German government. In Berlin, the question of restraining Austria had long been treated with a wink and a nod, but news of Russian mobilisation seemed to change everything.

For Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow, this change moved them to take a stand against Austrian policy at long last. They demanded answers, compromise, and more information, and the Chancellor was willing to go further still. Although long since forgotten in the mad scramble that followed, Bethmann was sufficiently alarmed to advocate the nuclear option - he would cancel the blank cheque entirely, if Austria did not see sense.

This message would be as terrifying as it was confusing for the Austrians, who had frequently been assured of their ally's solidarity, and of their freedom to craft whatever policy they wanted. But with Britain stating its conditional neutrality, France and Russia united in their defiance, and now Italy complaining more forcefully about Austrian behaviour, not even Berlin could ignore that Vienna was forcing it towards the abyss. The real question for the German government as the 29 July became 30 July, was whether they would pull back, or jump.

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Austria's bombardment of Belgrade represented the first shots of the First World War, though contemporaries could not have known this yet - they were more focused on what Russia was doing.

As news of Russia's partial mobilisation filtered through Europe, it caused a major crisis in the German Foreign Office. For Jagow, Germany's Foreign Minister and director of its policy towards Austria since the beginning, Russia's preparations meant nothing less than the complete collapse of his entire world view.

If Russia would not stand back and permit Austrian justice, then surely that meant war was inevitable?

Desperate to avoid the European war he feared, Jagow went to great lengths to work out a solution. He believed he found it in the partnership with Bethmann Hollweg, the Chancellor he had spent several weeks undermining. If these two German statesmen could put their heads together, and wrest concessions or at least some answers out of Vienna, perhaps the ruin of their country could be avoided. Troubling signals suggested it would not be easy, yet having led Germany to this point, neither man had much choice but to try.

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As they had done up to this point, the British continued to try to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, even as the opportunities shrank before their eyes. Amidst warnings pinged between London and Berlin that under certain circumstances, their respective neutrality could not be guaranteed, the German Chancellor sent an ill-advised appeal for the British to stay out. The effort was likely influenced by the atmosphere of panic then building in Berlin, owing to news of Russian preparations.

As the scales were falling from the eyes of those that had always insisted on Russian neutrality, Bethmann Hollweg created headaches for himself with his explanation of German policy. Germany would not harm the Dutch, nor take any French territory. But what of French colonies, and what of Belgium? To this, Bethmann could make no promises, and here was perhaps his greatest error in the crisis. It seemed small on paper, but for those in Britain eager to weigh in on the Entente side, Bethmann's dishonourable bargain was just what was needed to raise suspicions against Berlin, and undermine the anti-war party.

They needed such German errors, because the British Cabinet remained divided and incredibly suspicious of any foreign entanglements. Though high profile agitators like Grey, Churchill, Asquith and perhaps Lloyd George worked in the background, the British public were against joining the war. Some Cabinet members longed for the opportunity to test their support in Parliament, perhaps even collapsing the government, but Grey would never let it get that far. He kept quiet and non-committal, even as time was drawing near for Britain to declare itself.

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The dawn of a new day did not bring any new peacemaking opportunities. In their own way, Austria, Germany and Russia were immovable in their main goal - they would not back down, even if it cost them everything.

That such a roadblock sat in the way of peace did not prevent Kaiser Wilhelm and Tsar Nicholas from engaging in their famed, eleventh hour telegram exchange. The Nicky-Willy telegrams have often been highlighted as an example of the inherent pacifism of these conservative monarchs, but what hope did this initiative really have?

One emerging issue was the increased tensions between Austria and Germany. Despite urging them to do so for several days, Vienna had not provided its ally with any plans for its post-war treatment of Serbia. Frustrated with Austrian intransigence and the refusal to grant concessions to Italy, the German Chancellor pursued a short-lived but incredibly fascinating mission - to drive it home to Austria that if she would not clarify her aims or help herself, Germany was not willing to do the work for her.

This potential fracture in the Austro-German camp would only be healed if Russia acted pre-emptively, and engaged in mobilisation. But then again, the Russians could ask, if Germany had not been able to stop Austria to this point, was there any hope she could stop her now? If German influence in Vienna had declined, German mediation may be of little use. And if Germany was still influential, why had she allowed matters to get this far, if she had not agreed with what Austria was doing?

It was lose lose for Berlin, and not even the spectacle of the two cousins hissing at each other through barely veiled good wishes could mask the fact that matters had gone very far indeed from the heady days of early July. Russia was mobilising, and though she had not prepared her entire army, she was clearly unwilling to let Austria away with it. Her motives for doing so, and the excuses made to justify such a provocative step, are worth examining, because they get to the root of the July Crisis quandary. Did these contemporaries know what they were doing, or were they blindly following the suggested script off the edge of the abyss?

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Although the Austro-Serb War was now a reality, Britain did not know this until the evening of 28 July. In the meantime, Sir Edward Grey was determined to do all he could to make the mediation scheme work. But not everyone Grey dealt with could be described as sincere, and this included members of his own Cabinet.

Churchill had acted provocatively and pre-emptively in mobilising the fleet and moving it to its battle stations. The Cabinet remained divided over whether to choose a side, but the dilemma was clear. If she declared herself for Russia and France, those powers would be emboldened, and might take greater risks. If, conversely, she declared neutrality, the same effect could be felt in Berlin and Vienna. The solution was thus - still - to keep her options open, but this did not mean British diplomacy slept on 28 July, far from it.

Although the goal was the same, the landscape was rapidly changing under her feet. It was difficult to reconcile Austro-German goals of a limited Serb war with the need Russians felt to defend their Slav brethren. It was at least clear that if the war could be contained, Britain could remain neutral. Yet the space for neutrality was shrinking in line with the escalation in Austro-Serb tensions. By the end of the day, the two foes were at war, and the peaceful hopes of so many had been shattered. The prognosis looked grim, but as had been the case for the last few weeks, Sir Edward Grey had to try.

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For two and a half years, Russia has been waging a full scale war against Ukraine. In response, the West has mobilised an economic coalition of states determined to level sanctions against the aggressor, ideally, to force it to the peace table. Clearly, Russia has not been deterred, but how much of an impact are the sanctions really having? In her book Punishing Putin, Stephanie Baker analyses the reality behind these measures, but also their sheer significance. Indeed, we have entered a new era of Russian relations with the west, and there is no going back.

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After weeks of delay, hesitation and complications, Austria-Hungary finally delivered its declaration of war on Serbia shortly after noon on 28 July 1914.

This, we are often told, represented the beginning of the First World War. But was it as straightforward as that? Contemporaries did not necessarily believe that all hope for peace had been lost. A degree of optimism remained, even in Berlin, where Russia's intervention was perceived possible, but not inevitable.

Now that Austria had made its choice, what would Russia choose to do? As we see, Sazonov was depressed and angry by the Austrian act. In this cynical mood, he took several steps which were designed to ratchet up the pressure on Vienna to hold back, and on Berlin to persuade its ally to do so. And there was no guarantee that Austrian and Serbian forces would even meet on the field.

Serbia had withdrawn its army to the interior, and Habsburg armies were only beginning to be mobilised. Another fortnight was required before the army would be ready, but where should this army go? Thanks to her poor infrastructure and woeful military durability, Austria found she had fewer options than expected once Russia refused to back down. The military and political aspects of her policy were thus intertwined, yet each was as badly understood as the other.

As Germany urged Vienna to give it some indication of what it would do, and Britain pressed for direct Austro-Russian negotiations, the world continued to operate as if yet another crisis in the Balkans would work itself out. Had it not happened before? In fact, this time the crisis was different, and the potential consequences far more catastrophic.

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The 28 July 1914 is best remembered today as the point of no return, as Austria declared war on Serbia.

However, as we will see in this episode, the announcement of this Austro-Serb war, made in the afternoon, and reaching Europe's capitals by the evening, did not ruin the prospects for peace as we might expect. Many contemporaries still believed that it was possible to preserve peace, and foremost among these was Kaiser Wilhelm II. Weeks before, he had given the green light to the blank cheque, but on this morning, Wilhelm finally read Serbia's reply to Austria's ultimatum, and in his view, all reasons for war were now gone.

Wilhelm now proposed a way out of the crisis - Austria would occupy Belgrade, in lieu of Serbia's commitment to dismantle the Pan Serb propaganda and fulfil Austria's remaining demands. This was the Halt in Belgrade, and it was to have a short, but fascinating shelf life, while experiencing several ups and downs before it was eventually killed. In this episode, we trace this idea, and why some in the German government worked hard to push for it, while their colleagues worked to undermine them.

The German policy was confused, but also impatient. German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was running out of patience with his Austrian ally, and in his view, Vienna needed to be given a stark warning. She must make amends with Italy, and present her war plan to her ally - did she want to annex Serbia, or not? It was vital that these questions were clarified, as it would make all the difference when dealing with Serbia's protector, Russia. Could Germany stop the ball rolling, or were their efforts, like so many others, hampered by delusions, misinformation, and mistrust? Find out as we begin our coverage of this watershed moment in our history.

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On this otherwise unassuming Monday in 1914, Austria-Hungary was preparing to declare war on Serbia.

The declaration would come the following day, but in the meantime, Germany assisted Austria in keeping up appearances. Those tenacious Brits were at it again, and Grey's mediation proposal still hung in the air. Could a rejection of this scheme worsen the crisis? Perhaps, so it was necessary to tread carefully. The mediation idea would be passed onto Vienna, albeit without much enthusiasm, and Austria could maintain its image as the power in search of justice. But other concerns were rising to the surface.

The Russians were furthering their mobilisation efforts, and looked determined to continue their pressure campaign against Austria. But still, an optimistic view of Russian intervention reigned in Vienna, which stressed that the Tsar would bark but not bite. All evidence to the contrary was ignored, and encouraged but not directed by Berlin, Austria prepared to cut through all this mediation noise, and shatter the expectations of contemporaries with a declaration of war. No one could stop her now.

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In this enormous episode, we examine the largely forgotten story of British efforts to resolve the crisis, and efforts at home to prepare the people for what might come next.

Although Austria's ultimatum had expired two days before, there was still room for diplomacy to work, and Sir Edward Grey was determined to give it his best shot. To preserve peace, Grey pressed his conference scheme to the European courts. When this was rejected, he modified his approach, and accepted other suggestions like bilateral Austro-Russian negotiations. Telegrams pinged back to London, reporting on the deteriorating situation, yet Grey held firm to the principle that Britain should not declare itself. She had more leverage, he believed, if she maintained her 'free hand.'

In his very short address to the Commons, Grey alluded to the conference scheme, and stressed the government's commitment to peace, as well as its freedom of action. Yet, he did not reject claims made by The Times and other papers, which emphasised Britain's ties to its friends, and the duty this entailed. He also remained quiet about the elephant in the room - Britain was tied to France, and military discussions between them had secretly bound Britain to French war calculations. This Grey wisely kept quiet from the Cabinet, as a split was inevitable if he did not tread lightly.

This is exactly the kind of deep dive analysis which this podcast is all about, and I can only thank you so much for making it possible!

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If Austria-Hungary wanted the war with Serbia, it would have to get its skates on. Europe was eagerly looking for any sign of a way out, even if Austria was not.

The British were central in pressing the need for mediation, but they knew that Germany's inclusion was key if it was to work. The Germans, it was reported, anticipated British neutrality. This was wrong, it was insisted, because Britain would tend to her interests. Even more, Britain had kept its fleet, mobilised through annual manoeuvres, intact as the crisis escalated. Did this not prove Britain's seriousness?

Whether Britain was sincere or not, it mattered less than what Austria did. By now it was widely known that Austrian armies were not marching, and if the rumours were true, and she could not march until 12 August, then that gave plenty of time for things to blow over. But before Sir Edward Grey could put the finishing touches on another Balkan conference, he first had to ensure German support, and this was proving impossible to obtain.

The German imperative of supporting Vienna in its swift Serbian war remained in play, even if Austria had not moved. Mediation would threaten this goal, and it had to be countered. Besides, reports from Russia were beginning to make Berlin nervous. Increased military preparations could ruin Germany's own strategic plans, so more information was vital. Just then it was learned that the Kaiser and his Chancellor were returning to Berlin.

Could they persuade Austria to move? If not, could they persuade her statesmen to participate in diplomatic efforts? Berlin did not want a conference, but neither she nor Austria wanted war with Russia either. Could Russia not stay in her lane and ignore the attack on Serbia, especially after all the Serbs had done? The fatalist Austrian view asserted that whatever the consequences, Serbia had to be destroyed. It might be disastrous for the Habsburgs, but as the saying went, it was better to endure an end in horror, than a horror without end. 

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It's been a long time coming! The Age of Bismarck is finally here after so many years of planning, teasing, and dreaming. Tune in here to see how we plan to do it, and why you should be excited! Whether you're a long time history friend or just stopping by, Otto von Bismarck's life and times, and the age in which he lived, deserves your attention. The Iron Chancellor would accept nothing less!

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The ultimatum had expired, and yet somehow, Austria had not declared war on Serbia. What was going on?

Well, despite pushing the crisis forward with reckless abandon, the Austrian chief of staff Conrad von Hotzendorff now seemed awake to the dangers facing the country. The army would not be ready for war until 12 August, he said. This was a shock to the Germans, who continued to expect a lightning Austrian strike at Belgrade. But it did give the diplomats time to do their work.

From Britain, Sir Edward Grey believed a mediation scheme involving four uninvolved powers was the answer. He encouraged Berlin to push this idea, and the Germans did so, but only reluctantly, and out of fear of offending Britain if they did not. But the question of Russia was arguably the most important of all, and the Tsar was apparently now willing to exercise his military muscle by approving the period preparatory to war, and the mobilisation of key military districts.

This should have shown Austria that Russian intervention was highly likely, yet her statesmen continued to forge ahead. They had lost the diplomatic initiative, and they had failed to present Europe with a fait accompli. Instead, the sluggish, conditional Austrian response seemed ideally suited to diplomatic mediation. But would Austria take the easy way out? Incredibly, from Vienna, the answer was still no.

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Here we address the question - now that Austria's ultimatum to Serbia had expired, and the Austrians had evacuated Belgrade, what was Russia going to do about it?

The answer is as complicated as it is controversial. Russia's response revolved around military preparations; specifically, those preparations which would make the mobilisation of its enormous army across such a vast empire easier to carry out. These measures were called the Period Preparatory to War, and on this day, these measures were officially approved by the Tsar and his Ministers. What did this mean? Was the Period Preparatory to War simply mobilisation under a different name, or was it a reasonable response to the crisis, which merely granted Russia more diplomatic leeway?

Unsurprisingly, the answer is contentious. To some, this was the key aggravating factor which transformed the July Crisis from a regional dispute into the world war it became. To others, Russia's preparations may have been inflammatory, but they were not necessarily sinister. Should we take these measures as proof of Russia's intention to orchestrate a world war on favourable terms to themselves? Perhaps we should not go so far, but one thing is certain, by the end of the day, a line had been crossed in St Petersburg.

Once more details leaked out, Austria and Germany were bound to take notice. The question then became - would the Central Powers be scared off, or would they up the ante, seeing in Russia's behaviour yet another bluff which had to be called? Could anyone stop this game of chicken? In fact the Russians were not the only actors willing to be economical with the truth. Another was the French ambassador, Paleologue, and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berchtold, as well as many German officials, determined to have their localised war and firm in the belief that Russia would back down.

In this episode, we wade through this soup of contradictions, poor communications, mistrust and misinformation, to arrive at some worrying conclusions. Whoever we might claim was responsible, Europe was entering the twilight period of peace, whether contemporaries wished to acknowledge it or not.

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By now, everyone was expecting Austria-Hungary to do something once its ultimatum expired later in the day, but what? And could this response be adjusted, and peace be preserved, if only a certain diplomatic finesse was applied?

In Britain, Sir Edward Grey certainly hoped so. The solution, to him, seemed one of mediation, where the four uninvolved powers - Britain, France, Germany and Italy - gathered to arbitrate the Austro-Serb dispute. The question then became, could Germany be brought on side? Many were doubtful. It did not help that the German claim it had known nothing of the ultimatum was highly suspicious. Was it truly believable that Austria had acted entirely alone? This question informed the responses.

In Russia, Sergei Sazonov continued to lead a firmer and more assertive foreign policy, but to what end? As he learned of the British mediation plans, Sazonov did not rule them out, but he also failed to mention that Russia's preliminary military measures were already underway. It was understood that mobilisation was a dangerous risk, which would complicate mediation efforts. The further these measures had gone by the time mediation got its chance, the harder it would be to save the peace. This was why an extension of Austria's 48 hour deadline became briefly popular - this would give everyone sufficient time to act. Unsurprisingly, Vienna opposed this measure, and it scarcely got off the ground before time had run out, and Serbia handed over its reply.

Contrary to contemporary views and the opinions of historians since, the Serbian reply was not designed to placate Austria. It was instead designed to engender sympathy among the Entente. There was no defiant language or accusations, but Belgrade's response did reject core Austrian demands, and denied that they Vienna possessed sufficient evidence to prosecute its case. As the Austrians fully appreciated, the ultimatum was always designed to be unacceptable, but Serbia's 'perfumed' response, rather than a full throated message of defiance, greatly complicated the situation. Indeed, it was one among many complications of the day, as the glacial pace of Austrian policymaking encountered yet more roadblocks. All the while, in the east, Russian soldiers were marching to their destinations. If there was a chance for peace, then this was surely the last chance.

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We return to our narrative on an eventful day in world history. By the end of 24 July, Russia had established its policy towards Austria's ultimatum. But what was this policy, and why did Russia act so differently to crises in the past?

We find Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to be central to the events that transpired next. But what did Sazonov want? He authorised the period preparatory to war, and signalled his intention to support Serbia via war, if it came to that. This did not mean Sazonov was a warmonger, but he had not been entirely honest with the Central Powers either. Moderate advice was given to Serbia, and the Austrian and German ambassadors were informed that Russia would not look lightly upon an Austrian attack. Seeing German tentacles curling around any Austrian initiative, Sazonov felt he could not back down if Russia wished to retain her prestige, but what did this mean in practice?

Further afield, Britain was perhaps the sole power capable of offering a neutral space where mediation could take place. But how attractive were Grey's proposals, and were they likely to appeal to Germany? Did British distractions with the Irish Home Rule crisis impact its effectiveness in this regard? It seemed unlikely that London could rely on France. This time around, the French, represented in St Petersburg by Paleologue, maintained that Russia would find its ally loyally by its side for whatever came next. Such assurances were not designed to pull Russia back, because the prevailing belief in Entente circles was that only a policy of firmness could deter the Central Powers from going further.

However, if all the powers clung to a policy of deterrence, and if none considered backing down, what we are left with is a dangerous game of chicken with no off ramps. Since Sazonov believed that it meant war this time, was this proof of his conspiratorial policy, or simply of his realism? Could the Central Powers have done anything to defuse the crisis, or had the assumption of Russia's retreat blinded them to the disaster they now hurtled towards? All these questions and many more will be addressed in the episodes to come, so I hope you enjoy it!

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After a crazy two months, it's time we had a chat.

In this episode we'll be talking about the Age of Bismarck Patreon series, which has been advertised for years, and requested for even longer. We finally have a release date, and I can't wait to welcome you all to Bismarck's world.

We also talk about the July Crisis series, how it's gone for me so far, and why I feel compelled to change things up. We get a bit personal, but I've never been shy about being honest with you, so thanksss for your patience and enthusiasm!

WDF is entering an exciting new phase, but we have to make sure there's a proper balance between Zack's life and Zack's pod-baby, so that we can do justice to the fascinating projects we have in store for you. See you all...soon!

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By late 1912, it appeared the period of Anglo-German detente was over. The Kaiser assembled a War Council, and apparently planned for a war of domination. In fact, appearances were deceptive, and although Britain and Germany's relationship had been damaged, it was still intact. There now emerged a new opportunity to repair it, as the Balkan Wars brought the two disinterested powers together again.

The two powers had already achieved a great deal by pushing the naval race to the side. But other questions were more difficult. Both France and Germany came to terms with the role of Belgium in their war plans, but only Germany viewed its violation as a necessity. This key aspect of German strategy was already locked in, but this proved a grave miscalculation. That said, opinions in Berlin had arrived at more optimistic conclusions by 1914. Britain, it was said, faced an internal crisis over Ireland, and those intractable problems meant opportunities for the Central Powers.

Yet still, the Anglo-German detente continued, with fascinating trends emerging in the British Foreign Office. For so long dominated by anti-German sentiment and fear of Russia, a new generation of officials were graduating to new positions, and they were less sanguine about the Anglo-Russian relationship. A last minute trip by Grey's private secretary to Berlin suggested a new era of cooperation, but this, like so many other plans, fell to pieces once the Archduke fell in Sarajevo. Here we conclude the story of this underrated relationship, and set the scene for what was to come.

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By late 1911, Germany had been embarrassed by the Second Moroccan Crisis, and the Anglo-French Entente had once again rallied. We might have expected Germany to double down on its provocative naval campaign, to increase the pressure on Britain. In fact, what happened instead was the beginning of a period of Anglo-German detente. This was initiated through the Haldane Mission of spring 1912, which sought to exchange restrictions on naval building with political guarantees.

The mission was not a success, but it did terrify the French, who worked to consolidate their agreements with Britain on the seas, with dramatic consequences. In this tug of war for Britain's friendship, though, her officials were far less free than they may have assumed. A strong current of anti-German sentiment had become entrenched in London, and it would take braver steps to reserve this trend. Could they do so, and snatch peace from the jaws of conflict? Join me here as we continue our look at Anglo-German relations on the eve of war.

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Everyone knows the story of Britain and Germany before 1914. Or at least, they think they do.

Anglo-German relations following the Russo-Japanese War seemed bound to enter a period of hostility, enabled by the naval race which forced London to invest heavily in production and innovation, and produced the dreadnought as an unforeseen consequence. But this race to outbuild the other in warship construction did not lead automatically to the events of 1914. Indeed, many possibilities existed for the two rivals to patch things up.

This was what the French truly feared, but as they prepared for a second showdown with Berlin in Morocco, the British appeared to stand by them. Was the British Cabinet entirely convinced that Germany was its enemy? Many thought so, but again, matters were not so clear cut. Even Kaiser Wilhelm's disastrous record in PR could not guarantee that these two nations, tied together by so many dynastic, religious, traditional and economic threads, would face each other on opposite sides of the battlefield.

In this first part of our trilogy looking at Anglo-German relations, we set the scene and assess some key moments when Germany became the bogeyman of Britain. Yet even as the naval race became a naval scare, and even as Britain secretly planned for an Anglo-French defence, nothing was yet set in stone. The years that immediately preceded the war were vital for the next phase in the relationship - detente.

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Austria-Hungary finally delivered its ultimatum to Serbia nearly four weeks after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.

The journey had been incredibly slow, and the outcome was nothing like the fait accompli its statesmen had originally envisioned, but Austria had officially taken the bold step towards war. What did this infamous ultimatum contain? Did it leave any possibility for Serbia to accept it with some dignity? One point in particular - the participation by Austrian officials in a Serbian investigation - was bound to be unacceptable in Belgrade. Accompanied by a 48 hour deadline, the ultimatum hit the disparate Serb government, then preparing for elections, like a bomb. All was seemingly going according to plan. Now all Austria had to do was wait for its bombshell to settle in Belgrade. As for Russia, surely the Tsar would not intervene to help regicides, right? RIGHT?!

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On 20 July, the French President, Premier, and other statesmen docked at Kronstadt, aboard the fittingly named France.

It began a tremendous spectacle of Franco-Russian cooperation, just as rumours were swirling of Austria's nefarious intentions. The allies could not know for sure what Vienna was planning, but they could send some strongly worded warnings. As the French President attempted to put steel into his allies, his Premier suffered something akin to a breakdown. Perhaps Rene Viviani was anxious about domestic politics, or perhaps the pacifist Premier was beginning to realise that a great war was more likely. Either way, once they returned to the sea, French policy would be in the hands of Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador, and it was hard to see him as anything other than a hawk.

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As the French sailed for St Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian government gathered in Vienna for a meeting of historic importance.

It was here on 19 July 1914 that the infamous ultimatum to Serbia was finalised, but also the question of what kind of war Austria expected to fight. Shockingly, the question of Russian intervention barely registered. The tunnel vision was laser focused on Belgrade, and now that everyone was on the same page, and the pieces in place, nothing could stop Austria-Hungary putting the finishing touches on the most fatalistic policy imaginable. Their decision to move against Serbia was by now an open secret, but amidst the rumour and whisper, the most important step yet towards war had been taken, and this was to take the whole world by surprise.

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As the French President and Premier made their way to Russia, on board the France, they tried their best to keep up to date with what was happening outsides the confines of their vessel. Troubling rumours were not hard to come by, but they could not be wholly ignored. The Central Powers kept up a front of ignorance, even luring Sazonov into a false sense of security. Here we see how the allies reacted to the suspicious news, and how close their intelligence sources came to unearthing the truth. Even though they could not quite put their finger on it, Franco-Russian solidarity was the one constant they could feel confident in.

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With the Austro-Hungarian government on the same page at long last, it remained to follow through with the ultimatum. To Berchtold, this meant moving as quickly and as secretly as possible, so that once the ultimatum arrived in Serbia, Europe would be presented with a fait accompli. The Germans were similarly anxious, and emphasised the necessity of speed.

Still, neither Berlin nor Vienna gave much thought to the Russians. Somehow, a comfortable consensus permeated: Russia would not defend Serbia, but if she did, this was the best time to fight her. The more surprised Russia was, the more likely she was to be overtaken by events. Thanks to Berchtold's carelessness and cracked Italian codes, however, the secret did leak out. Here we examine how this happened, and what it meant for the deteriorating situation.

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In our final episode looking at the Entente, we bring our story up to the eve of the July Crisis.

How had past lessons influenced the way Russia and France interpreted the world by spring 1914? Was war certain? Had new military reforms so affected the balance of power that war was now inevitable? What did the position of Britain mean for the two allies, and why was London so concerned with losing Russia as a friend? Was Germany's effort to match its rivals really sustainable in the long term?

The British strategy of balancing between the two blocs was coming to an end, but how would the Germans react to news that Russia was now courting Britain into the Entente? Was Britain truly as free as she imagined, or was the cold reality of the bloc system about to dawn in London? Still, few contemporaries believed war would come - had the peacemakers not saved Europe from war in the past? Perhaps they had, but there was no guarantee that a spark in a sensitive region would not transform the situation.

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In our second installment of this Entente analysis, we look at the Liman von Sanders crisis.

By late 1913, a new crisis in Russo-German relations centred on the status of General Liman von Sanders, appointed to command the 1st Army Corps at Constantinople. To the Germans, this was a useful way to assert their influence in the Ottoman Empire and rebuild its capabilities after several years of conflict. But to Russia, the appearance of their rival in a theatre earmarked as a sphere of Russian interest seemed akin to a threat.

How would Sergei Sazonov react, and did the resolution of the crisis settle differences, or merely establish resentments and mistrust which reverberated right up to the outbreak of the First World War? Please join us, as we examine this forgotten crisis, assess the growing military power of Russia, its relationship with France, and the possibility that Britain might tie itself more securely to its former rivals. The Entente had come a long way, yet it was far from set in stone...

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In this first of three episodes, we look at the pre-war position of the Entente!

Before we bring our narrative further, it would be useful to turn our attention to what came before. The Franco-Russian alliance was formed in 1894, and over the next twenty years, the two allies experienced their share of ups and downs. Even as new crises shifted the balance of power, France and Russia stuck together. Russia brought the manpower, and France brought the money and expertise which could project that power.

By 1912, certain limits had been set on the alliance, depending on the theatre in question, but Raymond Poincare, Premier and then President of France before the war, worked to remove these breaks, and enhance the alliance. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov distinguished himself. After several ignominious retreats on the world stage, both partners were looking for opportunities to stand firm, and show the Triple Alliance they meant business. The inclusion of Britain might affirm the supremacy of the Entente, but first, Russia would have to secure its influence in the Straits.

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As Belgrade burned with rage following the death of Ambassador Hartwig, Berchtold was on the verge of his greatest triumph.

After several intense weeks of pressure, Stefan Tisza seemed finally to be seeing the light. A combination of factors, including German pressure, agitation from his subordinates, fear of Romania, outrage at Serbia, and probably exhaustion, all moved Tisza to accept a policy of war. Tisza was eager to clarify that this did not render him a hawk - he still wished for peace if this was possible. Yet, he no longer blocked the construction of an ultimatum designed to be impossible for Serbia to accept, and he no longer flew the lonely flag for diplomacy. How had Tisza been persuaded, and what did it mean for Berchtold, to finally have a united Cabinet behind him? Here we consider these critical questions, in a pivotal turning point of the July Crisis.

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Now that German support had been acquired, and the delivery of an ultimatum to Serbia was virtually guaranteed, Berchtold had one final mission - to persuade the Hungarian Premier Stefan Tisza of the necessity of war.

This was easier said than done, since Tisza had good reasons for resisting calls for a war which he believed was unnecessary and dangerous. But Berchtold was fortunate in that the Hungarian was in the minority - Tisza was the only senior Habsburg official to press for a diplomatic resolution to the assassination, and he knew he was alone in this. The pressure was bound to increase on him to make the 'right' decision, but just over the border in Serbia, a shocking incident momentarily jolted Berchtold away from his mission.

Nikolai Hartwig, Russian ambassador to Belgrade since 1909, arrived at the Austrian embassy in Belgrade to finally pay his respects. The date was 10 July 1914, and Hartwig was there to counter several unflattering rumours regarding his reaction to the assassination. Hartwig was also keenly interested in any news of Austria's intentions towards Serbia. It had now been a fortnight since the assassination, and surely Vienna did not intend to do nothing. But Hartwig never learned these secrets, because he dropped dead of a massive heart attack just as he and his Austrian colleague were getting down to business. Although what followed contained no shortage of farce and conspiracy, Hartwig's death was yet another red flag, and to Berchtold, it furnished yet more proof that Austria would never be safe so long as Serbia went unpunished.

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By 7 July 1914, Austria-Hungary's leading officials gathered in Vienna. The key item on the agenda was what to do about Serbia, but an unspoken item amounted to what to do about Hungary.

With German support for the punitive strike on Serbia now assured, all that remained was for the Habsburg government to maintain a degree of unity at such a crucial moment in its history. Yet, unfortunately for Berchtold, Stefan Tisza - the Hungarian Minister President or Premier - refused to give his approval for the kind of aggressive policy most in Vienna now wanted. Tisza feared the acquisition of more Slavic territories, which would dilute the Hungarian influence, but he was also fearful of Russian intervention on Serbia's side, and Romanian intrusions into Transylvania.

The solution, as Berchtold understood it, was to up the ante. Pressure would be heavily applied on the Hungarian holdout, and an impression of firmness would be presented to the German ally. After many years second guessing her ally, Germany had now signalled its willingness to support Austria regardless of the complications, and this gift could not be squandered. Yet still, Tisza's position was not irrational, and it was at least possible that the Hungarian could have an outsized impact on Austrian policy.

Indeed, as we will see, Stefan Tisza was instrumental in delaying the Austrian response, removing its element of surprise, and increasing the risks surrounding it. Berchtold could not change the 1867 Compromise which granted Hungary such powers, but he could use his contacts to wear Tisza down, and make him more amenable to a swift, firm response. Whether this was war, or diplomatic triumph, or whether an ultimatum should be sent at all, were matters which were still to be hammered out.

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With the blank cheque secured, Austria had received its ally's blessing to pursue a punitive strike against Serbia - what would happen next?

The morass of questions surrounding this development deserve greater examination, but you may be wondering, just how widespread was the pro-war party in Vienna? How many officials believed that only war with Serbia could fix the Empire's chronic problems, and why did they take this position considering the risks involved? In this episode we are introduced to a memorandum published on 6 July by Berthold Molden, a senior Habsburg author, philosopher and politician in the Austrian press office. If you've ever wanted to hear from an official contemporary source outside of the traditional coterie of conspirators, which historians have paid scant attention to in the past, then this episode is for you. Expect fascinating insights into Austria's psyche, damning indictments of Austria's position, and heavy condemnation of Serbia, Russia, and any other power who stood in Austria's way.

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Among all the controversies of the July Crisis, perhaps few compare to Germany's decision to provide Austria-Hungary with a 'blank cheque' for whatever policy it intended to adopt towards Serbia. In fact, word from Berlin suggested that the German government was impatient, and wanted Austria to strike Serbia as soon as possible. But, did this represent a German desire to launch a world war? As we see in this episode, the truth is more nuanced, but no less shocking. Germany was not seeking world war, but to repair the damage done to its ally by destroying the incessant Serbian threat once and for all.

But how would Vienna do this? Would she annex Serbia, or parts of it? Would she reduce her sufficiently to reorientate Serbian policy away from irredentist expansion in Bosnia? What divisions manifested themselves in Austria even as she strove desperately to recoup her position? More importantly, in the event of war between Austria and Serbia, could Russia reasonably be expected to stand aside? Incredibly, the status of Russia was not given nearly enough attention, but this was a sign of things to come, as the Habsburg grievance machine rumbled steadily onwards...

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Now that Vienna had decided to use war against its Serbian neighbour, the mission became one of guaranteeing German support. As we discuss in this episode, in Austria's estimation it was far from certain that Berlin would give this support. The record of diplomatic crises and cooperation in recent years suggested that Germany might even try to contain Austria's response, and prevent it acquiring the satisfaction it needed.

To confront this dilemma, Austrian Foreign Minister Count Berchtold rallied his colleagues around him, and plotted to confront the Kaiser once Franz Ferdinand's funeral took place. Unfortunately for him, the Kaiser was not coming. Vienna was too unsafe, it was said in private, and Germany would not risk its Emperor if the Serbs struck again. Such an embarrassing turn of events forced Berchtold to consider plan B. If Germany would not come to him, he would send his best men to Germany instead...

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With the shots heard round the world, how would Austro-Hungarian statesmen react to the news that the heir to their throne had been murdered in Sarajevo? In fact, as we see here, Austrian patience towards Serbia had been so exhausted by 1914 that a violent, warlike response was virtually inevitable. At least, Habsburg Foreign Minister Count Berchtold thought so. But what about the Hungarian element in the room?

Since the Compomise of 1867, Austria and Hungary had essentially become two cooperating entities, rather than an Austrian whole, so Hungarian approval from the Hungarian Premier would be necessary if any military policy was pursued. Berchtold would have to use all his skills of persuasion, but he would also call upon Emperor Franz Josef, and above all the Germans, to add greater pressure. Could he succeed? Austria's existence, Berchtold believed, hung in the balance.

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On 28 June 1914, Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb terrorist.

What followed was the July Crisis, as Austria-Hungary attempted to gain a measure of justice, or even revenge. No story of the July Crisis is complete without beginning here, but considering its infamy, what is there left to learn about this assassination and all that flowed from it? I would like to humbly invite you to join me, as I investigate how the act was carried out, what other assassination attempts in Sarajevo meant, why Franz Ferdinand's unique circumstances made the atrocity possible, and why the Austrians really should have seen it all coming...

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In this teeny tiny episode, we look at the Italian invasion of Libya and the Balkans Wars!

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How do you kill the status quo? By forming a league of extraordinary states, who want nothing less than to destroy the empire which has ruled over them for centuries. When the Balkan War began in October 1912, Europe was far from ready for the implications which would follow. The end of Turkish rule in Europe, and the expansion of young nation states eager to prove themselves appeared to guarantee that the peninsula would never be quiet again. Yet, aside from Europe, Russia had played a key role in bringing this league to life. To this, we may be tempted to ask why?

The answer is found in the Austro-Russian rivalry, but also in the opportunistic mood of the moment. The Balkan League's members - Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Serbia - were not traditional allies. Yet they were certainly capable of smelling blood in the water. In September 1911, Italy invaded Libya, and instigated a year-long war with the Ottoman Empire. Watching their overlord struggle with such a wide-ranging campaign, the Balkan League seized the moment, and attacked just as Italy met the Turks at the peace table.

What followed was the shocking disintegration of Turkish power in Europe, at a scale and speed no one expected. Yet, even though the League had won the day, the spoils proved harder to divide up among them. Hostility increased between Serbia and Bulgaria over the fate of Macedonia, and when a second war came, the ensuing dogpile by the Ottomans, Serbs, Greeks and Romanians shattered Bulgaria apparently for good.

By autumn 1913, a different question thus emerged. If the Balkan states were justified in throwing off the Ottoman yolk and expanding their powers, just how much expansion was too much? In Vienna's view, the Serbian threat had become intolerable. The only solution was to threaten her with ruin, and prevent Serbian occupation of Albania, including an Adriatic port. Germany stood behind her, Russia backed down, but this was the last such victory of the Central Powers.

In this episode we weigh up the impact of these pre-war conflicts, with a depth and obsession for nerdy details you've never seen before! Join me as I attempt to navigate such a turbulent world, where old assumptions were slain, traditional rivalries were reinforced, and a new order beckoned.

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In our second background episode, we cover the Bosnian Annexation Crisis from 1908-1909!

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From late 1908 to spring 1909, European attentions were intensely occupied by the Austrian decision to annex the province of Bosnia Herzegovina, which it had occupied since 1878. This decision spurred into life fascinating impressions and behaviours which became even more important in 1914. Russia was humiliated, Serbia was enraged, Austria learned the value of an ultimatum, and Germany stood resolutely by its ally. Meanwhile, the British and French looked on, concerned that the Balkans might activate the war they had been secretly preparing for behind closed doors. The annexation is thus a key point on our journey towards the war, so I hope you're ready to get into it! 

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In our first background episode, we look at the formation of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

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By 1890, the new German Kaiser Wilhelm II officially 'dropped the pilot', and assumed the powers of German foreign policy into his own hands. Within a few years, Russia had slipped from his grasp into the eager arms of France. The Second Holy Alliance of Bismarck's days was over, henceforth Europe would be dominated by two distinct power blocs.

As we will see in this episode, the reality behind the firm front each bloc put up was far from representative of the truth. Disputes existed, from colonial spheres to military conventions, to old antagonisms and new plots. How reliable was the Italian element? Could the Germans and Russians reach across the divide, and forge a new path independent of these barriers? And, what to do with those powers outside these groups?

The first of these was Britain, whose status as an isolated power living her best life was about to come to a screeching halt. Interestingly, the power Britain elected to ally with, to announce its return to the Concert of Europe, was a rising power in Asia, Japan. Even more interestingly, Japan was to play a pivotal role upending the apple cart of several decades of assumptions - foremost among them, the insurmountable power of Russia.

Russia's loss in the war with Japan, official by October 1905, shattered the existing balance of power. Into this dynamic situation, Britain drew closer to France, and further from a German partnership which had seemed the most likely outcome. By 1907, Britain went still further, embarking on a brave new course by looking at Russia as something of a friend. If not a friend, then at least a partner.

The closer alignment of Britain, Russia and France into a Triple Entente, however, was little more than a French dream at this stage. It was impossible to plan ahead when those wretched Balkans never seemed to stay quiet...

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How do historians explain the outbreak of the First World War, and how have these views changed over the last century? Were they influenced by new perspectives, new motives, or new source materials? How have they influenced our current understanding of the war's origins, and what impact have they had on the 'mainstream' view of why war broke out? In this episode we go on a journey through the historical record, where new theories and explanations emerged, in the teeth of contentious debate.

For some, the pursuit of truth was a matter of justice - finding significance in the loss. For others, it was a political necessity, to rehabilitate their nation. For others still, it was a mere matter of historical study - the need to find the truth, and be the first person to do so. Whatever the motives - whatever the results - the story behind how historians reached their conclusions, and how these conclusions changed, represents one of the most fascinating and important aspects of the First World War's origins story, and I can't wait to share it with you! 

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Welcome history friend, to this exciting new series!

110 years to the day since Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, and a decade on from our July Crisis Anniversary Project, I believe there has never been a better time to jump back into this world. This is a brand new series, and I have been working on it for some time now.

In this episode, we set some things straight. This is not a remaster, a re-release, or any form of recycling. Oh no, we're here for something far more special. Armed with my new expertise, far too many sources to count, and a renewed passion for this pivotal era, we are ready to bring you the July Crisis like you've never seen it before!

If our July Crisis Anniversary Project was a rigorously scheduled day-by-day account of the last few weeks of peace in 1914, this series is a different beast. Content is our focus this time around - deep dives, fascinating studies, and a more comprehensive analysis of the how and the why behind the descent into war in summer 1914.

If you're at all curious about how the First World War erupted; if you've never listened to the July Crisis Anniversary Project - and especially if you have - this series is for you! Please join me over the next few months, in this post-PhD gift to myself, as we bring this complicated, fascinating, tragic world to life, 110 years after it all fell to pieces.

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After nearly forty episodes, and many fantastic discoveries, what can we learn from this incredible year in history? Was it a turning point for the decolonising Europeans, or simply a signal that the United States was now the top dog? Was it truly damaging for the Soviets, or did the Hungarian chapter simply confirm what many had assumed - that only by forceful repression could the Warsaw Pact members be kept in line? This was a year of several spinning plates, but before we bid it farewell, we still have a bit more to say, so I hope you'll join me!

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Here we finish 1956, with the final episode in the series wrapping up Eden's story, and the Conclusion episode, wrapping up this eventful year.

The Prime Minister, once so revered, had irreparably damaged his reputation by acting as he did in the Suez Crisis. While on paper the record stated that Britain and France had acted with the most noble of intentions, in reality, as Eden well knew, the ambitions had been far more rudimentary and straightforward, and the miscalculations far more grave, than Eden would ever let on. He would meet his maker still parroting the lies which had so stupefied his political rivals, frustrated his allies and outraged the Western powers.

How can we explain Eden’s policy? How did the British political nation react afterwards? Was it ever possible to leave Suez behind? Did the incident significantly damage Anglo-Americans, as we are sometimes led to believe? Did it result in a downturn of British fortunes in the Middle East? All of these are critical questions, so I hope you’ll join me to investigate them as we tackle Anthony Eden, the Suez Crisis and this fascinating year of 1956 in one more eventful episode.

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Episode 2.20: Americans & Soviets examines the involvement of the Cold War’s primary protagonists in the Suez Crisis.

At long last, we bring the events in Hungary full circle with events in Egypt, and assess whether Anthony Eden’s crimes doomed Hungary after all. In short, we bring everything full circle in 1956. What the events of this year demonstrated, between the Soviet aggressions in Hungary and the Anglo-French adventures in Egypt, was that a strong United Nations was critical for the sake of the peace of the world. ‘I agree with you’, said Eden, ‘and that was why I acted as I did in the first place!’ While the Prime Minister was in full-blown deception mode, his political rivals in the Commons were far from satisfied. Their curiosity was piqued, rather than satiated, and they latched onto the inconsistencies in Eden’s version of events like dogs latched onto a bone. In the end, their suspicious persistence would prove correct, though even they would be startled by just how far Eden had gone.

To a great many British citizens and statesmen, it was easier to believe the narrative parroted by the Government. To suppose that the Government could have acted so rashly and aggressively was the antithesis of Conservative governance, and of a sensible foreign policy which the Tory ideology was meant to stand for. Not only that, but the version of events Eden parroted – that Britain had saved the peace by compelling the UN to offer up a peacekeeping force – enabled many Britons to feel proud of their country’s contribution to peace. They would have had good cause to feel proud, had there been any shred of truth to what the PM had said. It was clear to him by the end of 7th November that his choices had had consequences. Not only Egypt, but the relationship with the Americans, the powers of the Soviets and the nature of the Cold War itself had all been affected. It was at this moment, that Eden decided it was time for a holiday…

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1956 Episode 2.19 examines Eden efforts to completely redefine what the Suez Crisis had meant, and what Britain’s role in the crisis had been.

From the afternoon of 6th November, with a ceasefire in the air, a UN Emergency Force still had to be negotiated. Eden could claim that British and French forces were sticking around in Egypt only for the purpose of maintaining peace and protecting the Suez Canal. Yet, his critics could argue that Britain and France broke the peace in the first place, and that the Canal was now only blocked because of British and French belligerence.

For his sins, Eden’s Party would be attacked in the Commons on the 6th November by the Labour Leader, until, shortly after 6PM, he decided to spill the beans to his peers in the Commons. No, he wasn’t about to tell the truth, instead he was about to put forward the polished turd of an explanation for why Britain had acted as it did. We quote from Eden in full in this episode, as we are reliant on the good folks at Hansard for making the all-important speeches in the Commons over these heady days freely accessible to all.

Primary sources help build a story like no other, and here we can hear the British PM say the exact words he said at ten past six on 6th November. Words which, it would transpire, were based in the main on lies which Eden knew to be lies from the beginning. The British PM, as we learned last time, was now engaging in a new strategy – damage control. He was determined to make Britain look as good, as noble and as heroic as possible while doing it. By the end of his diatribe, one could be forgiven for thinking that the world owed Britain some heartfelt thanks. Only Eden and a closed circle of allies knew the truth, but it couldn’t stay this way for long…

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1956 Episode 2.18 brings us to a critical point in the narrative, where Anthony Eden decided that a ceasefire was in fact favourable after all!

So just what had changed? Thanks to Harold Macmillan, Eden was persuaded that the economic situation in Britain was close to breaking point, and the Treasury Secretary greatly inflated the figures to ape a crisis which could not be avoided, unless peace was reached. Explaining this event necessitates a small investigation into the elements of truth in Macmillan’s economic doomsaying, as well as a deeper examination of Macmillan’s motives. Was the Treasury Secretary motivated by the hopeless Egyptian situation, or by his political ambition to oust Eden and take his spot?

As the title of the episode indicates though, much of our time is spent on examining the incredible transformation in British aims which took place over the day of 6th November. With news that Egypt would not be capitulating now common knowledge among his peers, Eden determined to change virtually every aspect of the Egyptian campaign. If a ceasefire would have be implemented, then it was necessary Britain control the narrative which led to this ceasefire. This Eden did, with a breath-taking disregard for the truth.

Britain, so the PM claimed, had gone to Egypt not to remove Nasser, recoup prestige or recapture the Suez Canal, but to prevent the Egyptian-Israeli war from spilling over into neighbouring countries and, most incredibly of all, to draw the conflict to the attention of the UN. This latter goal was ludicrous, but Eden insisted until the end that because the UN Emergency Force was en route, this ‘aim’ of his had been successful.

This recasting of Britain’s role in the Crisis was never going to fool everyone, but it was immensely convenient now that Eden possessed someone to blame – the Americans – and something noble to cling on to – the idea that Britain had acted in the interests of the world. It was a combination which he was to uphold for the rest of his life, with the most damning of consequences for his legacy and Party. 

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1956 Episode 2.17 looks at Anthony Eden’s furious efforts to shape the debate on the British intervention in Egypt in the first few days of November, 1956.

Our story on 5th November where, just as British and French paratroopers were landing on Port Said, the British Government was fighting its own battle in the House of Commons. Selwyn Lloyd, the beleaguered Foreign Secretary, was tasked with standing up for British foreign policy in light of the emerging controversies. At this stage, the idea that there could have been collusion was vehemently denied, but for now, it was bad enough that Britain had acted without American support, defied the UN and failed to appraise all parties of the policy it planned to put forward.

There seemed a great deal of secrecy underway, and while he couldn’t quite put his finger on it, Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Party leader, knew that something was up. Gaitskell wasn’t the only one; his Labour colleagues fired a succession of difficult questions at Lloyd, who by now probably wished he had stood up to Eden when he’d had the chance. Lloyd was able to open the debates of 5th November with some good news – the resolution on the UN Emergency Force had been approved in the UN General Assembly, meaning that a peace force could soon be sent to the trouble spot of the Middle East. What stood out from this resolution though was the fact that the British and French had abstained rather than vote for it in the UN. This stunned and deeply angered the opposition, who believed that yet another opportunity for peace had been lost.

Hungary remained a topic on the lips of many, and few backbenchers on either side could ignore the fact that this crisis distracted perfectly from what was happening in Budapest. Still though, the Tories insisted – their intervention had been right, and peace would now be guaranteed. Eden’s government was now banking above all on a capitulation from President Nasser, which it was hoped would come once the Anglo-French forces landed in number on the following morning of 6th November. This victory would surely mask the terrible embarrassment which had preceded it, but here, it was made clear that not all were convinced. Something was afoot, yet even despite the objections of his peers, neither Eden nor Lloyd gave in. They had come to far to give up now. Might would make right, because in the confused international circumstances presented by the 1950s, it was only rational to conclude that Britain knew best… 

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1956 Episode 2.16 introduces the fascinating Canadian element into our story.

Eden’s efforts to control the discussion continued, as the Prime Minister sought to make the British people see things wholly his way. To some extent he would succeed, but much like his French counterparts, it was proving immensely difficult to control what people thought deep down about this strangely brave but also incredibly reckless action. For a few fleeting hours, it appeared as though Eden had judged correctly – it was nice to see the entente cruising into battle again without the American say-so. But this pride would evaporate once it became clear how alone Britain and France were in this plot.

Seemingly to the rescue in this equation was Lester Pearson, Canada’s Foreign Secretary and a critically important statesmen in the early Cold War era. An advocate of a police force controlled by the United Nations, and an enthusiastic supporter of negotiations taking place in the General Assembly, where many smaller states were represented, Pearson quickly became the face of solving Suez. This, of course, was not to Eden’s wishes, who wanted to crush Nasser, not be bailed out of his country. But even the PM had to make a show of going along with his proposals for the sake of good press, and before long, a stunning proposal was gathering momentum. A United Nations Emergency Force was the solution proposed by Pearson, and even while proposals in the General Assembly were not legally binding, Pearson soon counted several supporters eager to contribute men to this force.

The task of persuading the British and French to make peace and hold back while this force was assembled was another issue entirely of course. As we’ll soon discover, the art of backing down was something which Eden soon gravitated towards, as he moved to recast his country not as an interventionist power, but as one acting explicitly in the interests of the UN, and of course, of world peace. Until he had the opportunity to manipulate the truth though, the PM would have to rely on his Canadian friends to change the debate, and bring about a solution which even he could accept. It was destined to be a busy next few days.

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1956 Episode 2.15 resumes the story of Anthony Eden and his struggle to implement the once perfect plan upon his unwilling nation.

Having been challenged passionately at home by a disbelieving political nation in the last episode, here we see this suspicion and fear transplanted to Britain’s supposed allies, and to the United Nations. It was within the UN that some of the sneakiest and indefensible behaviour took place, as Britain was forced to veto measures which would have ordered a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. This put her forward, alongside France, as a disturber of the peace, and as the hypocritical Soviets rushed to condemn her actions, the American reaction also became apparent.

Having operated on the ludicrous assumption that President Eisenhower would fall into line, Eden was faced instead with the quite predictable scene of a confused, hesitant and deeply suspicious President, who could not bring himself to believe that Eden had actually done what he had done. Evidently, the PM was operating according to his own interests, and had failed to consider the fallout of his schemes, yet Eden never seemed to have paused for a moment, before it all kicked off, to think about what would happen if anything went wrong.

As further attempts were made to class the British act as legally justified, to the immense consternation of those legal officers who had insisted this was impossible, British foreign policy bungled its way through negotiations in the UN General Assembly, as John Foster Dulles came out strongly against the Anglo-French act. The news of an ultimatum had been delivered in the late afternoon of 30th October, according to their carefully laid plans. Now, the Egyptians would resist, the Israelis would compromise and make peace, and all would see that Egypt was the problem which only Anglo-French arms could solve. This delusional plan, while it had demonstrated several holes already, remained the hymn sheet of the British government. For better or worse, as Hungary was crushed under Soviet boots, and an Anglo-French flotilla approached the first military target in Egypt, everything must go according to plan.

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1956 Episode 2.14 takes us to the scenes facing Anthony Eden in Britain in the final days of October.

Having orchestrated an Israeli-Egyptian war, the plan now was to issue an ultimatum, and for Anglo-French forces to swoop into Egypt to separate the two belligerents. Such a noble act, Eden believed, would cloak the fact that Britain and France were really there to oust Nasser, recoup prestige and occupy the Suez Canal for Western benefit. It was a thoroughly imperialistic, backwards set of policy aims that moved Eden’s government forward, and what he seems to never have suspected during the time he spent crafting it, was just how the opposition in Britain would respond.

Incredibly, the PM seems to have expected everyone to have just believed him and his bare-faced lies. The fact that they did not and that many were aghast as the British act in tandem with France and acting outside of the realm of the UN forced Eden to go on the defensive. The PM had completely underestimated the situation, and he was now put in a position where he would have to lie in order to defend himself.

Amidst rumours which put it that he was largely to blame for the Crisis which was unfolding, Eden would insist that British forces were operating with France to keep the peace, and to protect the interests of the world, represented in the Suez Canal. What a noble set of goals, except of course, the claims were full of hot air. Under such circumstances were political and military disasters made, but the PM had made his bed, conspiratorial and confused as it had been. Now he would be forced to lie in it. 

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1956 Episode 2.13 examines the final moments of peace between 25-29 October, as the conspiracy to attack Egypt and make it look like an accident developed further.

In Britain, the focus was on the legal argument still, even despite the clear problems which Britain’s legal advisors in the Foreign Office had in painting any British attack on Egypt as legally justified. While some less informed Cabinet members, like the Lord Chancellor, insisted that there was grounds for claiming that British rights were involved and intervention justified, the majority of the legal profession disagreed. Anthony Eden meanwhile sought to lie and deceive his way towards the conflict, letting no hints drop in the meantime that what was to come would profoundly affect Britain’s position in the world.

The French and Israeli governments were already actively mobilised for war, involved as each was in its own miniature struggle for supremacy which promised to tie into the Egyptian situation. For France, it was Algeria and President Nasser’s tireless support of the enemies of France. For Israel it was President Nasser’s threatening Pan-Arabism and his refusal to permit Israel to access the Suez Canal. While these schemes progressed, hints were dropped and Egyptian nerves were frayed.

Surely though, it would not be possible to initiate such a conflict – surely the UN, or the US, or NATO or something would prevent such a 19th century approach to international relations from taking place? Indeed, in this strange transition period between world war, decolonisation and the increasing focus on domestic matters, here were three powers about to turn back the clock in policy and behaviour, in the name of a plan which was soon to shatter world opinion, and dramatically alter the debate. Our story is heating up, so make sure you don’t miss a minute of this incredible instalment here! 

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1956 Episode 2.12 takes us to the 22-24 October 1956, where the war plan that would create the Suez Crisis was created, developed and signed by Britain, France and Israel in an unassuming Parisian suburb.

This process was, of course, far from straightforward or guaranteed to produce a result. It required the French reassuring both the Israeli and British representatives about the solid nature of their plan, and it also demonstrated the lack of tact which Selwyn Lloyd in particular seemed to possess. One of the most incredible scenes though comes near the end of the episode when, on the evening of 24th October, Britain’s representatives return home to Anthony Eden with a copy of the Sevres Protocol in hand, only to come under rhetorical attack for leaving this paper trail in the course of their top secret discussions.

Eden was well aware that there could be no evidence of what had been done at Sevres, and he would send these men back to France to track down and destroy any pieces of evidence that remained. The Prime Minister, of course, was already planning ahead to what he would say when word of the Crisis got out. For the sake of plausible deniability, Eden wished there to be no evidence and no written record of the collusion. Thankfully for historians since, Eden’s wishes were not fulfilled. Here was the last piece of the Suez puzzle being set in place, so I hope you’ll give it a listen and enjoy!

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1956 Episode 2.11 finally takes us to that controversial moment when Britain, France and Israel began to move closer together.

The Sevres Protocol was neither developed nor signed in a day, and in the first two weeks of October, negotiations critically important to the later conflict were underway. At first, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd hoped to make use of the UN Security Council to gain British satisfaction in Egypt, and for a time he was successful in this aim, because Anthony Eden was ill and unable to order his subordinate around. Once Eden recovered though, Eden ramped up the pressure, and Lloyd was encouraged, alongside his French counterpart, to torpedo the negotiations in the Security Council which had aimed at a peaceful resolution.

While this peace effort was frustrated, a looming conflict aside from all these considerations began to develop. This involved Jordan, Britain’s firm ally in the Middle East, and he difficult relationship with Israel, the newly established ally of the French. Since neither the French nor British wished to see their newfound entente drift apart, the French government determined it would be better to spill the beans on what was being agreed with Israel rather than watch the different allies initiate an unwanted war in the region. Thus, the French travelled to Chequers, Anthony Eden’s swanky manor home, on 14th October 1956, to initiate the first step of the collusion which was to become infamous. At first hesitant, Eden was soon convinced of the genius of the plan – Britain, France and Israel would work together against the common Egyptian foe, and this partnership would surely sink President Nasser once and for all.

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1956 Episode 2.10 takes us to the Commonwealth, seen as so vital to British interests, but fracturing over the question of the best course of action to take against President Nasser.

The Canadian, Australian and NZ governments were all uneasy at the prospect of war, and some, like the Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, advocated a diplomatic approach. While Eden forged ahead with an aggressive policy, torpedoing another conference on the Suez Canal in the process, he increasingly began to alienate the Americans. The PM didn’t seem to care what other nations thought, though he was eager to make even better friends with the French throughout September. It was around this time in our story that things in France began to change – they were increasingly coming to provide weapons and support to a new ally – Israel.

Largely because of French prodding and intrigue, the Israeli element of the story became all important. While the British were not yet let in on the plan, Franco-Israeli military cooperation and supply deals were paving the way towards a more trusting, beneficial relationship which could soon be exploited. The Israeli government, led by David Ben-Gurion, was also desirous of a war with Egypt, that nation which had threatened his own with destruction time and time again. The dilemma was that Israel could not be seen as the aggressor, but how was such a war then to be crafted and set in motion? Scheming heads were set together, and before long, a solution more incredible than anyone could have imagined was brought into being… 

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1956 Episode 2.9 looks at that moment which has become infamous in history – the collusion between Britain, France and Israel.

We are almost ready to see these sneaky meetings take place, and for the infamous agreement take shape, but first, it is worth investigating another important and underrated angle of the Crisis. The key element of the Suez Crisis story that demonstrates how low Britain sank must be the manifest failure of the British Government to develop any legal argument in favour of their interventionist actions. In the past, formulating such an argument was simple – an act of aggression against British interests or allies was enough to provoke a war. Now though, the whole issue was a good deal trickier.

For one, the Suez Canal Company may have been a British ‘interest’, but it was also by no means damaged by the nationalisation of late July 1956. Second, try as he might, Eden failed in his efforts to convince the opposition and many of his peers that legally, Britain had a case in Egypt. Not only was Nasser working hard not to give Eden any excuse at this stage, but he had even compensated British shareholders in the Canal Company in previous months. While many would argue that Nasser’s use of force to nationalise the Canal Company was unsavoury, it was not, in the strictest sense, illegal, because Nasser was only taking what was in his country, and thus his to take.

In this episode we are introduced to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a person of foremost importance thanks to his legal work in the British Foreign Office. Fitzmaurice’s task was to find legal justification for an Anglo-French war in Egypt. This, as Fitzmaurice was made aware, was an impossible task. It was to Eden’s immense frustration that Fitzmaurice’s integrity was greater than his ‘loyalty’ or ‘patriotism’ – the legal officer refused to give Eden the legal justification he desired.

While on the surface this seems like an unimportant sequence of events, Fitzmaurice’s convictions here demonstrated clearly at the time, and speak loudly to this day, the fact that Eden’s interventionist policy in Egypt was baseless, and was devoid of the honour or noble intentions he would later claim. If the Prime Minister couldn’t even get his minion in the Foreign Office to see ‘sense’, then how on earth was he going to persuade the rest of the world? This question, as we’ll see, was far from Eden’s thoughts. If he couldn’t get legal approval, then he would move along with the plan regardless…

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1956 Episode 2.8 examines the increasingly secretive plotting which took place behind the scenes in early autumn 1956.

While Eden worked feverishly to make the conflict he desired come together, the countless variables continued to haunt him. We see here a glimpse of a common theme which will occupy us later on – the use of legal arguments to support the Anglo-French operation, on the grounds that Nasser had infringed upon British ‘rights’ and that Britain was thus entitled to compensation. In this episode we also are introduced to one of banes of Eden’s life, the leader of the Labour Party Hugh Gaitskell, who insisted that intervention in Egypt was wrong, and who began to suspect that something unsavoury was afoot despite what Eden told him.

Gaitskell was not the only one. Further abroad, the American desire to have a conference of Suez Canal users was met with private indignation from the British and French, whose governments would uphold to the end that Washington did not understand what was needed to deal with a man like Nasser. Increasingly, comparisons with Nasser to Hitler, and the idea that Britain must not ‘appease’ such figures yet again, did the rounds. Eden was determined to have his interventionist cake and eat it, and he instructed his Foreign Office deputies to look into the Charter of the United Nations as well. With so many different avenues to justification, Eden was certain that at least one of them had to provide a path to conflict. As we’ll see, he was ultimately to be disappointed.

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1956 Episode 2.7 examines the steps which led towards the military intervention in Egypt, by placing the British behaviour in its imperial context.

In spring 1955, Britain remained a premier power in the Middle East, while American representation in that theatre was not particularly impressive, save for the commercial connections which American citizens had with the different oil barons there. In the space of a year though, disquiet in the Middle East and several threats to Britain’s sphere of influence there emerged, crowned by Nasser’s refusal to fall in line. The personality of Anthony Eden stands out during these eventful months, as the veteran Tory statesman appears to have been wholly unable to accept the new status quo, or the rebellious qualities of a once docile corner of the Empire.

Even before the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, Eden was adamant that Nasser was not to be bargained with, and certainly not to be trusted. Convinced of this view, he sought to make all of his peers – both at home and abroad – come to see it this way as well. Such efforts were not wholly successful, as even following the nationalisation, Eden found to his horror that several of his peers in Government, and particularly the opposition, were not convinced that force needed to be used.

Was the nationalisation of the Canal Company really such a big deal, did it really require a war with Egypt? As per the terms of the military plans already made with France, preparations completely out of the view of Parliament were underway. Here Eden followed what was to become his modus operandi during the Crisis – acting with the approval and support of only a few peers, while everyone else was kept in the dark. This policy, while making everything faster, was to prove lethal once everything blew up in Eden’s face… 

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1956 Episode 2.6 looks at the increasingly close cooperation between Britain and France in light of the signal defeat of Western imperialist ambitions in Egypt.

We open our episode with a defining scene – President Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The nationalisation of the Canal was not the moment that the world flocked to condemn Nasser’s regime, as Anthony Eden may have hoped. For a time, the Egyptian leader would be seen as unstable, aggressive and unreasonable, but this bad press would die down as the Egyptians proved themselves very capable in handling the new responsibilities which the Suez Canal Company presented.

After convincing himself that the nationalisation of the Canal represented a national humiliation for he and his government, Eden proceeded to cement the Anglo-French commitment in the days that followed. Only 24 hours after the nationalisation occurred, French government ministers and the French premier were talking of travelling to London.

Within a week, military plans were being developed. These plans would be carried out by WW2 era weaponry, under WW2 era ideas of strategy, and even in the same secret bunkers under the Thames which had been used by Churchill to plan a resistance to the Nazis. Yet, this latest iteration of the entente cordiale was to prove anything but glorious, since at its heart was the desire to turn back the clock, and preserve the systems and status quo which held the developing world in permanent bondage. This mission was to doom Eden’s career and lead to the deaths of so many lives, and its planning stage began here.

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1956 Episode 2.5 looks at British commitments in the Middle East, and how setbacks there could massively drag down ideas of British ‘prestige’ in that region.

What did the French have to fear from Colonel Nasser, and how did this tie in with later Anglo-French agreements? The answers can be found here. Also of note in this episode is the moment when the Anglo-American loan to Nasser was cancelled, which meant that the Egyptian leader would be unable to construct his Aswan Dam.

With this setback for Nasser came Anthony Eden’s effort to paint the event as a personal triumph for himself, when in reality, Britain had been led by the Americans. Speaking of Eden, here we receive our first glimpse of the Prime Minister which suggest that he may not have been the flawless, crusading statesmen of the 1930s, and that he was, on the contrary, exactly what Britain did NOT need right now...

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1956 Episode 2.4 examines Britain's embarrassing and dissatisfying efforts to try and make Egypt see sense.

Here we see what kind of Government Anthony Eden led, and how he shook it up, or failed to shake it up, after he assumed the premiership in spring 1955. Anthony may have deserved his turn, but he would quickly exhaust the sense of goodwill he had built up over the years. In spite of his reputation for integrity and bravery when standing up to the appeasement policy of the 1930s, Eden proved wholly ill-equipped for dealing with this strange new world. Emerging from Churchill’s shadow, he felt extra pressures to act as though nothing had changed, and to pursue a Conservative foreign policy mindset as though he was still living in the 1930s.

After setting Eden’s premiership in context, we switch gears to President Nasser’s policy. Nasser had great ambitions for his country, and these centred on getting Egypt on track technologically, and fixing the grave problems which geography and poverty presented. The Aswan Dam was a radical solution which would solve these problems in one go. By the construction of this billion dollar project, the Nile could be harnessed, disastrous floods avoided, and the energy of nature made proper use of for industrial purposes. It seemed like the ideal solution, save for the key problem that Nasser lacked the kind of money required to engage in this building project.

While he was increasingly turning towards the Soviets for arms, for the moment, he was happy to look to the Anglo-American bankers to put up the funds.

The decision of the Americans and British to put up the money for this construction project may seem, in the context of the mid-1950s and especially considering what would follow, like a very odd decision indeed. Yet, as we’ll see, the Aswan Dam was not the investment opportunity which the British had hoped. Instead, once they and the Americans reneged on the deal, it proved to be the nail in the coffin of the already shaky Anglo-Egyptian relationship, and the beginning of a road towards conflict and crisis.

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1956 Episode 2.3 examines British views of Suez and Nasser's new Egyptian regime.

As the British government underwent a change and waved goodbye to great old men like Churchill, it was clear at the same time that this new government had no intention of changing its imperial tune. Egypt was a place to be held onto, not relinquished; Nasser was a figure to be loathed, rather than cooperated with; British prestige, as much as her long-standing strategic and security interests, depended on holding the Canal. That neither Churchill nor his successor in Anthony Eden proved capable of holding Nasser back speaks volumes about the awakening in Egyptian national consciousness which was beginning in the 1950s.

As the men at the top of the coup finished their own struggles and Colonel Nasser surged ahead, it became apparent that Egypt was in something of an ideal position. It had its problems of course, and its legacies of poverty and inequality for days, but it was in an ideal strategic position at the same time. Poised as the link between Africa and the Middle East, Egypt was the crossroads between different worlds. It was also, potentially, a crossroads in the Cold War, but for the moment, Nasser knew that his bread was buttered on its Western side.

Before conflict and crisis had their day, negotiation and diplomacy were allowed to flourish in this Anglo-Egyptian relationship. An agreement for policing the Suez Canal and for mobilising it during wartime was signed with the Cairo government. To insulate these deals, a Northern Tier system of alliances with other Middle Eastern states like Jordan, Iran and Iraq was signed. It seemed, at least on some level, that Britain was giving peace a chance. Yet, the more than the Foreign Secretary, and then the PM saw of Nasser’s Egypt, the less he liked. It was impossible to deal with an Egypt that did not seem to know its place, but with every meeting came a painful reminder that all was not as it had once been. The Egyptian puppets were gone, and it was uncomfortably clear that these new Egyptian men pulled their own strings.

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