Iran's Gambit

As Iran prepares for the fifth round of nuclear talks with the United States, the regime in Tehran underscores a strategy combining deterrence and diplomacy. Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi's latest remarks affirm Iran's readiness for transparency in exchange for sanctions relief, while rejecting any compromise on sovereign rights, such as enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil. Dr. Araghchi also appears to be reaching out to U.S. businesses, in an attempt to mobilize support in the U.S. for continued negotiations and a potential agreement.

Much like President Donald J. Trump's dual-track rhetoric toward Iran—alternating between coercive threats and inducements such as the prospect of sanctions relief—the Islamic Republic has likewise adopted a strategy of strategic ambiguity. Tehran is concurrently projecting a willingness to engage in diplomacy over its nuclear program, while simultaneously issuing deterrent threats to disrupt maritime oil shipments in the Persian Gulf in the event of U.S. military escalation.

In response to President Donald J. Trump's conciliatory overtures, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei invokes the historical precedent of Imam Hassan's treaty with Muawiya (subject of one of Khamenei's books), signaling a potential strategic recalibration. Concurrently, media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launch a coordinated campaign against a televised political satire that ridicules the Saudi Foreign Minister. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, while for the first time acknowledging "fundamental divergences at the level of overarching principles" between the United States and Iran, expresses cautious optimism regarding the prospects for diplomatic engagement.

Assessing the initial and subsequent rounds of bilateral negotiations with the United States, Iranian officials have expressed surprise at the rapid pace of diplomatic engagement. This acceleration is primarily ascribed to the limited scope of U.S. demands, the relative inexperience or subject-matter unfamiliarity of American negotiators, a pronounced strategic urgency to secure an agreement, and the personalized and unconventional diplomatic style characteristic of President Donald J. Trump. Nonetheless, the trajectory toward a comprehensive accord remains encumbered by persistent structural and political impediments.

Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi has asserted that U.S. interlocutors have refrained from introducing extraneous, non-nuclear issues during the most recent round of negotiations. He confirmed that technical-level discussions would resume in Muscat on Wednesday, April 23, and that he would reconvene with U.S. Special Envoy Mr. Steven Witkoff on Saturday, April 26, to evaluate progress. This indicates Mr. Witkoff's April 15, post on X, stating: "Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment" was not expressed as a U.S. demand in the course of the negotiations.

Receiving the Saudi Defense Minister in Tehran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei chose a condescending attitude in dealing with the younger brother of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, but the fact that he received him undermines policy recommendation of Iranian strategist Dr. Mehdi Kharatian, who argues Iran can improve its negotiation position vis a vis the United States by attacking Saudi interest. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi downplays the significance of the change in U.S. Middle East Envoy Steven Witkoff's ever-changing positions as expressed on television and social media.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei states he is "neither excessively optimistic, nor excessively pessimistic" regarding Iran's bilateral diplomatic engagement with the United States—an appropriate stance, given the latest recalibration in U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff's position on Iran's uranium enrichment capacity. While Iranian media appear condemn the change in Witkoff's position, Deputy Foreign Minister and member of the negotiation team Kazem Gharibabadi delivered a more careful assessment indicating Iran is more interested in what positions U.S. negotiators present at the negotiation table than what they post on social media.

As a prelude to potential diplomatic engagement with the United States, the Islamic Republic is strategically signaling both deterrence and openness to negotiation. The activation of Yemeni Houthi proxies and the controlled disclosure of the Revolutionary Guard's subterranean missile infrastructure serve as calibrated demonstrations of Iran's strategic depth and military resilience, aimed at reinforcing its bargaining position vis-à-vis President Donald J. Trump. Simultaneously, the removal of the U.S. flag from the facility's floor, alongside Tehran's formal diplomatic response, indicates a conditional willingness to engage in dialogue.

However, Iran appears to be setting its own parameters for negotiations. Two sources have dismissed the United Arab Emirates as a potential intermediary, implicitly suggesting that Abu Dhabi is an unlikely venue for talks. Furthermore, while Tehran has signaled readiness to deliberate on its nuclear program within the established framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it has categorically ruled out any discussion of its defense posture and ballistic missile capabilities, framing these as non-negotiable aspects of its national security doctrine.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's March 20 New Year address was far from jubilant, conveying a tone of somber resilience rather than triumphalism. He acknowledged that Iranians had endured significant economic hardship over the past year, with further adversities likely in the year ahead. Regarding recent communications from President Donald J. Trump and other U.S. officials, Khamenei adopted a posture of defiance, though his rhetoric was not categorically intransigent: Iran has no proxies in the Middle East region, he asserted, which may indicate Khamenei willingness to accommodate Trump's demands with regard to Iran's regional activities.

Separately, amid escalating geopolitical tensions between Washington and Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) aired video footage purportedly recorded within an underground Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) missile complex. The broadcast was likely intended as a demonstrative display of Iran's strategic deterrence posture, but also sent a subtle message to Washington: The facility's access tunnel floor was emblazoned with an Israeli flag, but as opposed to previous footage of similar installations, the American flag as not positioned adjacent to the Israeli flag.

Both illustrated old problems Iran will be wrestling with in the new year: attempting to reach a negotiatied solution to the crisis over Iran's nuclear program, negotiating from a position of strength, potentially sacrificing proxies for the sake of retaining the strategic core of the nuclear program.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran prepares for negotiations with the administration of President Donald J. Trump, the Islamic Republic finds itself in urgent need of expendable bargaining assets to safeguard the strategic core of its nuclear program. Yemen's Houthis, a key force aligned with Iran's regional ambitions, present an ideal sacrificial piece: First, Tehran escalates Houthi aggression against U.S. interests, using the Yemeni proxy as a tool to apply pressure and shape the regional security landscape. Then, at the negotiating table, Tehran offers de-escalation—promising to rein in the Houthis or even sever ties— in exchange for preserving the core of its nuclear program. Washington, on the other hand, targets Houthi positions to bereave the regime of its bargaining chip, coercing Tehran into offering strategic concessions during negotiations.

Iran faces escalating environmental and infrastructural crises, exposing governance deficiencies. Tehran's seismic vulnerability is critical, with accumulated tectonic stress indicating a high-probability magnitude 7+ earthquake. Rapid urbanization and inadequate disaster preparedness put millions at risk. Simultaneously, Iran's energy crisis worsens as demand outpaces supply. Dr. Hashem Oraee highlights policy mismanagement, with heavy subsidies fueling excessive consumption. Prioritizing residential energy over industrial needs has led to economic stagnation, inflation, and public sector shutdowns. Iran's water crisis compounds these challenges. Over-extraction, reduced precipitation, and groundwater depletion have pushed the country into hydrological emergency, leading to land subsidence. With 90% of water allocated to agriculture, shortages threaten national stability.

On the same day that former Emirati Foreign Minister Anwar Mohammed Gargash visited Tehran, purportedly to deliver an official communique from President Donald J. Trump to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei categorically dismissed the prospect of diplomatic negotiations with the United States.

On March 7, during an interview with Fox Business, President Donald J. Trump asserted that he had dispatched a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stating: "I hope you're going to negotiate because it's going to be a lot better for Iran... If we have to go in militarily, it's going to be a terrible thing for them... The other alternative is we have to do something, because you can't let them have a nuclear weapon." Later that day, while addressing the press from the Oval Office, the president reaffirmed: "We're down to final strokes with Iran,... We can't let them have a nuclear weapon." The president's latest declarations have elicited divergent reactions from the Islamic Republic, reflecting both internal factionalism within the ruling elite regarding strategic engagement with the United States and a lack of bureaucratic cohesion.

Today's discussion is dedicated to Iran-Russia relations, with a particular focus on Moscow's diplomatic overture to facilitate U.S. President Donald J. Trump's efforts to broker nuclear negotiations with the Islamic Republic. First, I will analyze the strategic implications of Russia's proposal, which was initially reported by Bloomberg News on March 4. Then, I will examine the reactions of Iranian political analysts to this development, assessing their perspectives within the broader context of Iran's foreign policy and regional security dynamics.

On March 2, a parliamentary majority impeached Dr. Abdulnaser Hemmati, minister of economy. Defending Hemmati, President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized to parliamentarians that Iran's economic problems will not be solved with the impeachment, and pointed at a different solution: Negotiations with the United States, in the hope of achieving sanction relief. However, he also added that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not allowing such negotiations. In other words, Pezeshkian is directly accusing Khamenei for the hardships Iranians suffer under the U.S. sanctions regime. But today's program begins elsewhere, a conversation with Professor Sadeq Zibakalam of Tehran University, who discusses his understanding of what President Donald J. Trump's real agenda and what he wants from Iran. Next, we will look at the statements from the director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization with regards to ongoing developments in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and finally, Ayatollah Khamenei's latest statements on the United States and President Pezeshkian's defense of former Economy Minister Hemmati.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has recently conveyed contradictory signals regarding the prospect of direct diplomatic engagement with the United States. On January 28, his remarks suggested openness to such negotiations, whereas on February 7, he appeared to reject the possibility. Officials within the Islamic Republic have subsequently interpreted Khamenei's statements through the lens of their respective institutional interests. In the latest demonstration of bureaucratic politics, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, at a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, stipulated "talks between Iran and the United States are not feasible as long as the maximum pressure campaign remains in effect." This negates Khamenei's February 7 statement. Meanwhile, former President Hassan Rouhani contended that Khamenei's opposition to direct negotiations is not absolute. Conversely, media outlets aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) underscore that Iran should not anticipate sanctions relief from the United States. Despite these divergent perspectives, there is a broad consensus among analysts that Russia is unlikely to serve as a mediator between Tehran and Washington.

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has once again recalibrated his strategic posture concerning diplomatic engagement with the United States. In his January 28 address, he appeared to tacitly endorse diplomatic negotiations with Washington. However, on February 7, Khamenei asserted that engaging in negotiations with President Donald J. Trump's administration is "neither wise and intelligent, nor is it honorable." The rationale behind this apparent policy shift remains unclear, though some Iranian analysts speculate it may be a reaction to the presidential memorandum recently signed by President Donald J. Trump. Khamenei's statements have also fueled speculation regarding President Masoud Pezeshkian's purported threats to resign, in protest to Khamenei's opposition to negotiations. The statements have also reignited a contentious discourse in which both proponents and detractors of diplomatic engagement with the United States selectively interpret Khamenei's remarks to advance their respective political narratives.

The Islamic Republic operated under a system of collective leadership throughout the 1980s. At the time, this governance structure remained largely unrecognized by external observers, but those with insight into Iran's political dynamics understood that supreme authority did not rest solely with Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Instead, the Islamic Republic's decision-making and policy implementation were effectively managed by a quadrumvirate comprising key institutional figures: the head of the legislative branch, Parliamentary Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the head of the executive branch, President Ali Khamenei; and the head of the judiciary, Mr. Abdol-Karim Mousavi Ardabili. The fourth figure in this arrangement was Mr. Ahmad Khomeini, son of the Grand Ayatollah, who wielded significant procedural power by controlling access to his father's seal, thereby formalizing state decrees in his father's name. This oligarchic configuration not only ensured the continuity of state functions but also reinforced regime legitimacy and facilitated the enforcement of policy decisions.

I perceive that the Islamic Republic is once again reverting to a form of collective leadership. While Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may not be physically incapacitated, he appears increasingly insulated from both internal political realities and the broader geopolitical landscape. The heads of the three branches of government, cognizant of Khamenei's evolving role, seem to be consolidating authority in response to both domestic instability and external strategic pressures. This emergent political arrangement suggests a recalibration of power within the regime, potentially signaling a return to coordinated elite decision-making as a mechanism for regime preservation. Should the Revolutionary Guard cooperate with the heads of three branches of the government, they regime may significantly improve its chances of survival. However, should Ayatollah Khamenei, feel left out by the president, the parliamentary speaker and the judiciary chief, he may use the Revolutionary Guard to counter balance the civilians and thereby undermine the regime.

As Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi lays the groundwork for a new round of nuclear negotiations with the United States, and Ali Larijani, senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, signals a willingness to offer nuclear-related concessions in exchange for sanctions relief, Iranian political analysts view President Donald J. Trump's psychology and Republican dominance across the executive and legislative branches as strategic levers to circumvent opposition from U.S. allies critical of Iran and to secure a durable bilateral agreement with Washington.

Today's program discusses renewed speculations about direct negotiations between Tehran and Washington, and as before, the two capitals appear out of sync: historically, when Washington was ready to negotiate with Iran, formidable impediments, primarily Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, prevented Tehran to take part in negotiations. Now that Tehran appears most interested, if not desperate for negotiations, President Donald J. Trump is possibly playing hard to get. Framing his authorization within his characteristic anti-imperialist rhetoric, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has officially sanctioned direct diplomatic engagement between the Islamic Republic and the United States. However, Washington appears unresponsive, as inferred from statements by Iranian officials and domestic media discourse.

Officially, the United States has maintained a military presence in Syria since September 2014. As of December, approximately 900 U.S. troops reportedly remain in Syria - a number which according to the latest reports may be closer to 2000. This military posture could face a rapid reconfiguration with President-elect Donald J. Trump's impending return to the White House, given his predisposition toward minimizing direct U.S. involvement in foreign military operations. While such a withdrawal is likely to erode U.S. leverage over the emerging governance structure in Syria, it may not significantly shift the strategic balance of power in Syria and the broader Middle East in a way that would generate a power vacuum conducive to exploitation by U.S. adversaries, including anti-American terrorist organizations or the Islamic Republic of Iran.

There is renewed speculation about Mr. Mojtaba Khamenei succeeding his father as the leader of the revolution and Iran's head of state. Separatelly, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are engaged in poorly coordinated attempts to reach out to President-Elect Donald J. Trump to prepare the ground for negotiations with the United States. I am not entirely sure the president and the foreign minister are communicating the same signal, let alone the regime in its entirety, including the Revolutionary Guard and Ayatollah Khamenei. The Islamic Republic really needs to coordinate better. Still better, Ayatollah Khamenei himself must communicate with the president-elect.

The central government in Iran, whether under the Pahlavi regime or the Islamic Republic, has historically provided institutionalized spaces for experts to engage in debates on technical—and occasionally political—issues aligned with state interests. These platforms, often manifesting as think tanks, policy research centers, and other quasi-official institutions, fulfill several critical functions: First, they channel dissent by allowing critics of government policies to articulate their objections within controlled environments, thus preventing such dissent from escalating into mass mobilizations or street protests against the regime. Second, they serve as a mechanism for the state to gauge the prevailing intellectual currents among elite circles, potentially co-opting and incorporating ideas that align with state priorities. Third, these fora can act as a tool for the regime to coopt members of oppositional elites by integrating them into the bureaucratic or executive apparatus.

With the advent of the internet, both opposition groups and the regime have utilized digital spaces to establish new platforms for discourse. Alongside entertainment content such as cooking shows, pet videos, and pornography, these digital spaces occasionally host serious and substantive debates. Notably, the Islamic Republic has refrained from censoring these discussions, likely because entertainment content overwhelmingly dominates viewer attention. From a political strategy standpoint, this ensures that the regime can extract value from these debates without risking significant political activation or mobilization among the broader Iranian public.

A pertinent example is the January 11 debate between Dr. Ali-Naqi Mashayekhi, Professor Emeritus at Sharif Institute of Technology (often referred to as Iran's MIT), who holds a Ph.D. in management, and Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi from Allameh Tabatabaei University. The two scholars engaged in a critical discussion on the structural and institutional factors underlying the stagnation of Iran's development, with a particular focus on economic development.

Commander Behrouz Esbati, the Public Affairs Director of the Joint Force Cyber Command, on January 7 centered his speech on his firsthand observations of the systemic collapse of the Assad regime. Approximately one hour of his speech was published by Tabnak News Agency, an outlet affiliated with Dr. Mohsen Rezaei, the longest-serving Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Commander Esbati's remarks can be categorized into two distinct sections. The first section presents an Iranian perspective on the progressive disintegration of the Syrian regime, including the erosion of military morale and widespread demoralization among the Syrian populace. This portion of his analysis appears to be both credible and candid. The second section, however, where Commander Esbati projects the future trajectory of the so-called 'Axis of Resistance,' is imbued with ideological rhetoric and serves more as propaganda. I have chosen to place limited emphasis on this part of his discourse.

There has always been a correlation, if not causality, between technological innovation and sociopolitical transformation: Gutenberg's printing press catalyzed the Protestant Reformation, and from his exile in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini famously utilized cassette tape recordings of his sermons to galvanize the Iranian populace against the Pahlavi regime during the 1970s. BBC Persian's radio service too aided the Iranian revolutionaries. The Internet similarly embodies revolutionary potential, a reality that underscores the Islamic Republic's systematic strategies to regulate and suppress it since Iran's initial connection in 1993. Following Israel, Iran became the second nation in the Middle East to gain access to the World Wide Web in 1993. However, during this nascent stage, Internet usage in Iran was confined to academic research within universities, rendering it inaccessible to the broader public sphere.

Concurrently, an increasing number of Iranians began to adopt satellite television as an alternative information ecosystem. In 1994, the Iranian parliament enacted legislation criminalizing the ownership and use of satellite receivers—colloquially referred to as "dishes"—which facilitated access to transnational satellite broadcasts. This legislative intervention was intended to preserve the monopoly of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) as the hegemonic apparatus for information dissemination and cultural programming within Iranian society. Nevertheless, despite state-enforced compliance mechanisms such as law enforcement raids to confiscate satellite equipment and the deployment of advanced signal-jamming technologies, a substantial segment of the population—including members of the political elite—circumvented these restrictions. Satellite television emerged as a parallel media domain, offering alternative narratives that undermined the state-controlled information architecture, thereby challenging the government's capacity to sustain informational hegemony.

Back to the internet, initially, Internet access in Iran was restricted to universities and research institutions. However, according to World Bank data, fixed broadband subscriptions in the country surged from 176 in year 2000 to nearly 11 million in 2021. Similarly, mobile cellular subscriptions grew from 9,200 in 1994 to almost 136 million in 2021. An increasing proportion of these mobile devices are Internet-enabled, granting users access to social media platforms. This exponential growth signifies a notable milestone for a developing nation but simultaneously presents profound challenges to an authoritarian regime intent on constraining personal and political freedoms.

To preserve its dominance over the digital information ecosystem, the regime has systematically imposed restrictions on widely used platforms, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram. Nonetheless, Iranian citizens have adeptly utilized Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to circumvent state-imposed censorship and access restricted content. From the regime's perspective, this challenge has been further exacerbated by advancements in satellite Internet technology. Increasingly, Iranian users are bypassing government-controlled telecommunications infrastructure by connecting to global satellite networks, such as Starlink, provided by the international aerospace and telecommunications corporation SpaceX. This trend is extensively documented in the Tehran E-Commerce Association's fourth report on the "State of the Internet in Iran.

· On January 1, Dr. Ali Larijani, former Supreme National Security Council secretary, and adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, defended Iran's track record in Syria. It is not known if Dr. Larijani's spin is only meant for the Iranian public, or he delivers the same message to Khamenei.

As the Islamic Republic commemorated the fifth anniversary of assassination of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Suleimani, many public figures, who had personal interactions with him delivered lengthy interviews discussing this near-mythical individual. On January 2nd, I discussed former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with Khorasan newspaper, and today, I'll discuss current Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi's interview. He delivered the interview on January 1, and my translation is based on the partial transcription released by Iran's al-Alam network. As you will see, there are significant differences between Dr. Zarif's account and Dr. Araghchi's, but this is understandable: the former no longer serves as foreign minister, and the latter is and must deal with the Quds Force bureaucracy in his everyday work. Nevertheless, as you will hear, you can always detect signs of inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, even in the guarded comments delivered by Dr. Araghchi.

Former Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with January 1, 2025 edition of Khorasan newspaper not only provides some insights into his relationship with the late Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem, but also into inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force. An audio recording, allegedly leaked to the media in 2021, provides greater insights into how the Quds Force undermined the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic efforts.

In the history of most countries, some eras appear more glorious than others. And at times, the past appears more glorious than what we expect of the future. This was my sense monitoring Iran's state-censored media today. Addressing the families of martyrs, including the family of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Soleimani, widows of Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, and other affiliated groups, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of Soleimani's assassination. In his address, Ayatollah Khamenei reflected on the apex of Soleimani's influence, particularly from 2003 to 2020—a period, which coincides with the height of Iranian geopolitical leverage in the Middle East. Regarding future prospects, however, Ayatollah Khamenei's rhetoric conveyed aspirations and hope but lacked a clearly articulated strategic framework. Clearly, glory was in the past and the future looks more uncertain.

On December 30, Tehran witnessed two competing demonstrations emblematic of Iran's polarized political climate: one orchestrated by the regime and the other a spontaneous expression of public dissent triggered by the latest depreciation of the Iranian Rial against the U.S. Dollar. The state-organized rally aimed to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of what the regime frames as "the sedition of 2009," a characterization starkly contrasting with global narratives that recognize this period as the Green Movement uprisings in Iran.

As some may recall, Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009 under contentious circumstances ignited political contention. His rivals, Mr. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mr. Mehdi Karrubi, contested the election results, sparking mass mobilizations. On December 27, 2009, millions of demonstrators took to the streets, marking a pivotal moment as chants against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emerged for the first time. In reaction, the regime organized pro-government demonstrations on December 30, 2009, events that the Islamic Republic's propaganda apparatus celebrated yesterday in an act of political mythmaking.

In contrast, the second rally, as noted earlier, arose organically as thousands of merchants in Tehran's Grand Bazaar protested the Rial's devaluation against the Dollar. This economic grievance underscores the regime's persistent struggle with public dissatisfaction fueled by economic mismanagement.

In today's program, I will analyze the Iranian media's selective coverage—or deliberate omission—of these dueling demonstrations, alongside a critical examination of the function and symbolism of pro-regime rallies within the broader context of Iranian political strategy and governance.

While presence of Iranian nationals among the Tahrir al-Sham Movement risks radicalizing the Sunnis in Iran, and therefore constitutes a security threat to the Islamic Republic, some of those radicals may be Intelligence Ministry infiltrators. However, infiltrators too can at times go rogue and pursue their self-interests.

On December 15, Iran's Supreme National Security Council issued a statement announcing suspension of the so-called "Hijab and Chastity Law," formally known as the "The Bill Supporting Families By Propagating the Culture of Chastity and Hijab". The bill, which was passed on June 13, 2024, was the regime's reaction to anti-hijab protests in the wake of the September 16, 2022 killing of 22-year-old Ms. Mahsa Amini in the custody of the so-called "Morality Police". It was also a reaction to the fact that increasingly, many women ignore the requirements for covering their head with a scarf in public spaces. Why is the regime capitulating on the hijab issue? In short, because President Masoud Pezeshkian, his Cabinet, and even the Revolutionary Guard and the Law Enforcement Forces, no longer believe enforcement of the bill can intimidate Iran's urban middle class into submission. On the contrary, enforcement of the Hijab bill can potentially provoke another round of anti-regime protests. The 1980's are over!

While President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the technocratic elites of the Islamic Republic appear to have accepted Iran's total defeat in Syria, and are reaching out to the new rulers of that country to establish formal relations, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guard and IRGC affiliated media outlets are still in denial and talk of "Syrian youth" rebelling against the new regime.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's December 22 address on the occasion of the birth anniversary of Fatemeh Zahra had little to do with plight of women, and a good deal to do with regional developments, in particular Syria. He appeared irritated by Israel's "boasting" and "grand standing," assured the Iranian public that Israel was defeated rather than victorious, and expressed hope Israel would be "evicted" from the Middle East region. On the same day, Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, Supreme National Security Council secretary, delivered an interview expressing similar views. Doest the regime, and in particular, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, believe his own propaganda? If his advisers, the likes of Mr. Ahmadian, constantly confirm his worldview, is Ayatollah Khamenei capable of distinguishing between propaganda and reality?

In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.

In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.

In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.

Collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime and manifest defeat of the Revolutionary Guard's strategy in Syria have exposed the organization to public critique in Iran. While still short of demanding accountability, reformist politicians are openly calling for civilian control over the military, and civilian supremacy in national security decision-making. There is, however, no indication that the Revolutionary Guard leadership is willing to voluntarily subject itself to civilian control or give up its decisive influence over national security decision-making. On the contrary, as evident on the front page of Revolutionary Guard mouthpiece Javan newspaper, the Guard is likely to use the Judiciary to prosecute and terrorize critics.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei showed defiance in defeat in his first public statement in the wake of the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. Indirectly, he accused the new rulers of Syria of being agents of the United States and Israel. Furthermore, he claimed Iran was willing, but incapable of airlifting troops to Syria due to U.S. and Israel closing the skies over Syria to Iranian airplanes. He further added that former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had not requested military assistance from Iran. Khamenei used many a minute talking of invulnerability of the Axis of Resistance, his term for what remains of Iran's proxies, despite collapse of the Assad regime, but his final warnings against those, who try to "demoralize" the Iranian public prove what is evident for all to see: the Assad regime's collapse was Iran's defeat, and defeat of Iran's proxy strategy.

On Asr-e Iran's satirical commentary on the 95% of Syrian voters, who voted for Bashar al-Assad in the May 2021 presidential election in Syria, but failed to support him in the face of armed opponents; and Fars News Agency's involuntarily commical comment on Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urging Assad to "democratise Syria". The program also features an English translation of an undated interview by Ahmed hussein al-Shara, Tahrir al-Sham group leader, who in an undated interview threatened to "bring the war to Iran" by inciting Iran's ethnic and religious minorities against the central government in Tehran. Finally, the program features a translation of Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi's interviw with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, in which he assured the viewers that changes in Syria will not significantly weaken the Axis of Resistance.

Fiasco!

Iran's national security strategy is evident. Lebanese Hezbollah, Tehran's most prominent proxy, is in disarray, while the Assad regime in Syria, once a linchpin for the strategic overland corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq, is on the verge of either disintegration or defection from Iran's camp. Today, rather than delving into real-time updates from Syria or elsewhere which other media do much better than yours truly, I will point at a few really simple economic factors driving the unraveling of Iran's geopolitical strategy.

If you've been keeping an eye on global developments, as I assume many of you have, you're likely aware of the seismic shift in Syria: Aleppo has fallen under the control of Tahrir al-Sham, a faction designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in May 2018. While the rapidity of this development may have taken some by surprise, the evolving power dynamics in Syria were long evident. Lebanese Hezbollah, a strategic ally of Syria and a linchpin in Iran's so-called Axis of Resistance, is in disarray. Having incurred devastating losses in Lebanon, it has redeployed many of its forces from Syria to Lebanon to confront perceived threats from Israel. Iran, Hezbollah's primary patron, is increasingly constrained in financing its regional alliances, while Russia, whose aerial campaigns were instrumental in preserving the Assad regime, has deprioritized Syria amid its protracted conflict in Ukraine. Additionally, the Assad regime, potentially under Israeli pressure and enticed by wealthy Arab states, has sought to distance itself from Tehran, potentially even curtailing arms transfers to Hezbollah. With the United States maintaining only a minimal military footprint in Syria and a likely complete withdrawal once President-elect Donald J. Trump takes office, the geopolitical calculus has shifted. Tahrir al-Sham, reportedly backed by Turkey, has seized the opportunity to expand its territorial gains in this fragmented and volatile environment.

Today, we'll delve into Iranian media reactions to these developments and assess the broader implications of losing northern Syria for Tehran's defense doctrine – which I can assure you, is in ruins.

In today's program, I'll spend a few minutes critiquing the Revolutionary Guard-affiliated media's preposterous commentary on the ceasefire in Lebanon. However, I won't dwell on these absurdities for too long. Instead, I'll transition to discussing an interview in Etemad newspaper with Mr. Mohsen Mir-Damadi, a reformist political activist, who provides an astute and pragmatic assessment of the state of Iran-U.S. relations.

Today's program focuses on a story from Jamaran News Agency, which may not be a familiar name to most of you, but it represents a noteworthy institution expressing the perspectives of the household of the late Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. For context, "Jamaran" refers to a village situated on the mountain slopes of northern Tehran, where Grand Ayatollah Khomeini's compound was located during the Iran-Iraq War. At that time, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini was often referred to as "Pir-e Jamaran," or the Old Man of Jamaran. While I am not entirely convinced that members of the Khomeini household harbor explicit political ambitions—having lost the post-Khomeini power struggle to Messrs. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei—it seems Mr. Hassan Khomeini, the most prominent figure of the Khomeini clan, is intent on remaining relevant. This is evident in Jamaran News publishing quality interviews with figures who held key public offices in the 1980s.

Yesterday, Jamaran News released an interview with Hojjat al-Eslam Seyyed Mahmoud Alavi, a politician who began his career in the 1980s and rose to prominence under President Hassan Rouhani. Mr. Alavi served as Minister of Intelligence from 2013 to 2021. Now, I can imagine what some of you might be thinking at the mention of a Minister of Intelligence in the Islamic Republic of Iran—perhaps picturing a figure combining Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor with the KGB. Yet, believe it or not, Mr. Alavi is known as an intellectual, and Iran's Ministry of Intelligence, for the most part, operates as a professional institution.

Currently, Mr. Alavi serves as an adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian on matters concerning ethnic minorities, religion, and religious sects. Yesterday, he attended a book launch for a publication titled Oral History Biographies of Nuclear Martyrs, dedicated to Iran's nuclear scientists who were assassinated, allegedly by Israeli intelligence.

Today, my focus is on two articles featured in yesterday's edition of Sazandegi newspaper, a publication representing the technocratic elites of Iran. The editor and most of the columnists associated with this newspaper have held governmental responsibilities, which grants them a distinctly pragmatic approach to politics compared to the average Iranian journalist, who is typically oppositional—oppositional to the Cabinet, or oppositional to the opposition! In contrast, Sazandegi adopts a perspective focused on practical political solutions.

Yesterday's edition of the newspaper featured two particularly intriguing articles—an uncommon occurrence in any daily publication. It's not every day you find two exceptional articles even in The New York Times, let alone elsewhere.

The first article delves into the political resurgence of Mr. Ali Larijani, the former parliamentary speaker and erstwhile Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Mr. Larijani has re-emerged in Iranian politics and appears highly active in signaling toward the United States. The second article discusses the policy options of the incoming administration of U.S. President-Elect Donald J. Trump vis-à-vis Iran.

Today's program is dominated by the escalating tensions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On November 21, select members of the IAEA Board of Governors, including Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, passed a resolution urging Iran to enhance its cooperation with the agency and provide a "comprehensive" report. This move, seen as an effort to pressure Tehran back to the negotiating table over its nuclear program, was met with a defiant response from Iran's Foreign Ministry, which vowed to "respond in kind." The Iranian media landscape reflects a growing polarization over this issue. Iran's state-affiliated outlets have offered a range of perspectives, revealing internal and external political strategies aimed at countering what is perceived as Western coercion.

There was a time when the European Union (EU) was perceived as Iran's ally, counterbalancing what Tehran labeled as the U.S. "Great Satan." During those years, Europe often sought to shield Iran from Washington's more aggressive policies. However, the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. Iran's growing alignment with Russia has alienated the Europeans to such an extent that their stance toward Tehran now appears more assertive and antagonistic than that of the United States. Amid these tensions, a cautious sense of optimism is palpable in Tehran, particularly following the meeting between Iran's UN Ambassador, Amir Saeid Iravani, and Elon Musk, a close adviser to President-Elect Donald J. Trump. Yet, no such optimism exists regarding Iran-EU relations, where prospects appear grim.

The EU's recent sanctions against Iran reflect a hardening stance fueled by Tehran's strategic alignment with Moscow. As Iran faces intensified European hostility, it appears to pin its hopes on the more ideologically fragmented Trump administration. Domestically, the recalibration of Iran's diplomatic leadership underscores a shift toward pragmatic engagement in the region. These developments signal a pivotal moment for Iran, as its foreign and domestic policies face heightened scrutiny and evolving challenges on multiple fronts.

As some of you may recall, yesterday's program was dedicated to the November 14 meeting between Mr. Amir-Saeid Iravani, Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations, and Mr. Elon Musk, entrepreneur and adviser to President Donald J. Trump. Today's program will continue this discussion, as the alleged meeting remains a focal point in Iran's heavily censored media. Iran's Foreign Minister Mr. Abbas Araghchi has outright denied that such a meeting took place. The conservative Kayhan newspaper prominently celebrated the dismissal of the meeting's news, while reformist outlets such as Ham-Mihan praised the initiative. There is also an intriguing front-page article in the Javan newspaper, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which merits our closer attention, and so does rumors of Mr. Ali Larijani being appointed Supreme National Security Council secretary in the near future.

The focus of today's discussion is the November 14th meeting between Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Amir Saeid Iravani, and Mr. Elon Musk, the prominent entrepreneur and perceived confidant of President-elect Donald J. Trump.

According to the November 14th edition of the New York Times, the two gentlemen engaged in discussions lasting over an hour at an undisclosed location. Subsequent reporting by other outlets revealed that the meeting occurred at Ambassador Iravani's official residence in New York City. An unnamed source cited by the New York Times claimed that during the meeting, Ambassador Iravani urged Mr. Musk to pursue sanctions exemptions from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and consider extending some of his business ventures to Tehran.

The meeting has predictably caused significant debate within Tehran, where perceptions of Iran's vulnerability to Israeli military actions have heightened concerns. Mr. Musk, likely motivated by his own economic interests, is seen as offering Tehran an opportunity to circumvent the Israel lobby in Washington, potentially opening a new chapter in U.S.-Iran relations. However, more cautious observers anticipate a potential rift between Mr. Musk and President Trump in the longer term. Should such a schism arise, it could empower pro-Israel factions within the incoming Trump administration to dominate U.S. national security policy-making. To judge by the media coverage, the meeting has also its critics in Iran, most prominently Kayhan newspaper. But just as remarkably, the Revolutionary Guard appears more cautious and has been largely silent.

The Islamic Republic has reacted with measured caution to the election of Mr. Donald J. Trump in the U.S. presidential elections. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains uncharacteristically silent, refraining from any direct commentary. Beneath surface-level official statements, such as "it does not matter who is president in the United States," lies a profound apprehension over managing the implications of Mr. Trump's victory—a sentiment echoed across Iran's state-censored media. Amid these muted or guarded responses, an outline of a possible strategy emerges, likely influenced by figures such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad-Javad Zarif and former Ambassador Hossein Mousavian. This approach may include diplomatic overtures involving flattery, lauding Mr. Trump's avowed anti-war stance, and suggesting the prospect of a historic "grand deal with Iran." However, such a strategy risks being jeopardized by recent allegations linking the Iranian government to a purported plot to assassinate Mr. Trump. The strategy is also vulnerable to the outcome of the factional power struggle in Mr. Trump's circle: Who will prevail in that power struggle, will also impact U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic.

Iran's proxy networks and missile capabilities are currently under significant strain. This situation could propel Iran towards a nuclear breakout—not necessarily the regime's first-choice option, but rather a potential consequence of these two other pillars faltering.

In an interview with the Financial Times published on October 29, Dr. Ali-Akbar Velayati, former Foreign Minister and current foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, indicated that Tehran is undergoing a strategic reassessment of its foreign policy, specifically with regard to engagement with Western nations. While Velayati underscored, "We do not have a positive history of negotiations with the U.S., nor do we trust U.S. intentions," many analysts in Iran perceive the interview as an initial outreach to Washington, aimed at staving off further Israeli military action against Iran. Concurrently, President Masoud Pezeshkian's recent appointments of ethnic and religious minorities to prominent government positions signal efforts to bolster internal unity and reinforce national solidarity under heightened international pressure.

Under the headline "Khamenei 'Open' to Closer Ties with the West", Ms. Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Ms. Bita Ghaffari present a curious article in today's edition of the Financial Times, which I interpret as an unofficial diplomatic communiqué from Tehran to Washington. From my analysis, it appears that Iran, faced with a series of significant strategic losses since September, is now reconsidering its position. These losses include the near-collapse of Lebanese Hezbollah, the failure of Iran's missile capabilities to breach Israel's multi-layered air defense systems, and Israel's repeated incursions into Iranian airspace. The situation is dire enough that the regime may be contemplating a negotiation of its capitulation with the United States. The question now is whether Washington is prepared to accept Tehran's overtures, and how Israel is likely to respond. I suspect Israel will do everything in its power to obstruct such a development, and so will Russia and China.

The latest billboard on Vali-Asr Square, in Tehran is a seldom promotion of a president, but Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian is also likely to be blamed if the Islamic Republic's conflict with Israel turns from bad to worse. In doing so, the regime protects Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who will remain infallible.

Following the October 25 Israeli strikes against targets in Tehran, Shiraz, and Khuzestan, Iran's state-censored media insist the attack was limited and the damage minimal. The uniformity of the message may indicate an information campaign aiming at calming the population, and lessen the pressure on the regime to retaliate, which will provoke another attack. Israel, however, which according to the New York Times, targeted air defense systems near Iran's petrochemical plants, may not wait for a response before launching new attacks against Iran.

The Supreme National Security Council, Iran's central national security decision-making body, remains one of the most secretive organizations in the Islamic Republic. Its proceedings are not public, and insights into its operations are mostly limited to references in the journals of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and scattered accounts from Iranian officials. Therefore, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's book "The Audacity of Resilience," published in Tehran in March, is a revelation. The book illuminates the SNSC process, documents interagency rivalry among Iran's government bureaucracies, and highlights the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' dominance in national security decision making.

In yesterday's edition of reformist Ham-Mihan newspaper, there ws an excellent article by Ms. Mansoureh Mohammadi, on appointment of governor generals under President Masoud Pezeshkian. In the past, I used to do a social background analysis of the governor generals, in order to develop a better understanding of the composition of the executive branch of government in Iran, and more broadly, about the ruling elites of the Islamic Republic. Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, I was particularly interested in how many governor generals were veterans of the Revolutionary Guard, and found out most of the governors appointed by Mr. Ahmadinejad were indeed former Guardsmen. For some time, I have neglected this work, and I was happily surprised by Ms. Mohammadi's article in today's newspaper, which shows Dr. Pezeshkian has invited everyone into the tent: Ethnic and religious minorities, representatives of his political rivals, and some of his own backers.

Today's program is based on a single article in Ham-Mihan newspaper, which discusses the Iranian opposition abroad, and delves into the principle of whether the end justifies the means, especially when this entails the unprecedented situation of opposition-minded individuals or factions supporting foreign adversaries attacking Iran, their homeland. Obviously, Ham-Mihan argues that the end does not justify the means, and depicts the exiled opposition as traitors and mercenaries of foreign powers, primarily Israel. Ham-Mihan has also some unrealistic policy recommendations, such as "dialogue, permitting dissent, and encouraging a multiplicity of voices" in Iran, which I will comment on in the final part of the program. After all, the Islamic Republic had such proclivity, there would be no exiled opposition in the first place!

Reviewing the Persian language media, you sense that an unsettling atmosphere pervades the political landscape, as though destiny is inescapably closing in. There is also a palpable sense of fatalism, a resigned recognition that the path forward may not be altered and catastrophe awaits Iran. n this charged atmosphere, the regime's desperation to construct a semblance of national unity becomes palpable, so much so that it has begun conjuring the ghost of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi—a monarch whom it has long vilified as both a traitor to his people and a puppet of foreign interests. This ironic resurrection speaks to the regime's faltering grasp, as it calls upon the very figure it once condemned in its quest for survival.

Dear listeners, I'm recording this program on Sunday October 20th. As you may recall, yesterday's program focused on the ongoing island dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. This issue resurfaced after the European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council issued a Joint Statement, calling on Iran to "end its occupation of the three UAE islands—Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa—which constitutes a violation of UAE sovereignty and the principles of the U.N. Charter."

Yesterday, I predicted that the Islamic Republic would use this affair to frame a new threat to Iran's territorial integrity, aiming to mobilize Iranian nationalism against regional rivals. This prediction came true today, as Iranian politicians are now competing to hurl insults at the European Union, Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Arab states. While I'll cover the most significant reactions in today's program, those patient enough to listen through will also hear a fascinating story about how Israel uses jinns, witchcraft, and supernatural elements to fight Lebanese Hezbollah!

Iran and United Arab Emirates both claim sovereignty over the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands. This conflict predates the Islamic Republic, with Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi ordering the Imperial Navy in 1971 to assert Iranian sovereignty over the islands. The dispute has simmered since then and resurfaces regularly.

A fresh episode occurred a few days ago when the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held their first summit, themed "Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity." The October 16 summit produced a Joint Statement that devoted an entire section to Iran. The statement emphasizes "the importance of diplomatic engagement with Iran to pursue regional de-escalation" and stresses "the importance of ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, ending the proliferation of ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and any technologies that threaten regional security." This refers primarily to Iran's arms exports to Russia, though it may also encompass Iran's arming of proxies. However, the section that sparked reactions in Iran was Section 46, which calls on Iran to "end its occupation of the three islands of the UAE—Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa—which constitutes a violation of the UAE's sovereignty and the principles of the U.N. Charter."

This is not the first time outside powers have sided with the UAE in the island dispute. Even China, sometimes considered a tactical ally of Iran, has supported the UAE's claims, as has Russia. In today's program, explore Iran's reaction to the joint statement and how the issue is likely to influence Iranian politics.

How is Hamas leader Mr. Yahya Sinwar depicted in the Islamic Republic's propaganda? Is his violent death likely to impact Iran? How come the "Morality Police" has almost stopped enforcing Iran's hijab law, and how can it be related to the war in Gaza and Lebanon?

With Lebanese Hezbollah—a key element of Iran's defense strategy and its main deterrent against Israel and, indirectly, the U.S.—struggling, Iran's state-controlled media are openly discussing nuclear breakout as a way to restore the balance of terror. Remarkably, Iranian lawmakers are participating in this debate. On October 9, 39 members of parliament sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council calling for a "revision of Iran's nuclear doctrine." Ahmad Bakhsheyesh Ardestani, a member of the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, echoed this sentiment in a recent interview with the reformist newspaper Shargh, emphasizing Iran's need to develop a nuclear weapon. He also delivered a few comments concerning the necessity for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to revise his so-called nuclear fatwa, or religious edict, which undermine the Iranian leader's religious authority. Everyone has now an opinion on fatwas!

In response to Iran's missile and drone transfers to Russia, the European Union sanctioned three Iranian airliners on October 14: Saha Airlines, which operates domestic flights within Iran; Mahan Air; and Iran Air. Following the sanctions, Iran Air suspended its services to EU member states. This leaves the significant demand for flights from Iran to Europe to be fulfilled by foreign airlines through connecting flights via intermediate countries such as Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar. While most Iranian media merely reported the new sanctions, Kayhan newspaper, a mouthpiece for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reacted strongly to the sanctions in its October 16 edition.

Today's Persian-language media are dominated by two major stories: the resurrection of Quds Force Chief Brigadier General Ismail Qaani, and the stalled nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, which seem to remain in the grave for the foreseeable future.

Preempting reformist criticism of the regime's foreign policy fiasco, Revolutionary Guard mouthpiece Mashregh News preemptively attacks Ham-Mihan Daily, accusing it and the reformist camp of "defeatism" and selling out of the ideals of the revolution - things Ham-Mihan's columnists have yet to write! However, in doing so, Mashregh News reveals that large parts of the Iranian public remain unpersuaded by the regime's account of the natural rivalry between two regional powers, Israel and Iran.

This Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting delivers both stories discussed in today's podcast: Dr. Masoud Assad-Allahi, former adviser to the Quds Force and a lecturer at the Imam Hussein University of the Revolutionary Guard, first blamed an Iranian company for not following security protocols before delivering pagers to Lebanese Hezbollah, but later was persuaded under interrogation to reach a different conclusion. Dr. Bizhan Abdolkarimi, a philosopher, had no such regrets, after accusing the Islamic Republic leadership of underminig social cohesion in Iran and weakening the country in the face of adversaries such as Israel.

While the photo of the handshake of presidents Masoud Pezeshkian and Vladimir Putin adorn the front pages of Tehran newspapers, former parliamentarian Mr. Heshmat-Allah Falahatpisheh disturbs the party with bitter facts.

Jamaran News, a website close to the family of the late Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, which usually releases interviews with, or articles written by various individuals with executive responsibility, released an article by Mr. Saeed Hajjarian, who explains why some Iranian appear to welcome Israeli bombing of their own country, and perceive Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as their liberator.

Unofficial mouthpieces of the Revolutionary Guard seldom praise Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the contrary, many a foreign minister has fallen victim for machinations of the Guard and its network. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who previously, in his capacity as nuclear negotiator, was the target of the Guard media, is now subject to panegyric articles in Javan newspaper, the most official among the Guard's multiple mouthpieces. Javan also appears to be warming to Iran's regional rival Saudi Arabia, yet at times, there are glimpses of the iron fist under the velvet glove: Javan not only re-used "reactionary" to describe the ruling houses of Arab states, but also accuses them of encouraging Israel's behavior in Gaza and Lebanon with their silence, and even verbalized the non-verbal threat of President Masoud Pezeshkian: Iran will respond "proportionately" if the Arab states allow their air space or military bases on their territories to be used in attacks against Iran. Is Javan newspaper chasing Arab states into the arms of Iran's adversaries?

39 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Iranian parliament, wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council demanding a revision of Iran's nuclear doctrine, and beg Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of issuing a new fatwa, or religious edict, annulling the ban on production and use of the nuclear bomb. While this particular letter may be more theatrics than real, the regime is weakened and desperate.

Despite President Masoud Pezeshkian's efforts, the Islamic Republic does not appear willing to give political freedom; lacks the means to improve the economic conditions of an increasingly impoverished population; and maintains restrictions on personal freedoms. No wonder some elite members fear a renewed round of anti-regime protests in the wake of Israeli bombardment of Iran.

If Quds Force Chief Brigadier General Ismail Qaani was indeed killed in Beirut, Lebanon, he is likely to be succeeded by Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh. How did Qaani change the Quds Force since he took over the leadership of the organization in January 2020, and is Fallahzadeh the right man under the disastrous circumstances the Quds Force and its allies find themselves in?

The threat of Israel was expected to unify rival factions in the regime, but the knives are out: Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani, son of the late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, likens Iran's government television, where Vahid Jalili, brother of former nuclear negotiator and presidential candidate Saeed Jalili is a senior executive, with revolutionary era radial Mohammad Montazeri, and warns against repetition of revolutionary era excesses.

The threat from the impending Israeli attack against Iran has managed to secure a degree of unity among the political elites of the Islamic Republic, but how long is unity likely to last? Apart from inter-elite unity, Is the regime also capable of bridging the gap between state and society in the case of a prolonged conflict with Isral, and possiblly the United States?

S1/E4: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's October 4th Friday prayer sermon served the purpose of legitimizing Iran's October 1st retaliatory missile attack against Israel and psychologically prepare the Iranian public for war, but at the same time avoid panic.

While President Masoud Pezeshkian is bridging the gap between his Cabinet and hardline element such as Kayhan newspaper and the Revolutionary Guard, Revolutionary Guard mouthpiece Javan newspaper openly calls for a revised nuclear doctrine and a nuclear breakout to compensate the degraded Lebanese Hezbollah and establish the balance of terror with Israel.

While Kayhan newspaper demands revenge and punitive action against Arab states and Israel's diplomatic representations abroad, the Revolutionary Guard and representatives of the technocratic elites urge caution. The intra-elite debate does not appear to be about use of force against Israel, but on the expediency of nuclear breakout to compensate for Lebanese Hezbollah's degraded capabilities.

Iran's recent debacle in Lebanon bears some resemblance to the Argentine military junta's defeat in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War; but unlike the military junta, the Islamic Republic is neither likely to surrender its nuclear program, nor willing to relinquish power. Instead, we may witness increased suppression at home and a dash for the bomb.