Paris Perspective

In this edition of Paris Perspective, we look at the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the ethnic cleansing of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and France's influence in the Caucasus.

At the beginning of November, Germany insisted that European mediation was the best option for Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach a lasting peace agreement.

The Caucasus neighbours have been locked in a decades-long conflict for control of Azerbaijan's Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Baku reclaimed in a lightning offensive in September.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev have held several rounds of peace talks under EU mediation and both leaders have said a peace treaty could be signed in the coming months.

However, last month, Aliyev refused to attend a round of peace talks with Pashinyan in the Spanish city of Granada, over what he said was France's "biased position".

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had been scheduled to join European Council President Charles Michel as mediators at those talks.

So far, there has been no visible progress in EU efforts to organise a fresh round of negotiations.

From a brutal war in 1988 to the 2020 conflict in which over 6,000 people were killed in 6 weeks of fighting what lies behind the animosity between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave?

For Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center think-tank based in the Armenian capital Yerevan, the hostile reationship between Yerevan and Baku is very much a construct of Soviet-era political machinations.

"Nagorno-Karabakh has historically been an Armenian populated region that has been very much used as a pawn by Moscow. It was used by the Soviet Union to actually divide and rule in terms of keeping-up a contentious potential conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan," he explains.

After seven decades of Soviet rule, there was an eruption of violence even before the implosion of the USSR.

"The outbreak of violence was largely due to the onset of Gorbachev's reforms – Glasnost, Perestroika, the new degree of openness and examining taboos.

"What we saw was the eruption of nationalism that occurred between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh conflict," says Giragosian.

The conflict was also unique at the time, as it was the first to erupt within the borders of the Soviet Union.

"During the Gorbachev period," he explains, "it was especially significant because the conflict tended to distort the development of independent Armenia and Azerbaijan, in terms of conflict economics and the fact that [they] were already locked in war upon gaining independence."

Azeri assertion, Armenian arrogance

Fast-forward to November 2020, and the two countries agreed to end a spike in hostilities that killed thousands over a six week period, signing a Russian-brokered peace agreement where Armenia – the loser – agreed to give up control of over 20 percent of territory captured by Azerbaijan.

Two thousand Russian peacekeepers were then deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh, but the most recent Azeri offensive against Armenian separatists in the enclave revealed the failure of Russia's mission to the region. 

"The war of 2020 was especially significant for several reasons," Giragosian explains. "First, it marked the emergence of a genuine military capacity by Azerbaijan to not only defend itself but to retake lost territory. It was also significant because it marked an end to years of Armenian arrogance and complacency."

Giragosian blames both sides for too many missed opportunities for compromise.

"Armenia, in many ways, was overly self-confident. But the most important casualty from 2020 was not the loss of territory, nor the loss of life, it was the demise of deterrence," he states.

"This ushered in a new period of insecurity on the ground, but for the Russian position, the Russians drafted and imposed their own ceasefire on both countries, and then failed to be able to uphold the terms. This is why Azerbaijan imposed a nine month blockade [on the enclave] and effectively seized control of Nagorno-Karabakh."

But for the think-tank director, it's the humiliation and weakness of the Russian peacekeepers that's most interesting – "Azerbaijan has become very good at challenging and defying the Kremlin," he tells Paris Perspective. 

Echoes of the 1915 genocide

Recent images coming out of Nagorno-Karabakh drew many comparisons with the 1915 Armenian genocide, bringing to the fore the question of national identity as residents of the enclave are defacto Azerbaijani citizens.

Baku maintains that the people of “Artsakh” or the Armenian population of Karabakh have the same rights as Azeris, but what is the reality on the ground?

"First of all, even prior to the most recent escalation, there was little faith and no confidence in Azerbaijani promises, largely because of the historical record.

"During the Gorbachev period through to the 90s, there were a number of anti-Armenian massacres and egregious human rights violations. The situation has only gotten worse in recent years," Giragosian underlines. 

What was remarkable about the September 2023 conflict was the speed and success of the Azerbaijani military offensive and how easy it was for them to drive out the Armenian population. 

So, was Azerbaijan's military objective to purge the enclave of all Armenians? 

"Yes," says Giragosian, "but what was interesting is their real objective was to have a protracted period [of conflict] for domestic political dividends within Azerbaijan."

Baku essentially expected a longer, protracted campaign "to maintain power that has a lack of legitimacy".

One could almost say that, politically, they were the victim of their own success, but "with dangerously high expectations," Giragosian adds. 

But what he finds interesting about the exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh – where the Armenian population was forced to leave with little more than they could pack into their cars – is that the refugees aren't looking to rebuild their lives in their ethnic homeland.

"Coming to Armenia, the core population of the last remnants of 100,000 Armenians are not necessarily keen to stay in Armenia. Many are now looking to go to Russia or European countries, because many of the Armenians from Karabakh have never lived in Armenia," Giragosian points out.

"I moved to Armenia over 15 years ago, and I'm as alien or foreign to the local Armenian experience as they are. And that's something we failed to understand," he underlines.

The quest for lasting peace

There is a massive Armenian diaspora in France, and Paris recently marked the 20^th anniversary of its recognition of the genocide committed by the “Young Turk” administration in 1915. But in light of the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, has France done enough to support Armenia and counter its isolation in the region?

Giragosian believes Paris has stepped up to the mark. 

"To be fair, French engagement has actually exceeded expectations. But at the same time, it's the EU's engagement that's both more significant and more effective than simple French actions."

He outlines that while President Macron's commitment to Armenia is important, a wider European context is necessary for sustaining the resilience of Armenia.

"The French will be announcing a package of military assistance to Armenia in the coming weeks, designed to provide a defensive capacity for Armenia. But it's the EU's engagement [that is important] because they're not trying to mediate the conflict, they are simply trying to facilitate a negotiated peace treaty.

"My worry is the day after and what is in store to ensure a lasting durable peace. That remains an open question and one in which France – within the EU – can actually work toward," Giragosian says.

So when the peace talks really do get in motion, what will work in Armenia's favour and what kind of end game will create a lasting peace?

"Let me be provocative," Giragosian quips. "I think the real challenge now is less the peace treaty, and more Russia, for Armenia.

"If we look at the peace treaty – the specific elements – Nagorno-Karabakh is no longer an issue," he says.

Border demarcation, the restoration of trade and transport, the opening of road and railway links are all significant aspects of a bilateral peace agreement – which are positive in terms of moving beyond conflict – but the real challenge is Russia.

"In terms of Armenia now seeking greater room to manoeuvre, we're not seeking to replace Russia [as an ally], but we're seeking to offset Russia. For Armenia, Russia has emerged as a more serious challenge as an unreliable, so-called partner," Giragosian concludes.

Watch the full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded by Cécile Pompeani and Nicolas Doreau 

Edited by Erwan Rome

Full Interview: France, the Caucasus and the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh – Richard Giragosian

This edition of Paris Perspective looks at the concept of Françafrique and the collapse of French influence in its former colonies. What have been the catalysts for the successive coup d’états in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger and Gabon over the past three years?

The domino effect of Sahel states falling into the hands of military juntas over the past three years has been particularly alarming to behold from a French perspective.

The takeovers have essentially followed the same playbook: France is condemned as an economic predator, military cooperation in the fight against jihadists is suspended, defence agreements with Paris are ripped up and French media outlets such as RFI and France 24 are shut down.

Almost identical scenes have played out at French embassies and military bases, with protesters denouncing French neo-colonialism and calling for the withdrawal of French troops. Russian flags have been conspicuous in the crowds.

Paris insists that the old Françafrique method of meddling in African affairs "died a long time ago". If this is true, where is the anti-French sentiment stemming from?

The legacy of "Françafrique"

To understand the present, one must look at the direct influence of France’s colonial administration across African countries, which metamorphosed into an infamous political old-boys club in the wake of independence in the 1950s and 60s.

Georja Calvin-Smith, producer and presenter of France 24's flagship "Eye on Africa" political magazine is quick to agree that the concept of Françafrique in the immediate post-colonial period was essentially born out of the former rulers' "right of entitlement". 

"I think Françafrique is best characterised from an African perspective as 'being done dirty' – being taken advantage of. That doesn't necessarily mean that there weren't African actors within the relationship that didn't benefit from it, but they were generally at the top of the social hierarchy...depending on what country you're talking about," she tells Paris Perspective.

Calvin-Smith underlines that post-colonial movers and shakers were essentially intermediaries between Paris and African capitals, either helping to secure permanent mining rights at rock bottom prices or adjusting policy ambitions for the benefit of France.

"They're seen as working with the former colonial power," she explains "to the disadvantage of the indigenous population."

"Ultimately, for decades, French and European economies have been propped up by the use and reliance on African resources," coupled with amenable African leaders she says.

Although French President Emmanuel Macron has been one of the most progressive French leaders in terms of trying to address some of the resentment over the legacy of Françafrique, Calvin-Smith says it doesn't matter: "You can say it doesn't exist, but those relationships still exist."

Rejection of 'paternalism'

From the outset, Françafrique defined the post-colonial era. African resources flowed into French coffers, in exchange for a degree of political and financial stability in the fledgling independent nations.  

"And that is the problem," the France 24 journalist continues, "because as much as we're trying to make it a binary situation about who got the most out of it ... there have been some developments in post-colonialism that can be measured as being better than others.

"That's the whole reason there is resentment. As much as we talk about political, sociological, even economic models, we're forgetting that there are real people at the heart of this."

If people feel belittled, side-lined and undermined by a paternalistic state, then this will likely shape their opinion. 

Paris Perspective #15: The future history of Jihad - Wassim Nasr

The forgotten generations

However, France's role in "guiding" African states through the independence years appears to have been rejected outright by a generation who are coming to terms with new political realities and are feeling neglected.

A new generation of Africans has emerged, one with access to information – and disinformation – in equal measure.

"By ignoring young people, if you ignore investment, and the intention to create the institutions needed to have a functioning society, then – by definition – you're ignoring the young people along with everybody else," Calvin-Smith points out.

It's also important to remember that the coups across West Africa are not all the same, she says, but rather shaped by different political and economic contexts.

"It doesn't mean that the resentment of those populations can't be exploited by actors who are taking advantage of this very valid resentment about France – or very valid concerns about security, or lack of opportunity – for their own political gains or just to take power.

"When we look at a lot of these countries – they're some of the poorest in the world – but also the richest in terms of resources. That disparity does not go unnoticed," she insists. 

ECOWAS and the putschist playbook

One common point among the coup d'états is that "none of these countries has returned to democracy since 2020," Calvin-Smith wryly points out.

A pattern has emerged, she observes: "Takeover quickly, check your back. When it comes to the international community, engage in some chats. Say that you will hold an election and then postpone the election".

For its part, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has responded invariably with sanctions, exclusion or in some cases, a threat of military intervention to ensure a return to democratic process.

Whatever the political outcome and transition of former French colonies back to democracy, France has seen its influence and credibility seriously damaged by the seismic events that have swept its traditional stomping ground over the past three years.

And all on President Macron’s watch.

Can we expect France and French diplomacy to regain its foothold in Francophone Africa? Will the reach of French influence in former colonies ever be the same? 

For Georja Calvin-Smith, it's "no". This page of history has definitively been turned.

Watch the full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded by Hadrien Touraud and Erwan Rome

Georja Calvin-Smith is the producer and presenter of France 24's political magazine "Eye on Africa". 

In this edition of Paris Perspective, we look at energy transition, the future of France’s atomic energy grid and President Emmanuel Macron’s political promise of a nuclear renaissance.

One year ago, as President Macron was readying himself for the campaign trail that would lead to his re-election, he gave an address in the city of Belfort – an historically industrial town in eastern France – extolling the policies of a nuclear renaissance in France and an eventual €60 billion investment towards the building of six new EPR reactors.  

Interestingly, this great leap forward towards energy sustainability and self-reliance came before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which sparked a Europe-wide energy crisis as the flow of Russian gas into the continent was essentially cut off. 

For Yves Marignac, award-winning nuclear safety expert with the négaWatt Association, Macron's speech was less a campaign rally, more a political statement of intent by an incumbent president. 

"He turned his back on his promises from the previous campaign when he said he would stick to the objective of reducing French dependency on nuclear power," says Marignac, whose group advocates for energy sufficiency, efficiency and the use of renewable sources.

"The energy crisis is more acute in France because of the failure of the nuclear sector ... The conclusion that has been given is that we need more nuclear power and not less, which is a paradox."

'Evidence of failure'

According to Marignac, France's nuclear industry is in such bad shape that French safety authorities aren't convinced it can meet the objectives set by the president in a safe way.

"We are faced with evidence of failure – from an energy point of view – and an industrial point of view. But the decision is that we need more nuclear energy and that is what President Macron said.

"So we are bracing for new reactors, we are bracing for the life extension [of old reactors] that won't come in the short term. Life extension is something that will change the trajectory [of nuclear power] between the 2030s and 2040s and the new reactors won't come in line before 2035 at the very earliest," Marignac insists.

The nuclear specialist also laments the fact that Macron's policy speech is driving France away from short-term priorities like sufficiency and renewables that could be delivered much faster.

"The government changed its mind [on energy efficiency] last year due to the energy crisis – but just two years ago, Macron was comparing energy efficiency to  Amish societies and discarded any policy of that kind," Marignac explains. 

Government policy versus public debate

Earlier this month Macron caused a stir with French opposition parties after convening his advisory council on nuclear policy while a public debate on the future of France’s energy production is ongoing, undercutting civic discussion on energy transition and how to achieve carbon neutrality.

So for the French government, is an open forum on the transition away from conventional energy production purely cosmetic?

"It is and unfortunately that's not new," says Marignac. "I often say that the French nuclear sector is too weak to dare to commit to a real democratic debate, but too strong to have to do it. We’ve seen that many times for decades and we see it again."

He believes that everything is stacked against the success of Macron's "nuclear renaissance plan", because France's nuclear industry is crippled.

Even so, warnings that France would face power outages and electricity rationing over the winter never came to pass. Indeed Macron scoffed at the idea of power cuts, rejecting such fears as "absurd". 

Yet despite the rickety state of France's nuclear power stations and previous scepticism towards energy sufficiency, it would appear that the message of being more frugal with power is getting through to the general population.

Politicians dragging their heels?

So are the French getting the bigger picture, although France itself has failed to reach its own targets on the development of renewable energy within the Cop21 Paris Climate Accord? 

According to Marignac, warmer weather has obviously played a part.

"There was a ten percent reduction in gas and electricity consumption, but you have to take into account the [milder] climate," he points out.

But there is a catch: "Part of it came from 'unchosen sufficiency', like people not being able to pay for the energy anymore."

More encouragingly, he says, "there was also a clear sign of positive sufficiency with people choosing to turn the heating down a bit, to drive less when it comes to fuel and to make small changes.

"I think this shows that when people understand that we are faced with this kind of structural crisis – be it climate urgency, energy security or sovereignty issues – they understand the interests and the benefits from sufficiency.

"I think this short-term experience really showed that people are much more open to make changes in consumption patterns than policymakers tend to think.

"When talking to people in the government or administration, I often have the feeling that they are lagging behind. The population's understanding of the kind of systemic change that we need to implement will provide a lot of benefits," Marignac concludes. 

So despite the promise of a renaissance for France's nuclear energy sector, it is the general public who are adapting faster to energy sustainability in a post-atomic world. 

Watch the full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora.

Yves Marignac, award-winning nuclear safety expert and head of the Nuclear and Fossil Energies Unit of the négaWatt Association.

In this edition of Paris Perspective, we delve into the roller-coaster world of cryptocurrencies, the Wild West of the Web3 revolution, and ask what we can expect in the brave new world of unregulated trading in virtual money.

Last year was a tough one for cryptocurrencies.

Looking at how decentralised financial markets performed over the last 12 months was like watching the electrocardiogram of a patient being treated for amphetamine addiction.

The past year witnessed the collapse of seven cryptocurrency platforms, the most notorious leading to the bankruptcy of FTX and the arrest of its 30-year-old founder and CEO, Sam Bankman-Fried.

And there's the problem of getting your head around how cryptocurrencies work.

Without going into the nuts and bolts of the techniques that allow people to buy, sell or trade virtual cash online – the bottom line is that, unlike traditional currencies that are underwritten by national governments, cryptos circulate without a monetary authority or central bank.

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For Raphaël Bloch, co-founder and editor-in-chief of “The Big Whale,” a Paris-based publication dedicated to decrypting cryptos, these are exciting times, especially for the post-Millennial generation who never knew a world without the internet. 

Bloch and magazine co-founder Grégory Raymond believe people need to be enabled to understand what's happening in the digital world.

"Web3 is a big subject. We're talking about Bitcoin, non-fungible tokens (NFTs) and blockchains."

OK. Clear as crystal so far?

Again, without going into the nitty-gritty of how these new financial tools actually function – as there are plenty of websites out there that can explain it better than I – looking into the world of crypto is reminiscent of Las Vegas: casinos with distinct, non-transferable chips, serenading gamblers into competing establishments in a desert city that sprung out of nowhere, exploiting unregulated gambling laws.

Surely that is a fair comparison?  

"For six or seven years," says Bloch, "that was the case, going back to 2016 or 2017.

"But now, it's not a casino or Las Vegas." Cryptocurrencies do create a new space with no rules, but countries and governments are working on legislation.

"You also have legitimate investors and start-up companies in Europe – you have a lot of unicorns. It's not a casino any more."

2022: Annus horribilus for cryptocurrency

Yet 2022 underlined that investing in cryptos does not guarantee success for everyone.

When FTX hit a brick wall with liquidity issues in November 2022 and subsequently collapsed, there were consequences for all the 22,000 cryptos in circulation. Values plummeted. 

But that was because "FTX was a scam," Bloch explains. "It had an impact on the market, but that was only because of one man's fraud.

"Obviously, it had an impact on other companies, but people know that it was just a matter of fraud. They didn't leave the market, they just sold part of their investments.

"And in the next two or three years, we're going to see a bull market again," Bloch asserts.

Who can you trust? 

So is there a personality profile of people who "roll the dice" at the crypto table? 

"We have almost 20,000 subscribers," says the co-founder of The Big Whale.

"It's mostly the young generation – under 35. But it's also white collar people who want to invest their money in the crypto ecosystem and in Web3 technology."

It's mostly men, but Bloch says more women are getting involved. 

However, with the collapse on seven cryptos in 2022 and the industry still reeling from the ripple effect on the unregulated market environment, any newcomer would be forgiven for asking a very simple question: Who can you trust? 

"It's really good question. We know that in the crypto space, it's really hard to know who you can rely on. There are so many companies that are telling people on Twitter and social networks that they shouldn't miss 'the next big thing' and that's why we launched The Big Whale – not to be a sheriff in the Far-West, but to give neutral and accurate info on projects, exchanges and companies," Bloch explains. 

Nothing to do with 'Moby Dick'

So what is the relevance of naming his company "The Big Whale"? Anything to do with Captain Ahab and an elusive, white cetacean as written by Herman Melville? 

"No," Bloch laughs.

"We decided to choose 'The Big Whale' for several reasons. The first is that we usually hear that Web3 is like a big ocean of information and people want to understand what's going on in this big ocean ... and because we want to play a big part in that ocean.

"The second is that a whale – in the crypto market – is like a big financial investor. So it's like a gimmick for crypto fans.

"The third one: a whale is a big, carbon-neutral organism – equal to a forest, something like 1,000 trees – so it outlines that Web3 needs to be more ecological," Bloch concludes. 

It is quite easy to forget how far we have come since Web 1.0 in the 1990s and even the concept of personally uploading and streaming filmed material in a matter of seconds, only came to the fore in the last decade. So if Web3, blockchains and anything "non-fungible" seem like alien concepts today, it would appear that it's only a matter of time before they become a mainstream part of our daily lives.

Watch the full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora.

Raphaël Bloch is co-founder and editor-in-chief of “The Big Whale” – a Paris-based publication dedicated to cryptocurrency, blockchains and Web3 technology.

This edition of Paris Perspective looks at the legacy of the Kyoto Protocol on the 25th anniversary of what was, in effect, the first legally binding international agreement on reducing greenhouse gases.

On 11 December 1997, the first international agreement of its kind – the Kyoto Protocol – was signed.

It aimed to cut the amout of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere and, in doing so, reduce the number of extreme weather events that are growing in frequency every year.

The agreement mandated 37 industrialised countries and the European Community, made up of 15 nations at the time of the Kyoto negotiations, to cut their greenhouse gas emissions.

It also exempted more than 100 developing countries, including China and India, from the mandatory reductions.

Twenty-five years on, how effective has the protocol been? Have successive Cop summits succeeded? Have the promises by rich nations to reduce emissions had any impact on global warming? Will their actions prevent temperatures rising by 1.5°C by the end of the century?

At the Cop27 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh in November 2022, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called for an end to the "toxic cover-up" by companies who claim to be “carbon net zero”.

In this respect he cited companies that have invested in fossil fuel exploration and exploitation, companies whose actions have resulted in deforestation, and/or those companies that have offset emissions instead of reducing them in a practice known as ‘greenwashing’.

He descirbed this expansion of fossil fuel exploitation as "reprehensible" and noted that it could  "push our world over the climate cliff".

From 'catastrophe' to 'hope'

Although the Kyoto Protocol only entered into effect in 2005, it laid the foundations for the historic 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change at Cop21.

For now, at least, there has been a lot of goodwill, says Stephan Savarese, CEO of TechnoCarbon, a company that is developing low-carbon building materials to replace steel and concrete.

In 2021, after the Cop26 summit in Glasgow, for example, a UN panel got to work on drawing a "red line" around greenwashing and net zero targets from companies, cities and regions.

Everybody wants to be part of the transition process that is designed to keep warming below 1.5°C by the end of this century by adopting net-zero strategies, Savarese told RFI English.

Any rise beyound that  and the planet enters a situation "where we don't know what will happen, but [believe it will] probably [result in] catastrophic climate change," he said.

One key aspect in uniting the world in tackling climate change is communication, says Savarese.

"If we want to move away from that fear of catastrophic climate change, we need to give people hope. We need to start defining the solutions," he says

If people think it's too late to avoid catastrophe, that sends out a "really bad message", he adds.

"We have a choice. And that choice is not to choose extinction." 

 Climate transition

The first target set by the Kyoto Protocol was to reduce emmissions, but data as to whether it has been a success or not depends on when the data is being presented.

"The answer is probably yes. And probably no.We will have a few years where the emissions will go up and go down. We have the goodwill, but we haven't got our act together. The big focus over the next few years, is how do we get our act together?" Savarese explains. 

Loss and Damage Agreement

However, one of the most positive and progressive deals to come out of the Cop27 meeting in Egypt is the Loss and Damage agreement

It is designed to compensate vulnerable countries whose future is directly affected by climate change, such as the Seychelles and island nations in the South Pacific. 

"[The fund] should be €100 billion per year ... [but] that's just a fraction of the global effort to achieve climate transition, which is estimated to be over €1,200 billion per year ... [and] we haven't even done that. So of course, the acts are far behind the declaration. But at least we have the declaration," says Savarese. 

Even with landmark agreements such as Kyoto in 1997 and the more recent Paris agreement which went into force in November 2016 , it has also become clear that small actions by companies and groups - such as Savarese's TechnoCarbon - could have a greater impact on mitigating climate change sector by sector.

Small acts for climate change

It raises the the question as to whether every gesture that aims to reduce our carbon footprint – from the household, to the office, to the factory floor – has an impact, in the global scheme of things?

"Yes," Savarese says. "We are millions of people working on this now.  And this is the first achievement,[notably] mobilising millions of people [to act in response to] climate transition.

"Everyone at their level has their way of acting on that," Savarese concludes. 

Watch the full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora and Nicolas Doreau

Stephan Savarese is the CEO of TechnoCarbon, a Paris-based company that is developing low-carbon building materials to replace steel and concrete.

This edition of Paris Perspective looks at the outcome of the US midterm elections, asking why a Republican "red wave" failed to emerge, and examining the potential of American socialism ahead of the 2024 presidential face-off.

In the United States, midterm elections are seen as a referendum on how the incumbent's administration is doing, and it is rare that a sitting president comes out unscathed.

By the end of polling on 8 November, it became apparent that a Republican "red wave" – one that would secure right-wing control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives – had failed to materialise. 

As it stands, the Democrats control the Senate while the Republicans have the House of Representatives – but only by the slimmest of margins in either case. 

The balance of power

So, what does this knife-edge scenario mean for the next two years of President Joe Biden's mandate?

For Max Dunitz, an activist with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), Republican control over the House of Representatives could spell havoc.

The position of Speaker will be hotly contested in the wake of Nancy Pelosi's departure after two decades at the heart of lower house debate, says Max Dunitz. "And we could expect plenty of investigations into the Biden administration," he tells RFI.

"There will be deadlock," he says, especially if "the Judiciary Committee is split evenly between the two parties." That will slow down the process of confirming judges and other presidential appointees.

Dunitz recognises that the Democratic majority in the Senate will be of some help in ensuring that administration nominees do get appointed.

The rise of DeSantis

While it wasn't a resounding endorsement of Biden's government, the vote revealed cracks in former president Donald Trump's appeal to the conservative electorate, as many of the inexperienced wannabes endorsed by Trump failed in their bid to join the big league on Capitol Hill.

Although the results of the US midterms have dealt a significant blow to Trump's re-election bid in 2024, the setback did not stop the billionaire from declaring his intentions to run earlier this week. 

The clear winner in the Republican camp was Ron DeSantis, who was re-elected as Governor of Florida with a 20-point margin, a turbo boost for the ultra-conservative politician's intention to run for the Republican party's nomination for president. 

Now there is a real challenger to Trump's vice-like grip on the GOP, we can expect a broader, more boisterous field in the US primaries. 

"There's going to be a tough fight for the nomination," says Dunitz, but he adds that "there's not a big distinction between DeSantis and Trump in terms of policy."

Of course, there are many who believe DeSantis to be more dangerous than Trump.

"He does pick fights [with Democrats] ... he fired a prosecutor in the Tampa Bay area who wouldn't prosecute doctors who provide abortion care," Dunitz notes.

"This would suggest that he would be very focused on using his power to dismantle a lot of the competent administrative [structures] and use it for partisan aims."

Biden's midterm report

Although the current administration is perceived as "liberal" in comparison to the rough-shod populism of the previous president's policies, how do people on the American left think Biden has done since taking office in January 2021?

Dunitz, whose group has backed Vermont senator Bernie Sanders for president in the past, says that Biden's policy of full employment has been a win for the administration.

"People have been very sour about the economy in the news media. But when you actually look at the polls, a lot of people are pretty optimistic about their own personal financial situation," Dunitz believes.

"They see the high prices affecting everyone and they say, 'okay, the economy's bad, but hey, I was part of the great resignation, I got a better job, I was able to find work that better suited my skills'."

The "great resignation" is the term used in the US to describe the record number of people who left their traditional jobs in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, essentially reshuffling the American workforce.

"People are pretty optimistic about their own situation," Dunitz adds.

"They're able to get better jobs, they have more power to bargain with employers ... we don't have the concentrated misery that we had after the last recession [2007–2009] where there was 10 percent unemployment by the midterms".

'Distracting moral panics'

As Democrats continue to win key races and the US electorate appears to be tiring of Trumpian politics, could this be to the advantage of American socialism? 

"People are pretty tired of distracting moral panics," says Dunitz.

"It's very clear that these people are not focused on the cost of rent or the cost of everyday groceries.They don't have serious plans to help people," adds Dunitz, who believes that voters are looking for someone who can offer clear proposals. 

United we stand, divided we fall

As an activist with the "France for Bernie" movement and the DSA's Paris chapter, Dunitz was a keen observer of this year's French elections and the gains made by the far-left, especially the emergence of a new left-wing coalition, NUPES, after the decimation of France's traditional Socialist Party in 2017.

What have been the lessonss for American socialists from 2022 French polls?

"I think the main takeaway is that the left does better when united," Dunitz says, underlining the differences between electoral systems in Europe and the US.

"In many countries, you make the coalitions after the election ... in the US, we make [them] before the election," Dunitz explains.

Four takeaways from the US midterm elections

"The midterms in states where the Democratic Party was very united, [like] in Michigan – where the number two person in the statehouse will be a DSA member – the Democratic Party did very well.

"In New York ... where Democrats were fighting each other ... the party did very poorly, so I think the one takeaway is that the left should try to stay united," Dunitz concludes.

So will we "Feel the Bern" in 2024? Will Bernie Sanders stand again for the White House? 

"I have no idea," he admits.

Watch the full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey

Recorded and edited by Yann Bourdelas

Max Dunitz is an activist with the "France for Bernie" movement and the Democratic Socialists of America's Paris chapter.

In this edition we’re going to dive into the political Twilight Zone that is British politics to examine how the post-Brexit roller-coaster ride has evolved and expanded into a full-blown theme park as the UK installs its fifth prime minister in six years.

Many political observers have compared the implosion of the recent slew of Conservative UK governments to the antics of a tin-pot banana republic.

And it has been the half-baked economic policies of short-lived Treasury minister Kwasi Kwarteng – on the orders of "executive chef" Liz Truss – that led to them both being kicked out of the kitchen. 

Back in 2016, few could have predicted what a recipe for disaster Brexit would become for the British economy, let alone the country's political stability. 

Six years on one might be forgiven for feeling a sense of schadenfreude creeping into the oppositions' political narrative.

The populist maelstrom of jingoism is apparently clearing to unveil the stark reality of near-economic collapse.

Since prime ministers Cameron, May, Johnson and Truss have been taken off the menu, the rock of stability that was once the UK has been eroded off the sands and crashed on the shore.

Ok. Enough with the metaphors.

Return to stability

Following Liz Truss' resignation last Thursday, the Conservative Party's 1922 Committee gave their MPs a tight window to choose a new PM by this Friday.

By Monday, Boris Johnson had ruled out a comeback (for now), although he had garnered the support of at least 102 MPs that would have given him the threshold to join the hustings.

By midday, former chancellor Rishi Sunak and leader of the House of Commons Penny Mordaunt were the only contenders in the race.

By lunchtime, Mordaunt had pulled out, clearing the way for Sunak to be named as Conservative Party leader and therefore the UK's next prime minister. 

As political machinations continued at breakneck speed in London, France's President Emmanuel Macron wished the UK "a rapid return to stability" as yet another leader bit the dust. 

On the question of stability, Jeremy Stubbs, who heads the Association of British Conservatives in Paris told RFI that he still remains hopeful. 

"It's true that there was a sudden drama surrounding Liz Truss, the sacking of a chancellor and other acts ... which showed her whole leadership and legitimacy were in doubt," he explains.

"What we can hope for or at least expect is a return to something like normality. That is to say a leader who knows what they're doing; who is not going to try any alternative medical cures on the economy."

Stubbs reckons Sunak's tenure at Number 10 will be neither exciting nor inspiring, "it's just going to be economic management of a traditional kind ... with probably a lot of bitter pills to swallow," he says.

What Britons are bracing for

After the calamitous six-week reign of Liz Truss and former chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng’s ill-conceived budget – which almost collapsed the British economy – what are Britons bracing for in the coming weeks?

"It's going to be very, very hard," Stubbs concedes, "because the Conservative reign in government began back in 2010 with austerity. Things seemed to be getting a little bit better, then the pandemic came." 

Stubbs believes that "all the signs" are there that the UK is going to be ushering in a new era of austerity.

"We're back where we started."

Even Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer admits that the UK can't avoid austerity measures. 

"He blames it all on the conservatives, of course," Stubbs chides, "but he admits that even if Labour were in power, they would not be in any position to do anything terribly different for the moment."

The head of British Conservatives in Paris harkens back to the dark days of 1973, when Conservative Prime Minister Ted Heath admitted "it's going to be a long, hard winter such as we have never known."

Stubbs believes this winter, "those words are going to come to haunt us."

Frustration and confusion

Looking at the implosion of successive Conservative governments from afar may be entertaining for some, but how have traditional Tories – such as Stubbs and his association in Paris – viewed the shenanigans at Westminster from abroad?

"I think the feeling is one of frustration and embarrassment," Stubbs admits, "but ultimatly we hope that somehow the ship will be brought back on to an even keel."

In that sense, Stubbs says he doesn't feel the mood is very different abroad than in Britain.

However, one thing is clear: Sunak's appointment as prime minister isn't an election, but a coronation.

"That might generate a greater amount of frustration – particularly in Britain – less so abroad," he recognises.

Stubbs concludes, "I think members find themselves in a very, very difficult situation – psychologically. They're hoping that things can be brought back to some sort of normality.

"People are frustrated ... who is responsible to who here? It's a time of great confusion."

Watch full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Cécile Pompeani, Nicholas Doreau and Erwan Rome.

Jeremy Stubbs is the head of the Association of British Conservatives in Paris and deputy editor of Le Causeur magazine.

This edition of Paris Perspective looks at what France needs to do to achieve its carbon-neutral goals by 2050. Is it possible to decarbonise the country's supply chains from A to Z, while facing ever more challenging economic and logistic hurdles?  

Remember the global rush to buy toilet paper?

At the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, the fragility of the world's supply chains was laid bare as supermarket shelves emptied and governments struggled to allay consumer fears that the system was broken.

Just over two years later, the world is facing the worst energy and inflation crisis in a generation, with a war in Europe and the threat of nuclear conflict.

The pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine have helped underline the importance of decarbonising the way goods are transported.

The Shift Project

Reuben Fisher is Freight Project Manager with The Shift Project think-tank, and co-authour of a recent report entitled “Securing freight in a finite world.” 

Since 1960, freight traffic in France has tripled. Road freight accounts for 90 percent of the market and 95 percent of that is powered by fossil fuels.

When Fisher set out in 2020 to define the challenges ahead, the concept of transporting more goods with a limited amount of energy was not top of the agenda. But that has changed.

"When we were working on this aspect of the report in 2020, limited energy wasn't the most immediate factor.

"Now, it's become a crucial concern," Fisher explains, "fossil fuel for our vehicles is subsidised at a rate of almost 25 percent of the cost."

2022 droughts and waterways

2022 has been indelibly marked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent choking of the world's largest supply of grain. That sparked a global food crisis. Russian gas supplies to Europe have been cut off, sanctions against Moscow are having a negative impact on Western economies and inflation has hit a record high. 

2022 has also been one of the hottest on record. In France, drought provoked by a succession of extreme heatwaves devastated crops and massively impacted the country's waterways.

Barges were able to load only a fraction of normal tonnage because water levels in canals and navigable rivers were so low. Can inland water transportation be future-proofed as the summers get hotter, and the water levels lower?

As a short-term solution, Fisher believes "an operational answer is the maintenance of the waterways, ensuring that they don't fill up with mud so we can keep the water level as deep as necessary for the boats to get through." 

This year, when the barges couldn't take the goods on board, the road hauliers picked up the load, thus increasing the amount of freight on motorways, feeding into the cycle of congestion, pollution and environmental degradation. 

'The last kilometre'

The Shift Project's report on securing freight in a finite world also proposes that urban deliveries should be fully electric within 5 years. Anyone living in an urban environment in France will have already noticed a dramatic increase in e-bike and e-cargo deliveries since Covid. The carbon neutralising of the so-called "last kilometre" – delivery to the end point – would seem to be well underway. 

"It's definitely gathering pace. But it's not the case everywhere," Fisher underlines. "Paris is probably ahead of the crowd.

"I'm not sure we're seeing the same things in all of the big cities throughout France. Paris has the objective of having zero diesel vehicles by 2024. So we're looking at just over a 12-month period. The transition that we're seeing in Paris, is probably an example for other cities to follow."

He says that although The Shift Project emphasises that all delivery vehicles should be electrified, "wherever possible, we should replace those vehicles by cargo banks."

These are intermediate logistics centres, from which bulk-shipped goods can be re-distributed by cycle courrier or collected by pedestrians.

However, their generalisation would require huge operational changes within the delivery chain, including infrastructure for people servicing the banks to be able to shower after work. 

Will that be done in the next five years? "Yes, in some places, but probably not in all of the big cities in France." 

The buck stops here

According to The Shift Project, if everything in their toolbox is utilised between now and 2050, energy consumption will be reduced by 80 percent and freight emissions by 96 percent. 

That is a mind-boggling reversal of the current trend.

However, when it comes to getting the private sector and governments to pick up those tools, one question hangs like a sword of Damocles over carbon transition initiatives – How much will it cost?

"My answer is going to seem extremely unprofessional, but I don't know," Fisher laughs. "The reason I don't know is that within the report, we worked with the physical constraints – which are basically energy and limited supply."

Although the cost of decarbonisation will be an issue, he says, it will be secondary.

"If the aim is to decarbonise and to ensure that we can maintain an enjoyable society with a limited amount of energy, then the question of how much it costs is probably not the main question."

It will need to be worked out and it will need to be budgeted.

To conclude, Fisher brings to the fore another, often overlooked, aspect of what decarbonising our supply chain will entail. 

"What will the impact of these transformations be on employment? Both in terms of who we need to train now in order to make sure that these changes can happen? Because some jobs are going to disappear."

Might it be the full electrification of France's motorways and vehicles that will put the biggest dent in the pockets of the public and private sectors who join the drive to be carbon-neutral by 2050? 

"It might be," says Fisher but it will most likely be the future human resources in a carbon-free world. 

"We didn't work on the quantification of the cost of training, for example. So, if we are saying that we're going to train the several million people who will work in the logistics centres, that could probably be a little bit pricey, too."

Watch full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Erwan Rome and Vincent Pora.

Reuben Fisher is the Freight Project Manager with The Shift Project think-tank and co-author of the report “Securing freight in a finite world”. He is based in Aix-en-Provence.

In this edition of Paris Perspective, RFI's David Coffey meets former UK foreign secretary and CEO of the International Rescue Committee, David Miliband, to discuss the crises the world is facing in 2022 and what his NGO is doing to help millions of refugees and internally displaced.

Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine has sent grain prices sky-rocketing and further highlighted the fragility of the supply chain, with food insecurity in developing countries of particular concern.

A succession of failed rains and subsequent drought has plunged East Africa into near-famine conditions, while Afghanistan's economy has collapsed since the Taliban took over in August 2021, with almost the entire population now living below the poverty line. 

During a recent visit to Paris to meet French President Emmanuel Macron, David Miliband, head of the International Rescue Committee, emphasised that Afghanistan is the worst of the crises that feature on the NGO's "Emergency Watchlist".

Women's rights under the draconian rule of the Taliban are of particular concern. Miliband's organisation has some 7,000 local staff working in the country in the wake of the withdrawal of the US-led military coalition last year. 

Afghanistan's economic collapse

Miliband chooses his words carefully when he explains, "it's easier in some ways to do humanitarian work in Afghanistan today, than it was two or three years ago.

"Why? Well, there isn't a war going on. So it's actually safer in one way. Now, it's less safe if you are a vocal opponent of the regime. And it's less safe or less free, if you're a woman."

Miliband says that around 45 percent of the IRC staff working in the country are women, delivering treatment to the malnourished, education – including for girls – as well as livelihood support.

"What we're facing is an economic meltdown. The war economy is over, but a new economy has not been built. They've been given a crash course in administration, in establishing a new, much poorer equilibrium.

"And that's how you end up with this extraordinary statistic ...The United Nations says that 97 percent of Afghans are living below the poverty line." 

He underlines, however, that the statistic is a measurement of the formal economy, accepting that there is a large informal economy in the country. 

As CEO of the International Rescue Committee, Miliband laments the fact that Afghans are being punished twice over since assets were frozen by the US following the fall of Kabul. 

As the economy is in freefall, Miliband underlines, "they didn't choose their government, but they're being punished for their government in a way that doesn't actually help them."

Founded in the fight against fascism

So what is the International Rescue Committee and what work does it do? What drew Miliband to join the organisation, touted as "the most under-recognised yet influential non-governmental aid group in the world," when he left UK politics behind? 

The International Rescue Committee, headquartered in New York has its origins in Europe, and was founded by Albert Einstein in the 1930s.

"He was consumed by a sense of guilt," Miliband explains "and fear about what was happening in Europe, the rise of the Nazis, the threats to Jews, to intellectuals, to dissidents, and he effectively set up the IRC in order to rescue people from Europe.

"Our first employee was a man called Varian Fry, he set up a safe house in Marseille, he issued 2000 fake passports and people like Marc Chagall lived because they were helped to escape from Nazi-occupied France by the IRC or its founders," explains Miliband.

According to the former foreign secretary, that spirit of humanity, entrepreneurialism and of risk taking remains part of the lifeblood of the organisation: "We help people whose lives are shattered by conflict, persecution and disaster to survive, recover and gain control of their lives.

"Why did that attract me? Very briefly, one – I like hard problems and these are tough cases. Two – not many people knew about the IRC, and it had a responsibility in 2013 when I joined, to step up as an organisation that was focused on these problems. Thirdly – my parents were refugees. So there's a sense of the closing of a circle really, to work in this area," he confides.

Food insecurity is nothing new

In 2022, the repercussions of Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine have shaken the global economy to its foundations, with Moscow's strangulation of Ukraine's grain exports and the shutting down of Russian energy supplies to Europe having knock-on effects across the planet. 

For Miliband, however, the Ukraine war didn't create a food crisis, it has just exacerbated a precarious situation that already existed. 

He says that there were135 million people at acute levels of food insecurity – two steps below famine level – three years ago.

"Now it's 345 million," Miliband explains, "in part, driven by Covid and then by the Ukraine crisis and the effect on grain prices. So it's important to understand what the problem is to develop a solution.

"We're saying we've got to do two things. One – we got to treat the symptoms. The US delivered $1.1 billion of commitment in July, to mitigate the worst effects of the crisis for the 35 million people at the door of famine in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia. We've got to treat child malnutrition much better – 80 percent of acutely malnourished kids don't get any help at all at the moment.

"We can't as an international agency affect the global food system. But we can argue for and invest in, for example, climate resilient agriculture, because Africa should be feeding more of its own people.

"But that takes investment. That takes account of the dangers of the climate crisis, which is here. Now I often hear people say, 'Oh, well, better to feed people now ... we'll deal with the climate crisis in 40 years time'. The climate crisis is here now," he concludes.

David Miliband is the UK former foreign secretary and CEO of the International Rescue Committee based in New York.

This edition of Paris Perspective looks at Turkey’s role within NATO and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s balancing act between Moscow, Kyiv and the Western military alliance.

The role of Turkey's authoritarian president Erdogan as a potential mediator in the Ukraine crisis has been under the spotlight ever since Russia first invaded its neighbour.

As a key Black Sea power that controls the shipping lanes into the Mediterranean – with ambitions to assert its influence in the Middle East and Africa – Turkey has shown itself to be adept at running with the hares while hunting with the hounds when it comes to international diplomacy.

Although Turkey and Russia have been fighting on different sides of proxy wars in Syria and Libya, a mutually tolerant cohabitation between the two powers can be put down to the cosy relationship that both Erdogan and Vladimir Putin have displayed in recent years – notably in the wake of a failed 2016 coup attempt to overthrow the Turkish leader. 

As a longtime member of NATO that has kept diplomatic channels open with Ukraine and Russia throughout the conflict, Erdogan's presence at a recent summit of the military alliance in Madrid underlined the importance of his position, despite the fact Turkey is viewed with distrust by the United States. 

In June Turkey threatened to block Finland and Sweden's application for NATO membership over their recognition of the PKK Kurdistan Workers Party as a legitimate, nationalist movement and not a terrorist organisation.

The move exasperated Western officials, but it did not come as a surprise. 

Carpe Diem

Turkey's uncomfortable role as the bête noir within NATO has many observers squirming in their seats.

But for the Erdogan administration, Turkey is exactly where it wants to be, says Dorothée Schmid, a specialist on Turkey with the Paris-based think-tank IFRI. 

"I feel [Turkey's] very comfortable nowadays. They're really seizing the opportunity of the Ukrainian crisis to make the world understand that their status as a global power has changed," she explains.

Schmid maintains that Turkey is going through a sort of rehabilitation process within NATO after being side-lined as "the difficult ally" that is underscored by Ankara's relations with Moscow.

When it comes to the relationship between Erdogan and Putin, Schmid highlights the reasons behind their proximity: "They know each other very well ... they've been in strategic business together ... but since the 2016 coup attempt ... it's been said that Putin himself was the one who warned Erdogan that there was a coup going on.  [Putin] basically saved his life."

Yet, trying to get a handle on Erdogan's intentions is a difficult task for the uninitiated. He has consolidated presidential power and shifted the secular foundations of the country towards a more populist, islamist agenda. 

One could be forgiven for thinking that the Turkish strongman is looking to rebuild the Ottoman Empire, but Turkey's position as a Black Sea power means that Ankara's hand has been forced when it comes to walking the diplomatic tightrope in the region. 

"[Turkey] has a very strong relationship with Russia. Gas imports from Russia go through the Black Sea. And Turkey is a partner with Zelensky in Ukraine. They have a strategic partnership ... providing them with drones. They were working on building an industrial partnership in the weapons industry.

"At the same time, they work with the Russians. So, they had no choice than to remain neutral in this crisis. They were engaged with both sides," says Schmid.

She believes that Erdogan understood very quickly that the Turks want to remain neutral in this war.

"What I heard from the very beginning of the Russian offensive in Ukraine, coming from Turkey, was that the Turks should remain neutral like they did during the Second World War, which is a very telling, very interesting comparison because they [only] joined the Allies' camp at the very last minute in February 1945, when they were sure that the Nazi side was totally defeated."

Shipping lanes and the Montreux Convention

Turkey is hoping this crisis will be short-lived, because the longer it goes on, the bigger the problems for Ankara as it controls the Bosporus Strait.

As a NATO member, Turkey is compelled to police a blockade on Russian shipping, but was hesitant at first.  

"At the beginning of the crisis, there was a call from Zelensky for them to close the Bosporus to Russian ships," Schmid explains. 

The Turks reportedly waited for a few days, evaluated the situation and decided that Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine was indeed a war.

Under the Montreux Convention, where Turkey is allowed to close the Bosporus Strait to all warships in times of war and to permit merchant ships free passage, they had to block ships.

"The Turks had this ambivalence to play with and then decided that they would block Russian ships. Ankara knew it would come under strong pressure from the Allies to revise the Montreux Convention," says Schmid. 

According to the IFRI academic, the Montreux Convention only protects Turkey's sovereignty: "Turkey can interpret the Montreux Convention according to their own interests. So far they've decided – after letting the necessary military capacities from the Russians to enter the Black Sea – to stop it because they wanted to keep a balance.

"But they've been accused of letting commercial ships pass through smuggling arms, to the theatre of operations. So they are under [intense] surveillance."

Turkey's showcase at NATO summit

So with Turkey's pivotal position within NATO and the warring parties on the Black Sea, how has Erdogan played his cards with suspicious allies at the June summit in Madrid? 

"We don't know exactly what Turkey's checklist was at the summit, but we see it as it was – a formidable opportunity for Turkey to show off and explain to the world that it was an opposition force within NATO.

"This crisis is all about the reintegration of Turkey within the NATO community," she says.

According to Schmid, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined their priorities for the summit to her directly.

"Number one, Russia. Because Russia is dangerous, which is very interesting.

"Number two, the PKK. The West has to understand that they're terrorists. It's not only Turkey's problem, it's about terrorism. So this wide label makes it easier for the other partners to endorse Turkey's position. But they've been mainstreaming this PKK issue within NATO for the last 10 years.

"The third point was China. Why China? Because they know it's on the US agenda," Schmid concludes, as Ankara knows it needs to play that card when dealing with Washington.

The bottom line is that Turkey is back, centre stage, defending its own interests.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited Vincent Pora.

Dorothée Schmid is an expert on Mediterranean and Turkey issues with the French Institute of International Relations, IFRI. 

Paris Perspective looks at the state of peace in the world in 2022 on the occasion of the publication of the 16th Global Peace Index. Steve Killelea is the founder and executive chairman of the Institute for Economics and Peace, which publishes the Index.

The 16^th edition of the Global Peace Index was published this week. Data from the Index shows that, on a world-wide scale, military spending has fallen. 

However, expenditure on the military in China, US and Iran has increased.

Yet despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, the index shows that Europe is still the most peaceful region in the world.

Ironically, the situation regarding violent protests worldwide has deteriorated. According to the index, the world is actually 0.3 percent less peaceful even though military expenditure has gone down.

When broken down economically, the impact of violence on the global economy in 2021 was $16.5 trillion, or $2117 per person on the planet.

Paris Perspective spoke to the Australian philanthropist and two-time Nobel Prize nominee who founded the Institute for Economics and Peace and the Global Peace Index, Steve Killelea

With war in Ukraine, the European continent is no longer a peaceful place and the once "braindead' North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been rejuvenated by Putin's invasion.

The resurrection of NATO

It is reckoned that NATO's expenditure will rise by seven percent in the next couple of years to $38 billion by 2024.

Meanwhile, the fact that Europeans are coming to terms with a war of attrition on their soil in the face of an aggressive Russian behemoth casting a shadow across the continent, which is, in turn, driving an existential shift in NATO's relevance in the 2020s, is generally seen as a good thing. 

But is it a good thing for global security? 

For Killelea, the overall budget will definitely have an effect in North America if NATO's military spending goes up seven percent, "but I don't know how much of an effect that's going to have on other parts of the world."

"If you look at Latin America, in South America, well, it's probably different," he says.

"[But when it comes to Africa] it'll vary from country to country. Countries in the Sahel, which are particularly challenged through terrorism, we'd expect in a number of those countries to see increases [in military spending] as well." 

What about Asia with end of the war in Afghanistan? "In many ways, we'd expect to see some decreases in military expenditure there. But for India, that may be different, because it's got issues with China," he explains.

"It's difficult to actually make a prediction going forward on how this is really going to affect global expenditures on the military. But certainly, we do need a strong military to be able to defend our countries, but every extra dollar we spend - which we don't need on the military - can be more productively invested elsewhere.

"So understanding these balances is very, very difficult." 

The impact of Covid-19

What has been easy to understand in 2022 is how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has triggered fundamental changes in defence postures and policies, supply chains and food security. What needs to be clarified is how long it will take to adapt and move away from dependency on Russian oil, gas and grain exports.

Killelea also reminds us that we can't forget the impact of Covid on the world's trading networks.

"We've got all the issues coming out of Covid," he tells RFI. "The supply chains haven't been fixed. We've then seen China, particularly Shanghai go [back] into lockdown, which has further exacerbated a whole lot of supply chain issues, which again, underpin inflation.

"Then on the back of that we've now got the Ukraine war, which has turbo-charged those inflationary pressures and supply shortages."

Killelea is certain that these factors are not going to disappear within the next two years.

"But the real factor," he says "is inflation, and what that's going to do to global economies -  particularly in terms of turning them into [economies in] recession.

"If we look at global debt - and I don't know the figure today - but if you went back six months ago, it was 246 per cent of global GDP.

"That's all private debt, government debt, and business debt...

"Now with inflation running at eight percent - and it's probably gonna go higher when we just look at the shortages currently - where do the interest rates end up and how well, can the economies cope with that?"

Then there's the political instability all this creates.

"Political instability is the highest it's been since we started the Global Peace Index 16 years ago. And obviously, part of that is fuelled by the Ukraine. But it's also fuelled by North Asia and the tensions with China and a number of its neighbours.

"And violence against citizens. That's at the highest it's ever been. Violent demonstrations [are] at record highs as well," he says, adding that along with the confluence of economic and human rights issue, there are 88 million refugees now: "That's the highest...in the last 16 years as well."

Russia, China influence in Africa

And there are also shifting sands in zones of influence. When it comes to peace on the African continent, Russia's renewed interest in countries such as the Central African Republic and Mali - which were traditionally French and within France's remit - are now turning to Moscow, much to the annoyance of Paris. 

"We can see the Wagner group...pulling its troops out [of Africa] and using them now in Ukraine. We see that in the Central African Republic, they organised a group of mercenaries from there to come over and fight for Russia," he says. 

"That may change as Russia's economy is going to be much more restricted than it has been in the past. So it's going to be a lot harder for it to fund groups like Wagner," Killelea remarks, however he believes China may step in and fill in some of the gaps.

"China in the last year appointed a peace envoy for the Sahel so we need to see how that develops over time. That may be a good thing or it may be bad thing - we don't know yet."

China is starting to step up on the "adviser side of cooperation", but Killilea says he finds it "very hard to imagine that [China] will actually put troops on the ground at this stage in the Sahel. But I could see them putting technical experts in there to help with advice".

Social media and 'real-time intelligence'

It is the development and accessibility of technology and the power of social media that have really underlined the shift in how war is fought in the 2020s.

Witnesses film events in real time and post them directly onto social media platforms. This begs the question: has modern warfare become more accessible and therefore cheaper to execute?

Killilea says the answer is twofold, depending on what level of warfare you are talking about. 

" [On one hand] in a lot of parts of the world for $20, $40, $200 - you've got yourself a really lethal weapon," he says.

"On the other hand, what we're seeing - and we can see it with the Ukraine trying to get at the Russian artillery pieces which are shelling them - they need really sophisticated, long range missiles. They're very expensive and very hard to get and they're relying on the US to supply them with it.

"So at one end, one can say the answer is yes. At the other end, not so much so."

But one thing the Ukraine war is demonstrating is the change in the way intelligence is gathered.

"When you see a tank coming down the street – you ping it on social media, then a bomb goes off somewhere," he says.

"Now you see some artillery - now you've got the ability to put that up on social media.

"That gets shared instantaneously and in real time. It's unfiltered. It's raw.

"So in terms of intelligence and intelligence gathering, that's vastly different to what it would have been even a decade ago."

"Then," Killelea concludes "you'd have some central body collecting it, then filtering it to make sure it's right, then disseminating it... and that was quite often well after the event."

Watch full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Nicolas Doreau and Vincent Pora.

Steve Killelea is an Australian philanthropist and two-time Nobel Prize nominee who founded the Institute for Economics and Peace and the Global Peace Index

On 29 May, 1942, the Nazi occupation of Northern France banned Jews from appearing in public without wearing a yellow star on their left breast. Paris Perspective looks back at this dark period in French history, while taking the temperature of the current situation regarding anti-Semitism in France and the political affiliations that represent the Jewish community.

Eighty years ago, French Jews over the age of six were given just over a week – until 7 June – to present themselves at police prefectures and mayors' offices to buy their yellow stars.

Now the infamous yellow star represents more than anti-Semitic persecution. It has also has become a symbol of anti-establishment resistance.

Nazi obsession with identifying “the hidden enemy” for propaganda purposes – and for stigmatisation and humiliation – was originally the brainchild of Hitler's chief propagandist Joseph Goebbels in 1938.

It was then embraced by the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, who is credited with having orchestrated the Holocaust. It was first put into practice in Poland in 1939 by Reinhard Heydrich, who headed the Nazi Reich's central security office.

From the fall of France to the Nazis in 1940 to the decree of May 1942 – the eighth repressive order to be handed down by Germany – French Jews were already terrified, says Robert Ejnes, executive director of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF). 

He tells Paris Perspective about his mother's experience as a 20-year-old Parisian who was forced to sew the yellow star onto her clothes. 

"She was afraid – when she was riding on the metro, when she was walking in the streets – that somebody would come and check if [the star] was well sewn on," Ejnes says. 

He explains that the decree on was the first step that led to the infamous "Rafle de Vel d’Hiv” in July, when thousands of French Jews were rounded up at a Paris velodrome and transported to extermination camps.

"That's where my grandparents were arrested and deported," he recalls.

For Ejnes, that memory comes with a lot of emotion.

"It was a sign of discrimination put on Jews the same way it had been put with the 'rouelle' in France in the in the 14th century. So it only recalls bad memories," he says.

If you refused to accept the stigma of being singled out for being Jewish, you were arrested. If your star was covered by a coat or another item of clothing, you were arrested. Those people very often did not survive, Enjes says.

"If you read the eighth directive, you see that it had to be sewn very tightly on to jackets, it was not just a sign or a pin that you could move from one coat to the other."

If you had several coats, you had to buy several stars.

"If you wanted to change [coat] every day, you had to buy as many as you needed. You had to buy it," Enjes emphasises.

Collaborators denounce Jewish families

And then there were the denunciations of Jews to German authorities.

"My grandfather was denounced because he had a store on the rue du Faubourg St Antoine, and he had an apartment," Enjes recalls.

At the same time, many people also helped Jews escape – "in the countryside, very often families" – but history is not black and white. There were repercussions for anyone found helping Jews.

"They could be arrested as well; they really took risks with their own life ... they could be deported, they could be killed - not to be seen again," Enjes says.

"It's important to understand this – the psychology, the sociology of the country – at a time of war."

Yet the collaborationist Vichy administration, south of the Nazi-occupied zone, refused to make Jews wear the yellow stars.

"We don't know their motivation," Ejnes says. "We don't know whether they were afraid of the ideology or whether they were afraid that the population would definitely not accept it."

Ejnes reminds us that not all countries accepted Nazi rules. In Denmark, the king said he would wear the yellow star should his subjects be obliged to wear it.

The same in Morocco. "[The king] said all his subjects were not Jews or Muslims or Christians. They're all Moroccans and nobody under his kingship will wear a yellow star to discriminate one against the other."

Anti-Semitism in France in 2022

Fast forward to 2022, and anti-Semitism remains a heated subject in France.

The death of a young Jewish man – Jeremey Cohen, who was killed by a tram while running away from a mob – recently pushed religious crime to the centre of France's presidential debate just days ahead of voting. 

The 2018 killing of Holocaust survivor Mireille Knoll in Paris still resonates within France's Jewish community.

Investigating police must prove an anti-Semitic motive behind any attack, Ejnes says, adding the law works differently in the UK. 

"If something like this happens [in Britian], there is a presumption of anti-Semitism" and lawyers have to prove the motivation was not anti-Semitic, he says.

"In France ... since 2003, 12 people have died ... for the only reason they were Jewish.

"Among them a young man who was killed in Paris, and the four who was were killed in Toulouse [10 years ago]. And the four that were killed in the Hyper Cacher [supermarket]."

Political representation

In the wake of French President Emmanual Macron's presidential victory and in the run up to legislative elections in June, how is the Jewish community represented among the highly polarised political parties in France?

To answer that question, the executive director of CRIF needs to explain the role of his organisation.

"CRIF is the umbrella organisation of Jewish institutions in France; we are not a political organisation," he says.

"Our job is to represent the Jews within all the constituents of the French society – including the political constituents, the presidency, the government, the members of parliament – but also with other religions, with the intellectuals so that we carry the voice of the Jewish community.

"We do not pretend to rule or to give indications as to political votes as to how the French Jewish population should vote. The only thing we say regularly to Jews that that people should not vote for the extremes.

"The reason we say that is our long experience. We know that whenever the extremes come to power, it's not good for the Jews, and it's not good for the country."

Shared values

Almost 20 years ago, former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon lambasted France as being the most anti-Semitic country in Europe. He implemented a fast-track "return and settle" option for French Jews to move to Israel.

However, the response from the Jewish community to Sharon was: “We are French first, Jewish second." Does that still ring true in 2022?

"Definitely," Ejnes says. "The Jews of France were accused in 1967 and 1968 of having a double allegiance to France and Israel. We are tied to Israel for historical reasons.

"For 2,000 years Jews have been chased from Jerusalem ... we definitely have ties to the State of Israel. But we are French. [It's like] somebody who loves his father and his mother – we can love both.

"French Jews are French. We are the French Jewish community with a definite French culture, and share the same values of liberty, equality, fraternity, and we fight for it.

"Nothing will change that." 

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Nicolas Doreau.

Robert Ejnes is the executive director of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF), based in Paris.

Paris Perspective looks at what Iran's history of Western sanctions can tell us about similar meaures against Moscow, and whether embargos on Russian oil and gas can ever succeed in ending President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine.

The European Union recently announced a sixth sanctions package against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in February.

However, Moscow hopes to split EU resolve on the bloc’s importation of Russian oil and gas, with Hungary and Slovenia looking for exemptions over two years.

The EU depends on Russian gas for 45 percent of its imports and 40 percent of its consumption. Twenty-five percent of oil imports to Europe also come from Russia.

There are doubts, however, about how successful economic pressure on Russia will actually be. To date, Moscow has weathered the litany of embargoes uncomfortably, but resiliently enough.

So what lessons can be learned from Iran, which was brought back to the negotiating table following severe sanctions imposed by the Obama administration in 2011.

The talks between Iran and the P5+1 eventually led to the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement, which allowed Tehran a limited uranium enrichment programme in return for sanctions relief.

Iran has been battle-hardened by various levels of sanctions for over four decades, but how have international sanctions impacted the people on the ground? 

Lawyer, author and Middle East defence specialist Ardavan Amir Aslani tells RFI they have "transformed the daily lives of normal Iranians into hell".

"People have been suffering, unemployment has been on the rise, inflation has been on the rise, and hopes for the betterment of the economy are non-existent," he says.

"However, the government is still in place as strong as ever, and going through this with great degree of ease.

"As history has proven, beginning from the Cuban situation since 1962, sanctions, no matter how severe ... have never resulted in forcing submission upon that sovereign state at hand."

Sanction relief does little to help

And even when sanctions are eased – as with a 2013 interim relief deal for Iran ahead of the final JCPOA agreement – the benefits were "too insignificant and came too late to have any meaningful impact on the economy," Amir Aslani says. 

Yet Iran and its theocratic regime have survived the ebb and flow of international embargoes and ostracisation by Western governments.

So what mechanisms has the country used to circumvent direct access to international markets and finance? Iran, it appears, has become an expert in sidestepping international sanctions.

"They are experts as far as shipping oil internationally through sham corporations that they incorporate on a daily basis," Amir Aslani says.

"Sometimes during the voyage of an oil tanker, they change ownership and the flag of that vessel five times before it reaches its ultimate destination. They know the tricks of the trade."

But ultimately what matters is finding a buyer for sanctioned oil and refined products – the most difficult part. This is as true for Russia as it is for Iran.

For Amir Aslani, people must understand what's happening with regards to the Russian situation.

"It's not the entire world against Russia. It is the OECD – western Europe, Japan, South Korea," he says.

"India, China, a vast majority of Arab countries and Africans are not in love with the sanctions story, which means that they are willing to do business with Russia ... the biggest buyer being China.

"China has been constantly acquiring Iranian oil in substantial quantities over the years."

Investors were prepared

Yet the difference between today's sanctions against Russia and past sanctions against Iran is the speed of their implementation. Also, the Moscow stock market was and is more globally connected than its equivalent in Tehran.

Amir Aslani agrees there are substantial disparities between the two.

"First of all, the Iranian currency has been cut off from the international financial market for four decades. It has been many years that you can't actually transfer any funds to or from Iran – this was not the case with the Russian ruble," he explains.

"The huge difference [with Russia] is that it seems as if the entire investing community was well prepared for imposing these sanctions – as if they were expecting some major invasion, and the corroborating legal documentation for the imposition of sanctions was already in place.

That was a huge mistake for Putin, Amir Aslani adds, because the Russian leader underestimated the West's resolve regarding Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

"He thought that the West would react as they did in 2014 [following the] annexation of Crimea ... this was not the case. And immediately those sanctions were imposed," he says.

That's why Russia is having so much difficulty, and it's why the ruble crumbled.

"The Russian economy is in the process of being totally strangled."

Sanctions have never achieved the their goals

But Europe will end up playing a much higher price for cutting ties with the Kremlin and weaning the continent off its reliance on Russian oil and gas. So, in the mid-to-long term, who will come out on top? 

The Western sanctions playbook seeks to apply targeted measures on elites close to power, freezing financial assets and imposing severe limitations on access to international finance. But how effective was that same strategy in bringing Iran to the negotiating table ahead of the 2015 nuclear deal?

"Not very effective at all" Amir Aslani says. "The [Iran] negotiations have reached a stalemate: the Iranians are not showing up; the Americans are not showing up; the entire operation is in a state of inertia."

This, he adds, is due to the US refusal to remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guards from the foreign terrorist organisation list.

"Nobody seems to be under any particular pressure to push the other one to come to the negotiating table," Amir Aslani says, adding the same is true for Russia.

"This recourse to sanctions is basically something that has never delivered the political results that the opposing countries are looking for."

Consequently, it's the people who suffer on the misguided premise that the population will revolt against the governing authorities because of their hardships.

Iran has gone through this entire process for the last 43 years, yet nothing has happened.

"You've had revolts here and there, but that they haven't managed to destabilise the regime in Iran," Amir Aslani says.

And the same rings true with Russia, he adds, all the more so because the people there are not even inclined to revolt, because they're in agreement with the position of the President [Putin]."

Russia has yet to demonstrate its true power

Initially some pundits said Putin would run out of money after six weeks. Now 13 weeks into the war, Russia shows no sign winding down the conflict in Ukraine. But what other markets can Russia turn to in order to offset the eventual closure of the European market for oil and gas?

Firstly, for Amir Aslani, Russia hasn't even demonstrated its power over the markets.

"We keep on talking about the dependency of Europe to Russian oil and gas – which is a fact – which cannot be replaced overnight," he explains.

Even if you had alternative options, as far as liquefied natural gas is concerned, the countries that are in dire need in eastern Europe don't have the infrastructure for unloading LNG.

France, where energy supply is 70 percent nuclear and 30 percent gas, is not going to be massively impacted. 

"Is that the case of Poland?" asks Amir Aslani. "Is that the case for Germany? If these countries are supposed to be cut off from Russian oil and gas as we get closer to winter six months from now, how are they going to survive?"

He underlines that you can't build an LNG downloading facility in six months. And the power of Russia goes even further than that, by forcing the United States to re-establish relations with a Venezuelan regime it has sought to overthrow since the days of the socialist-populist president Hugo Chavez.

Russia's real power is the repercussions for the global economy of a complete cessation of oil and gas production.

If Russia decided not to export any of its 12 million barrels a day, that would "push the economy of the entire planet into a total recession," Amir Aslani says, pushing the cost of a barrel to more than $300.

"That is the power of Russia that hasn't been utilised," he says, adding the same "mechanism of sanctions busting", and circumventing international sanctions that Iran used will also apply to Russia.

"So is the economy going to go down the drain? Certainly. Will that compel the regime from changing its course? I don't think so."

For Amir Aslani, Putin has two options.

"Either capitulation – that's not going to happen because it's the fall of the Russian regime and the fall of the President of Russia. Or a radicalisation of the regime."

It seems that is what will most likely happen if the existing course of action continues.

Watch full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Steven Helsley and Vincent Pora

Ardavan Amir Aslani is a lawyer, author and Middle East defence expert based in Paris.

As France heads to the polls this Sunday for the second round of the presidential election, with incumbent Emmanuel Macron facing a strong challenge from far-right contender Marine Le Pen, Paris Perspective looks at the rise of populism in France and how it might effect international relations, particularly with the United States. 

Since the beginning of Putin's war in Ukraine, NATO, the transatlantic alliance founded to contain any war on the European continent, has been resurrected as Washington's bulwark against Russian aggression.

Only recently, President Macron called the organisation "brain dead". Le Pen called it a "Cold War relic" and the entire organisation was facing an existential threat until the Ukraine invasion.

Now NATO has invited itself back into the presidential debate, and become a focal point of the foreign policy platforms of each candidate.

If she were to win the French presidency, Marine Le Pen says Paris would repeat France's 1966 move of leaving NATO's integrated military command all while adhering to its key article 5 on mutual protection.

Once the war in Ukraine comes to an end, she says, there should be a "strategic rapprochement" between NATO and Russia.

A French exit would essentially withdraw the only EU nuclear power from the command structure of the US-led military alliance of 30 countries.

State of play between France and the United States

As France looked "across the pond" during the United States 2020 presidential elections, many were expecting a massive re-set in relations between traditional European allies and the White House when Joe Biden beat the mercurial Donald Trump, but that didn’t really happen.

The world looked aghast at Biden's shambolic withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, and France had a diplomatic meltdown in August 2021 when a submarine deal with Australia was undercut by a US-UK nuclear deal, the so-called AUKUS fiasco. 

So eight months later, and a potential reset of France's agenda in the Elysée Palace in play, how do relations stand between Paris and Washington? 

"They're going pretty well in everyone's opinion," says Robert James Oliver, political analyst and active member of Republicans in France.

"Just a few months ago we had the Vice President Kamala Harris visiting Paris. But relationships aren't necessarily between countries as much as they are between the individuals running them. With somebody like Biden he's not all that offensive."

However, the seismic shift in international diplomacy and the rejuvenation of traditional alliances didn't happen, and the last 18 months have seen the Biden administration maintaining the status quo on US foreign policy. 

Oliver says that it's not exactly the status quo inherited from the Trump presidency but the transatlantic relationship is a bit warmer than it was.

"I would say that's because of the personalities that are involved. The United States has come out of a long period of apologising to the rest of the world. People in the US want their jobs back. So they are still "America First" and there are still people who don't believe that they should have to give up everything for for a foreign country."

Despite EU concerns, the USA calls the shots

Despite the shuttle diplomacy prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - spearheaded by President Macron - the European Union was quite unsettled by being side-lined by both Washington and Moscow in the negotiations.

Was that a calculated snub from the Biden administration to the technocrats in Brussels or just normal US foreign policy tactics when dealing with Putin?

Oliver believes it's a little bit of everything. "You have the European Union, which is about 400 million people scattered through 27 states, some sharing a currency, some not. Each state is a sovereign country with its own its own military force - NATO is an amalgamation of them."

"The United States, which is individual states, under one sovereign government under one currency that's guaranteed by the federal government,is different.

"Who guarantees the EU? What is it backed up by? It's the same thing with NATO. What's backing up NATO? NATO is essentially 400 million people in Europe plus 350 million in the United States, with the United States being a far stronger power, with atomic weapons." 

So when it comes to dealing with potential aggressors, Washington will lay claim to have the upper hand in negotiations. 

"NATO was created by the United States so that wars would be contained in Europe," Oliver underlines.

So if France were to pull out of NATO’s military command, as suggested by Marine Le Pen, how would that wash with Washington?

"You mean if France were to pull out again?" Oliver laughs. "And so France is back in NATO. Really? Can we have our next discussion at the French NATO base here in France? Can we have our discussion there? Because I don't think we're going to find it!" 

The political analyst believes that France's role in NATO remains hazy.

"We don't know what kind of a player France is in NATO. They've been very supportive militarily. But in actually stepping up to the plate, that's questionable."

Unlike the Norwegians who are very much involved, and have been since the end of World War Two. 

"I was recently in Norway in September," Oliver explains "and I saw their exercises and what they do. They showed me one of the fjords where they have sonar plates to specifically catch the Russians when they sneak in. So they're a very, very strong ally."

"Today we have this situation where Europe is forced to defend Europe with the backing of NATO once again. But the whole [Ukraine invasion] is backfiring on Putin rather than weakening Europe.

"He's actually strengthened it with countries that never before wanted to be a part of NATO like Finland actually speaking about joining", Oliver says.  

Political repercussions

Following her comments on NATO and her continued Euroskepticism, if Marine Le Pen manages to unseat Macron, how would her rise to power be greeted by the Biden administration?

"I don't know how similar Trump and Le Pen are today! To tell you the truth I'm not sure she will unseat Macron but if she does, you still have a congress, you still have a parliament here in France - a very strong parliament.

"It's doubtful she'll get everything she wishes for, but she will scare the daylights out of people for a while! Her image is not a good one in the world," Oliver asserts.

However, will the rise of far-right populism in France have any effect on the Trumpist factions of US society in the run-up to mid-term elections in November? 

For Oliver you first have to distinguish between the politicians running Washington and the average person in the street.

"When you start to talk about the average guy in the street, they don't know anything about French politics.

"The people on the street understand France from a perspective, when there's an issue of whether France is on our side or not on our side", says Oliver. When France refused to join the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, "there were people in front of the French Embassy on Fifth Avenue, pouring bottles of French wine down the drain. We were laughing with friends while taking a French class then at Alliance Français," quips Oliver.

"These people are so stupid! They already bought the wine, why didn't they just drink it and not buy anymore?"

Any lessons learned from Trump and Brexit?

When it comes to the French electorate, many are asking how the far-right has risen so far in the polls, despite the brutal lessons learned after four years of Donald Trump in the White House. 

For Oliver, a lot of Le Pen's rhetoric is "hot air". Following the lines of Brexiteer Nigel Farage won't work for Le Pen, when she mentions "restructuring" the European Union as an association of sovereign states. 

"We can see the similarities, but will Le Pen actually pull out of the EU?" Oliver questions. 

No matter who wins the election on Sunday, Franco-US relations will remain top of the presidential agenda over the next five years. Oliver says that underlining France's support for the United States remains central to everything, and is more important than France's internal politics. 

"Brexit had no effect on Americans. If you're going to fly on a family vacation to London, you're still going to pay in pounds, whether or not England is part of the EU," says Oliver.

"But NATO would be something Americans would pay a lot of attention to, as they did when De Gaulle took them out in the 1960s. That would be a shock," concludes Oliver. 

And making sure that France and the US are still on the same page when it comes to tackling Russia or any threat to NATO would be paramount. 

Watch full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora and Erwan Rome

Robert James Oliver is a political analyst and active member of Republicans in France based in Paris.

With only a few days to go before approximately 48 million registered voters are invited to cast their ballot in France’s first round of presidential elections, Paris Perspective looks at the polemics that have shaped the campaign trails to date and the probabilities of the outcome of round one on Sunday 10 April. 

In the final days ahead of France's first round of presidential elections, all 12 contenders are tightening their resolve to convince the electorate that their vision of the future is the best for France and its people.

However, both the Right and Left of France’s political spectrum have found it difficult to find a “silver bullet” that can take down Emmanuel Macron’s track record over the past 5 years – like navigating protests, pandemics and Putin – without such criticism blowing up in their face and compromising their campaign.

When the aspirations of political contenders started making the headlines over 6 months ago, there was plenty of chatter about the staging of American-style primaries and open debates to solidify individual candidates' chances. 

Most of the veterans on France's right-wing outright refused to be drawn into what they saw as televised grand-standing, which would be a divisive rather than unifying force.

On the splintered Left, a “People’s Primary” plebiscite held in late 2021 has done more damage than good for the democratic process, let alone France's left-wing, when veteran Socialist minister Christiane Taubira came out on top of the “popular primary”.

However, the directors who organized the process gave their backing to far-left France Unbowed leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon instead, leaving many disillusioned and angry at the whole experiment, begging the question - where will France's Left turn after after the 1st round of the presidentials on 10 April?

No more "American-style" primaries 

First and foremost, says author and political strategist Gérald Olivier, the whole affair has been "the final nail in the coffin of French primaries, that just don't work."

"Primaries are meant for the general population - like a pre-vote before the vote. It may work for the US because of the size of the country and the way parties are structured there, but it does not work here," Olivier explains. 

So what we have seen at the end of this process is a Left which is completely scattered, split and divided. 

For the two front runners on the Left - Socialist candidate Anne Hidalgo and France Unbowed contender Jean-Luc Mélenchon - their combined percentage points have them hovering at 20%, meaning a left-wing candidate in the second round is incredibly unlikely. 

It is true to say, with the benefit of hindsight and empirical knowledge, it is very difficult to unseat an incumbent from office in time of crisis.

So with Macron chairing the EU presidency while the continent is reeling from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent economic fall-out from the conflict, is it a given that the leader of La République en Marche will waltz back into Elysée Palace?

Olivier agrees that this is the outcome most people expect, but it's not a foregone conclusion.

"It's pretty clear that he will be on the second ballot," he says. "And he might be facing Marine Le Pen again. He might be facing Valérie Pécress from Les Républicains ... There was a time when everybody thought that Eric Zemmour was going to be the major surprise of this election [but] I think the conflict in Ukraine brought down his hopes."

The far-right contender held a very positive opinion of Vladimir Putin until the February invasion and has seen his numbers drop in the polls.

In the second round - in a scenario that would play to Macron's advantage - "we might have simply a repeat of 2017," Olivier says, when Le Pen lost the presidency.

Digging for dirt that just won't stick

Emmanuel Macron has been running an extremely short 40-day campaign. The question is whether there is any political ammunition that could be used against the President between now and 10 April and thus could be detrimental to his re-election?

A recent senate inquiry into up to €1 billion of tax payers money being paid to consultancy groups - dubbed "The McKinsey Report" - threatened to rattle the Macron re-election campaign over rumblings that zero taxes were paid on the consultancy groups' earnings. 

"Too little too late," Olivier jibes. "The bottom line is, though these things matter, they might be explored after the vote but it's not going to change [the outcome] of the vote in just 10 days' time."

Many French people are indeed disappointed with Macron, but he holds the advantage of the incumbent.

"He does not need to campaign as the front runner - the other guys need the attention; the other guys need the limelight. All he has to do is hold his ground, and he's holding it very well", Olivier adds.

"Macron is basically waiting to see who he will face for the second ballot, and on the night of 10 April, he will change or adapt his stance according to who that person is.

"But right now, it is running to his advantage for him to be presidential and not to be a candidate, especially in a time of international crisis ... when you look at it, the events of the past few weeks have worked in his favour."

The political price of pro-Putin politics 

The Ukraine crisis has hit the main far-right candidates hard – Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour both caught out by their previous expressions of admiration for Vladimir Putin. Despite recently archived footage of an ebullient Le Pen being given the red-carpet treatment during a visit to the Kremlin, it is Zemmour's standing in the polls that that has been most affected.

According to Olivier, Zemmour's credibility has been "tremendously" impacted.

For Le Pen and Zemmour, they have two messages, says the political strategist: "The number one message is the same: anti-immigration, pro-French identity, pro-security, and they hit the same voters on that line."

When you look at the international politics proposed by Eric Zemmour, he has a vision of a new world order - moving beyond NATO - where Russia would have its place as a legitimate world power and France would be freed from US foreign policy.

"That message was perfectly acceptable until Putin changed the rules", Olivier underlines, reminding the world that he believes violence and military force are the right way to resolve political conflict. 

Putin has crossed a line 'that has not been broken since World War Two. Putin has brought the world back to a Cold War era where it is not acceptable to stand with the bad guy. He's the bad guy," Gérald Oliver asserts. 

War in Europe and the shift in voter priorities

Even for Macron, a reorientation of election campaign priorities has had to be undertaken since his shuttle diplomacy to avoid an invasion of Ukraine ultimately failed.

Keeping in mind that the incumbent's reform plans for his first mandate were derailed by the Yellow Vest protests that were put on hold due to the Covid-19 pandemic, sky-rocketing fuel and energy prices have returned centre-stage due to the sanctions against Russia. 

This, however, is a problem for everyone, says Olivier - not just Macron. 

"His [Macron's] presence is more reassuring and this is something in his favour. But what we can see is the complete change in priorities when you listen to voters.

"All of a sudden, the two priorities that are on people's mind are energy and food.

"Forget the climate, forget global warming, even immigration. Immigration is now number four or number five in voters' priorities, because the war in Ukraine has changed everything," Olivier underlines.

It is curious to say, but for the first time in decades the potential result of a French election could be decided by events outside of France's national borders. Energy autonomy and food security have risen to the top of the electorate's concerns.

"People are worried about having bread", concludes Olivier, "which is something that has been completely unheard for at least for the past eighty years."

Watch full video here

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora, Nicolas Doreau and Erwan Rome

Gérald Olivier is an author and political strategist with the IPSE Institute in Paris

This edition of Paris Perspective looks at the implications of Russia’s decision to invade a neutral, sovereign European democracy, and at the likely impact of Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine on the future of peace on the continent. 

What is Russian President Vladimir Putin's endgame?

From the war with Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the recent suppression of dissent in Belarus and Kazakhstan, the question of President Vladimir Putin's long-term strategy remains open.

Was the decision to invade Ukraine a suddenn reaction to a perceived threat, or part of a well-nurtured plan to reestablish Russia as a global superpower?

Questions have been raised about Putin’s mental state, especially in the wake of the Covid pandemic, which gave many people plenty of spare time to think out their own personal ambitions, dreams and goals. Could the same be said of the man in Moscow?

In the run-up to the 24 February invasion, French president Emmanuel Macron was in the vanguard of European diplomacy with Putin, promising to keep “channels of communication” open with his Russian counterpart.

But was there ever a chance that Macron could have succeeded in mediating with Russia and preventing the invasion, or was it a foregone conclusion that underscored the impotence of the West to engage with Putin?

Lessons from history

For international security consultant Serge Stroobants, we have to consider recent history since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

When we analyse the attitude of the West towards Putin we need to look at the past three decades, and what we allowed the Russian regime to get away with in the realm of international relations.

"For the past four or five years, we have been witnessing a shift from a liberal approach to international relations - where peace is at the heart of economic interconnection. What is at heart of this individual is a more competitive world based on a more offensive approach to international relations," Stroobants asserts. 

"That's an evolution of the past two to three decades. I think the decision to invade Ukraine is something that was always there as an idea that started to crystallise by early September with anew strategic defence pact between the United States and Ukraine."

Western inaction

Indeed, with the permanent support by the European Union and NATO for the self-determination of the Ukrainian people and their political leadership, these are all elements that led to an acceleration of Putin's decision to wage war.

However, there are precedents from the past that could be seen as crucial to Putin's gambit in invading Ukraine, specifically those emanating from the United States. The Obama administration declared the use of chemical weapons in Syria as a line that could not be crossed, yet nothing was done by Washington once chemical weapons were deployed in Idlib province killing dozens of civilians. 

So with Putin's manoeuvres, the West appears to be paying the price for inaction and apathy. 

According to Stroobants, when you look at the narratives that have been used by both President Putin and his foreign ministry to explain why this war is being waged, we hear rhetoric from the Kremlin about Russia's responsibility to protect against the presence of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons.

"We also heard the word 'terrorist' [being used] countering terrorism or a fascist or Nazi regime. A lot of those arguments have also been used in the past 20 to 30 years to start operations in Iraq or in Libya. We're basically getting back the arguments that the West gets a UN Security Council resolution to intervene in countries. And it takes away from the political arguments to refute what Russia is saying today," Stroobants says.

The cost of war

There is of course the question of money to finance the invasion of Ukraine. As Russian troops are being drawn further into a theatre of urban warfare, the financial cost increases exponentially.

Sanctions notwithstanding, Stroobants believes Putin has been looking at Russia's accounts.

"There was about €650 billion ready for him, but with the sanctions that have been imposed, I would say about 80 percent is now frozen somewhere. So he cannot access that anymore.

"After the sanctions have been applied, there is about €30 billion left for him really in cash to use. But what I think we need to look at is the effectiveness of the sanctions on him from a positive perspective, but also from a negative perspective.

"I would say what really struck me in the past weeks, is this self-sanctioning of the private sector, basically disengaging completely from Russia. This has been really hurtful for the economy. 

"But we mostly need to look at the dependency on Russian oil and gas, and coal in Europe. This is still flowing and this exchange is something close to about €700 million a day. So that's also a figure we need to take into account," Stroobants reminds us. 

As the Russian advance and supply trains have been bogged-down over the past 20 days, Russian have relied heavily on missile attacks. If the war continues to be drawn out could the Kremlin resort to a war of attrition?

Again, says the security specialist, we must refer to recent history. "Look at Russian military interventions in Afghanistan in the 80s, but also in Chechnya and in Syria. Basically, this is the worst-case scenario in Ukraine - urban warfare, street by street, house by house.

"For example, we have also looked at spikes in terrorism as a tactic used in an insurgency. We have seen those spikes, after the intervention in Georgia in 2008 and after the taking over of Crimea in 2014," says Stroobants, so we should expect to see a rise in terrorist tactics. 

Ukraine's relationship with the West 

However, there are accusations of hypocrisy against NATO and Europe when one looks at the downfall of the Libyan dictatorship in 2011 and the appeals from Ukraine to implement a no-fly zone. 

The wave of outrage in the West and promises of support for the people of Ukraine has been moving, but in the face of Russian military aggression this has been compared to being the equivalent of sending “thoughts and prayers” after an automatic rifle massacre in the USA, while refusing to repeal gun laws.

Stroobants maintains that two different things need to be taken on board before going that far. 

We need to look at "the collaboration before the conflict and the support within the conflict", he says. 

"In both cases, before the conflict [we had] the Strategic Defence Cooperation with the US. Ukraine is a NATO partner. There has always been an exchange between NATO and Ukraine," Stroobants says.

"Now in the conflict, there is still the support both from the United States but also members of NATO and the EU individually - in a bilateral way - [delivering] lethal and non lethal and logistic support to Ukraine.

This war, however, will not be won militarily and diplomacy will have to prevail, but at what cost remains to be seen.

No matter what the outcome, with Putin still in charge, many analysts are convinced we are going to enter a new Cold War that will be much worse than the previous one. 

Firstly, says Stroobants, we did not start a new opposition.

"The Ukrainian conflict has been going on for a long time. And it's not only Russia. So we clearly see an evolution of two different approaches to international relations, to the norms and values of international relations," he says.

How power is managed in 2022

There are also the different approaches on how counties in the modern world use their power to maximise their influence on other countries or regions.

"That's something that has emerged. Conflicts have multiplied and there has been a definite decrease in levels of peacefulness worldwide."

New blocs are forming, as can be witnessed at the UN General Assembly -  "the good guys, the bad guys and the non-aligned".

But what is really painful for Europe especially is that the economic interdependence that was a guarantee for peace on the continent over the past three decades has now become a liability in a non-peaceful world.

"From my perspective," says Stroobants, "when you see the evolution of the past decades in the lives of peacefulness, what is happening now is the level of civil unrest going up...not to mention the environment or climate change. 

"We are basically entering a new world order that is multipolar, therefore less stable with more competition. And this competition is now at the heart of international relations. And that's something that we need to adapt to."

So those who think that, after Covid, we will just go back to normal life are wrong

"It's Covid along with a lot of other crises," Stroobants concludes, "that have created a new world to which we need to adapt. Those are the difficulties that we are facing at the moment."

Watch full video here

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora.

Serge Stroobants is an international security consultant with the Brussels-based Institute for Economics and Peace

The past decade has witnessed a tsunami of refugees fleeing conflict, making the journey towards Europe in search of a better life. Reaching its peak in 2015, the welcome refugees received was mixed, as fears of Islamist infiltration permeated the anti-migrant debate. The result was a the rise of populist movements across the EU. Paris Perspective looks at exile, Islam and the shifting sands of migration through the prism of political realities, historical truths and contemporary literature.

Migration has become one of the most hotly debated political issues of modern times. From the building of the wall along the US-Mexico border to the razor-wire fences rolled out across Eastern European frontiers, arguments over how a deluge of traumatised migrants will impact the status quo of affluent states have been divisive.

Proponents of the universal declaration of human rights are squarely pitched against a fearful indigenous population who see the influx as an existential threat. 

The fear of radical Islam taking hold in Europe was compounded by a series of terrorist attacks across the continent, one of the most notable being the 13 November 2015 attacks across Paris in which 131 people were murdered. 

So can Islam coexisit in the liberal democracies that emerged from the ashes of World War II? 

The novel Exiles from Paradise explores the confrontation between enlightened Islam and radicalism.

Author Brigitte Adès, who is London bureau chief with Politique Internationale, felt compelled to put pen to paper after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, as Western societies found it difficult to distinguish between radicalised Islamists and the Muslims that have been living in Western counties for generations. 

"I felt that it was very unfair, and it was going to lead to a lot of problems," Adès remarks. "So I thought the best way was to write a story to show their their side of the story, their side of the problem of identity, [what] they feel when they were coming to live here, or were born here."

This sense of "disconnect" is a common thread when looking at integration into European democracies. "They felt neither from there, neither from here," says Adès.

"And they had to find a place in their societies. And our part was very important to play ... our part to actually welcome these people. And so the best way was to get them to be understood. And the best way to do that was to write a novel."

Multi-culturalism and intergration

The key for the author is to make people understand migrants' culture and where they come from.

Exiles from Paradise is a tale of two Franco-Iranian friends, Farhad and Reza, who take diverging interpretations of Islam and the historical divergences the religion has taken. It looks at the challenges of what being marginalised means in a Western society.  

Yet when dealing with migration, France and Britain have two very distinct approaches that have been the subject of debate for decades.  

Multi-culturalism in the UK versus full integration in France. Both models are flawed, but does one system work better than the other?

First and foremost, says Adès, Muslims in Britain are much better off. "I have lived in both countries for a long time," she says "so I see the communities that we create in the UK. [It may be] very comfortable for Muslims, but they feel that they're living in a minute Islamabad.

"They are totally ostracised from the rest of the population. They're tolerated. They're welcome. But they're not integrated. As a result, it leads to problems."

And there is still a discrepancy as to whether the French experience or the UK experience works for Muslims. "It doesn't work very well," Adès asserts.

No matter where you are, the author says, "if you feel that you're completely ignored ... some individuals become totally mad. And they'd rather do bad deeds than [do nothing] at all. And that's what leads to extremism."

Politically liberal, religiously radical?

Adès finds that Muslims in France are much more traditional in their approach to Islam. As a result, integration takes longer because there is a lack of openness.

Speaking anecdotally about a conversation with a Muslim taxi driver in Paris: "He was a very mainstream man. And we're talking about everything. We agreed in a lot of things on politics and international politics.

But when discussing the arrival of an Islamist regime in Pakistan, he believed the implementation of brutal laws made the country better: "He was saying they now the cut off the hands of thieves; they cut the throats of rapists. That's what should be done in France!"

"So you see," Adès continues, "this man who had a fantastic [liberal insight] became very extreme."

Getting to the crux of this duality between modern democracy and radical narratives among Muslims brought Adès into the heart of Islamic communities where the insidious nature of radicalization in ‘normal’ mosques became apparent. 

"I wanted to research about Islam and the way it was preached, because I thought it was cool. And I was in the UK. So I went to a lot of mosques. And I went to bookstores at the mosques," she says.

"I saw that Sunni and Shiite were talking to each other, they were very friendly, and everything was fine. Then I realised that a lot of the books that were there were very subversive.

"There were books about jihad, the fact that you shouldn't be integrating - because if you integrate, you're a bad Muslim - and things that I thought were very subversive because these Muslims are there to stay.

"They have to be integrated, they have to be part of the UK."

She also points to the fact that there are spies in the mosques who report what is being preached to their financial backers. If the "money men" - usually Saudi-linked proponents of Wahhabism - don't like what they hear, the Imam will lose his job. 

Echoes of exile

Brigitte Adès' family history is itself steeped in stories of displacement and migration. So as a French writer and journalist living in London, does she identify as a migrant? 

"I feel like an expat because I feel very profoundly European and French. But it took a while, as I was a third generation Sephardic Jewliving in France.

"The French are very welcoming when people are assimilating, which my grandparents did. But my grandparents were still migrants. My parents were born in France, so they were more ingrained into French system and the culture was totally French.

"We have no idea of speaking Greek - because we came from Rhodes, Greece, but also [going back to] 1492 after Spanish Jews were expelledby Isabella the Catholic." she explains. 

Adès still feels French but is still affected by her family history of exile: "I really feel for these people, I really want them to understand the concept of the society where they are in now. To be able to feel comfortable." 

When it comes to a sense of belonging in France, how does the anti-migrant shift to the far-right in French politics make her feel?

"I'm upset by the way it's using the fear of a migrant invasion to play for their own benefit. And I think it's sad," Adès laments.

"I think it's sad that it works. I see that Brexit occurred because there was this horrible poster pretending that there would be hoards of migrants from Syria - and [Britain] was not even in Schengen. So it was ridiculous that they were doing that but it it worked.

"I think there is a big problem," Adès concludes. "I don't think it's a just and fair game, it's actually dangerous. But it works and that's what I'm upset with, especially someone like Zemmour who comes from an immigrant background himself.

"He's using fear and is pushing the right buttons." 

Watch full video here

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora and Erwan Rome.

Brigitte Adès is the London bureau chief with Politique Internationale and author of “Exiles from Paradise” published in English by Arcadia Books.

It seems that every move Russian President Vladimir Putin makes has Western powers ever more perplexed as to what his intentions are when it comes to Ukraine. As French president Emmanuel Macron embarks on a diplomatic mission to Moscow and Kyiv, Paris Perspective looks at what's at stake amid the standoff between the Kremlin and its Cold War adversaries, and if France can deliver a solution. 

Following a flurry of high-level diplomatic talks throughout January – from Geneva to Brussels, to Vienna and Paris – the meetings achieved next to nothing and Russia continues its military build-up on Ukraine’s eastern border.

This Monday, Macron kicks-off a whirlwind tour of lightning diplomacy to Moscow and Kyiv, playing multiple roles: international mediator, level-headed negotiator and de facto leader of the European Union. 

It's a heavy, hydra-headed performance for even the most seasoned political player in their prime, let alone a 44-year-old rookie looking to secure a second, five-year mandate this April. 

Macron's latest attempts to lower tensions between Putin and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky are, however, consistent with the two main features of French foreign policy since he came to power in 2017.

'Diplomacy of audacity' vs realpolitik

Macron has always argued the European Union should take greater charge of its own defence and security, and has sought to push France forward on the international stage with what he describes as a "diplomacy of audacity".

However, his noble efforts at deal brokering to date have not borne fruit: Libya is still in chaos, Iran continues its uranium enrichment and Lebanon's political system is as byzantine as ever – despite Macron's good intentions. 

Yet with France holding the rotating EU presidency, Macron's diplomatic intervention may pack a bigger punch when he hits the tarmac in Moscow. 

As he wades into the fray, one of the first points of rhetoric to be addressed relates to a 1999 agreement between Russia and Western governments that states that "no country can strengthen its own security at the expense of others".

This is a key issue that Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov maintains is at the heart of the Ukraine crisis, amid Russian fears of Nato expansion. 

Instead of dealing with the EU as a whole, Russia has appealed to individual states who were signatories to the document to test the temperature.

Divide and conquer?

So is Russia actively trying to undercut the European bloc by appealing to individual states bilaterally, in a bid to further divide a fractured Europe? 

Marie Dumoulin director of the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, says Russia's overtures are open to interpretation. 

"Yes, it's probably a way to feed divisions among Western countries, and not only the European Union but all the Western allies. But you also have a very legalistic vision of this [approach].

"These countries signed up to these commitments as OSCE participating states. And the OSCE is not the kind of coherent organisation like the EU or Nato. So it's really as individual states that these commitments have been signed. And that's why he addresses them individually," Dumoulin explains. 

But to counter this rhetoric, the OSCE charter says countries should be free to choose their own security arrangements and alliances. And Ukraine's right to choose whether to join Nato or not is central to the current standoff with Moscow.

Does that not, in itself, undercut any Russian complaints of self-determination when looking for international recognition of Ukraine's separatist regions, such as Luhansk and Donetsk? 

Hypocritical perhaps. Paradoxical? Definitely, says Dumoulin: "Russia is saying you're not respecting this commitment that security should not be guaranteed at the expense of the security of another state.

"But at the same time, Moscow pressures Ukraine and the West by threatening Ukraine's security. So it's doing what it reproaches the West of doing.

"Another paradox is that Russia is appealing to this 1999 OSCE declaration, but at the same meeting, Russia made commitments to withdraw its troops from a number of territories where they are stationed – including Transdniestria and Georgia at the time," Dumoulin underlines. 

Nato in post-Soviet Europe

Ukraine was not of concern when the 1999 accord was signed, but it it can be considered as another example of a "Russian presence" without the compliance of a neighbouring country.

Since the escalation of the latest post-Cold War expansion spat, the finger pointing has gone both ways, with the steady absorbtion of former Soviet states into the military alliance over the past 20 years. 

There is indeed controversy over Nato encroachment into Russia's sphere of influence, says Dumoulin, especially over what promises Nato actually gave Moscow at the time. 

"Russia says there was a clear promise back in the 1990s, that Nato would not expand, and there is this 1997 act and they want to go back to this period.

"At the same time, Nato countries say there was never a clear commitment not to expand and expansion has been also a consequence of Russia's behaviour.

"Neighbouring countries need to have some sort of security guarantees," Dumoulin adds. "And if Georgia and Ukraine want to join Nato, it's precisely because they feel threatened by Russia."

Securing Europe's place at the table

Many of Macron's detractors say the young president is naive about France's status on the international stage, failing to grasp the country's limitations as a middle-ranking world power.

So taking on board what is at the centre of the maelstrom, and the self-righteous interpretations that can be used as ammunition on both sides of the dispute, can Macron's diplomacy prevail where previous negotiations floundered? 

Dumoulin remarks that initially Russia only wanted to deal with the US and wasn't interested in engaging with the EU.

"They didn't want to start or launch new talks in the framework of the Normandy Format, where France and Germany play a mediation role," she says.

"Now, it seems that they have changed their approach and they accepted a first meeting of the Normandy Format in Paris recently ... And definitely Putin has talked to a number of European leaders – among them Macron – with whom he's had regular contact for the last five years."

Since Chancellor Merkel left office, Dumoulin concludes: "Macron is probably one of the European leaders who has the closest relationship with Putin, so he's trying to make use of this relationship, whether it brings added value and allows for de-escalation? It remains to be seen."

Watch full video here

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora and Erwan Rome.

Marie Dumoulin is the director of the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Paris bureau.

With just two months to go before presidential elections in France, the media swingometer continually points to a concrete shift to the right. On this end of the political spectrum, candidates are rallying the electorate with identical battle cries: more security on the streets and playing hard on immigration. Paris Perspective looks into the issues that matter most to the French electorate. 

France is entering into uncharted waters in the run up to April polls, as the intractable power of social networks and the tacit political manoeuvering of media outlets finally catch up with French politics. 

On the face of it, one would be forgiven for thinking the hard-right was comprehensively in the ascendant with tough talk on immigration and security cramming the airwaves, internet and "twittersphere".

With all sides taking stock of the paradigm shift in US politics in 2016, and the vulnerability of the democratic process to cyber-meddling, France is bracing itself for a bumpy ride on the hustings peppered with populism, patriotism and paranoia.   

In these cynical times, no matter what the realities are on the ground, political spin doctors will claim that pre-election polls are open to interpretation and statistics can be manipulated. 

The state of play ahead of the elections

As things stand, if the French were to vote next weekend, President Emmanuel Macron remains solidly in front, hovering around the 25 percent mark.

On his heels are far-right National Rally's Marine Le Pen and the more moderate right-winger Valérie Pécresse, who are both vacillating around 17 percent.

And among the panoply of left-wing candidates, only the far-left firebrand Jean-Luc Mélenchon makes any blip on the radar, but still fails to score double-digits. 

But two months is an eon in politics, as the vice president of pollsters Opinion Way Bruno Jeanbart explains.

"We have to be careful about the data for the moment because we are still far from the election. The closer we are to the vote, the better the polls will be when comparing with the final result," he says.

"Fifty days before the election is too far away to be sure that what is shown by the data is going to be what will will occur at the polling station."

But amid the inevitable campaign-trail cries of "fake news" and "false polls" that the world has become used to since 2016, Jeanbart maintains the statistics are usually sound: "I don't think it's possible [for polls] to be manipulated, but they can be wrong."

Breaking the rules in 2017

In the past, French presidential elections were traditionally quite predictable, with the ultimate dichotomy falling in favour of either the centre-left or the centre-right. But all that changed in 2017, when Macron hit the scene, breaking all the rules. 

To make it to the top in France, says Jeanbart, you routinely needed a history in politics: "You needed to have a long political career, to have been elected before – as a mayor or as an MP – you needed to be supported by a political party."

And none of that was the case for Macron. Jeanbart reckons what happened in 2017 was the consequence of a rejection by the population and voters of the traditional left and right.

And for Macron, a young former investment banker, the political stars aligned in his favour after president François Hollande imploded the traditional left by not standing for a second term, while the centre-right Les Républicains collapsed in the wake of a nepotism scandal that put an end to front-runner François Fillon's political career.

Macron went on to take the laurels for the Elysée Palace, decisively defeating Le Pen in the second round of the presidentials. 

The social divide on France's right

Fast forward to the 2022, where the battle to dethrone Macron is being thrashed-out among the right-wing candidates playing hard-ball with immigration and security portrayed as the pivotal issues.

While Le Pen and Pécresse clamour to win the hearts of both the moderate and more extreme elements of the right, little appears to distinguish the two candidates at first.

The key in distiguishing them, says Jeanbart, is the socio-economic status of their core electorate.

"The difference between Le Pen and Pécresse is the base that they have as voters. Le Pen is very strong with blue collar workers, people with low incomes, low levels of education.

"This is not the case with Pécresse, who is a much more traditional, conservative candidate, strong with white collar workers, people with high levels of education and with older voters.

"Le Pen is much stronger with young voters."

What is Macron's Achilles' Heel? 

And with a solid shift to the right ahead of April's polls, French nationalism is playing its part, as candidates promise a crusade to "clean up" ghettoised areas, reclaim “non-French” neighbourhoods and to reconquer "no-go" zones.

But is that really what scores highest on the agenda for the average French voter?

Jeanbart recognises its importance, but when he looks at the data the most important issue (for now) is purchasing power.

"The increase in prices tops the bill with the French population, followed in second place by the rise in crime," he says. 

"Immigration is fourth. But it shows that traditional right-wing issues are very, very important among the French population, and this explains why we have this high level of voter intentions on the far right.

"Le Pen and Zemmourare both gathering about 30 percent of voters' intentions, which is incredibly high."

Essentially right-wing candidates have taken control of the narrative, concentrating on emotional issues that can be presented as Macron's Achilles' Heel.

"It's more difficult to attack him on the pandemic crisis or the economy," Jeanbart adds. Covid notwithstanding, France has recorded an unprecedented 7 percent growth in its economy, not seen since the end of World War II.

Chaos on the Left works well for the Centrists

One thing that does play in Macron's favour is the disarray amongst France's left-wing parties. 

Despite suggestions of a"grand coalition"regrouping all the Socialist, Communist and Green candidates into a left-wing confederacy, the concept appears to be doomed from the outset. 

"It's mess on the left," with all eight candidates collectively polling an exceptionally low 25 percent. 

"The one thing the left doesn't accept is ... that a strong part of their [voter base] are still voting for Emmanuel Macron."

These were the ones who brought Macron to power in 2017, "and they are still supporting him now".

The best and worst case scenarios for Macron's re-election

But with Macron's first five-year mandate eclipsed by Covid, it was also shaken to its foundations by the Yellow Vest movement, which exploded onto the streets of France over the rising cost of fuel.

From late 2018 until the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, the increasingly violent demonstrations underlined the ever-widening chasm between urban and rural France.

So what is the best case scenario for Macron to regain the confidence of the electorate in 2022? And indeed, what is the worst case scenario for the incumbent? 

Jeanbart maintains the best case is for Macron to maintain the status quo he created that brought him to power, "which is gathering the traditional parties – the centre left and centre right – together."

These voters are the ones who are pro-European, pro-business and who will stand with him in the face of rising populism.

Securing a second round run-off against Le Pen is the best way to present himself as 'the reasonable candidate against the populist".

The worst case scenario is that Pécresse beats Le Pen in the first round of the presidential election, and qualifies for the run-off against Macron. 

"If she gets in on the second round, she has a pretty good chance of beating Macron," Jeanbart says.

Macron is in a strange situation as an incumbent, he adds, with very strong support from a small base of 25 to 30 percent of the population. "But also a lot of people hate him."

If Pécresse makes it to the second-round, Macron will lose a lot of votes – not because the far-right is convinced by Pécresse," says Jeanbart, adding they think she's too moderate.

"They would prefer Pécresse rather than see Macron re-elected for a second term."

Watch full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Cécile Pompeani and Erwan Rome.

Bruno Jeanbart is the vice president of Opinion Way, a research and polling agency based in Paris.

France has taken over the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the first time in 13 years. Under a banner of "relaunch, strength, belonging", President Emmanuel Macron will have to find common ground across the 27 member states on several key issues. Paris Perspective looks at what France will put on the table between now and the end of June.

France took over the revolving presidency on 1 January with a great deal of fanfare by the Macron administration and discussion in the French media.

As a founding member of the European Union, France could be forgiven for taking the 2022 chairmanship of the bloc with resolve, as Paris comes to the table with a packed agenda, ranging from a plan for a common policy on migration and a strategy to deal with sabre-rattling Russia.

It also aims to regulate digital platforms and develop a common EU approach to post-pandemic economic recovery.

All of this provides a showcase for Macron's leadership in an election year. 

Finding consensus among a divided Europe is key to the success of France's six-month mandate.

After Germany's Angela Merkel stepped down from her role as chancellor and the EU's de facto leader after 16 years in office, the limelight is now set on Macron to step up to the plate. 

But can the French President match Merkel's talent for compromise and concession on an EU level, while avoiding potential criticism for using the EU presidency for national political gain?  

"First of all ... this presidency in an electoral context is detrimental for Europe," says Yves Bertoncini, president of the Movement-Européen France and former director of the Jacques Delors Institute in Paris.

"It should have been avoided ... but Macron decided to maintain [the election] calendar."

According to Bertoncini, holding the EU presidency in an election year means Macron will become a target when it comes to European affairs.

"Even if he does positive things, he will be negatively targeted by his opponents." 

Finding an elusive consensus on migration 

Even so, the French presidency of the European Union is an opportunity for France to set the agenda on crucial issues such as migration, an issue that Paris has put at the top of its agenda with a view to getting eastern European and Mediterranean countries on board with a common policy.

Many of the so-called "front line states" who bore the brunt of the 2015 migration tsunami from the Middle East and North Africa feel abandoned by Brussels, and have expressed their anger at the ballot box, giving rise to populist, anti-EU administrations. 

Ahead of 1 January, Macron met with Hungary's ultra-nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Budapest to test the temperature with his political opponent. So, can the EU under France's guidance find common ground with Orban on migration?

For Bertoncini, the main issue is one of perception: "For some Europeans, migrants are victims – to be backed and to be welcomed. Not all of them, but some of them.

"For Orban and some other leaders, migrants are threats. So as long as you have such a divide in the perception of the migrants, it's very difficult to find a common ground except on the fact that you need to control the external borders of the Schengen area," he says.

"So on this at least you can have consensus in Europe, including between Macron and Orban.

"However, once you take back control of the flow of migration and accept the migrants on Europe soil, the divide still remains. 

"The new coalition in Germany is open to migration. Orban remains very opposed, because for him, it's a political trick. The reality is that no migrants want to settle in Hungary, but it's in his interest is to show that there might be an invasion and I'm afraid that France is caught in the middle."

Coordinated European defence strategy

Another concern at the top of France's EU to-do list is European defence as the spectre of a Russian invasion of Ukraine – and a direct confrontation with the West – looms large over the geopolitical landscape. 

The last time France held the rotating EU presidency in 2008, the agenda was dominated by relations with Russia over its intervention in the Georgian province of South Ossetia and subsequent conflict with Tblisi.

With all the preparation France has put into setting the programme during its tenure of the presidency, is there a possibility the schedule could be derailed by Moscow's machinations?

Bertoncini says that even if you have a consistent, water-tight programme set for the EU presidency, realpolitik could push everything in another direction. 

"It's difficult to predict. For Sarkozy back in 2008 it was a presidency struck by crisis – the global economic and financial collapse, the invasion of Georgia plus the constitutional 'No' in a referendum in Ireland – so you never know exactly what might happen."

To date, Macron has had to face the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. If Russian aggression comes to the fore in the coming weeks, he will also have to face that too and find an EU common stance against Moscow, in tandem with the United States.

Bertoncini points out that a common European defence strategy has been a holy grail in France in past four decades. This policy even goes back as far back as the time of General De Gaulle. 

"Macron has made the right moves recently to show that we need to try and have a more conceptual European approach [to common defence], but with the Americans – even more precisely with Nato."

A Nato summit is set to be organised at the end of this spring. This means that as France concludes its presidency of the EU, Macron will be able to say that he has at least made the effort. 

Watch full video here

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora and Erwan Rome.

Yves Bertoncini is president of the Movement-Européen France and former director of the Jacques Delors Institute in Paris.

France's influence in the Indo-Pacific came under the spotlight this autumn when a Franco-Australian submarine contract was dropped by Canberra in favour of a security alliance between the US, UK, and Australia: AUKUS. This edition of Paris Perspective looks at France's overtures towards allies in its former colonial neighbourhood and the state of relations between Paris and Beijing.

The poor handling of the AUKUS submarine deal in September left France clutching at straws when it came to asserting its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

China called the US-UK-Australian security pact “irresponsible". Since then, France has been making diplomatic overtures to other regional powers - such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Korea - to push for more influence.

For Antoine Bondaz, research fellow with the Strategic Research Foundation in Paris, you have to look into the history of France's pivotal role in the Pacific that still endures today to understand its current position. 

"I think it's very important to remind everyone about French interests in the region. France is not an observer in the Indo-Pacific. France is a resident power," Bondaz says.

"We have more than 1.7 million French people living on French overseas territories, from Réunion Island to French Polynesia.

"It [represents] more than 92% of the special economic zone and maritime domain of France and we have more than 7,000 soldiers permanently deployed in the region."

According to Bondaz, when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, France's role is about sovereignty not just business or cultural interests. 

France's strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Yet following the very public diplomatic meltdown among regional allies that came in the wake of the AUKUS pact, many observers found it difficult to pin down France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific and how Paris plays off Beijing when trying to counter China's passive-aggressive dominance in its traditional sphere of influence. 

"France decided to lay out its Indo-Pacific strategy a few years ago in 2018, when President Macron visited Australia," Bondaz explains. "And that strategy was very security and defence focused. 

"That explains why [France's] ministry of the armed forces in 2019 were the first ministry to release its own Indo-Pacific strategy - it was a security strategy."

Then, between 2019 and 2020, says the researcher, that strategy diversified to include business interests, cultural interests and global interests.

The whole initiative was updated and presented in July of this year focusing much more on trade relations. 

The AUKUS bombshell landed just one month later.

So has the US-UK-Australian security deal called into question the whole structure of France's Indo-Pacific strategy?

No, says Bondaz: "It forces France to be clear and recalibrate. Australia was one of the three key strategic partners with France in the region along with India and Japan.. 

"Australia is no longer a strategic partner. Relations have deteriorated to an all time low and [that's] not going to change in the foreseeable future."

According to Antoine Bondaz, every cloud has a silver lining and the AUKUS deal made France rethink its strategy, reach out to other Indo-Pacific countries.

"We're not going to leave the Pacific," he says. "We're still going to keep the Indo-Pacific strategy, but it's going to evolve a little bit."

The diplomatic dance between Paris and Beijing

When it comes to China, France has been running with the hare, and chasing with the hounds. Paris might have taken a firmer stance with Beijing recently, but France also needs to cooperate with China regarding the Paris Climate agreement, protection of biodiversity, and reform of the World Trade Organisation.

So where do things stand when it comes to direct relations between Paris and Beijing?

"It's ambiguous," says Bondaz. "French diplomats would call it tri-dimensional. The idea from a European view is that China is both a cooperation partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.

"It means that we are fully aware that we have to cooperate with Beijing on many issues from climate change to preventing the next pandemic," he adds. 

Engagement with China "disappointing"

However, relations are always complicated between any EU state and China as all players have to try and balance their relationship with Beijing. 

When Macron was running for the presidency, he had two priorities: "The first was torebalance economic relationswith China that are very unbalanced with huge trade deficits," Bondaz says, adding that very little has been achieved on that front, apart from the lifting of a beef embargo.

The second dimension was climate change.

"Some might say that, thanks to France, China stayed in the Paris agreement," quips Bondaz. But it’s not because of France - it's because the US under the Trump administration pulled out of the climate deal, giving China a more vested interest in staying wtihin the Paris Agreement.

But for Bondaz, the results of Franco-Chinese relations since the beginning of Macron's presidency have been mixed "and a little disappointing."

Watch full video here.

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Cécile Pompeani and Erwan Rome.

Antoine Bondaz is a research fellow at the Strategic Research Foundation in Paris.

The transatlantic friendship is still on shaky ground almost a year after Joe Biden swept to power with the promise of stamping out four years of vitriol from the Trump presidency. Paris Perspective probes why the Franco-US honeymoon was so quickly extinguished, and what steps are being taken to repair the centuries-old alliance.

During a time when new alliances and friendships are being forged, France feels it’s losing out, explains former US diplomat William Jordan, now based in Paris.

Complicated post-Brexit British ties with the EU, Australia's stunning about-face over a lucrative submarine deal and the US's desire to also build up strategic partnerships with other countries has created a geopolitical jigsaw that's making it hard for France and the US to find the pieces that will enable them fit comfortably in the bigger picture.  

When France recalled its ambassador from Washington after Australia dumped Paris in favour of a three-way submarine defence deal with the US and Britain, Biden was quick to dispatch Vice President Kamala Harris to the French capital to hurriedly work things out.

Pulling out the ambassador was a dramatic move, and the first time France had done so in its 243-year frienship with the United States.

While the Harris visit was an important first step, the "subgate" betrayal – which France unequivocally descibed as a "stab in the back" – is still far from forgotten, Jordan told RFI.  

"They [Harris and Macron] met in the met in Rome at the G20, and it was very clear that the French position was to make the Americans grovel a little bit more," he says.

"But what I've heard from the American embassy here, is that everybody believes the visit by Kamala Harris was positive.

"If an American official visits Paris, participates in all the meetings, sticks to predictable talking points, doesn't sulk and doesn't refuse to attend certain things because they're afraid they're going to be beaten up by all the other participants ... well, then it's a success."

Rival pact

Australia, the US and Britain this month formally embarked on their controversial deal, the AUKUS security alliance, to equip Australia's navy with nuclear-powered submarines. 

France remains infuriated by the secretive way in which the three countries collaborated to ditch the French deal to supply Canberra with traditional diesel-powered submarines.

AUKUS allows for the exchange of sensitive "naval nuclear propulsion information" between Australia, the US and Britain in a bid to confront strategic tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Biden has admitted that AUKUS was handled clumsily and "was not done with a lot of grace". 

For its part China, has called the agreement “extremely irresponsible”.

New alliances?

In response to the switch of allegiances in the Indo-Pacific, France has also shifted its focus. Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian paid a two-day visit to Indonesia to follow up on a defence deal and the sale of 36 Rafale jets.

Paris is seeking to strengthen its ties in the region via high-level meetings in countries ranging from Japan to India and Vietnam. When listing regional allies ahead of the Jakarta trip, Le Drian made sure not to count Australia among them. 

Yet when it comes to facing down China, French policy in the Indo-Pacific is "ambiguous, to say the least", says Jordan.

"The French made a big deal [on the internet] about having sent a nuclear submarine on a worldwide patrol that included going through some of the disputed waters in the South China Sea."

However, every time the US has tried to get France and other European countries on board against China, the reaction has been uneasy.

The big question, says Jordan, is to what extent is France plans to go it alone.

"Is this going to be woven into some larger Western initiative?" he asks.

"And if that's the case, where exactly does Europe as a whole fit in? Because at the moment, the last thing one can say about Europe is that it has a cohesive, coherent or consolidated policy."

Filling the Merkel void

Indeed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the way out, Europe finds itself with no collective leadership.

For the Biden administration, Jordan says, the EU has to "get its act in order", adding there wasn't much enthusiasm for French President Emmanuel Macron to step into Merkel's role as de facto head of Europe.

"What we're seeing here is the defining of a post-Brexit Europe. Britain used to play an important role in the past, and is now no longer part of it," Jordan adds.

It's a pivotal time for Europe, and for the US as Biden makes decisions on how to deal with Nato – an alliance that faces challenges of its own – as well as China, Russia and Ukraine.

When Biden said America was "back", it was thought that he would take steps to restore ties with America's longtime partners.

"That hasn't happened," Jordan says. "Washington is looking for European leadership, and trying to find out who to engage with."

The Russian challenge, however, underscores that for the last 15 to 20 years, Nato is no longer the greatest alliance that ever existed. 

With Russian troops reported to be amassing on the border with Ukraine, the role of Nato and how the alliance stands to shape transatlantic ties will be significant. This will be particularly important given the Soviets had long sought ways to sow division among Nato allies, Jordan adds.

"The short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles were only for use against Europe," he says. And having risen through the ranks of the KGB during the Cold War, Vladimir Putin has a lot more levers at his diposal that the Europeans do to fight back. 

"[Putin's] looking to see how far he can push things. And is the West prepared to go into a hot war on behalf of a country that isn't part of Nato?" 

Unlikely. 

Despite drawing a line in the sand regarding the integrity of Ukraine during a recent telephone conversation with Putin, Macron has more pressing issues on the home front as France gears up for presidential elections in April 2022.

To be continued.

Watch full video here

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey

Recorded and edited by Thibault Baudel

William Jordan is a former US diplomat based in Paris and president of the Association of Americans Resident Overseas.

High-end goods are more than fancy purses and jewellery. They're a powerful diplomatic tool and an instrument of soft power that contributes to the international reach of world powers. With France's "great houses" leading the aristocracy of luxury, Paris Perspective looks into the actions and strategies employed by luxury brands in promoting their countries of origin. 

From time immemorial, the use of luxury goods in diplomacy has been an essential part of relationship and nation building.

Be it vassal kings paying tribute to their feudal overlords, or impressing guests at a political fundraiser with champagne and caviar, luxury has been an essential tool in winning over adversaries and flattering allies. 

In this era of globalisation, the political power of luxury has geopolitical repercussions. Brands that constitute the essence of luxury have been resilient to crises through the decades and centuries. 

More recently – between the 2008 global economic collapse to the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic – luxury goods have taken a short term hit, but almost instantly rebounded to pre-crisis levels of consumption.

This is because luxury is not just a tangible extravagance, but also a state of mind, says Bruno Lavagna, a consultant who specialises in the geostrategy of luxury.

"One of the main characteristics of luxury is that whether we are confronted by climate change, wars, natural catastrophes – luxury is always there whether you are rich or poor," Lavagna said.

Everyone needs luxury he adds. "After a crisis, after a pandemic, after a war, you will go back to luxury – whatever that might be."

It might take the form of an item from a fancy brand, or a dream to be realised. 

'Ambassadors' and the diplomatic lexicon

And it's through this quest for a dream within the so-called “great houses” like Louis Vuitton and Chanel, that a lexicon has emerged rich in diplomatic vocabulary.

Luxury “ambassadors” are appointed, representing the "national spirit" of a brand, expanding a country's international reach through a luxury commodity. As such, the use of diplomatic jargon is hardly a coincidence.

"Not at all," says Lavagna, who is also the founding director of the Be.Exclusive consultancy in Monaco.

"Beginning with my own story. I've been working in the luxury businesses for more than 35 years. And I have very [specific] geographic and historical roots, speaking English, German, Italian, of course, and French.

"When you travel, when you go abroad, you need to discover, you need to understand. As luxury is a global phenomenon, the diplomatic echoes resonate within it."

By 2021, Asia has become the epicentre of the luxury market, with China accounting for 40 percent of the world's 450 million global luxury consumers.

But as Beijing seeks to dominate the new silk routes under its colossal Belt and Road project, important questions are raised.

Have the “great houses” questioned the authoritarian approach of leader Xi Jinping? 

Do the affluent brands of status and style offer any response to rights abuses in Xinjiang, military expansionism in the South China Sea or the contentious status of Taiwan?

Perhaps the Chinese market is too important to the "purveyors of dreams" to rock the political boat.

"Don't forget that there are 1.4 billion Chinese living in a world of seven billion people," Lavagna says. "That means China will be everywhere."

Even during the pandemic when the Chinese market was closed, they still bought luxury goods because there was a hunger and desire to buy.

Yet, when it comes to the politics of Beijing, it would appear the big brands are resigned.

"Back to the attitude of human beings. We are very selfish and very proud. So, each people, each nation wants to show off and sell."

And China is the factory of the world. 

The rise of China as the world's largest consumer of luxury goods has been good for France, which remains the leader in luxury brands.

 The 'French Touch' 

French companies account for six of the top 10 “houses” with Louis Vuitton at No.1, valued at €47.2 billion, followed by Chanel at €37 billion.

Italy’s Prada at No.10 is a "lowly" €3.5billion.

Lavagna explains why the “French Touch” has resonated so persistently across the globe. 

"French history is so strong, so powerful that to be proud of our French identity, years ago the French government promoted the savoir faire,le talent in different areas. Architecture, Chateau de Versailles, Louvre, the way of eating – gourmet – champagne, drinking … So everything."

In fact, it all goes back to the Sun King, Louis XIV, whose expansion of the Chateau de Versailles under the financial guidance of Jean-Baptiste Colbert established the economic model of importing cheap raw materials, and converting them into coveted, luxury items through French savoir faire.

Fast forward 350 years – from the Sun King's reign to the G7 meeting of world leaders – and host French President Emmanuel Macron in Biarritz used the gathering of the world's most powerful players as an opportunity to showcase French produce and know-how.

Lavagna believes this national grandstanding of opulence and "art de vivre" become the norm when nations host the G7 gatherings, adding that Macron's move to hold the G7 in the Basque resort town of Biarritz was very clever.

"We don't always need to put Paris or Versailles in the spotlight. It could have been another city [other than Biarritz] but it's a part of French history ... it showed that France has a very different landscape," he says.

Reinventing luxury amid climate change

When it comes to the gatherings of the "great and good", protests on the inequities of the modern world are sure to follow to highlight the impact of climate change, environmental degradation and collapsing biodiversity. 

With these challenges at the fore of modern political debate, what lies ahead for the use of luxury as a geopolitical tool? How have the “great houses” adapted to the next generation’s demand for sustainability and ethical production?

Critics maintain that any moves by high-end brands to move towards carbon neutrality or reduce environmental impact has been done in the name of upholding the image of luxury brands. 

Lavagna remains sanguine on the issue. "You try, right?" Yet the success of brands can also hold them to ransom. 

"It's what's called mass prestige," says Lavagna. "If you're successful, you produce more, you sell more. But in the end, everybody has the same items, so it's no longer a luxury."

The next generation

In the future, luxury brands have to be very clever, show restraint and get back to their roots.

"Luxury is not perfect, nobody's perfect. But luxury brands have the money and the power to incite a revolution from the inside," Lavagna says.

"The climate change youth generation is right to ask for a more responsible environment and less of a footprint. But don't forget that luxury brands came from nature when the maitre d'art transformed [raw materials] into food, clothes or fragrances.

"So it's time to get back to nature."

Watch full video here.

Written, produced & presented by David Coffey

Recorded, mixed and edited by Cécile Pompeani and Nicolas Doreau

Bruno Lavagna is a consultant in luxury geostrategy and the founding director of 'Be.Exclusive' based in Monaco.